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Chapter 1
Introduction
Armed groups are a constitutive element of intrastate political conflict. Their internal organiza-
tion, their goals, and the means of violence at their disposal strongly influence conflict dynamics.
Recent examples include the rise and advance of the so-called ‘Islamic State’ in Syria and Iraq, the
peace process between the Colombian government and the ‘Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo’ (FARC), or the defeat of the ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’
(LTTE) in 2009.
Despite the pivotal role of armed groups, actions taken amid conflict can always be attributed
to individuals. This is most evident in cases where few commit large-scale attacks such as in
the 2016 bombings in Brussels, but also applies more generally. In the end, it comes down to
individuals who behave in certain ways; who, for instance, voice specific demands or operate the
trigger of a gun.
Although the practice of ascribing agency to groups is widespread in media and research
alike, group agency is a phenomenon that has astonishingly aroused very little academic interest.
One reason for this might have to do with the widespread focus on more practical issues, such as
the collection of quality data or the development of highly specialized statistical models to make
sense of it. Top journals dedicated to the study of intrastate conflict only seldom publish articles
that lack an empirical analysis of a highly specific question. This has pushed more foundational
issues of ontology and theory development into the background. We might attribute this to the
growing maturity of the field: Having left issues of ontology behind, research can now dedicate
efforts to developing and applying sophisticated methods to complement our understanding of
the various specific phenomena related to intrastate conflict.
The present analysis argues that contemporary conflict research is not as mature as it may
appear. The empiricist philosophy of science, in which most current conflict research is rooted,
does not provide a solid foundation for applied empirical research. Rather, many of its basic
assumptions are probably wrong. Conflict research can thus greatly profit from taking a step back
and investigating what exactly contemporary methods presuppose in terms of ontology.
The main aim of the current analysis is to place the study of political conflict upon a sound
footing. Departing from the position of critical realism in the philosophy of sciences, a comprehen-
sive analysis of social ontology, and a close examination of existing research, the present analysis
brings forward new concepts of political conflict and non-state conflict actors and argues in favor
of more rigorous theoretical reasoning.
The second part of the present analysis focuses on a phenomenon, which—in light of the state
of research—appears most relevant to the study of intrastate conflict: Non-state conflict actors. On
grounds of the social ontology developed in the first part, the second part specifically addresses
what non-state conflict actors are, how and under what circumstances they emerge, and how they
act. The analysis shows that under certain circumstances our intuitive tendency to ascribe agency
to collectives is justified.
In demonstrating how the occupation with philosophy of science, social ontology, and the-
ory is of immediate value for empirically-oriented research, we put the entirety of its developed
concepts to use. This analysis presents original data on intrastate political conflict and non-state
conflict actors in Asia and Oceania as well as makes use of geographically disaggregated data on
socio-economic, demographic, and geographical structures. Testing the developed theory in a sta-
tistical analysis illustrates that the path pursued does not result in a completely different style of
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research that loses all points of contact with current research practices. In contrast, it aims to show
that an explication of often-implicit ontological assumptions can contribute to our understanding
of intrastate political conflict.
1.1 Recent Advances in the Study of Intrastate Conflict
Given the empirical prevalence and policy relevance of intrastate conflict it is not surprising that
academic research has gone to great lengths to explain its causes and dynamics. These efforts
have led to notable advances in recent years. Specifically, two trends are discernible that pertain
to the availability and precision of data and the investigation of the causes of intrastate conflict
(Cederman and Gleditsch 2009; Gleditsch, Metternich, and Ruggeri 2014; Wencker, Trinn, and
Croissant 2015).
A first trend is the improvement of the tools of measurement. As a result, the amount of in-
formation on conflictive processes has increased at an enormous pace. This is reflected in an ex-
tension of the empirical scope of conflict databases. Since its origins in the work of Wright (1942),
Richardson (1960) and the Correlates of War Project (Singer and Small 1972; Small and Singer
1982) which mainly focused on highly-violent conflicts, the view has since then been broadened
to include conflicts below the level of war (Themnér and Wallensteen 2014; Wallensteen and Ax-
ell 1993) and non-violent campaigns (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). The Minorities at Risk Project
(Gurr 1993, 2000) has collected data on ethno-political conflicts. Conflict research in Heidelberg
has added data from a more qualitative-oriented perspective (Croissant, Schwank, et al. 2009;
Croissant and Trinn 2009; Croissant, Wagschal, et al. 2010; Pfetsch 1991a; Pfetsch 1991b, 2001,
2006; Pfetsch and Billing 1994; Pfetsch and Rohloff 2000a,b; Rohloff 2007; Schwank 2006, 2007,
2012; Schwank and Trinn 2010). This improvement is part of a greater development. Going be-
yond a country-year perspective on conflicts, researchers recently localize conflicts more precisely
than ever before. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Georefer-
enced Event Dataset (GED) have pushed the boundaries of data precision by collecting event
data (Buhaug 2010; Buhaug and Lujala 2005; Raleigh and Hegre 2010; Schrodt and Hall 2006;
Sundberg and Melander 2013). In a similar move, a recent fundamental revision of the definition
and measurement strategy of the Heidelberg approach has recently increased the spatiotempo-
rally resolution of its data (Schwank, Trinn, and Wencker 2013; Trinn 2015; Wencker, Trinn, and
Croissant 2015). Disaggregation has likewise improved our understanding of actors in intrastate
conflicts. One focus has been to refine our knowledge about the geographic location of ethnic
groups (Cederman, Buhaug, and Rød 2009; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Weidmann, Rød,
and Cederman 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Another focus lies on a more detailed
analysis of dyadic configurations and more precise data on non-state conflict actors (Cunning-
ham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009b; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Gent 2011; Salehyan, Gleditsch,
and Cunningham 2011).
Evidently, the increase in data availability has not been restricted to the field of conflict re-
search. More and more information on economic, societal, and political systems has become
available. This has led to a second trend: The analysis of a large variety of explanatory variables
with predominantly quantitative methods. With regard to the explanation of the onset, incidence,
recurrence, and duration of conflict, researchers have examined almost every conceivable phe-
nomenon of reality reasonably connectable to intrastate conflicts: From immanent characteristics
and dynamics of conflicts to the political, socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic struc-
tures of the affected countries and their neighbors, and from the attributes of individual leaders
and of non-state groups to the international system (Dixon 2009; Newman and DeRouen 2014).
Although the debate is far from settled, a consensus with regard to at least some explanatory
factors has emerged. Among them are unsurprising factors such as population size and recent
conflict but also unstable and weak state institutions, a large dependency on oil exports, and the
existence of horizontal inequalities.
1.2 Shortcomings and Aims
In spite of these impressive improvements with regard to data and analysis, four significant short-
comings remain. The first two shortcomings are more general in nature and pertain to the con-
cepts that underlie empirical research and the formulation of theory. The latter two shortcomings
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relate to our understanding of the processes leading to the emergence of intrastate violent conflict
and our understanding of conflict dynamics.
A first shortcoming relates to the concepts that underlie data collection projects. The recent
debate has been concerned mainly with the collection of quality data and measurement issues
(Salehyan 2015; Spagat et al. 2009; Weidmann 2014b). As important as these considerations are,
what scholars refer to is only the tip of the iceberg. The debate is primarily concerned with op-
erational definitions, i.e. detailed measurement strategies, that provide the tools for measuring
the object under investigation. What such definitions do not tell us, however, is what the object
is. In other words, real definitions are needed. Developing reliable indicators is evidently an im-
portant task. Nevertheless, it is only a second step in complete conceptualizations of empirical
phenomena. Equally important is to specify the ontology of political conflict. This is even more
true considering we know from Sambanis (2004) that underlying concepts affect causal inference.
While data collection has progressed significantly, definitional, operational, and empirical dis-
agreements between data projects remain. This tension among datasets makes it necessary to
investigate the nexus between data and the multifaceted reality, which is provided by concepts.
If ontological core characteristics are left out of conceptualizations, there is no way to assess the
validity of indicators. In this perspective, the current evaluation of data collections has lost sight
of a pivotal issue.
This shortcoming applies, a fortiori, to the concepts and data projects on non-state conflict
actors (NSCA). Although the apparent surge of intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War
has led to a better recognition of the role of non-state actors in conflicts, conflict actors have at-
tracted far less attention than conflict measures to date. As a result, most definitions underlying
quantitative research on conflict actors remain shallow due to the needs of coding reliability and
the amount of data to be processed (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009a; Harbom and
Sundberg 2009; Pearlman and Cunningham 2012). Rather than discussing constitutive attributes
of non-state actors, existing research primarily focuses on indicators and works with operational
definitions. Consequently, causally relevant properties such as regulative processes within actors
remain poorly understood.
While quantitative research often lacks elaborated concepts and can be criticized for a one-
dimensional focus on measurement, qualitative research seldom fulfils the prerequisites for com-
parative analyses. Qualitative researchers usually focus on single or few NSCAs and characterize
these in greater depth, e.g. by analyzing dynamics within non-state actors or focusing on charac-
teristics of individual members (cf. Dudouet 2012; Gates 2002; Harpviken 2013; Humphreys and
Weinstein 2008; Weinstein 2007). Typical research methods comprise interviews and field studies.
Since qualitative research typically involves rich descriptions of few cases, it often lack universal
definitions and quantifiable indicators. There exists no single conceptualization and operational-
ization which is suitable for quantitative and qualitative research alike, i.e. which convincingly
combines a valid and concise definition with a conceptualization suitable for extensive compari-
son.
We can thus conclude that data availability on intrastate conflict, conflict actors, and explana-
tory variables has greatly increased and has improved our understanding of conflict dynamics.
At the same time, however, most definitions of political conflict and conflict actors lag behind this
level of sophistication. Rather than discussing constitutive attributes, existing research primarily
focuses on indicators. From this derives the first aim of the present analysis: The first aim of the
present analysis is to provide definitions of ‘political conflict’ and ‘non-state conflict actor’ that go beyond
immediate observables. Both concepts should offer a systematic hierarchy of attributes and indicators and
thereby offer a solid point of departure for the development of theories and measurement strategies.
Closely related to the first shortcoming, there exists a second one with regard to the construc-
tion of theories. It is deeply linked to the dominance of the empiricist paradigm in conflict research
as described by Newman and DeRouen (2014, p. 4):
Since the 1990s civil war studies has been driven by empirical, especially quantitative, approaches, which
reflect a growing concern with methodological rigor and testable hypotheses. According to the positivist
empirical approach, scholars can generate rigorous explanatory theory through observation and testing on
a range of questions related to the causes and the nature of civil war. The quantitative and econometric
approaches are at the heart of this academic renaissance and some of the key debates in civil war studies
have reflected this approach.
At first glance, this does not seem to pose a problem. And it is certainly true that careful ob-
servation based on reliable indicators is of utmost importance for successful empirical research.
However, the lack of adequate concepts and the one-dimensional focus on methods rather than
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the ontological underpinnings of our investigations leaves current conflict research rather theory-
deficient.
The most frequently cited article in the study of intrastate conflict provides an example of a
theorymerely reduced to catchwords. Based on regression analysis of more than ten highly aggre-
gated proxy variables, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that the conditions that favor insurgency—
for instance, the weakness of government institutions, the possibility to hide, or foreign support—
have the greatest explanatory value pertaining to the onset of civil war. The grievancemechanism,
on the other hand, is dismissed as an unlikely cause for civil war.1 This finding is based on an anal-
ysis which features a tremendous gap between highly aggregated data on structures (macro-level)
and the theoretical arguments referring to individuals (micro-level) or groups (meso-level). Aside
from the fact that the theoretical and empirical foci do not match, the different levels of analysis
remain poorly defined and relations between levels are not adequately discussed. Moreover, the
possible interplay of seemingly rival mechanisms is only poorly addressed. It is not necessarily
either grievance-inducing factors or conditions that favor insurgency which explain the onset of
civil war. These shortcomings are a direct result of a lack of clarity with regard to levels of analysis
and causal processes.
It is true that the gap between theoretical and empirical foci is closing due to more disaggre-
gated data. However, despite progress with regard to the formulation and empirical testing of
micro-level mechanisms (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; cf. Weidmann 2014a), current research
remains theory-deficient. It suffers from what Sørensen (1998, p. 238) observed with regard to
sociology in general:
“There has been enormous progress in what we can do with data, and in the sophistication of mathematical
and statistical tools (...). Nevertheless, quantitative sociology remains very theory-poor. In fact, the main-
stream has regressed rather than progressed.”
Piling up empirical evidence in these variable-centered approaches or ‘garbage-can regressions’
(Achen 2005), conflict research is in danger to lose sight of more general discussions of theoretical
approaches. What is missing is a comparative approach that focuses not only on measurement,
but also on theory. From this derives another aim of the present analysis: The second aim of this
thesis is to systematize, clarify, and criticize existing explanatory approaches of the onset of intrastate
political conflicts.
The two shortcomings described thus far are rather general. They are, however, related to two
more specific shortcomings pertaining to our understanding of specific conflict-related phenom-
ena. The first of these exists with regard to the study of processes leading to the emergence of
intrastate violent conflicts. There is an abundance of research that investigates what structural
conditions contribute to the ‘onset’ of political conflict; the latter widely equated with a conflict
passing a certain threshold of deaths. What is missing, however, is a comprehensive theory that
explains both why individuals bind together in groups to fight against the government, and also
how these groups achieve to act coherently based on their beliefs and volitions. On the one hand,
our lack of understanding is a result of a poor comprehension of the concept ‘group’ and what it
means to act collectively. On the other hand, this lack of knowledge can be attributed to the exis-
tence of underspecified theories that do not adequately capture processes of group-formation.
What exactly are ‘groups’ and how do they stand in relation to individuals? Are they aggre-
gates of individuals who act and think alike? Or is it adequate to attribute genuine beliefs, aims,
and tactics to groups? Can we even say that groups act? Although these questions seem to stand
at the center of the study of intrastate violent conflict, current research has not yet adequately
addressed them. Even studies that go beyond the highly aggregated level of war and specifically
focus on conflict actors (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009b; Harbom, Melander, and
Wallensteen 2008) take groups as the main units of analysis and do not choose to problematize
or legitimize this approach. Brubaker (2004, p. 7) has coined the term ‘groupism’ to denote this
view:
Yet despite its apparent centrality, the concept of “group” has remained curiously unscrutinized in recent
years. There is, to be sure, a substantial social psychology literature addressing the concept (Hamilton et
al. 1998; McGrath 1984), but this has had little resonance outside that subdiscipline. Elsewhere in the so-
cial sciences, the recent literature addressing the concept “group” is sparse, especially by comparison with
the immense literature on such concepts as class, identity, gender, ethnicity, or multiculturalism—topics in
1 “The mechanism that gives rise to nationalist contention in modernist arguments is state or societal discrimination
along the lines of cultural difference, which is thought to create the grievances that motivate rebellions. Grievances are
difficult to measure independently of our knowledge of the actions we are trying to explain (rebellions, civil war), but
measures of average levels of discrimination are feasible” (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
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which the concept “group” is implicated, yet seldom analyzed on its own terms. “Group” functions as a
seemingly unproblematic, taken-for-granted concept, apparently in no need of particular scrutiny or ex-
plication. As a result, we tend to take for granted not only the concept “group,” but also “groups”—the
putative things-in-the-world to which the concept refers.
Brubaker’s view applies to the field of conflict research as only few studies investigate the for-
mation of groups (see Humphreys andWeinstein 2008; Schlichte 2009a; Staniland 2011; Weinstein
2005, 2007). The dominant strategy is to either take groups as givens or to refer to individuals and
abstain from referring to groups. A brief overview of the three explanatory approaches dominat-
ing conflict research substantiates this argument.
The economic perspective entertains individualist arguments. It assumes actors to maximize in-
dividual benefits and approaches the question of group formation according to the well-known
collective action problem. Collier (2000a, p. 99), who is a typical representative argues: “The free-
rider, coordination, and time-consistency problems together pose formidable obstacles to rebel-
lions motivated purely by grievance. (...) The remaining strategy for a rebel leader is to rely upon
greed.” From this stems a profound skepticism with regard to group formation based on collective
aims.
A second school completely abstains from arguments pertaining to the micro-level but focuses
on opportunity structures. As Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009, p. 3) argue: “Factors that are im-
portant for the financial and militarily feasibility of rebellion but are unimportant for motivation
decisively increase the risk of civil war.” These arguments resemble ecological arguments. Strictly
speaking, they do not make any nomological statements with regard to individual participation
within groups, as they neither state a micro-mechanism nor elaborate on any relations between
different levels of analysis such as the collective action problem.
A third school, which studies the link between ethnic groups and conflict, originated with
Gurr (1993, 2000) (cf. Horowitz 1985). The characterizing feature of this school is that it specifically
addresses the influence of structures on individual motivations. We can denote it as the moderate
collectivist approach. Among the three perspectives, it takes the link between individuals and
groups most seriously. This is plainly discernible from the following statement by Stewart (2008,
p. 11):
“The motivation of the participants is clearly at the root of any violent situation. (...) [T]he majority of inter-
nal conflicts are organised group conflicts—they are neither exclusively nor primarily a matter of individu-
als committing acts of violence against others. What is most often involved is group mobilisation of people
with particular shared identities or goals attacking others in the name of the group. While young men may
fight because they are unemployed, uneducated, and have few other opportunities, they also generally fight
out of loyalty to a group (sometimes an ideology or a cause).”
More recent research by Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013), Cederman, Weidmann, and
Gleditsch (2011), and Stewart (2008) has pushed the limits of this approach and contributed to
our understanding of actors in intrastate conflict (cf. Østby 2013). In conjunction with better data
on horizontal inequality and ethnic groups, we gain a more adequate picture of how inequality
between ethnic groups is linked to the onset of political violence. As will turn out, the moderate
collectivist perspective is most adequate as a point of departure.
However, even in this strand of research we find a tendency to assume rather than explain
groups. The focus is more on why groups engage in violence rather than why individuals bond
together in groups. This might appear to be hair-splitting, but as the discussion in chapter 4 aims
to demonstrate, there is a difference not only between individuals and groups, but also between
individual and collective action.
Taken as a whole, conflict research has insufficiently addressed the constitutive and causal
links between the levels of individuals and groups. From this, we can derive our third aim: The
third aim is to develop a theoretical framework that clearly separates the micro-level of individuals and
the meso-level of groups and elaborates on the processes through which individuals bond together to form
groups.
By turning away from the formation of groups and focusing our view on the measurement of
conflict intensity we can identify a fourth shortcoming, which pertains to the analysis of patterns
of violence. This deficit points to the nearly ubiquitous one-dimensionality in operationalizing
conflict intensity via battle-related fatalities.
The large majority of databases on violent conflict exclusively focuses on consequences of
violence at the expense of the employed means. Among these datasets are the Correlates of War
project (COW) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Small and Singer 1982); the Center for Systematic
Peace (CSP) (Marshall 2014); the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Uppsala Conflict Data
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Program 2015); and the data presented in Fearon and Laitin (2003). In this group, CSP is the
most differentiated since it uses a large number of indicators. The remaining three projects only
consider fatality figures. The only exceptions are the Minorities at Risk project (Gurr 2000) and
the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2014), both of which cover
issues pertaining to means and consequences.
The dominance of one-dimensional approaches to the measurement of conflict intensity—
which, from the empiricist’s perspective, equals the definition of conflict intensity—blurs impor-
tant characteristics of conflict dynamics. An exclusive focus on fatality figures precludes an un-
derstanding of what we can denote as ‘profiles of violence’, i.e. the patterns of conflict intensity
that emerge from the conflictive interaction of non-state conflict actors and the government in in-
trastate conflict. With this in mind, the present analysis derives its fourth aim: The fourth aim is to
develop and implement a multidimensional and multi-indicator approach of conflict intensity that allows
the investigation of how conflicts are fought.
1.3 The Root of the Problem
The shortcomings of current conflict research with regard to concepts and theories are symptoms
of a more fundamental problem: The dominance of the empiricist paradigm and an almost utter
neglect of philosophy of science in conflict research. The rise of empiricism has certainly much to
do with technical innovations that have facilitated the application of quantitative methods—first
and foremost regression—and the increasing availability of data that has made such analyses fea-
sible (Clayton 2014). Interestingly, however, empiricism’s rise to power has largely come about
without any scholarly debate. We can identify a complete lack of discussion on issues related to
the philosophy of science in conflict research. While debates on the ontological and epistemologi-
cal underpinnings of everyday research have been present in economics (Lawson 1997, 2003) and
international relations theory (Wendt 1999), similar debates are virtually non-existent in conflict
research. There has to date only been a single article discussing critical realism and conflict (Korf
2006). This is not to say that alternatives to the dominant empiricist paradigm are completely ab-
sent (see, for instance, Jabri 1996; Jackson 2004; Jackson and Dexter 2014; Kaufman 2001; Mundy
2011; Wilmer 2002). Nonetheless, the field is characterized by a stark imbalance in favor of sophis-
ticated statistical approaches and a widespread neglect of basic issues of ontology, epistemology,
and causation.
Important further still is to address how returning to discussions of such basic issues could
contribute to conflict research. One might argue that we should leave philosophy to the philoso-
phers and proceed on our path of both identifying the often-slight gaps left in the literature and
allotting the most attention to explanations of highly specific phenomena. In the end—one might
say—conflict research has come a long way. Although we must postpone more thorough dis-
cussions on the advantages of a critical realist approach and the shortcomings of empiricism to
chapter 3, we can offer a brief idea here as to the reasonswhywe should care about the philosophy
of science.
First, a specific philosophy of science is—at least implicitly—part of every scientific work.
Thus, every scientific work in conflict research (most often tacitly) follows certain assumptions
with regard to ontology. Unfortunately, these assumptions often remain unclear. The economic
theory of civil war as laid out by Collier and Hoeffler (1998) provides an example, which is rep-
resentative of the larger school of rational choice theories. The authors’ explanation of civil wars
builds on the fundamental nomological assumption that individuals maximize their individual
economic wealth. Depending on the authors’ position in the philosophy of science, we can inter-
pret this in two ways: The concept of a rational actor might either be a rather unrealistic assump-
tion, which nonetheless allows for the generation of good predictions; or it might be thought to be
a highly accurate description of individual decision-making. These two different interpretations
of the rational actor—as mere tools or as attempts to adequately describe reality—are instances
of an instrumentalist and realist interpretation of theories, respectively. Following instrumental-
ism, concepts and theories are no more than useful instruments to formulate expectations about
empirical patterns. Hypotheses might “have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descriptive
representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic
the assumptions” (Friedman 1953, p. 14). Put plainly, ‘whatever fits the data best, is a good the-
ory’. In contrast, the realist camp holds that concepts refer to real objects. In this view, adequate
theories refer to causal mechanisms that exist ‘out there’. Concepts and theoretical mechanisms
6
1.4. RESPONSE CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
are not exclusively constructs of the researcher, but also exist independently from our specula-
tions. Most probably, we can regard David Collier and Anke Hoeffler as instrumentalists as they
are prominent figures in both the economic and the feasibility approach. The fact that one set of
authors proposes significantly different theories at the same time is a good indicator of an instru-
mentalist position. But although we might infer the authors’ position, it is not clearly explicated.
This vagueness with regard to fundamental questions is widespread in research on intrastate
conflict. Whereas methods are often and rightfully discussed in length, the ontological and epis-
temological stance almost always remains implicit or briefly mentioned without discussion. This
complicates interpretation and criticism, thereby impeding scientific progress. An explication of
ontological and epistemological underpinnings does not add anything to an analysis but rather
elucidates otherwise implicit premises. Debating ontological, epistemological, and methodologi-
cal foundations should thus be considered responsible scientific practice.
Second, a discussion of the rather abstract arguments dominating the philosophy of science
does not unnecessarily complicate research regarding ‘hands-on’ phenomena such as conflict,
but can rather provide practical guidance on how to interpret concepts, theory, and methods.
For instance, whether we take an instrumentalist or a realist stance affects how we deal with in-
consistencies within and among theories (Popper 1994; cf. Albert 2012). As discussed above, the
individualist and the moderate collectivist approach are incompatible with regard to how they
treat structural influences on individual decision-making processes. Upon confrontation with em-
pirical results from two incompatible approaches, an instrumentalist can accept the underlying
incompatibilities as unproblematic. In the end, he or she might say, theories do not refer to reality
and, as long as they allow for pre- or retrodiction, they are acceptable. From a realist perspec-
tive, in contrast, such incompatibilities are not acceptable. If theories are to be adequate models of
real world processes, they cannot include contradictory statements. In the realist perspective, an
incompatibility entails that at least one of the positions is not adequate (cf. Sayer 2010, pp. 44–49).
Critical realism also affects how we interpret results and how we do research. In applying
this to the example at hand, theories on the onset of intrastate war that build on the assumption
of individual wealth-maximization fared rather well in large-n statistical analyses (cf. Blattman
and Miguel 2010). From an instrumentalist perspective this renders the rationality assumption
feasible. From a realist perspective, this remains doubtful: The power to pre- or retrodict, on the
one hand, and the empirical adequacy of the concepts leading to these results, on the other hand,
are not separable. Theories are not simply useful to generate empirical expectations; they are
either true or false. And to judge empirical adequacy, instruments have to be valid.
Finally, we might dispel the neglect of fundamental issues as a temporary trend. However, of
notable importance is, first, that such an argument does not absolve us from our responsibility
to address these issues. Second, there are no signs that the tide will turn. In contrast, the “gap
between (1) positivist, cross-national, and especially quantitative approaches and (2) qualitative,
case study, and critical approaches seems as wide as ever, and possibly widening” (Newman and
DeRouen 2014, p. 8).
1.4 How to Address the Shortcomings
Based on the foundations of a critical realist philosophy of science, the present analysis addresses
all four identified shortcomings and what has been identified as their root by developing a coher-
ent conceptual, theoretical, and empirical approach to study the formation of non-state actors and
emerging profiles of violence in intrastate political conflict in Asia and Oceania. Firmly rooted in
the critical realist philosophy of science, the present analysis draws on original concepts of polit-
ical conflict and non-state conflict actors, a theory that details the complex relationship between
individuals, groups, and social structure, and highly detailed data on inequality, demographic,
economic, and geographic characteristics of subnational units, profiles of violence, and armed
groups, to explain how inequality leads to the formation of conflict actors and how opportunity
structures determine profiles of violence in intrastate conflict.
The proposed argument is empirically tested in a comparative analysis of non-state actors
and dynamics of political conflicts. Given the considerable efforts needed to collect disaggregated
data, the present analysis focuses on Asia and Oceania. From a comparative perspective, a focus
on this world region seems to offer most explanatory leverage. There are democratic, autocratic,
and hybrid regimes; monarchies, military and one-party dictatorships; federal, decentralized, and
unitary systems; societies with very large and very small populations as well as high and low
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population densities; ethnically and religiously homogenous and heterogeneous societies; pre-
dominantly Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, and Christian countries; capitalist, post-communist, and
communist systems; as well as very poor and exceedingly rich nations. The region can thus be
considered to be a ‘microcosm’ of the societal diversity in the world.
The analysis finds that non-state conflict actors most likely form in those regions, where in-
dividuals are disadvantaged in multiple dimensions and along ethnic lines as well as where de-
mographic and natural factors make group formation feasible. Once groups have emerged, the
organization of non-state actors and their immediate strategic environment influence the level of
violence we see in intrastate conflict.
To finally arrive at this conclusion and to address the aims of this analysis, the following steps
are taken:
Before delving into the substantial discussion, chapter 2 provides us with the context of con-
temporary conflict research. Having discussed the broader lines of research above, the chapter
systematically summarizes reviews of existing approaches to the explanation of intrastate politi-
cal conflict. Since the systematic review is centered on variables and less on theory, this comple-
ments the discussion of explanatory approaches in chapter 7. It likewise allows for the derivation
of a set of explanatory and control variables for the theoretical discussion in chapter 8 and the
empirical analysis in chapter 9.
Chapter 3 presents the ontological position of critical realism. To carve out implications for
empirically-oriented research, it specifically demarcates critical realism from the position of em-
piricism, which is dominant in contemporary conflict research. The chapter identifies a major
difference with regard to the definition of causal powers: While empiricism equates causal laws
with the constant conjunction of events, critical realism urges us to derive causal powers from
an analysis of the structure of things. This justifies the importance of concepts with regard to the
formulation of theories and the development of classifications. Moreover, it provides arguments
against instrumentalism. The chapter likewise identifies too narrow a focus on the formative in-
fluences of structure on agency (the ‘diachronic downward perspective’) in the works of Archer
(1995) and Bhaskar (1978). Although the argument in itself is sound, it fails to address what is
described as the ‘synchronic perspective’, namely, an elaboration on the constitutive rather than
the temporal relationship between individuals, groups, and social structures.
Chapter 4 develops such a synchronic account based on the concept of intentionality. It ar-
gues that shared intentional states are the single most decisive elements in defining groups and
social structure, as well as in delineating individual and collective agency. This understanding
motivates the definitions of political conflict and non-state conflict actors in chapter 6. Based on
the notion of emergence, chapter 4 develops arguments as to why structure is partly independent
from individuals. The arguments complement the diachronic perspective and further substantiate
approaches that integrate formative influences of structures on individual decision-making pro-
cesses (which are discussed in 7 and developed in chapter 8). With regard to agency, the chapter
proposes that although individuals are responsible for their behavior, they might very well act on
the volitions of collectives. This enables the resolution of tensions between the individual and the
group-level in the explanation of conflict behavior.
Chapter 5 elaborates on the methodological implications of the ontological and epistemologi-
cal position of critical realism. It discusses the construction of adequate definitions, classifications,
and explanations guiding the subsequent analysis.
Chapter 6 develops definitions of ‘political conflict’ and ‘non-state conflict actor’ that go be-
yond immediate observables. Both concepts offer a systematic hierarchy of attributes and indica-
tors and thereby offer a solid point of departure for the development of theories andmeasurement
strategies. Based on a critical realist approach, the definitions recognize the nature of conflicts and
collective conflict actors as structure and processes.
Chapter 7 shifts the focus from concepts to theory. It identifies two core nomological com-
ponents in theories on intrastate conflict: The first relates to enabling, constraining, and forming
effects of structures on individuals. The second deals with the theory of action to explain individ-
ual and collective participation in violence. Based on how these two nomological components are
fashioned, three explanatory approaches are identified: the individualist, the collectivist, and the
moderate collectivist approach.
Chapter 8 develops a theory to explain the circumstances under which non-state conflict ac-
tors emerge and what determines the dynamics of intrastate violent conflict. Drawing on the
research on “horizontal inequality” (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Gubler and Sel-
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way 2012; Østby 2008, 2013; Stewart 2008), the theory systematically elaborates on different lev-
els of analysis along a modified version of the macro-micro-macro model (Coleman 1990; Esser
1993). Referring to emergence and downward causation, the theory stands in stark contrast to the
economic perspective with its exclusive focus on material incentive structures and problems of
collective action (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Lichbach 1998). The advanced
theory clearly distinguishes between a synchronic, constitutive relationship between levels and
diachronic, causal relations. For instance, a shared belief in group membership is not leading to
group formation but rather is a group. The shortcoming of a widespread neglect of processes
of group-formation is addressed by specifically focusing on non-state conflict actors. Selectively
drawing on socio-psychological and philosophical research provides empirically tested micro-
mechanisms and justifies the group perspective, respectively. The theory thus neither exclusively
focuses on groups, i.e. people sharing a collective identity, nor exclusively on non-state actors, i.e.
organized collective actors, but rather addresses the formation of groups and of collective subjects
as two distinctive steps.
Chapter 9 employs a comparative approach to test the theoretical arguments empirically. It
relies on spatially and temporally highly disaggregated data on social structure, non-state ac-
tors, and conflict dynamics. To assess “horizontal inequalities”, the analysis makes use of the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), the world’s largest individual-level population
database, which holds spatially disaggregatedmicrodata from census records (Minnesota Popula-
tion Center 2013). From the individual level data it develops a genuine measure of inequality that
allows the assessment of inequality on an unprecedented level of detail. Information on socioeco-
nomic, demographic, and geographic features, i.e. those structural characteristics that are denoted
as ‘opportunity structure’, is collected from satellite and census data. This extends far beyond the
usual country-year approach in terms of accuracy and measurement validity. To analyze the for-
mation of non-state actors, the author presents the Disaggregated Conflict Actor Dataset (DISCA),
a new database specifically collected for the present analysis. The coded indicators are systemati-
cally deduced from the definitional attributes of non-state conflict actors developed in chapter 6.
Building on scientific publications and media reports, the database holds information on some 80
non-state conflict actors with regard to organizational features (foundation, disbandment, iden-
tity, aims, internal organization), radius of action (headquarters, territorial control), and coopera-
tion between actors. In contrast to other databases (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009a;
Harbom and Sundberg 2009), the data is dynamic and captures changing features of actors over
time. Moreover, it decouples actors from conflicts so that the formation of actors is not equated
with conflict onset. Information on patterns of violence on a subnational level is available from
the new DISCON dataset as developed by Trinn, Wencker, and Schwank (2016). It builds on the
broad yet differentiated and integrative concept of conflict and a multi-dimensional and multi-
indicator approach to intensity as developed in chapter 6. This improves our abilities to recognize
and classify conflictive phenomena, to capture conflict transformation, and to arrive at a valid
measurement of intensity. The DISCON dataset comprises spatio-temporally disaggregated data
on 181 violent and non-violent interstate, intrastate, and substate conflicts in Asia and Oceania
from 2000 to 2014. The violent conflicts are disaggregated into more than 6,300 region-month in-
tensities based on about 31,600 individual indicator assessments, which measure the deployment
of weapons and personnel, the numbers of fatalities and refugees, and the amount of conflict-
related destruction. The multi-dimensional measurement of conflict intensity, implemented for
the first time, allows for the analysis of profiles of violence in a comparative perspective.
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Chapter 2
State of Research
This chapter offers a systematic review over the state of research.1 The aims of the chapter are
twofold. First, it contextualizes the arguments forwarded in this analysis by systematically sum-
marizing existing approaches. Second, it allows to derive a list of standard variables to be con-
sidered in the development of the theoretical in chapter 8 and the empirical analysis in chapter
9.
Systematic reviews differ frommost extant literature reviews in that they are based on explicit
methodological procedures to provide a representative and comprehensive comparison of the
literature. They allow to map the state of research, uncover the overall popularity of concepts
and indicators, identify time trends in the literature, as well as evaluate the explanatory power of
specific variables.
Generally, two types of systematic reviews can be discerned (cf. Cooper 2010; Pigott 2012):
Research syntheses comparatively assess empirical results pertaining to a specific phenomenon to
carve out general findings. Theoretical reviews comparatively assess theories concerning the expla-
nation of a specific phenomenon to uncover differences and similarities pertaining to underlying
assumptions, concepts, and nomological statements.
Theoretical reviews in the field of conflict research usually rely on less systematic procedures
to compare the explanatory value of variables. They do not detail systematic procedures to search
and select studies, to retrieve theoretical arguments from the studies, and to synthesize the results.
Rather, existing theoretical reviews summarize results by selectively drawing onwhat they regard
as valid research.
Section 2.1 presents a research synthesis. Due to its empirical focus, the section takes a variable-
centered approach. The basic idea is that a variable is considered to have explanatory value if it
systematically covaries with conflict onset.
We need not necessarily have access to the raw data used in the studies under review. Where
original data is not provided or synthesizing original data would require extensive recoding, re-
search syntheses can draw on aggregated statistical measures such as the statistical significance
or the direction of fit of coefficients. Under the assumptions that the statistical tests under in-
vestigation were properly conducted and the covariates were carefully selected, such syntheses
should give an unbiased estimate of covariance based on partial regression coefficients. If these
assumptions are regularly violated in the studies under review (Achen 2002, 2005; Schrodt 2014),
this likely affects the accuracy of summarizing approaches.
The research synthesis presented in the following is not a meta-analysis. Although not im-
plied by the literal sense of the word ‘meta-analysis’, this subtype of research syntheses is—since
the first meta-analysis by Pearson (1904)—reserved for a very specific method: research syntheses
employing statistical methods to combine results from similar studies on distinct samples in order
to enlarge sample size (Dixon 2009, p. 707). Meta-analyses—though not generally inapplicable in
the social sciences—are not found in conflict studies. This is due to the fact that existing quanti-
tative research articles deal with same global sample and largely even the same dataset (Schrodt
2014; Wencker, Trinn, and Croissant 2015).2
1 Parts of this chapter are also included in a working paper (Trinn, Schwank, and Wencker 2016).
2 The fact that a great majority of existing research relies on the same conflict dataset is problematic. We know that
differences across databases a fairly large (Sambanis 2004) which seems to imply that the debate on how to measure
conflict is not settled. This underlying disagreement on what constitutes political conflicts is one of the reasons why the
present analysis tests hypotheses based on a newly introduced dataset.
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Civil War Internal Armed Conflict
Political Instability, Polity IV Ethnic heterogeneity
Regulation of Participation, PolityIV* Political Instability, PolityIV
Region: Middle East and North Africa GDP change in %*
Years since change >3 on Polity index Linguistic component of ehet
GDP change in %* Oil exports of GDP
Anocracy, Dummy 1990s, Dummy
Partially Free Polity, Freedom House Ethnic Fractionalization
Neighbor at war, dummy Regulation of Participation, PolityIV*
Rough terrain Ethnolinguistic Diversity
1960s, Dummy* Years since change >3 on Polity index
Polity IV, squared* Ethnic Fractionalization, squared
New State Cold War, Dummy*
Median regional polity2 value* Share of largest ethnic group*
Ethnic dominance Country has de facto autonomous region
Share of population in military forces* Share of population in military forces*
Region: Western Europe and United States* Religious component of ehet
No. of neighbors at war Neighbor at war, dummy
Presidential system* Ethnolinguistic diversity, squared
Region: Middle East and North Africa
Primary commodity exports of GDP, squared
Table 2.1: Robust indicators in models with civil war and internal armed conflict as explananda (own figure
based on Hegre and Sambanis (2006)). Shown are all indicators with a significance of⩽ 0.05 ( one-sided test);
* = negative coefficients; italics = robust pertaining to both dependent variables.
Research syntheses of quantitative studies have limits that go beyond the immediate ques-
tion of how we should aggregate results of individual studies. These limits are discussed in more
detail in chapters 5 and 8. At this point, it suffices to state that research synthesis provide guid-
ance but are not in themselves sufficient to identify adequate explanations. Nonetheless, those
variables that are identified as ‘valuable’ should be included or at least be discussed within an
adequate theoretical framework . In addition, adequate indicators should be included in the sta-
tistical analysis to allow for robust and valid inference.
Section 2.2 presents existing theoretical reviews. Taken together, these reviews add up to a
detailed picture of the present state of conflict research. As it turns out, however, none of them
systematically compares theoretical mechanisms. Consequently, this analysis presents its own
comparison of explanatory approaches in chapter 7 after the criteria of adequate theories are have
been developed in chapters 3 - 5.
2.1 Research Synthesis
For social science research in general and conflict research in particular research syntheses are
rare. In the field of conflict research, two studies systematically compare a large number of ex-
planatory variables: Hegre and Sambanis (2006) and Dixon (2009).
Hegre and Sambanis (2006) conduct a sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil war
onsets.3 They take 88 indicators from the literature, group them based on 18 categories of inde-
pendent variables, and investigate the robustness of statistical inferences by systematically com-
paring results of some 4.7 million logistic regressions with varying model specifications for two
dependent variables.4 They identify 20 and 22 variables as robustly related to the onset of civil
war and internal armed conflict, respectively. These include two core variables which are added
to almost all models on civil war onset: the size of the population and GDP per capita. The re-
maining variables are listed in table 2.1, ordered by the level of significance.5
3 Strictly speaking, a sensitivity analysis is not an instance of a research synthesis. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) do not
summarize results of existing studies but rather re-estimate models including indicators from existing research.
4 Indicators are grouped in categories to avoid multicollinearity. Only one of multiple possible indicators per category
is included in each estimated model.
5 The reliability of sensitivity tests has been cast into doubt by Plümper and Traunmüller (2016). Hence, the results
should be interpreted with care.
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Hegre and Sambanis (2006) identify seven indicators that are robustly related to the onset of
civil war and internal armed conflict: political instability, the regulation of participation, a regional
dummy for countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the proximity of a regime change,
GDP growth, a neighboring country at war, and the size of the military forces. However, the
explanatory value of variables derived from the Polity Index should be interpreted with care
because some of its indicators are endogenous (Vreeland 2008).
A comparison of results for the two specifications of the phenomenon to be explained reveals
differences. Whereas eight indicators of ethnic composition are robustly related to the onset of
internal armed conflict, only one, i.e. ethnic dominance, is robustly related to civil war onset.
Thus, the ethnic composition seems to be related to the outbreak of conflicts of lower intensity,
while not playing an important role with regard to the outbreak of high-intensity conflict (Hegre
and Sambanis 2006).
Dixon (2009) systematically reviews the results of 47 quantitative studies on civil war and
intrastate conflict onset. His sample comprises 203 different independent variables from 64 re-
gression tables. The selection process is rather ad hoc: “The studies reviewed in this paper were
found using JSTOR, Academic Search Complete, Digital Dissertations, and recent conference pa-
pers” (ibid., p. 708).
All in all, Dixon identifies high scholarly agreement on the conflict-inducing effects of the
following factors:
• Large population
• Status as an oil exporter
• Poverty
• Low economic growth
• Recent conflict
• Anocratic regimes
• Regime instability
Although this list of seven factors constitutes the central finding of the paper, the inclusion
criterion is not sufficiently specified. It is a “subjective measure of confidence, determined by
the number of authors who have evaluated the variable, the significance levels found by these
authors, and the generality of the authors’ dependent variables (that is, more weight is given
to studies of civil war than ethnic war or low-level civil conflict)” (ibid., p. 719). The lack of a
systematic procedure to identify the studies under review and the non-transparent definition of
‘degree of consensus’ are the central drawbacks of the approach.
Due to the drawbacks of the existing approaches, Trinn, Schwank, and Wencker (2016) have
compiled a dataset that comprises the results of 110 articles published between 2000 and 2015
in a number of high-ranking academic journals.6 In contrast to Hegre and Sambanis (2006), our
review relies on the genuine statistical results of the papers under analysis. In comparison to
Dixon (2009), we review more than twice as many articles. Moreover, the ‘subjective measure of
confidence’ is replaced with a more clearly defined method to derive the explanatory value of
variables.
Beyond this extension in scope in comparison to Dixon, we do not count statistically signifi-
cant findings in the original studies but rather draw on the distribution of positive and negative
coefficients irrespective of their significance. Leaving aside statistical significance as an evaluation
criterion and including all variables rather than only those of theoretical interest in the original
studies mitigates the effects of p-value ‘hacking’ and selective reporting. Under the condition
that a variable has been tested often enough, we are able to identify which variables are robustly
related to conflict across different research designs.
The analysis includes 244 ‘analytical units’, i.e. unique configurations of dependent variable,
the period and space under investigation, and the dataset used. AU are not equal to individual
regressions analyses. If models investigate the same phenomenon and dependent variable stem-
ming from the same dataset in the same period and space, we subsume these models under a
single AU. This aggregation of similar regression models within articles mitigates the risk of ar-
tificially bloating the number of cases. We consider this reasonable since many of the included
6 The included journals scored at least with a rank of 45 on the list of high-impact political science journals provided
by Giles and Garand (2007): International Organization, American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political
Science, International Security, European Journal of International Relations, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of
Peace Research, International Interactions, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Security Studies. Political Geography
had to be omitted due to practical issues, whereas the American Sociological Reviewwas added to the sample. For a study
to be included, it had to compare at least five cases and had to investigate the onset, incidence, duration, or recurrence of
violent intrastate conflict. Applied methods or the theoretical framework did not serve as selection criteria.
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models are not independent in the sense that they use similar or even identical data. Due to our
aggregation, models are counted as different cases only if specifications substantially vary in the
sense described above.
For each analytical unit, the predictors and outcomes are classified according to a taxonomy.
Different operationalizations of identical or sufficiently similar phenomena are subsumed under
a single variable.
In order to arrive at a set of ‘consensus determinants’ of violent intrastate conflict, we syn-
thesize regression results by drawing on the sign test (Borenstein et al. 2009). This method tests
whether the number of negative and positive coefficients for a variable significantly differs from
a binomial distribution with a probability of success of 0.5. We attribute explanatory power to
a variable if a binomial test rejects the null hypothesis of a random distribution with the usual
p-value of 0.05. To gain enough statistical power for our test, we require a variable to be tested
in at least six analytical units. Since we are not interested in a specific explanatory variable but
rather in testing the explanatory value of all included variables, we have to consider the problem
of multiple hypothesis testing. To account for this, we apply the Holm-Bonferroni correction to
adjust p-values. Since we are agnostic as to whether the variables under scrutiny have a positive
or negative influence on the phenomena under review, we perform a two-tailed test.
The main drawbacks of the sign test are that it neither allows to estimate effect sizes nor takes
into account sample sizes (ibid., p. 326). Moreover, unlike genuine meta-analyses, it does not en-
hance the statistical power of the original studies by pooling observations. Althoughwe are aware
that superior methods of synthesizing studies exist, we consider the sign test the best available
option in view of our study design for three reasons.
First, comparing effect sizes across studies is complicated by varying variable andmodel spec-
ifications across studies (Becker and Wu 2007). Synthesizing effect sizes would thus require ex-
tensive recoding. Moreover, multivariate model specifications differ with regard to the included
predictors so that individual coefficients are not directly comparable (ibid.).
Second, studies in conflict research repeatedly analyze the same population. Consequently,
pooling these studies would not significantly increase the sample size, which is a key motivation
of meta-analysis. We partly account for a lack of independence between studies by aggregating
the results of regressions in ‘analytical units’, as explained above. Although this does not solve the
issue of overlapping or even identical samples across studies, our procedure allows for uncover-
ing the robustness of effects given different study designs. Consequently, we do not consider our
approach a genuine ‘meta-analysis’.
Third, other methods provide no viable alternative. Vote counting, i.e. synthesizing studies
by counting significant positive and negative as well as non-significant coefficients, is generally
discouraged (see, e.g. Borenstein et al. 2009, pp. 251–255). Hedges and Olkin (1980) show that the
power of vote counting might even decrease with a growing number of studies under review.
Our synthesis reveals four imbalances in quantitative conflict research: a one-dimensional fo-
cus on conflict onset as the dependent variable, a dominance of quantitative operationalizations
of conflict via death figures, a clustering of independent variables on the level of structures, and
an almost complete neglect of social variables referring to health and education. Apart from these
imbalances, the systematic review identifies seven core variables that seem to be linked to conflict.
Quantitative conflict research almost exclusively focuses on the onset of violent political con-
flicts (161 of 244 analytical sets). Investigation into the incidence (63), duration (13), or recurrence
(7) of intrastate conflict together only account for about a third of the analyses. This lends further
relevance to our goal of studying conflict dynamics. Quantitative comparative conflict research
has to date almost exclusively focused on the explanation of specific conflict-related related events
such as onset, incidence, or recurrence. What has been largely neglected, however, is the way con-
flicts are fought as expressed in a closer look on the intensity of conflict. The present analysis fills
this gap by carving out profiles of violence and analyzing variation in conflict intensity in chapter
9.
Concerning operationalization, more than four out of five analyses regarding all dependent
variable types rely on quantitative thresholds in the form of the number of deaths in a specified
period. Qualitative operationalizations are still largely neglected. Nonetheless, the improvement
in the availability of information on conflicts worldwide made it easier for researchers to em-
ploy more sensitive thresholds and to identify and code conflicts of lower intensity. Lowering the
threshold from 1,000 (Singer and Small 1972; Small and Singer 1982) to 25 battle-related deaths per
year, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2015) has greatly influenced quantitative-comparative
13
2.1. RESEARCH SYNTHESIS CHAPTER 2. STATE OF RESEARCH
research and provided the most widely used operationalization of conflict in contemporary anal-
yses.
Nonetheless, even lower thresholds do not address the problem of a one-dimensional focus on
fatality figures which is prevalent in conflict research. Developing and applying a more substan-
tial definition and a multidimensional measurement of conflict intensity (cf. ch. 6), we addresses
this shortcoming.
Moreover, by equating onset with the passing of a certain fatality threshold, conflict onset and
conflict escalation cannot be clearly separated. From the perspective of a critical realist under-
standing of political conflict as an incompatibility of intentions, the passing of a fatality figure
constitutes an escalation rather than the onset of a conflict. A realist definition of political conflict
and of conflict actors as developed in chapter 6 allows to focus on the ‘real’ onset of political
conflict.
A third imbalance exists with regard to independent variables. The most common approach is
to find causes for intrastate conflicts in the realm of the structural characteristics of nation states.
While this is especially true for the study of conflict onset and incidence, analyses of conflict re-
currence dominantly test variables referring to characteristics of, and the time since, the last con-
flict. As was to be expected, conceptually endogenous conflict characteristics, such as the conflict
item, intensity, and actors, are of special interest in explaining the recurrence and duration of con-
flicts. More importantly, however, factors located on the individual level (e.g. biographical data
on leaders) have scarcely been used in the reviewed analyses. This is remarkable in view of the
facts that agency-centered approaches form the dominating theoretical framework for explaining
violent intrastate conflicts. This finding thus supports the view—presented in the introduction
and further elaborated in chapter 7—that there is a significant gap between the theoretical and
the empirical focus of explanatory approaches.
More frequently analyzed but still rare are variables on the group level, e.g. the exclusion of
specific populations from political power or the strength of armed non-state actors. Interestingly,
however, in qualitative intensity analyses, a large share of the independent variables used belong
to this type possibly signaling a certain proximity between more qualitative approaches within
the realm of quantitative research and actor-focused explanations. This might have to do with a
lack of adequate data allowing for quantitative analysis of group level variables.
The present analysis addresses these gaps by putting an emphasis on the level of individuals
and groups. First, it includes the most disaggregated individual-level data as a source to compute
its inequality score. Second, it introduces a database that holds time-variance information on char-
acteristics of non-state actors. Both are presented in chapter 9. In consequence this closes the gap
between the theoretical and empirical focus that is characteristic of contemporary quantitative
research on intrastate conflict.
The last imbalance pertains to the type of variables used. Whereas socioeconomic indicators
are frequently considered in analyses, social variables referring to health and education are rarely
used. These variables, however, are central as they are arguably among the most important deter-
minants of life satisfaction. By including a large variety of health- and education-related variables
in the measurement of horizontal inequality (e.g. the availability of electricity or a toilet, literacy,
and educational attainment) the present analysis closes this gap.
Apart from these four imbalances that are addressed in the present analysis, the systematic re-
view identifies 388 distinct independent variables which were analyzed 2,525 times. The sheer
quantity of different variables shows that research seeks to be precise as well as innovative,
putting to use nearly every conceivable phenomenon of reality reasonably connected to intrastate
conflicts. However, only about a fourth (100) of the variables were employed in more than five
analytical units and just 23 in more than 20 analytical units. Although this variation is to be wel-
comed, it reduces the statistical power of the sign-test.
Figure 2.1 presents the results of our synthesis with regard to the explanatory value of vari-
ables. The points indicate the share of positive coefficients of the respective independent variable
in the analytical units under review. The shape of the points indicates whether the p-values ad-
justed using the Holm-Bonferroni method lie below p = 0.05 or not. The confidence intervals
provide insight into the certainty of this estimate not taking into account multiple hypothesis
testing.
Our results show that the onset of conflict seems to be positively associated with the log of
population size, ethnic fragmentation, the status as an oil exporting country, the ‘anocracy’ regime
type, regime change, mountainous terrain (log and linear), the relative size of ethnic groups, si-
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Ethnic group (relative size)
Ethnic dominance (dummy)
Political discrimination (MAR) (dummy)
Hydrocarbon production (oil) (pc)
Primary commodity exports
Democracy (Goldstone et al.) (dummy)
Ethnic group (discrimination: political) (dummy)
Hybrid regime (partial autocray, Freedom House) (dummy)
Regime stability (in transition) (dummy)
Country size (log)
Hybrid regime (anocracy, Polity) (dummy)
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Figure 2.1: Results of sign test for 49 explanatory variables synthesizing 161 analytical units. Points indicate
the share of positive coefficients. The shape of points indicates whether the p-values adjusted using the
Holm-Bonferroni method lie below p = 0.05. Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence interval for sign-test
not taking into account multiple hypothesis testing.
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multaneous conflicts in neighboring countries as well as non-contiguous territory. Conversely,
GDP per capita (log and linear), the squared regime level, and the length of peace appear to have
conflict-inhibiting effects.
We can thus state that countries that are young, ethnically fragmented, characterized by rel-
atively large excluded populations, or populous are more probable to experience conflict onset.
Pertaining to the economic and political system, poor economic performance and dependence on
oil, as well as unstable regimes increase the propensity of conflict. With regard to geography, the
existence of rugged terrain or non-contiguous territory as well as neighboring countries in conflict
increase conflict risk. The same seems to be true when the last conflict ended only recently.7
2.2 Theoretical Reviews
We now turn to theoretical reviews, i.e. those works that summarize the state of conflict research
from a more or less theoretical point of view. Each of the three reviews presented in this section
pursues a different way to structure the field of research.
Kalyvas (2007)—making no claim to be exhaustive—differentiates three categories of explana-
tory approaches following three “distinct styles of research” (ibid., p. 417): The ‘economic style
of research’ rooted in the field of development economics and primarily focusing on the conflict-
inducing role of the abundance of natural resources, the ‘international relations style of research’
primarily conducted by IR-scholars highlighting the role of nationalist aspirations and inter-
ethnic conflict, and the ‘comparativist style of research’ pursued mainly in sociology and compar-
ativist political science explaining the emergence of intrastate conflict via lacking state capacity.
The criterion to differentiate the approaches is the type of variable doing the primary explanatory
work. For each school of research, Kalyvas presents various mechanisms linking the respective in-
dependent variables to civil wars and discusses methodological issues. While typical explanatory
variables are loosely linked to three schools of analysis, Kalyvas does not present a systematic
theoretical comparison.
Bussmann, Hasenclever, and Schneider (2009) differentiate three ‘analytical perspectives’ sub-
sumed under the terms ‘identity’, ‘institutions’, and ‘economy’. The three perspectives broadly
correspond to three mechanisms of coordination: legitimacy, coercion, and interest, respectively
(cf. Wendt 1999). For each analytical perspective, the authors present typical explanatory vari-
ables, causal mechanisms, empirical results, and discuss methodological issues. The approach is
quite similar to Kalyvas’ in that it primarily differentiates approaches along the explanantia.
Blattman and Miguel (2008) structure their review along two explananda: conflict between
parties, on the one hand, and formation of and individual participation in collective conflict ac-
tors, on the other. Focusing on accounts based on rational choice theory, they systematize the myr-
iad of explanations for these explananada by highlighting two types of formal economic theory.8
The first type, i.e. contest models, represent the equilibrium between two parties in dependence
of macro-economic variables such as the distribution of wealth as well as the availability of means
to fight. According to the model, each of the parties decides to either take part in the legal econ-
omy or to fight in order to maximize wealth. The second type of models focuses on asymmetric
information and commitment problems making war a reasonable choice for the conflict parties.
Individual participation in collective actors can be explained via individual incentives; either pos-
itive incentives such as pecuniary interests or negative incentives such as threat and punishment
by leaders. Apart from these approaches that model conflict as interaction between unitary collec-
tive actors, Blattman and Miguel stress the need to explain individual participation in collective
actors. In contrast to Kalyvas and Bussmann et al., Blattmann and Miguel focus more strongly on
theoretical mechanisms. Their summary, however, remains focused on formal economic theory.
Each of the three articles provides a good overview over the state of the art of conflict research.
Taken together, they add up to a detailed picture emerging from the different angles on the field
of research. By each citing more than 80 publications, the overviews are generally broad.
As a trade-of, however, all lack a detailed account of theoretical mechanisms. This shortcoming
pertains to a lesser degree to Blattman andMiguel (ibid.), who identify basic arguments typical for
7Asmentioned above, the finding with regard to anocracies as measured by Polity might be an artifact (Vreeland 2008).
8The authors focus on a narrow version of rational-choice theory by predominantly looking at cost-benefit calculations
of individual and collective actors related to material interests. However, some wider approaches within rational-choice-
theory that include non-material goods are also discussed.
16
2.3. SUMMARY CHAPTER 2. STATE OF RESEARCH
a specific strand of research. Kalyvas (2007) and Bussmann, Hasenclever, and Schneider (2009),
on the other hand, seem less interested in detailing and comparing theoretical accounts.
A strategy to characterize explanatory approaches in more detail is pursued by Ross (2004).
He restricts his review to a specific type of independent variables, i.e. natural resources, and sum-
marizes the results of a restricted sample of 14 cross-national econometric studies based on their
coverage, their operative variables, and their findings. While this twofold restriction allows Ross
(ibid.) to summarize findings and compare approaches in more detail, he primarily focuses on
issues of operationalization, data collection, and statistical results.
2.3 Summary
Systematic reviews provide guidance in the vast field of research on intrastate conflict by summa-
rizing the literature on grounds of consistent methodological procedures. This chapter discussed
two types of systematic reviews: research syntheses and theoretical reviews.
Research syntheses by Dixon (2009) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006) as well as a new analysis
with original data by Trinn, Schwank, and Wencker (2016), revealed four imbalances character-
izing current conflict research: a one-dimensional focus on the onset of violent conflict, narrow
operationalizations of conflict via death figures, a unilateral focus on variables on the macro-level
at the expense of individual- or group-level factors, and a neglect of social variables.
The present analysis addresses all of these issues. To cope with the focus on conflict onset and
the related issue of a narrow operationalization via death figures, this study presents a theory (ch.
8) and an empirical analysis (ch. 9) of conflict dynamics based on a multidimensional measure-
ment of conflict intensity (ch. 6). It likewise casts doubt on the common practice of operationaliz-
ing the onset of conflict by what is actually violent escalation. A realist definition (ch. 3) of conflict
allows clearly separating both. Complementing research on the impact of structural variables, the
present analysis discusses how individuals, groups, and structures are constitutively related (ch.
4), how they causally affect each other (ch. 8), as well as empirically analyses individual-level data
and original dynamic data on non-state conflict actors (ch. 9). Drawing on census data likewise
allows including information on health and education.
From the results of the research syntheses we can furthermore conclude that an empirical
analysis should at least control for the size of the population, economic development and the
status as an oil exporter, previous and neighboring conflict, the political regime, the size of ethnic
groups, and non-contiguous territory and mountainous terrain to evade problems of omitted-
variable bias.
Apart from these variables, the debate on what variables influence the onset of intrastate con-
flict is far from settled. This is astonishing since research designs—specifically those that match
the selection criteria of the above-presented research syntheses—do not differ significantly from
one another and, specifically in the recent years, predominantlymake use of a single source for the
dependent variable: the UCDP dataset. Making use of new sources of data, the present analysis
‘brings in some fresh air’ into the field of research.
The overview over theoretical reviews shows that current conflict research is divided into
different schools. There is, however, no clear consensus on how to structure the research field
with regard to theory. This seems to originate in a too strong focus on explanantia (Bussmann and
Schneider 2007; Kalyvas 2007) which goes together with a lack of detailed accounts of theoretical
mechanisms.
Those theoretical reviews that do focus on mechanisms are narrow with regard to their theo-
retical (Blattman and Miguel 2008) or empirical scope (Ross 2004). In line with the second aim of
this thesis, this leaves us in need of broad review of explanatory approaches that focuses not on
variables but on theory. Such a review is presented in chapter 7.
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Chapter 3
Critical Realism in Philosophy of
Science
When we know what a thing is we know what it will tend to do, if appropriate circumstances materialize.
(Bhaskar 2008, p. 230)
Amidst all this confusion and tumult in the haunted house of philosophy, workaday researchers carry
on calmly with their routines. Models are run, ethnographies are written, interviews are conducted, and
archives are scanned. Some of the work is very good. Knowledge seems to grow. But no one really knows
how or why. Except perhaps Roy Bhaskar.
(Gorski 2013, p. 663)
Critical realism is both a hypothesis on the nature of the natural and social world, as well
on how we gain knowledge thereof. Critical realists stand between theorists of empiricism, who
assume that all our knowledge derives from observed patterns of regularity, and those of interpre-
tivism, who emphasize that our perception of reality is unique in that it is in large part a product
of our own construction. Balancing both perspectives, critical realists argue that the natural and
social world exists apart from our own individual perception of it. Moreover, we are able to un-
derstand it fairly well even though our perception remains imperfect and our knowledge always
fallible.
The critical realist perspective influences the way to define terms, construct theories, and con-
duct empirical analyses by taking a specific stance regarding ontology, epistemology, andmethod-
ology. Ontology deals with the question of what exists. A social ontology, i.e. an ontology that
focuses on the objects of investigation in the social sciences, answers two questions: (1) What en-
tities populate the social world? (2) How are these entities characterized? The answers to these
questions guide the conceptualization of agents and structure. Epistomology, i.e. the study of
knowledge (episteme), deals with the “nature, sources and limits of knowledge” (Klein 2005). A
specific epistemological position usually answers the following questions: (1) What does it mean
to know something? (2) How and to what extent can one know something? Methodology is the
study ofmethods, i.e. instruments or techniques that are applied by scientists to gather knowledge
about the objects of interest. Methods describe specific ways to perform research. Methodology
has these methods as its object and primarily deals with the question of what kind of methods are
adequate to arrive at knowledge about a certain entity.
Critical realism can broadly be situated between the two paradigms of empiricism and inter-
pretivism (cf. Gorski 2013; Maxwell 2012; Moses and Knutsen 2012).
Classical (or British) Empiricism was most systematically stated by David Hume (Radcliffe
2008). At its core lies the epistemological statement that all human knowledge of the external
world is based on observation (cf. Markie 2015; Moses and Knutsen 2012; Salmon 1989). Every-
thing we know about things external to us grounds on our experience and is thus a posteriori.1
The fact that our knowledge of the external world is mediated by sensory experience makes
empiricists at least skeptical toward the existence of unobservables (Wendt 1999). If our knowl-
edge of the world is restricted to what we know from sensory experience, then we cannot make
1While empiricists rule out a priori knowledge about the external world, they accept a priori knowledge pertaining to
analytical statements such as ‘a triangle has three sides’.
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statements about the state of the world beyond our perception. The epistemological position of
empiricism thus heavily influences its ontological stance (Bhaskar 1978). In the empiricists’ view,
the world consists of perceived facts (also compare section 3.2).
From this springs a specific approach to methodology that has the systematization of knowl-
edge gained from observation as its primary objective. Causality, in the empiricists’ view, does
not exist in the external world but is a product of imagination resulting from successive sense-
perception. Consequently, adequate explanation should refrain from statements regarding un-
observables or at least understand such talk as merely instrumentally useful (Friedman 1953). As
further elaborated in section 5.2, an adequate empiricist explanation takes a deductive-nomological
form: regularities are subsumed under a ‘law’, i.e. an abstract statement of a universally valid reg-
ularity.
Interpretivism emphasizes the difference between the natural and the social world. It argues
that social entities differ from the objects studied by physics, chemistry, and the like in that they
are socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Consequently, human beings are not inde-
pendent observers of the social world but deeply entangled in it.
This contrasts with the position that social science should be modeled according the ideal
of the natural science (cf. Comte 1853). Instead, interpretivists aim to ‘de-naturalize’ the social
(Krell 2003). Radical interpretivism would even extend its critical view to the natural sciences
(Feyerabend n.d.). Here, the list of entities regarded as socially constructed reaches far into the
realm of the natural sciences (Hacking 1999).
Epistemologically, interpretivism argues that observation is never unbiased but rather heavily
influenced by subjective understanding. Knowledge is relative and might differ between indi-
viduals, members of different cultural groups, and might change over time. Ideas mediate our
understanding of the world.
Pertaining to scientific progress, interpretivism questions the unbiased position of the re-
searcher accumulating and systematizing knowledge. Instead, it highlights that a researcher’s
view is always theory-laden (Gergen 1982; Kuhn 1962).
Taking account of the subjective dimension of the constitution of reality and its perception,
interpretivist methodology in the social sciences adheres to the methods of verstehenwhich center
on subjective meaning to explain social interaction (Weber 2008). Typically, interpretivists argue
in favor of qualitative methods, such as discourse analysis, that allow for the discovery of the
subjectivist dimension of knowledge generation.
Critical realism stands in between the empiricist and the interpretivist camp. It combines onto-
logical realism and epistemological relativism. The former claims the existence of natural entities
independent of our perception and of social entities mostly independent of our own individual per-
ception. The (social) world is intersubjectively constructed (Searle 1995) but it exists ‘out there’.
Thus, the social world is not entirely different for each of us or open to interpretation to our liking.
Consequently, it is possible to assess statements to be more or less adequate. With interpretivism,
critical realism shares the view that there exists a sphere of reality beyond the immediately ob-
servable. But where the former highlights the subjectivist nature of our perception, as well as
the construction of meaning detached from external reality, the latter problematizes how exactly
the external world and individual perception are linked. From this results a view of an almost
‘object-like’ character of the social world.
At the same time, critical realism rejects the empiricists focus on sense-perception as one-
dimensional and specifically refutes the concept of causality as constant conjunction. Instead, it
regards causality as a property of objects contingently producing events.
Epistomological relativism states that we do not observe reality directly, but rather from a
specific point of view. People are not ’blank slates’ and perception is not reducible to physical
sensations. This pertains to scientific investigations and our everyday perception alike.
Critical realism thus accepts the double hermeneutics in social science research: the objects
under investigation in the social sciences are constructed and the process of our understanding
involves interpretation (Giddens 1984). Yet, the fact that our perception is always mediated does
not preclude attaining knowledge of the external social world. While statements regarding the
social world can be rendered as either true or false, we must measure the truth value of our state-
ments along with the inherent uncertainty they contain, as knowledge is always fallible (Popper
2007).
Methodologically, critical realism endorses the analysis of the deeper structures of reality.
Where interpretivismmight go as far as to even neglect that any direct access to reality is possible,
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Empiricism Interpretivism Critical Realism
Social
Ontology
Skepticism regarding
unobservable entities.
Statements about what exists
cannot reach beyond perception
Social phenomena are
constructed via perceptions and
(re)created by human practice
Social phenomena are
inter-subjectively constructed
and (re)created by human
practice
Episte-
mology
Inductive generation of
knowledge via sense-perception
Subjective interpretation of
experience by observers who
are part of the observed
Imperfect perception of social
phenomena independent of
specific observer
Method-
ology
Explanation of constant
conjunctions via deduction from
instrumental scientific laws
Explanation via understanding
of subjective meaning
Explanation via reference to real
causal powers emerging from
the structure of things
Table 3.1: Paradigms of philosophy of science.
critical realism aims to formulate theories that correspond to external reality. The three positions
of empiricism, interpretivism, and critical realism are summarized in table 3.1.
We argue in favor of a more conscious approach to the ontological and epistemological under-
pinnings of empirically oriented research. To do so, we draw on critical realism, which arguably
provides the most viable and consistent approach in the philosophy of science.
Having localized the paradigm of critical realism relative to empiricism and interpretivism,
this chapter summarizes critical realism, in general, and its arguments in the social sciences, in
particular.2 Bhaskar (2008, p. 56) summarizes his argument as follows:
My overall aim, it will be remembered, is to argue that the ultimate objects of scientific understanding
are neither patterns of events nor models but the things that produce and the mechanisms that generate the
flux of the phenomena of the world. Scientists attempt to discover the way things act, a knowledge typically
expressed in laws; and what things are, a knowledge (...) typically expressed in real definitions. Statements
of laws, I have suggested, are statements about the tendencies of things which may not be actualized, and
may not be manifest to men; they are not statements about conjunctions of events, or experiences. But in
developing this theory I do not attach any great importance to the word or even the concept law’. Rather
what is essential to the realism developed here is the idea that the things and mechanisms of nature, that
constitute the intransitive objects of scientific theory, both exist and act independently of the conditions,
normally produced by men, that allow men access to them.
As the quotation reveals, critical realism aims to describe the different layers of social reality—
ranging from unobservable potential powers to directly observed empirical patterns—and the
relation between these layers for the purposes of scientific research.
Section 3.1 further elaborates on these different layers describing the distinction between tran-
sitive and intransitive objects and the differentiation between the real, the actual, and the empir-
ical. Section 3.2 presents the Humean account of empiricism and demarcates it from the critical
realist conception. This account argues that laws cannot be regarded as constant conjunctions be-
tween events. Section 3.3 introduces an alternative account of causality. Overcoming the Humean
focus on regularities, causal powers are defined as attributes of things that emerge from their in-
ternal structure. Section 3.4 applies critical realist thinking to the relation between structure and
agency and carves out two kinds of macro-micro relations.
3.1 Critical Realism
Bhaskar (1978) introduces two important differentiations with two and three categories, respec-
tively: First, he differentiates between ‘transitive objects’ and ‘intransitive objects’. Second, he dis-
tinguishes ‘the domain of the real’, ‘the domain of the actual’, and ‘the domain of the empirical’.
Both differentiations are addressed in turn.
2 The exact definition of ‘critical realism’ is disputed, especially concerning its demarcation from ‘scientific realism’
(Chernoff 2007; also see Tang 2011, footnote 5). Even within philosophy of science, ‘realism’ is a broad term (Kneer 2009).
We will focus on the position of Bhaskar (1978, 1979) subsuming his ‘transcendental realism’ in the philosophy of science
and his ‘critical naturalism’ in the philosophy of the social sciences under the term ‘critical realism’. Apart from Bhaskar
(1978, 1979), the basic assumptions of critical realism in the social sciences are summarized by Collier (1994), Gorski (2013),
Hartwig (2008), and Outhwaite (1998). The implications of critical realism for the explanatory program are discussed by
Albert (2012) and Archer (1998). Jackson (2011, pp. 72–111) discusses critical realism in international relations. More recent
publications take on the discussion (see Archer et al. 1998; Danermark et al. 2002; Dean et al. 2006; Kneer 2009; López and
Potter 2001; Maniacs 2006).
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3.1.1 Transitive and Intransitive Objects
The distinction between intransitive and transitive objects lies at the heart of critical realism. In-
transitive objects are those things, structures, mechanisms, and processes that exist independently
of human activity, independently of our knowledge of them, and function independently of the
conditions we produce to receive knowledge about them (Bhaskar 2008, pp. 12, 25, 56, 234). Tran-
sitive objects, in contrast, exist of our knowledge of the world: our thought patterns, scientific
positions, concepts, theories, and methods (ibid., p. 11).
Apart from the skeptical empiricist position (cf. Wendt 1999, p. 52), the existence of intransitive
objects appears obvious to us in everyday thinking and poses no immediate difficulties pertain-
ing to natural objects. For example, the assumption that gravity would remain in force without
anyone perceiving it or measuring it in an experiment is probably widely shared.
Entities analyzed in the social sciences, however, are different. Their very existence depends
on mental representation and/or human practice (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Searle 1995). Con-
sequently, it does not seem plausible to categorize social facts—such as sovereignty, money, or
friendship—as intransitive entities.
However, social facts are often naturalized: Stable social facts are taken for granted and appear
‘quasi-natural”. They constrain our actions and exist independently of our individual perception
of them (Durkheim 1982). Although social facts might be constructed collectively, they are not
malleable individually. Social reality is dependent on human thought but independent of indi-
vidual thought. In consequence, it seems plausible to naturalize social facts and regard them as
intransitive objects.
3.1.2 The Real, the Actual, and the Empirical
A second differentiation that allows grasping the position of critical realism is between the do-
mains of the real, the actual, and the empirical (Bhaskar 2008, pp. 35–52; cf. Collier 1994, pp. 42–
45). The empirical comprises all that is perceived. In conflict research, for instance, we may di-
rectly observe clashes, troop movements, or peace talks.
The actual encompasses the empirical as well as all those events that are not observed. As
conflict research continuously improves in terms of data quality and quantity, the actual and the
empirical overlap more and more.
The real is the most extensive domain comprising all events, perceived and unperceived,
as well as structures and generative mechanisms. These structures and mechanisms exist even
though they might not lead to specific events. Applied to our example, we might infer a high
escalatory potential of a conflict from the fact that it is fought about an indivisible good. In this
case we have neither observed an escalation nor do we have any indication that an escalation
has taken place unobserved. Nonetheless, we have identified an escalatory potential due to an
analysis of the conflict’s structure.
The relation between the actual and the empirical is a matter of the quality of our observation.
Arguably, most current work in conflict research is dedicated to further closing the gap between
what we can observe and measure, on the one hand, and what happens, on the other. While
this is highly important, current research has focused less on the difference between the actual
and the real. It is specifically in this regard that critical realism can contribute to an improved
understanding of political conflicts.
Most importantly, causalmechanisms need to be regarded as independent from events (Bhaskar
2008, p. 36). In essence, the distinction allows accounting for the fact that events can be “out of
phase” (ibid., p. 47) with mechanisms. For instance, although every averagely trained human
is capable of finishing a half-marathon, few will actually do. Similarly, any functioning nuclear
weapon is capable of inducing a chain-reaction and it holds this power independently of an ac-
tual explosion due to an induced chain reaction. Although almost none of the nuclear bombs ever
constructed actually exploded, we can understand their causal powers and might even further
improve their function without testing them.
This leads to an important point: The ultimate goal of science lies in the discovery of causal
mechanisms beyond the sphere of empirical events. This is not to say that empirical analyses are
futile; nor does it imply that we need not carefully scrutinize the way we collect data on empirical
events. As Bhaskar (1978, p. 47) writes:
Theworld consists of mechanisms not events. Suchmechanisms combine to generate the flux of phenomena
that constitute the actual states and happenings of the world. They may be said to be real, though it is
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rarely that they are actually manifest and rarer still that they are empirically identified by men. (...) We are
not doomed to ignorance. But neither are we spontaneously free. This is the arduous task of science: the
production of the knowledge of those enduring and continually active mechanisms of nature that produce
the phenomena of our world.
The tripartite understanding of reality allows us to carve out one of the main implications of
critical realism for practical research: The guiding principle of science is to uncover the structures
and processes bringing about the powers and abilities of things beyond what actually happens.
This also links the three domains to the intransitive/transitive divide. The transitive concepts
and theories of a science should correspond to the intransitive structures and mechanisms in the
domain of the real. Put plainly, scientific ideas should mirror reality, which, in turn, is more than
what can be immediately observed.
We can now summarize the position of critical realism in terms of two claims. First and fore-
most, all critical realists accept the ontological position of broader philosophical realism: ontolog-
ical realism. A natural and social world exist out there independent of our individual knowledge
(Kneer 2009, p. 11; Tang 2011, p. 24; Bhaskar 2008, p. 12; Byrne 1998, p. 37). This does not nec-
essarily entail that all things are reducible to physical entities.3 However, materialist entities have
ontological priority (Tang 2011, 217f) over social facts. Everything that exists either purely consists
of or ontologically depends on material matter.
The independence claim states that the external world exists independently of human percep-
tion. Questions of epistemology and ontology need to be kept separate. In contrast, empiricism
and interpretivism emphasize epistemology. The former does so by arguing that all we can be
sure of is what we perceive, while the latter states that what we see is largely constructed. This
leads to deep ontological skepticism. Critical realism builds instead on the idea of an observer-
independent reality. Only if the world exists independently of our perception of it can we reject
the claim that ontology can be reduced to epistemology (Bhaskar 2008, pp. 5, 26–35). Its acceptance
itself is thus a prerequisite to distinguishing between ontology and epistemology. To collapse both
spheres would be to commit the epistemic fallacy. This constitutes the topic of the next subsection.
3.2 A Critique of Humean Empiricism
In order to carve out the position of critical realism, it helps to demarcate it fromHumean Empiri-
cism.We focus on the notion of causality as it lies at the heart of explanation and is thus of greatest
importance for the conceptual and empirical analysis in subsequent chapters. Most importantly,
critical realism rejects the idea that causality can be defined as a constant conjunction of events. In
contrast, it favors a mechanistic approach arguing that causal power emerges from the intrinsic
structure of an entity.
The following first presents the general idea of critical realists’ criticism of Humean empiri-
cism. Subsequently, the discussion is narrowed down to the issue of causality.
3.2.1 The Epistemic Fallacy
The general idea of critical realists’ criticism of Humean empiricism is that the latter reduces
questions regarding the state of being to questions of how to obtain knowledge. The main target
is the Humean idea that since we are not able to gain knowledge of anything but of individual
sensations, we have to arrive at a concept of being via sense-perception. Two quotations elucidate
this position:
There is no impression nor idea of any kind, of which we have any consciousness or memory, that is not
conceived as existent; and it is evident, that from this consciousness the most perfect idea and assurance of
being is derived (Hume 2012, p. I.II.VI).
[S]ince all our perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing else in the universe, they
are also distinct and separable, and may be considered as separately existent, and may exist separately,
and have no need of any thing else to support their existence. They are, therefore, substances, as far as
this definition explains a substance. Thus neither by considering the first origin of ideas, nor by means of a
definition are we able to arrive at any satisfactory notion of substance; which seems to me a sufficient reason
for abandoning utterly that dispute concerning the materiality and immateriality of the soul, and makes me
absolutely condemn even the question itself. We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a perception. A
substance is entirely different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance (ibid., p. I.IV.V).
3Just because intransitive objects exist apart from our individual perception and idea of them does not entail that they
are reducible to physical particles. For instance, social facts such as ’democracy’ or ’conflict’ have an existence apart from
their material constituents although they would cease to exist without any materialist entities on which they supervene.
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In these passages, discussing the existence of an immaterial soul, Hume recommends aban-
doning the inquiry into the quality of observer-independent entities, as these are not perceivable.
He transfers the inquiry into the nature of the being of the world to an inquiry based on our per-
ceptions. Put differently, Hume substitutes questions of ontology with questions of epistemology,
which Bhaskar (2008, p. 26) describes as epistemic fallacy: “the view that statements about being
can be reduced to or analyzed in terms of statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological ques-
tions can always be transposed into epistemological terms.” Put plainly, the Humean view does
not take account of entities beyond our perception.
From this emerges an ontology that is wholly centered on events. Hume is a realist pertaining
to the empirical, as well as an anti-realist pertaining to the domain of the real (including causal
mechanisms) and intransitive entities.4
In contrast, critical realism argues that the realm of knowledge is logically and temporally
prior to the realm of being (ibid., pp. 29–30). Critical realists’ arguments against the Humean
position are most clearly stated and bear the greatest consequence for methodology in the context
of causality. This is the topic of the following section.
3.2.2 Causality and the Status of Theories
What does it mean to say ‘A caused B’? The question of causality lies at the heart of scientific
explanation. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between correlational and mechanistic ap-
proaches to causality (Bhaskar 1978; Elster 1989; Gerring 2005, 2010; Glennan 1996; Harre 1970,
1972; Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Reiss 2009). This subsection discusses the origin of correla-
tional approaches in Humean empiricism (cf. Maniacs 2006; Millican 2009). Subsection 3.2.3 then
presents a realist critique.
For Hume, causality lies in the repeated experience of spatially and temporally close objects:
“the constant conjunction of objects constitutes the very essence of cause and effect” (Hume
2012, p. I.IV.V). Causality is that we repeatedly perceive A shortly before and spatially close to
B. Causality is thus an idea derived from successive sense-perceptions and not a property inde-
pendent of human thought (Collier 1994, pp. 7–12, 74–75; Lorkowski n.d.; Bhaskar 2008, pp. 23–
26, 54; Hartwig 2008, p. xvi). This implies—against the mechanistic approach defended here—
that we cannot grasp causality by exclusively examining the potentially causing entity. There is
no such thing as a causal mechanism. Instead, we have to experience cause and effect and we have
to do so repeatedly.
Hume (2012, p. I.III.XIV) derives his idea of causality from more abstract epistemological ar-
guments:
What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together. (...) [A]s
we have no idea, that is not derived from an impression, we must find some impression, that gives rise to
this idea of necessity, if we assert we have really such an idea. In order to this I consider, in what objects
necessity is commonly supposed to lie; and finding that it is always ascribed to causes and effects, I turn my
eye to two objects supposed to be placed in that relation; and examine them in all the situations, of which
they are susceptible. I immediately perceive, that they are contiguous in time and place, and that the object
we call cause precedes the other we call effect. In no one instance can I go any farther, nor is it possible for
me to discover any third relation betwixt these objects. I therefore enlarge my view to comprehend several
instances; where I find like objects always existing in like relations of contiguity and succession.
In this passage, Hume argues that since all our knowledge is rooted in sense-perception we
need to derive our account of causality from it. His account of causality bases on the idea of
contiguity in time and space and temporal succession.
Turning his view to mental processes, he describes how the mind links successive sensations
to form an idea of causality via the resemblance of the various occurrences. The psychological
processes that lead to the idea of causality are purely based on experiences which “make their
passage into the mind by the common channels of sensation or reflection” (ibid., p. I.III.XIV). In
the same section, Hume explicitly renounces the idea of causality as an inherent power of objects.
It reads as a direct refusal of mechanistic accounts.
[T]he supposition of an efficacy in any of the known qualities of matter is entirely without foundation.
This presumption must encrease upon us, when we consider, that these principles of substantial forms,
4Current research has not agreed upon whether Hume is to be read as an anti-realist. Four interpretations exist (cf.
Hakkarainen 2007, pp. 282–293): (1) Hume denied the existence of intransitive entities, (2) Hume allows for the existence
of intransitive entities; (3) Hume was skeptical about intransitive entities and refrained from a statement on the reality
of intransitive objects; (4) Hume has changed his view over time and thus needs to be interpreted periodically. All four
interpretations are still debated (cf. Hakkarainen 2007; Kail 2008; Loeb 2008; Malherbe 2008; Millican 2009; Price 1940).
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Figure 3.1: Hume’s concept of causation.
and accidents, and faculties, are not in reality any of the known properties of bodies, but are perfectly
unintelligible and inexplicable. (...) [T]he ultimate force and efficacy of nature is perfectly unknown to us,
and that it is in vain we search for it in all the known qualities of matter.
This culminates in his two definitions of cause:
We may define a CAUSE to be ’An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects
resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble
the latter.’ If this definition be esteemed defective, because drawn from objects foreign to the cause, we may
substitute this other definition in its place, viz. ’A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another,
and so united with it, that the idea, of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the
impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other’ (Hume 2012, p. I.III.XIV).
The first of the two definitions gives an account of the objects of sense-perception happening
in succession, while the second elaborates on the processes of the mind that link these successive
sensations to form the idea of causality via the resemblance of the various occurrences.
Figure 3.1 illustrates both definitions. We perceive the conjoined occurrence of like objects
where the individual instances are independent from one another. Our mind then forms the idea
of necessity. Both definitions of cause thus work in conjunction. Causality is reduced to the re-
peated succession of sense-perceptions that are spatially and temporally close. Where conjunc-
tions are constant, i.e. appear repeatedly, individuals begin to see the connection between events
(cf. Millican 2009).
This inductive reasoning, that causality is a product of our imagination resulting from suc-
cessive sense-perception, lies at the very bottom of the empiricist account of causality. And it is
this idea of causality that underlies the empiricist methodology dominant in current research.
It underlies all methods aiming to infer causality exclusively by observing the co-occurrence of
hypothesized causes and effects.
The Humean definition of causality is clearly at odds with the mechanistic approach since
Hume’s view is anti-realistic as far as causal power is concerned.5 Causality is not defined as
a mind-independent property, but as something psychologically ascribed to objects of sense-
perception. The following presents the critical realist critique of the Humean argument. It makes
an argument about the world beyond our perception even though perception is our exclusive
entrance to the external world.
3.2.3 The Transcendental Argument
Until this point, we have set out the broader positions of critical realism and Humean empiricism.
This subsection presents arguments against the Humean account of causality.
5In the context of causality, we find a similar debate on the correct interpretation of Hume’s writings as above. Some
argue that Hume proposed the existence of causal powers as intransitive objects (cf. Strawson 2002), i.e. inherent in ob-
jects apart from regular succession or the perception thereof. Others argue that he is to be understood as anti-realist (cf.
Millican 2009). A third position claims that he takes a middle ground as skeptic or agnostic about the world beyond sense-
perception (Kail 2008). We follow the interpretation of Hume as being non-realist toward the idea of causal power (“the
Old Hume interpretation” (Millican 2009)), as it appears to me as the most plausible position. In addition it aligns with the
critical realist critique and—inmore pragmatic terms—facilitates a clearer understanding of both positions. Consequently,
we exclusively rely on Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature to illustrate his argument, while proponents of the “NewHume
interpretation” often rely on his Enquiry.
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One argument in favor of the critical realist approach is a transcendental argument brought
forward by Bhaskar (2008).6 Departing from a widely accepted statement P (minor premise), it is
shown, that another claim Q needs to be true for the uncontroversial claim P to be possible (major
premise). The conclusion then establishes the truth of the more controversial claim Q (see Fig. 3.2)
(Bhaskar 1979, pp. 5–11; McWherter 2012, p. 224).7
Major Premise: Only if Q then P
Minor Premise: P
Conclusion: Q
Figure 3.2: The structure of transcendental arguments (adopted from McWherter (2012, p. 224).
Bhaskar’s uses this argumentative figure to establish that causal laws are irreducible to human
perception (intransitive) and regularities of events (structured) (cf. Bhaskar 2008, pp. 20–26; cf.
McWherter 2012) (see Fig. 3.3). From the transcendental argument follows a very fundamental
ontological fact about the world: the distinction between real objects, events, and our perception.
The argument is ontological, not epistemological, in that it asks ‘howmust theworld be for science
to be possible?’ instead of ’what can we know of the world?’ (Bhaskar 2008, p. 13; Bryant 2011,
p. 43).
The argument departs from a widely shared minor premise: i.e. “(i) that men are causal agents
capable of interfering with the course of nature and (ii) that experimental activity, the planned
disruption of the course of nature, is a significant feature of science” (Bhaskar 2008, p. 44). The
argument thus requires us to accept that in experiments, scientists are not passive observers, but
trigger the mechanisms of interest under the conditions of closure. Setting up an experiment is
a causal interference in the world that is necessary for a certain sequence of events to occur. (cf.
ibid., pp. 1, 21, 23, 43–44). Moreover, for the argument to be valid, experiments need to be consid-
ered important for science. This minor premise is arguably widely shared, although it seems to
primarily focus on the scientific practice in the natural sciences. Before proposing an extension of
the argument below, however, we proceed with the original argument.
The main argumentative step establishes that for the minor premise to be true, we must nec-
essarily accept that causal laws exist even when they are not experienced and are not manifested
in events (ibid., pp. 19, 25–26, 42). This contrasts with the Humean view that laws are defined
as (experienced) constant conjunctions. Neither a constant conjunction nor the occurrence of any
event is necessary for causal laws to exist. If, for instance, no atomic bomb had ever exploded, we
could still theorize about its causal power to induce a self-propagating chain reaction. There is no
constitutive relation between empirical regularities and causal laws.
Indeed, causal laws are often ‘out of phase’ (Bhaskar 1979, p. 35) with events. This is because
in open systems, i.e. outside the experimental setting, mechanisms interfere and counteract each
other and, consequently, sequences of events do not occur in a regular fashion (Bhaskar 2008,
pp. 46, 84). Experiments, in contrast, take place in ‘quasi’-closed systems where external influ-
ences on the working of the mechanism under analysis is precluded as good as possible so that
processes can be observed in isolated fashion (cf. Collier 1994, pp. 33–34). Experimental closure is
thus a means to make causal laws visible via the regularity of events. If open and closed systems
were completely different, we would not be able to derive any meaningful insight from experi-
ments (Collier 1994, pp. 34–36; McWherter 2012, p. 205). If open systems were similar to closed
systems, experiments would be redundant (McWherter 2012, p. 205). The transcendental argu-
ment establishes that causal power and mechanisms are at work in open and in closed systems
alike, although in the former they may exist without being realized. And experiments only make
sense if findings remain valid outside the experimental setting.
6 For a detailed re-construction the transcendental argument see McWherter (2012), Collier (1994, pp. 31–41), Bryant
(2011, pp. 42–52), and Clarke (2010a). For a critical discussion see Kaidesoja (2015) and the debate in Clarke (2010b),
Elder-Vass (2015), McWherter (2015), and Ylikoski (2015)
7 The general form of the argument is deductive because the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. How-
ever, the argument puts ‘the cart before the horse’ because central interest lies not on establishing the truth of the conclu-
sion but rather of the major premise.
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Major Premise: Only if (1) causal laws exist independently of our concepts, ideas, and
perception of them (intransitive), and (2) causal laws are distinct from and possibly out of
phase with patterns of events (structured), experiments are intelligible
Minor Premise: Experimental activity is intelligible
Conclusion: Causal laws are intransitive and structured.
Figure 3.3: Bhaskar’s transcendental argument (own figure adapted from Bhaskar 2008, pp. 20–26, 42; cf.
Clarke 2010a; McWherter 2012).
We can turn around the argument to refute the “misidentification of causal laws with their
empirical grounds” (Bhaskar 1979, p. 12). If we accept that experimenters are able to trigger a
certain sequence of events in experiments and belief in the empiricist definition of causal laws as
constant conjunctions, it follows that scientists create rather than discover causal laws (Bhaskar
2008, pp. 23–24). “[I]t lies within the power of every reasonably intelligent schoolboy or moder-
ately clumsy research worker to upset the results of even the best designed experiment, but we
do not thereby suppose they have the power to overturn the laws of nature.”(ibid., p. 24). Con-
sequently, if the existence of laws hinged on regularities and regularities can be influenced to the
liking of the experimenter, statements about laws would become arbitrary and lose their scientific
significance.
3.2.4 The Transcendental Argument in the Social Sciences
The transcendental argument departs from the minor premise that experiments play a significant
role in scientific research. Arguably, this applies only to a limited extent to social science research
where experiments are seldomly conducted due to financial, practical, or ethical reasons. This
section, however, argues that a critical realist ontology remains valid for observational studies as
well.
First of all, experiments do play a role in the social sciences (cf. Dunning 2012). Natural ex-
periments allow insight into causal relations because some natural process assigns units of ob-
servation (quasi-)randomly into treatment and control group. Thus, experimental closure cannot
only be obtained by active intervention but also by selecting cases in which the natural course
of events led to a quasi-experimental setting. What counts as a natural experiment depends on
whether assignment is independent of confounding variables.
The very act of qualifying natural experiments as specifically meaningful for scientific infer-
ence and as superior to less focused observation presupposes that some causal relation exists that
does not directly translate into empirical patterns. Natural experiments only make sense if causal
relations are somewhat hidden in empirical patterns. Qualifying a certain course of events as a
natural experiment presupposes assumptions about the causal structure under analysis; where
this causal structure cannot be inferred from the course of events itself. Hence, the act of qualify-
ing a natural experiment as insightful requires assumptions that go beyond mere observation.
Although natural experiments are without doubt helpful for causal inference, they play a mi-
nor role in practical research. The general line of reasoning, however, can be extended to obser-
vational research by showing that widely employed and accepted strategies of causal inference
presuppose knowledge about causal structures that cannot be extracted from observation alone.
Put differently, the following argues that current methodological practices require us to accept a
real definition of cause.
In comparative observational research, causal inference–at least within the empirical-analytical
framework–always involves conditioning to decrease confounding bias: To isolate the statistical
relation between two variables, we account for factors that might blur this relation. Examples
are the selection of control variables in multiple regression or the stratification of data in match-
ing techniques (Morgan and Winship 2007). Case selection strategies likewise follow this logic by
selecting cases that are particularly (dis)similar (Mill 1882). Qualitative Comparative Analysis ap-
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X Y
Z
Figure 3.4: Directed acyclic graph representing a causal model with a cause X, an effect Y, and a confounder
Z.
plies conditioning by performing set-theoretic methods (Ragin 1987). All these approaches have
in common that the very process of isolating a relation requires us to know from what other pro-
cesses we need to isolate the effect. To more clearly illustrate this point, we can draw on recently
influential strategies of causal inference: the potential-outcome framework presented by Holland
(1985), Neyman (1923), and Rubin (1974) and Pearl’s (2000) ‘modern analysis of causation’. Pearl
(ibid.) develops an extensive formal logic describing how we can identify causal relations from
observational data based on causal models. For our purpose, a very simple example conveys the
logic.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the notion of confounding by means of a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
The DAG illustrates a hypothesized causal model between three phenomena: a cause X, an effect
Y, and a confounder Z. For instance, X might stand for the indicator of a barometer, Y for bad
weather, and Z for atmospheric pressure. Assuming this causal structure, we can derive from
the model that controlling for Z allows identifying the causal effect of X on Y. In our example,
controlling for atmospheric pressure would reveal that there is no causal relation between the
indicator of a barometer and the weather. Had we not included Z in our causal model we would
have inferred a relation between the indicator of a barometer and the weather.
Statistically speaking, conditioning on certain variables simply produces different estimates
thanwhat wewould gain from an unconditioned view. Put differently, our estimate of the relation
X→ Y, e.g. a regression coefficient, varies depending on Z. As Simpson’s paradox (Simpson 1951)
illustrates, we can even manipulate the estimate at will by choosing Z.
If we accept that conditioning to reduce confounding bias is an important scientific practice,
take into account the variability of estimates in dependence of the chosen covariates, and under-
stand causal relations as constant conjunctions, it follows that whoever determines the choice of
covariates at the same time determines causal relations. Were causal laws constant conjunctions
and constant conjunctions in the form of conditional probabilities derived from observational
data are at the discretion of researchers (by choosing Z or by selecting cases), we would have to
admit that causal relations are relative to what we belief to be our causal model. This implies a
subjective and relativist view of causal relations.
All approaches that base causal inference on a strategy of controlling for confounders neces-
sarily require the formulation of causal models representing a belief in causal relations governing
the phenomenon under analysis. Thus, whether we regard an estimate as scientifically relevant,
i.e. whether we think that it reveals to us true facts about the world, hinges on our justification of
the set of chosen covariates. But this justification is not something we can derive from the data.
At its core, confounding is not a statistical concept (Pearl 2000). Causal models always refers to
objects beyond our data. Causal inference based on conditioning requires us to accept that causal
laws cannot be reduced to constant conjunctions. The very motivation of creating artificial closure
through careful case selection or conditional probabilities only makes sense if we accept causal
relations to be more than correlated events. Hence, the intelligibility of quasi-experimental ap-
proaches and conditioning strategies requires us to accept arguments that refer to ontological
relations beyond the actual.
The modern strategies of inference have made their way to philosophy and thus to more fun-
damental investigations of the notion of cause. Woodward (2003, p. 59) draws on the notion of
manipulation to define causation:8
“A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) direct cause of Y with respect to a variable
set V is that there be a possible intervention on X that will change Y or the probability distribution of Y
when one holds fixed at some value all other variables Zi in V .
8According to the above definition, we here focus on direct causes in contrast to total causes (see Woodward 2003,
pp. 45–61).
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This definition conveys the same basic logic as as the more methodologically oriented ap-
proaches by Holland (1985), Pearl (2000), and Rubin (1974). The causal relation between X and
Y somewhat depends on a set of variables Z which lie on alternative causal paths between the
hypothesized cause and the hypothesized effect. We have seen above that the identification of the
causal relation X → Y hinges on controlling for Z. Knowing Z is necessary to identify the direct
causal relation X → Y. However, Woodward even goes one step further. Transferring method-
ological insights to a philosophical definition of causes he defines causes as existing relative to a
set of variables, i.e. relative to Z.
The identification of Z, however, lies beyond the possibilities of the presented approaches. We
cannot infer the set of confounding variables with the same techniques, i.e. by re-applying the
strategy of identifying X → Y. This would only move rather than solve the problem leading to a
circular argument. The adequacy of Z cannot be judged based on the strategies of causal inference
themselves. The fact that the manipulationist framework provides no answer on what constitutes
causation disqualifies it as a real definition of causation. Clearly, the manipulationist approach to
causation is very useful in showing how we might think of causation in actualist terms. It does
not, however, define what causation is.
To sum up, the transcendental argument rejects the view that causality is an idea derived from
or defined by constant conjunctions. We have argued that it is necessary that causal power ex-
ists apart from our perception and concepts by investigating the premises of experimental scien-
tific analysis and conditioning strategies in comparative empirical research. Holland (1985), Pearl
(2000), Rubin (1974), and Woodward (2003) provide guidance on how to retrieve evidence of
causal relations from observational data. However, all statements about causal relations derived
from applying these approaches remain conditional on ontological assumptions that lie beyond
these approaches. The approaches are thus methodologically but not ontologically informative.
Causality is more than an idea derived from constant conjunctions. This surely complicates re-
search practice. Pragmatic considerations, however, should not be among the prime criteria to
guide our research. To the contrary, scientific progress hinges on adequate and congruent posi-
tions in ontology, epistemology, and methodology. What is needed is an ontological investigation
of causation. This constitutes the aim of the next section.
3.3 The Causal Power of Things
An adequate concept of causality is of paramount importance as causal statements not only form
the core of theories, but also constitute the main object to be discovered or tested in method-
ological approaches. In the following, we present a critical realist account of causality as well as
investigate the concept of theory.
From what has been argued above, we can surmise that causality should not be defined based
on events (the Empirical) or objects of sense-perception (the Actual). Moreover, if causal lawswere
unconditional statements about regularities, there would be no or very few candidates for such
laws in the social sciences since constant conjunctions are an absolute exception in open social
systems. If causal powers were to only exist in closed systems, they would be meaningless with
regard to open social systems. The alternative is to understand causal statements not as empirical
statements but as statements about stable dispositions of objects or systems (Bartelborth 2007),
as ‘normic’ or ‘transfactual’ statements (Bhaskar 2008, p. 82) existing in open and closed systems
alike.
Given the importance of the term, the definition of ‘causal powers’ in Bhaskar (ibid.) is rather
vague.9 It basically rests on four concepts: structures, powers, tendencies, and generative mecha-
nisms (Collier 1994, cf.). In order to obtain a clearer and reduced account of causality, we simplify
and clarify this terminology in the following.
9 In retrospective, Bhaskar (1979, p. 187) spoke of the ambiguity and lack of clarity in his demarcation of terms as a way
to make his research program more accessible: “So one gives, as it were, a multiplicity of routes into the new network, in
the hope that the reader will get a feel for it. Here again, though, when the shades of night fall, one ought to be able to see
how the different terms ‘hang together’.”
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3.3.1 Structures, Natural Kinds, and the Role of Concepts
Causal powers found on ‘structures’ (e.g. Bhaskar 2008, pp. 15, 36, 37, 46, 234).10 As the term
‘structure’ is not explicitly defined inARealist Theory of Science, we can define it here as “a set of re-
lations between elements that has some measure of coherence and stability” (Bernardi, González,
and Requena 2006, p. 162). This seems to be compatible with Bhaskar’s use of the term in the
context of atomic structures (Bhaskar 2008, p. 164; cf. Bhaskar 2008, p. 69).
Since structures belong to the domain of the real and are distinct from events (Bhaskar 2008,
pp. 25–26, 42, 96), we cannot describe the structure of an entity by referring to events. Indeed, it is
just the opposite: We should derive implications about the behavior of objects from an analysis of
their structure. This implies that conceptualization precedes the formulation of theory and careful
definitions are essential parts of causal inference.
Intrinsic structure define natural kinds. Natural kinds are groups of things that share causal
properties (Bartelborth 2007, pp. 94–95). Thus, natural kinds are things behaving similarly in sim-
ilar situations. They are ‘natural’ because the kinds reflect observer-independent similarities. If
we are to divide the world according to natural kinds, we are not to project our interest upon it.
Instead, classifications of natural kinds aim to mirror the real structure of the world.11
Natural kinds allow for both the differentiation between dissimilar entities as well as for the
aggregation of like entities (Bhaskar 2008, p. 229). Consequently, the “justification of our systems
of taxonomy, of the ways we classify things, of the nominal essences of things in science thus lies
in our belief in their fruitfulness in leading us to explanations in terms of the generative mecha-
nisms contained in their real essences. Not all ways of classifying things are equally promising;
because not all sets of properties individuate just one and only one kind of thing” (ibid., p. 201).
Natural kinds are thus of great importance for the process of classification.
3.3.2 Power and Tendencies
When investigating the causal powers of an entity, we are not primarily interested in the entirety
of possible acts that entity is able to perform, but rather in what it ‘tends’ to do. Gurr (1974, p. 317),
for instance, differentiates between ‘capacity for violence’ and ‘need for violence’. He argues that
while all men biologically possess the capacity for violence, this does not pertain to the need for
violence. While the capacity for violence may be biologically given, the need for violence would
denote a specific disposition. To capture these disparities, we can differentiate between ‘power’
and ‘tendency’. Power describes the entirety of all actions an entity is able to perform in virtue of
having a specific structure (Bhaskar 2008, pp. 222, 229).
A tendency, on the other hand, is an exercised power.12 Referring back to our example, all
men have the power to act violently; nevertheless, few actually have the tendency to do so.
3.3.3 Generative Mechanism
Researchers in the social sciences increasingly call for the identification of causal mechanism’. In
discussions and reviews, the call for mechanisms is often expressed in breadth with the warning
not to equate causality and correlation. If mechanisms provide a cure to the problems of correla-
tional analyses, their meaning should be made clear. However, in spite of–or even perhaps due
to–the popularity of the term, a clear definition is amiss Smith (2006). Hedström and Ylikoski
(2010) and Gerring (2010), for instance, identify nine or ten different definitions of mechanism,
respectively.13
10 In his definition of causal power, Bhaskar draws on Harre (1970) and Harré and Madden (1975) who speak of ‘pow-
erful particulars’.
11 The realist interpretation of natural kinds is disputed: “The concept of natural kinds, as just circumscribed, is entirely
non-committal as to the issue of scientific realism. Natural kinds are created by a corpus of laws irrespective of whether
these laws are interpreted merely as useful but fictitious unifiers or are thought to refer to a theory-independent reality”
(Carrier 1993).
12 Bhaskar (2008, pp. 40, 88, 221, 223) introduces two different meanings of the term tendency. The differentiation be-
tween both, however, remains rather obscure, rendering it analytically deficient. Collier (1994, p. 125) argues that the
difference between the two meanings of tendency is “in degree only”. Due to the unclear demarcation of the terms, we
will drop the differentiation between the two types of tendencies. Against Fleetwood (2011), however, we do not regard
power and tendency synonymous.
13 Interestingly, Gerring criticizes the lack of clarity pertaining to the definition of the term but does not offer a solution
or new definition. This is particularly problematic as Gerring (2010, p. 1506) has a strong opinion with regard to the role
of mechanisms: “specifying and testing causal mechanisms is a universal goal, but not a requirement, of causal analysis.”
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Mechanisms play a pivotal role in the critical realist approach to explanation. They describe
how structural characteristics of things lead it to possess certain powers and tendencies. Thus,
structures and mechanisms are not synonymous (Collier 1994, p. 62). Structure describes a set of
relations among constitutive elements defining natural kinds. Mechanisms describe how powers
and tendencies emerge from the interaction of related elements. They delineate those particular
features of structures on which certain dispositions supervene.
When it comes to explanation, we would add two specifications: First, in causal explanation,
representations of mechanisms should refer to tendencies rather than the broader category of pow-
ers. While it is certainly of interest how powers come into existence, an explanation must refer to
those powers actively exerted in the respective situation. These are usually the far more interest-
ing questions in scientific research.
Second, outside the experimental setting, multiple mechanisms interfere with one another and
thusmight cancel out or reinforce each other. This is one reasonwhy tendencies do not necessarily
lead to certain events. Explaining phenomena thus includes a discussion of how different mecha-
nisms interact.
By breaking up sequences of events in ever more detail, we might come closer to mechanisms.
But these are not mechanisms. Such an approach to mechanisms easily leads to an infinite regress.
What counts as an adequate explanation for some, might be regarded grossly oversimplified for
others. Moreover, simply describing processes ever more precisely does not preclude us from
mistakenly depicting correlations for causation. Adequate explanation needs to refer to the inner
working of objects bringing about tendencies and possible interactions of such objects. Hence,
mechanisms are constitutively tied to objects and not descriptions of sequences of events.
A complete explanation that draws on mechanisms necessarily involves the following four
steps:
1. identification of entities involved
2. analysis of internal structure of the involved entities
3. identification of mechanism that detail how tendencies emerge from the structure
4. analysis of interaction of tendencies.
This, in turn, again emphasizes the great importance of comprehensive concepts. They are an
indispensable part of every adequate scientific explanation.
In summary, we adopt the following definitions:
• Structures describe the arrangement of particles within a single entity.
• Powers describe the entirety of natural possibilities of an entity to act. They emerge from an
entity’s internal structure.
• Tendencies denote those powers that are exercised, active, and primarily at work due to a
specific state of process of the underlying structure of the respective entity.
• Mechanisms describe those processes or states of structures that bring about tendencies.
Causal connections exist in the domain of the Real. Once actualized, they might lead to events
in the domain of the Empirical, although an empirical regularity is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition to speak of a causal power. These events might then be observed by researcher
in the Actual. Hence, critical realism argues that causal powers should not be reduced to empirical
regularities.
3.3.4 Causality in Critical Realism and Empiricism
Having now described the critical realists’ approach to explanation, what difference does it make?
To conclude this discussion and make the differences more explicit, we can now refer back to the
empiricist perspective.
Interestingly, Hume (2012, p. I.III.XIV) somehow ‘anticipated’ the argumentation of critical
realism. He formulated a self-critique, which bears great similarity to the account of causal powers
as attributes of entities. The passage is of great interest, as it presents Hume’s ‘answer’ to the
critical realist account to causal explanation.
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Figure 3.5: The critical realist approach to causation.
What! the efficacy of causes lie in the determination of the mind! As if causes did not operate entirely
independent of the mind, and would not continue their operation, even though there was no mind existent
to contemplate them, or reason concerning them. Thought may well depend on causes for its operation,
but not causes on thought. This is to reverse the order of nature, and make that secondary, which is really
primary. To every operation there is a power proportioned; and this power must be placed on the body, that
operates. If we remove the power from one cause, we must ascribe it to another: But to remove it from all
causes, and bestow it on a being, that is no ways related to the cause or effect, but by perceiving them, is a
gross absurdity, and contrary to the most certain principles of human reason.
I can only reply to all these arguments, that the case is here much the same, as if a blind man should pretend
to find a great many absurdities in the supposition, that the colour of scarlet is not the same with the sound
of a trumpet, nor light the same with solidity. If we have really no idea of a power or efficacy in any object,
or of any real connexion betwixt causes and effects, it will be to little purpose to prove, that an efficacy is
necessary in all operations. We do not understand our own meaning in talking so, but ignorantly confound
ideas, which are entirely distinct from each other.
In Hume’s view, critical realists make claims about entities that are not perceivable. More
specifically, Hume criticizes that critical realists falsely attribute causal powers to things that are
not perceivable per se but rather solely exist as successive sense perceptions. Following the crit-
ical realists’ critique of Humean empiricism, however, we have argued above that questions of
causality cannot be reduced to regularities. Instead, causality is a tendency of objects. Constant
conjunctions are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for a causal power to exist.
This is certainly not to say that empirical regularities are of no value in the process of scientific
discovery. On the contrary: the identification of laws often starts with the observation of empirical
regularities. However, where the empiricist stops with the identification of constant conjunctions,
the critical realist might take them as one possible point of departure to investigate in mecha-
nisms and tendencies of the object in question. An identification of causal powers thus does not
stop at—nor does it necessarily involve—observation, but rather always involves the theoretical
work of conceptualizing the entity of interest (Bhaskar 2008, p. 169). Most importantly, causality
and regularities are not equated. Researchers necessarily need to go beyond both that which is
perceived and that which happens.
What is then the goal of scientific analyses in the social sciences? First and foremost, it should
not be the ‘identification of laws’. This is because the notion of law—widely understood as “gen-
eral and unexceptional connections between specified characteristics of events” (Hempel and Op-
penheim 1965, p. 139)—is deeply linked to constant conjunctions. And even if we accepted the aim
of searching for laws, we would not expect to find any in the social sciences.
An alternative would be to introduce long lists of boundary conditions for a specific law to
hold. This, however, would lead to conceptual stretching of the term ‘law’ and would put a lot of
weight on the respective conditions (cf. Woodward 2003, p. 183).
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Rather, we should abstain from the search for laws and instead focus on the identification
of causal powers in the sense aforenamed.14 With regard to the implications of this proposition
for practical scientific research, we would like to highlight two consequences of critical realist
ontology. These two points will serve both to summarize and condense statements and findings
made thus far into an applicable research process.
• Critical realist ontology emphasizes the importance of comprehensive conceptualizations
of the objects under investigation. Concepts are not just useful heuristic devices. Based
on systematic empirical observation, adequate concepts correspond to the real observer-
independent entities. Concrete requirements for adequate real definitions are developed in
chapter 6.
• Valid conceptualizations and classifications give an understanding of the causal properties
of the objects under investigation. Statements of laws refer to the mechanisms that generate
tendencies. Valid explanations of events refer to the combined effects of the mechanisms
and tendencies of the involved objects. The conditions of what counts as an adequate expla-
nation are elaborated in section 5.2.
3.4 Critical Realism in Social Science
The discussion thus far has addressed critical realism without a specific focus on the social sci-
ences. This section sets out critical realism in the social sciences (cf. Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1979;
Collier 1994; Lawson 1997; Outhwaite 1987). The main focus in this subsection, and most of the
following chapter 4, rests upon what constitutes the objects under investigation in the social
science—individual intentions, social facts, and social structures—and how they are related.
In anticipation thereof, critical realism does not make a fundamental distinction between the
explanation of social and natural phenomena (Bhaskar 1979, p. 3). This does not imply that social
scientists should blindly emulate the natural sciences: the double-hermeneutic is an integral part
of the social sciences (Giddens 1984). An alternative would be to argue for a purely hermeneu-
tical approach. This, however, would be just as inadequate as to emulate the natural sciences, as
the objects populating the social world are not exhaustively characterized by the meaning human
beings assign to it (Bhaskar 1979, pp. 149–150; cf. King 1999).15 Most importantly, an approach
purely focusing on individual subjective meaning would deprive the social sciences of the possi-
bility to objectively analyze, compare, and criticize interpretations. If the social worldwerewholly
subjective, it would lack any objective basis, which might constitute a point of reference for the
scientific debate.
We follow a via media: Specific procedures are needed to take the “non-natural surplus”
(Bhaskar 1979, p. 27) of social objects into account. As will be shown in chapter 4, intentional-
ity is the single most important constitutive element separating the natural and the social world.
Consequently, a modified—though not radically different—scientific approach to the study of so-
cial facts is needed. As in the natural sciences, the objects under investigation in the social sciences
are intransitive: They exist independently of our individual researchers’ perspective. Surely, so-
cial facts, such as a conflict or a specific norm, might depend on mental representations. Once
they exist, however, such instances of social facts can be analyzed like objects. Thus, although the
objects in the natural and the social sciences radically differ in how they are made up, both are
objects that can be scientifically studied by referencing to powers, tendencies, and mechanisms
(ibid., pp. 24–26).
Most fundamental for explanations in the social sciences is the definition of and the relation
between structure and agency. The following subsection 3.4.1 defines both terms. Subsequently,
section 3.4.2 discusses an argument in favor of the independent existence of a social structure.
Finally, section 3.4.3 comprises a critical discussion of this argument. There we argue that an
account of social facts should be based on a broader notion of intentionality that not only includes
activity, but also intentional states of mind.
14 In the above discussion, we attempted to avoid the term ‘law’. Regarding the cases in which it was used, this was
due to terminological consistency with the cited works.
15Bhaskar (1979) primarily attacks the ‘Winchian paradigm’ (cf. Winch 1959) as representative of the hermeneutic tra-
dition. The discussion continues today with King (1999), who consequently criticizes Bhaskar’s discussion of Whinch as
inadequate.
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At the most basic level, the reality of social objects justifies the unity of method in the social
and natural sciences. If social objects are real just like molecules, natural and social sciences share
fundamental commonalities. To establish the reality of social objects, Bhaskar (cf. 1979, pp. 31–32)
takes the following argumentative steps.
1. Human agency as intentional activity presupposes social structure.
2. Social structure is irreducible to intentional agency and vice versa.
3. Social structure and individual agency stand in a mutual causal relationship.
4. Therefore social structure and intentional agency are autonomous from one another and
both real.
In the following, we discuss these arguments in detail.
3.4.1 Definition of Agency and Structure
Before reaching further elaboration on the notion of agency in section 4.5, we can define agency
here as the performance of intentional action (Davidson 1963).
The notion of structure is ubiquitous in social science and thereby remains one of the lat-
ter’s fundamental concepts (Sewell 1992). Its definition requires more elaboration. Fundamen-
tally, structure refers to “a set of relations between elements that has some measure of coherence
and stability” (Bernardi, González, and Requena 2006, p. 162). This reveals three fundamental
properties of structures: Structures (1) consist of elements, (2) that are related (3) with a certain
amount of permanency. Transferring this definition to the realm of the social, we can define so-
cial structure as the entirety of stable patterns of relations between positions. Scott (2011, p. 145)
expresses this with great clarity16:
To talk of the ’structure’ of a society is to refer to recurrent patterns of activity that endure over considerable
periods of time, despite a continuous turnover in the particular people undertaking them. A social structure
is the enduring pattern of arrangement among the individual members of a group; it is the anatomy of a
population considered as a social body. (...) Individuals can be said to occupy positions’ or places within a
social structure, and so a social structure is a set of connections among positions rather than simply among
the individuals who occupy them.
The quote explicates an important distinction between appearance and constitution of struc-
ture. When talking about structure, one refers to ‘patterns of activity’. This is how we perceive
structures: As manifested in what people do. Patterns of activity, however, are not structure. At
any point in time, social structures exist independently of practices.
In its essence, the term social structure denotes relatively stable arrangement of related social
positions. Positions describe slots in the social structure to which specific powers and liabilities
are attached through shared acceptance in society.17 By occupying positions, individuals have—
with or without their knowledge—the position-related powers at their disposal. This is not to
say that it would be false to speak of a ‘structure’ to describe relations between individuals. Spe-
cific individuals and the way they were related, i.e. a specific inter-individual structure, can be
of great explanatory value in the explanation of specific events. Likewise, fleeting relations (or
non-permanent structures) might exist and be of explanatory value in certain situations. How-
ever, it would be more adequate to investigate into the mechanisms governing specific types (or
natural kinds) of social structures, as well as to generalize generative mechanisms over and above
individual cases. This has to do, primarily, with the relative independence of structures from in-
dividuals to which we turn now.
The continuous existence of social structures rests on the fact that positions endure even if
persons change (Bhaskar 1979, p. 52; Sayer 2010, p. 63). In addition, single persons might occupy
different social positions (Blau 1977, p. 28). It is even conceivable that positions endure without
individuals occupying them. For example, in the short period between the assassination of Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy and the inauguration of Lyndon B. Johnson aboard Air Force One, the social
position ‘President of the United States’ persisted unoccupied. Even in this—admittedly short—
period of time, it was possible to analyze the position of the President, its powers and liabilities,
and to characterize its role within the wider structure of the political system of the United States.
16For a discussion of the notion of social structure from a critical realist perspective see Bhaskar (1979), Collier (1994),
Lawson (1997), Porpora (1989), and Sayer (2010).
17This definition of positions as institutional facts will be further elaborated in chapter 4.
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Another example is provided by the position of the deceased North Korean President Kim Il Sung
as ‘eternal president’. Even after his death in 1994, Kim il Sung still ‘occupies’ the position of eter-
nal President.18 Thus, although positions, to be endowed with certain powers and liabilities, are
ontologically dependent on the existence of individuals—in the given examples, the American or
North Korean people still believing in the position of the President—the existence of positions is
not dependent on the fact that they are occupied. Conversely, the same individuals might hold
multiple positions. For instance, part of a description of the structure of the German government
might refer to Angela Merkel and Sigmar Gabriel as Chancellor and Vice Chancellor, Chancellor
and Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, or as leaders of governing parties. The
same individuals occupy several positions. Likewise, as Merkel and Gabriel will leave their posi-
tions at a certain point, they are interchangeable. Others take their place and might instantiate the
same social structure. Radcliffe-Brown (1940) makes a similar point:
Throughout the life of an organism its structure is being constantly renewed; and similarly the social life
constantly renews the social structure. Thus the actual relations of persons and groups of persons change
from year to year, or even from day to day. New members come into a community by birth or immigration;
others go out of it by death or emigration. There are marriages and divorces. Friends may become enemies,
or enemies may make peace and become friends. But while the actual structure changes in this way, the
general structure may remain relatively constant over a longer or shorter period of time.
We can conclude that, to a certain degree, positions are independent from their occupants.
Thus far, we have predominantly elaborated on positions and the notion of permanency. Rela-
tions, however, are at least equally important. By analogywith the differentiation between specific
structures and ‘positional structures’, two types of relations can be discerned: Relations between
intentional subjects and relations between positions, respectively.
Relations between intentional subjects are at least constituted by mutual awareness. In other
words, a specific social relation exists where intentional subjects, those being either individu-
als or groups, take each other into account. An experimental setting modeled after the prisoner’s
dilemma provides an illustration: In a situation without direct interaction, each individual takes
the prospective decision of the respective other into account in order to minimize punishment for
himself.
Just as positions remain abstract from specific individuals, relations between positions can be
rendered abstract from concrete interaction or the ‘taking account of each other’-view of relation.
Relations between positions rather denote typical kinds of associations held between positions. Ex-
amples of such relations are domination and subordination. The position of German Chancellor,
for instance, is bestowed with the right of direction over the ministers. This serves as an instance
of a relation of dominance and can take many concrete forms ranging from overruling a minis-
ter in a cabinet decision to his or her dismissal. To a certain degree, the position of Chancellor is
defined by the fact that it stands in a relation of dominance vis-à-vis the members of cabinet.
This leads to the necessary differentiation of two types of relations: Relations can either be
constitutive for the related objects or they can be contingent (Bhaskar 1979, p. 54; Sayer 2010, p. 61;
Albert 2010b; Esfeld 2002; Schützeichel 2008). We can apply this distinction to specific and abstract
relations alike. For example, two cyclists who are riding along one another andwho are not part of
a team—an instance of an inter-individual relation—are contingently related. Each cyclist would
remain what he is, a cyclist, if he was riding alone. In contrast, the relation between landlord
and tenant—an instance of a relation between positions—is constitutive. The properties of being
a landlord and of being a tenant mutually depend on one another. The existence of constitutive
relations entails irreducibility with regard to those properties that depend on these relations. We
cannot understand the position of a landlord by disjoining him from his structural embedding. In
contrast, one can very well understand what it means to be a cyclist from an atomist perspective.
Constitutive relations thus imply irreducibility of the properties to which they give rise.19
Weaving these concepts and definitions together allows for the development of an adequate
understanding of social structure. This thesis follows a nomothetic understanding of social sci-
ence, aiming to carve out natural kinds and descriptions that are generalizable to a certain degree.
Consequently, a nomothetic understanding of science should predominantly focus on a more ab-
stract view of structure: As relatively persistent relations between positions. In contrast, Idio-
18The constitution of North Korea reads: “Under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and the Korean people will uphold the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung as the eternal President of
the Republic and carry the revolutionary cause of Juche through to completion by defending and carrying forward the
idea and achievements of Comrade Kim Il Sung” (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2009).
19This argument is an instance of a synchronic argument and will be further debated in subsection 4.4.1.
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graphic explanations might very well refer to specific relations between specific individuals. In
the explanation of specific events, these might even be preferable as they are more precise. Now
that we have a basic understanding of agency and structure, we can proceed to the question of
how both are interlinked.
3.4.2 Relation between Structure and Agency
The relation between structure and agency is the subject of extensive debate in the social sciences
(cf. Elder-Vass 2010; Giddens 1984; Kühn and Lorenz 2011; List and Spieckermann 2013).
An influential argumentative figure to describe the relation between structure and agency is
what we denote as the diachronic downward perspective. This argument is expressed in the Trans-
formational Model of Social Activity (Bhaskar 1979, pp. 39–47) and the morphogenetic approach
(Archer 1995). The argument tries to establish the independent existence of structure from agency
via reference to the structure’s pre-existence. The argument stresses the temporal sequence in the
relation of structure and agency and is thus diachronic.
Furthermore, the argument departs from thewidely acknowledged point that agency exists. In
accordance with our above definition, agency can be described as intentional behavior. Following
the argumentative figure of transcendental arguments (only if Q then P, see subsection 3.2.3), it is
then argued that individual agency must necessarily presuppose the social structure:
[T]he real problem appears to be not so much that of how one could give an individualistic explanation of
social behaviour, but that of how one could ever give a non-social (i.e., strictly individualistic) explanation
of individual, at least characteristically human, behaviour! For the predicates designating properties special
to persons all presuppose a social context for their employment. A tribesman implies a tribe, the cashing
of a cheque a banking system. Explanation, whether by subsumption under general laws, advertion to
motives and rules, or redescription (identification), always involves irreducibly social predicates (Bhaskar
1979, p. 35).
Put succinctly, social action never happens in a vacuum. To communicate people rely on the
institution of language. Acting within a society happens within existing written and unwritten
rules. Even the act of breaking with existing conventions only becomes intelligible with an un-
derstanding of existing conventions. Agency not only draws on the social structure created previ-
ously, but happens within institutions that were often shaped over long periods of time. Society
is “always ready made” (ibid., p. 42) and “pre-exists the individual” (ibid., p. 42). Thus, agency
happens within structures that are beyond the immediate influence of individuals, structures that
have been created before individual intentional action happens. Accordingly, social structure is
always formerly present where agents intentionally act. As Bhaskar (ibid., p. 42) notes, this not
only entails that structure is a logical premise, but also that it pre-exists intentional agency: “[I]f
society is always already made, then any concrete human praxis, or, if you like, act of objectiva-
tion can only modify it; and the totality of such acts sustain or change it.” Although structures
enable or constrain intentional actions, actors need not necessarily be aware of that fact. It is not
necessary to have an adequate picture of the social world for the social world to exist. In addition,
the outcome of our actions may not be intended. Nevertheless, structures may endure, enable,
and be dependent upon our actions, even without our awareness of the fact that we reproduce
this specific structure.
Following the logic of the transcendental argument, the independent existence of structure
follows from the above premises as an analytical truth. If individual intentional action exists, and
social structure is a necessary condition for its existence, then social structure must also exist.
A possible objection against the independent existence of structure from agency would be to
posit that both terms do not refer to different things, i.e. that either structure could be reframed
in terms of agency or vice versa. If we could define—and thereby reduce—social structure to in-
dividual intentional agency, then the notion of structure would be epiphenomenal. In view of the
widely shared assumption of methodological individualism, this seems the most credible threat
to the diachronic downward perspective, as well as to any other argument that builds on the relation
between structure and agency. Any multilevel argument would become tautological. The inde-
pendent existence of structure from agency is important as for something to bear causal power it
must exist. As argued in the introduction to this chapter, explanations referring to things ‘as if’
they would exist do not count as genuine explanations in the critical realist tradition.
We have seen above that structure can be regarded as objectified, or as having an object-like ex-
ternal status despite being mind-dependent. Structure constrains and enables individual agency
in a way that cannot be reduced to the latter. At the same time, structure is activity-dependent. For
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structures to exist, they must be reproduced. It is a rather obvious fact that social structure cannot
not exist without individuals (Bhaskar 1979, pp. 47–50). In other words, social structure cannot be
ontologically independent of individual agency in a sense that structure would exist without in-
dividuals. This, however, does not contradict the pre-existence of structure before agency. For the
structures that pre-exist a specific intentional act at time t were (intentionally or unintentionally)
created by intentional agency at t−1. Consequently, temporal pre-existence of structure and the
ontological dependency of structure on individuals are compatible positions.
From this discussion emerges an important point: The relation between structure and agency
can be conceived of in two different ways. The diachronic perspective investigates the relation be-
tween structure and agency over time. A diachronic argument necessarily relies on temporal
sequences. It focuses on the dependence of agency at time t on structure at time t-1 and the re-
construction of structure at t-1 through agency. The synchronic perspective, in contrast, investigates
how structure and agency are related at any instance of time. The most prominent advocates of
the diachronic perspective in critical realism are Bhaskar (ibid.) and Archer (1995). The synchronic
perspective, in contrast, has received much less attention. Following this gap in the literature,
chapter 4 specifically addresses the synchronic relation between structure and agency.
3.4.3 A Synchronic Perspective on Agency and Structure
This section sharpens the critique of the diachronic perspective and thereby links it with the fol-
lowing chapter that develops an alternative approach. The main problem with the diachronic
perspective lies in its exclusive and narrow focus on activity dependence. More appropriate, how-
ever, would be to not found structures on activity in the sense of goal-directed behavior, but rather
on intentional states of mind.
The diachronic perspective underscores the importance of activity in the colloquial sense
of ‘people doing something’. We can focus on the formulation of the diachronic perspective in
Bhaskar (1979) to illustrate this point, as it has been very influential in the subsequent debate
(Archer 1995; Collier 1994; Lawson 1997). Here, Bhaskar (1979, p. 44) formulates a quite restric-
tive definition of intentionality as “the feature that persons are material things with a degree of
neurophysiological complexity which enables them not just (...) to initiate changes in a purposeful
way, to monitor and control their performances, but to monitor the monitoring of these perfor-
mances and to be capable of commentary upon them.” This definition of intentionality is rather
narrow and focuses on goal-directed behavior and individual reflection (cf. ibid., pp. 104–105).
Specifically addressing the question of how structures are (re-)produced, Bhaskar ([1979] 2005,
p. 192) affirms the idea of activity-dependence when he argues that structures are “carried or
transported from one space-time location to another only in or in virtue of human praxis”. And
praxis, in turn, “typically consists in causally intervening in the natural (material) world, subject
to the possibility of a reflexive monitoring of that intervention” (ibid., p. 91).20
What is lacking in the diachronic perspective is that it precludes an understanding of struc-
tural persistence in the absence of activity. As activity can be spatiotemporally localized, making
it a necessary condition in the existence of structure insinuates that structures cease to exist in the
absence of activity. The argument that is elaborated in detail in the following chapter does not do
away with a concept of activity. It does, however, found the concepts of social structure and social
action on the broader concept of intentionality. It thereby adds to the debate that it is not activ-
ity or goal-directed behavior, but rather intentional states of mind that carry social structures over
time.While the emergence of social structure might necessarily rely on activity, it is not activity that
sustains it over time. Indeed, What mind-states carry structures over time are. Thus, where the
emergence of institutions may hinge on activity, the existence, reproduction, and possible change
of social institutions does not.
Two examples illustrate this argument. For instance, a social structure such as a conflict might
exist even in the absence of specific activities. Without question, some form of activity has to
occur for conflicts to emerge. Both conflict parties must become aware of the fact that they are
in conflict, meaning that only through reciprocal action can conflict occur. Moreover, conflicts are
20Bhaskar has been criticized for his narrow definition of activity (Benton 1981). The critique, however, did not focus
on the notion of activity per se. Bhaskar has subsequently conceded that the continuous existence of a structure is not
necessarily dependent on specific activities. Power structures, for instance, might exist even without being manifest in
observable conflict (Bhaskar [1979] 2005, p. 192; cf. Outhwaite 1987). They are not exclusively reproduced by activities in
which superior position enforce their will in the face of opposition. Although this is an improvement, it is not a major
retreat from the statement that structures always ground on activity.
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oftenmanifesting in specific conflict measures (whether these are perceived by researchers or not).
Nonetheless, neither the logical necessity that reciprocal activity instantiates conflicts as shared
intentional states, nor the empirical fact that conflicts are manifest in specific actions constitutes
the enduring existence of conflict hinges on activities. A conflict might well exist and endure as an
incompatibility of intentions without the conflict parties acting upon the incompatibility. Someone
who argues that activity is a necessary condition for the enduring existence of conflict would be
forced to accept that conflicts cease to exist in between two actions. This is undoubtedly not the
case. Thus, activity creates and transforms conflicts and makes them perceivable to observers. It
does not, however, constitute conflicts.
Sovereignty, as another example, is inherently relational and as such provides an adequate
example for a social structure. One cannot think of sovereignty as an intrinsic property of an
individual. The fact of being sovereign necessarily depends on the acceptance of others. At times,
however, a sovereign might not exercise his sovereignty, e.g. by giving orders or making rules.
This does not mean, however, that the person is no longer sovereign. Sovereignty may further
exist under the condition that those who obey maintain the intention to carry out the sovereign
orders.
If my interpretation of Bhaskar is accurate, then his approach needs a modification. Specifi-
cally, his stance requires further explanation for the synchronic existence of social institutions as in-
tentional states without the occurrence of an activity. Here, we followMandelbaum (1955, p. 306):
“Ideologies and banks and marriage systems do not exist unless there are aggregates of individ-
uals who think and act in specific ways, and it is only by means of establishing the forms of their
thoughts and their actions that we can apprehend the nature of the societal organization in which
they live, or that we can corroborate or disallow statements concerning this organization.” Thus,
Bhaskar’s account needs to include a clearer notion of intentionality; a notion that entails acting
and thinking, or activity and intentional states. This requires a broader definition of the term ‘in-
tentionality’. It should not be reduced to purposeful action, but also include intentional states of
the mind. Social action always includes intentionality, but not inversely. The following section
thereby aims to establish a broader account of intentionality.
3.5 Summary
Although a philosophy of science is at least implicitly included in every scientificwork, it is hardly
ever discussed. Conflict research has to date completely abstained from discussing these founda-
tional questions. This is problematic since one’s position in philosophy of science has concrete
consequences on how research is done and results are interpreted.
Critical realism is a fallibist position in philosophy of science. Situated between empiricism
and interpretivism, critical realism puts ontology first. Based on a transcendental argument, it ar-
gues that the external world exists independently of our perception and that social phenomena—
although inter-subjectively constructed—exist independently of our individual perception of them.
Critical realism identifies uncovering powers of the objects under observation as a main scientific
goal. Against empiricism, it argues that our transitive concepts and theories need to correspond
to the intransitive structures and mechanisms in the domain of the real. Scientific ideas should
mirror reality, which lies beyond and is distinct from that which is immediately observable and,
evenmore so, from that which is actually observed. Evenwithout regularity wemight infer causal
mechanisms, powers and tendencies from the objects of observation.
Against instrumentalism it argues that concepts and theories are not merely useful tools, but
are only adequate if they indeed correspond to real observer-independent entities. Parsimony is
thus not an end in itself. Rather, the complexity of definitions and explanations is a function of the
complexity of the objects and mechanisms to which they refer. Moreover, causality and regularity
are not to be equated. Finally, the development of adequate theories—even apart from very spe-
cific empirical puzzles—is an end in itself in scientific investigations and may well reach beyond
a concrete research question. We can derive three implications that find concrete expression in the
structure of the present analysis.
First, a thorough discussion of concepts elucidating the essential nature of the objects under
investigation is a sine qua non in every scholarly work. Consequently, section 5.1 develops gen-
erally applicable but simultaneously specific criteria to evaluate concepts from a critical realist’s
perspective. Based on these criteria, chapter 6 then discusses existing concepts as well as develops
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the main concepts of interest in the present analysis: political conflict, non-state conflict actor, and
the natural and social space.
Second, the way we classify objects under investigation should mirror natural kinds and not
our immediate pragmatic interest. We classify the objects under observation in this analysis via
specification of their essential properties as is done in classifications of political conflicts, non-state
actors, and the macro-level in sections 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, respectively. Furthermore, it is reflected in
the DISCON database as well as the Non-State Actor Database. As these essential properties ide-
ally constitute the causal powers of objects, such an approach should yield greatest explanatory
value.
This leads to the third point: Rather than postulating constant conjunctions, theories should
elaborate on the causal powers of things that are not reducible to but nonetheless often reflected
in systematic covariation of events. This approach finds expression in chapter 8, which develops
the link between social structure, individual intentionality, the formation of groups, their tactical
decisions, and the emergence of profiles of violence.
With regard to the relation of structure and agency in the social sciences, the critical approach
underlines what we have termed the diachronic downward perspective: Although structure on-
tologically depends on agency, the latter pre-dates the former. Thus, although structure without
agency is unthinkable, as without persons there would be no social structure, agency always
takes place within existing structures. “People cannot communicate except by utilizing existing
media, produce except by applying themselves to materials which are already formed, or act save
in some or other context. Speech requires language; making materials; action conditions; agency
resources; activity rules” (Bhaskar 1979, p. 43). Structures as relations between positions enable
and constrain activity. This is the core of the critical realist account of structure and agency. The
constitutive element of social structure as well as of groups is found in an account of collective
intentionality. This constitutes the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Intentionality, Positions, and
Collective Action
This chapter develops a synchronic account on the relation between individual subjects, collective
subjects, and structure in the social world. It elucidates how social facts found on intentionality.
Bringing together different approaches from philosophy and the social sciences, it defines funda-
mental concepts underlying a critical realist approach to explanation.
The key term of this section is ‘intentionality’. Intentionality separates the natural and the so-
cial world. While the natural world exists independently of human intentions, the very being of
the social world depends on them. Brute and institutional facts are the key objects in the respec-
tive spheres (Searle 2010, p. 10; cf. Searle 1995, pp. 120–125; Rawls 1955). An example of a brute
fact is that the sun emits photons. Money is an example of a social fact. If all people were to van-
ish from the world, the sun would still shine; money, however, would cease to exist. Focusing on
the social world, we can identify two key concepts: institutional facts and social action. Whereas
institutional facts stand for the synchronic perspective, social action allows for the understanding
of the diachronic interplay of structure and agency. Together, both concepts transcend the narrow
focus on activities that was identified above as a deficiency of some critical realist approaches the
laster chapter. Institutional facts are powers the very existence of which is constitutively depen-
dent upon the fact that they are collectively recognized. Intuitive examples are sovereignty, the
police, and money, but also friendship and marriage. Thus, if we if we speak of institutional facts,
we do not speak about physical objects, e.g. the paper of a money bill, as physical objects. Rather,
we speak of these objects as institutional facts, i.e. as objects that have a certain status and certain
powers due to the fact that they are collectively recognized as having such a status and the related
powers. This chapter shows how the concepts ‘collective’ and ‘group’ on the meso-level as well as
the concept of ‘social position’ and hence ‘social structure’ on the macro-level can be derived from
the notion of institutional facts. The term social action denotes all intentional acts by individuals
or collectives involving more than one person. Every social action is comprehensively defined by
the involved agent, i.e. individuals or collectives, their goals and beliefs, and their behavior. Non-
intentional behavior or non-social behavior are not covered in the following analysis. Collective
action is a subtype of social action which describes joint actions by individuals sharing a common
goal.
The synchronic account provides a solution for the deficiencies of the diachronic perspective
discussed in section 3.4 by replacing the notion of activity-dependence with intentionality. The
discussion on the independent existence of social structures by Bhaskar (1979) and subsequently
Archer (1995) revealed a widespread ambiguity regarding the differentiation between constitu-
tive and causal arguments within the context of relating structure and agency. Causal relations
are those between cause and effect, which implies a temporal lag. Constitutive relations, in con-
trast, denote the very entities that essentially define a thing at any point in time. Both types of
relations need to be clearly separated. Institutional facts and collective intentionality stand in a
constitutive relation of supervenience. At any moment in time, institutional facts—and conse-
quently social positions and social structures—constitutively depend on shared intentions. There
is no ‘temporal lag’, for instance, between the state of affairs among a number of individuals shar-
ing the belief in the meaning of a white flag as a symbol of surrender, on the one hand, and the
very power of that flag to indicate the discontinuation of resistance, on the other. Institutional
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Figure 4.1: Constitutive and causal relations in the macro-micro-macro model.
facts are the central concept to describe synchronic relations in the social world. They define rela-
tional states among individuals such as, e.g., relations of superiority and inferiority, and between
individuals and material objects such as the white flag. Reference to an adapted version of the no-
tion ‘institutional fact’ advanced by Searle (1995) allows the understanding of relative positions in
social structures as well as the powers and duties that are attached to these positions at any point
in time. Structures, however, do not remain static. This is where causal relations characterized by
temporal sequencing and social actions come into play. The concept of social action enables an
investigation of diachronic relations and thereby elucidates the processual nature of the social.
Structural states are brought into being, effectively altered, and perceivable through the ongoing
stream of communications and actions by individual and collective actors. The diachronic view
investigates these processes that alter and re(create) the objects that make up the social world.
Institutional facts and social action are deeply interrelated. Social action influences institu-
tional facts, inasmuch as it can create, alter or reproduce (but not constitute) them. Inversely,
institutional facts influence social action, for (at least any goal-directed) social action always takes
existing institutional structures into account. Consequently, the processual and the structural di-
mensions of the social world are inherently linked. Social structure presupposes collective in-
tentionality and social action, which in turn presupposes relations. However, although both are
ontologically entangled, they are analytically distinguishable.
Applying the classes of synchronic and diachronic relations to the now-classical macro-micro-
macro model (cf. Coleman 1990; Esser 1993) allows us to discern three foci of social science expla-
nations:
1. Constitutive relations between social structures and intentional states
2. Causal influence of structure on agency
3. Causal influence of agency on structure
In its original formulation, the macro-micro-macro model exclusively referred to causal re-
lations between levels. The adaptation in figure 4.1 includes both perspectives. A double line
indicates constitutive relations, while an arrow depicts causal relations.
The following four sections develop the synchronic account of the social world. Section 4.1
introduced the notion of intentionality and develops a taxonomy of different kinds of intention-
ality. Section 4.2 describes how we can understand social structure as emanating from collective
intentionality. Section 4.3 discusses different approaches to define groups and ends with a defi-
nition of the term. Section 4.4 addresses the complicated issues of reducibility. Discussing the ex-
tent to which the macro-level is reducible to the micro-level, the section argues that an adequate
understanding of individual intentions necessarily involves reference to related individuals and
thereby social structure. The last two sections address the diachronic perspective. Section 4.5 sets
out an understanding of individual and collective action. Section 4.6 argues that groups capable
of collective social action can be regarded as collective subjects and thus as agents in their own
right.
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4.1 Individual and Collective Intentionality
This section describes the role of intentionality as a constitutive element of social reality. Inten-
tionality is the capacity of the human mind to refer to objects external to it. Institutional facts and
collective social action, i.e. cases in which individuals collaborate in actively achieving a shared
goal, are based on a specific form of intentionality: collective intentionality. Collective intention-
ality is a state of affairs in which intentional states are shared among individuals. This might be
in the form of collective recognition, as in the case of weak collective intentionality, or in the form
of inter-individual cooperation, as in the case of strong collective intentionality. A broad concept
of intentionality allows us to address the aforesaid desideratum: to substitute the constitutive
attribute ‘activity-dependence’ with the more extensive attribute ‘intentionality-relative’ in the
definition of social facts. This subsection develops such an account by taking the following steps.
Subsection 4.1.1 introduces the notion of intentionality and with it four different criteria to
compare different types of intentionality. These criteria are the subject, content, object, andmodus
of intentional states. The section furthermore develops the concept of collective intentionality. Of
particular importance is the fact that Searle defines collective intentionality via intentional con-
tent. According to Searle, collective intention is not necessarily qualified by the fact that it is
shared between individuals. Instead, it is characterized by the fact that the content of the inten-
tional mind state takes the form of ‘we intend’. The section criticizes this approach. It argues
that collective intentionality necessarily relies on shared intentions. For, only intentions that are
actually shared between related individuals serve as an adequate foundation for social facts.
In conclusion, the argument refers back to the notion of social structure as a necessary prereq-
uisite for individual agency. If social facts and social action rely on collective intentionality and
if collective intentionality is necessarily relational, then agency requires structures. This is in line
with a modified version of critical realism in the social sciences that has its very foundation in
a relational concept of collective intentionality. Such an account serves as a foundation for the
conceptualization of structures of inequality and collective agents, and further guides theoretical
arguments about the interplay between both.
4.1.1 Intentional States of Mind
Intentionality is defined as the “capacity of the mind by which it is directed at, or about, objects
and states of affairs in the world, typically independent of itself. (...) Intentional states are always
about something, or refer to, something” (Searle 2010, p. 25). Intentionality not only comprises
those states of mind that are colloquially described as intended, e.g. ‘I intend to do more sports’,
but also “belief, desire, hope, and fear” (ibid., p. 25). In short, “intentionality is a name for the
directedness or aboutness of mental states”(ibid., p. 26).
Intentional states have a subject, a content, an object, and amodus (cf. Schmid and Schweikard
2009, pp. 39–45). The subject is the bearer of an intentional state. For Searle (2010, p. 44), for in-
stance, only individual persons can be subjects of intentional states. The content of an intentional
state is the proposition that makes up the intentional state. For instance, the individual belief in
rainfall has “I believe that it is raining” as its content.1 Sometimes the content of an intentional
state is just the representation of an object, e.g. in the intention “I admire Thomas Jefferson” (ibid.,
p. 27). The object is the entity to which an intentional state refers. In our first example, this is the
state of affairs that it is raining. In our second example, it is Thomas Jefferson. However, not every
intentional fact necessarily has an existing object as reference. An example is the belief ‘unicorns
exist’. The modus describes the intentional type or the psychological mode in which the inten-
tional state of a subject is related to its content.2 For example, one might hope, believe, or fear that
it is raining. Symmetrical to these three examples, three different modi of intentionality are dis-
tinguished: practical (or conative), cognitive, and affective. Practical intentional states describe
intentions or desires; cognitive intentional states encompass perception, memory, and belief; af-
fective intentional states describe evaluations and emotions.
Different modi of intention exhibit different types of relation between the intentional state and
the world. The differentiation goes back to Anscombe (2000) and his description of a man who
1We cannot restrict the notion to ‘it is raining’, since it makes a difference whether a belief is an I-belief or a we-belief.
This does not refer to the subject but to the content of the intentional state.
2As intentional states are completely contained in mental representations and are not necessarily related to mind-
independent states of affairs, the point of reference of the modus is the content of the intentional state and not the object.
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goes shopping.3 The first class of modi of intentional states includes representations of a state of
affairs that is not yet the case but should be realized. This class has a world-to-mind relation of
fit. To be satisfied, the state of the world must match the intentional state of mind. An example
is an order. The world-to-mind relation relates to the practical modus of intentionality (Searle
2010, p. 15). The second class of modi of intentional states are descriptions of the world and are
true if they are an adequate representation of any given existing state of affairs. These modi have
a mind-to-world direction of fit. The mind must adequately represent the world. Examples are
perceptions or beliefs as in the case of the detective. Accordingly, the mind-to-world fit relates
to the cognitive mode. A third class of modi of intentional states encompasses those intentional
states where the fit is presupposed. This is the case with affections such as pride or shame. If I am
proud of something, I presuppose its existence.4 Closely related to themodus of state of intentions
is the idea that intentional ideas represent conditions of satisfaction (ibid., p. 29). Each intentional
state represents a state of affairs that can be either true or false, in the case of mind-to-world
direction of fit, or satisfied or frustrated, in the case of world-to-mind direction of fit.
In summary, intentionality describes the fact that mental states are about states of affairs or
objects in the world. They can be differentiated via their subject, content, object, and modus and
are characterized by a specific direction of fit.
4.1.2 Internalist and Externalist Collective Intentionality
With an understanding of intentionality, we can now turn to the specific characteristics of collec-
tive intentionality. Collective intentionality lies at the heart of social phenomena. Individual inten-
tional states, as described above, are important in grasping the relation between individuals and
the world. Collective intentionality, however, is the key to understanding social objects. Almost
all forms of social phenomena, among them institutional facts and collective action, are collective
phenomena and require collective intentionality (cf. Schmid and Schweikard 2009, pp. 45–46).
We can define collective intentionality both as a we-intention and thus, due to its content or
as a state of affairs, a point at which a specific intentional state is shared among individuals. This
section presents the definition via contents as advanced by Searle (1990, 1995, 2010). The account
can be characterized as internalist because the collective intentional state is said to be entirely
contained within individual minds. This entails that collective intentionality contains an intrinsic
property and is thus an atomist position. This will be further elaborated in section 4.4. We will see
that this account is inadequate, as inter-individual relations are a constitutive element and thus
a necessary definitional attribute of collective intentionality. Consequently, subsection 4.1.3 will
defend an externalist position. Due to the fact that Searle has been hugely influential in the debate
on intentionality, as well as in highlighting the differences, the following briefly summarizes his
approach before advancing an alternative view.
Searle (1990, 2010, pp. 47–48, 1995, pp. 23–26) defends a ‘first-person plural’ form of intention-
ality. If an intentional state is in the form of ‘we intend’, then it is a form of collective intentionality.
Thus, collective intentionality is defined as ‘collective’ via its content.
Cases in which individuals share an intention and are mutually aware of their intentions (I-
intentions plus mutual belief) are not cases of classic Searlean collective intentionality. This is
mainly, because they do not capture an essential attribute of collective intentionality, namely co-
operation. Despite the apparently pivotal importance of cooperation, Searle’s definitions and ex-
amples remain rather ambiguous. In an illustrative example, Searle (2010, p. 48) argues that coop-
eration lies in “an obligation”.5 Later, Searle (ibid., p. 53) writes: “In order to engage in collective
3“Let us consider a man going round a town with a shopping list in his hand. Now it is clear that the relation of this
list to the things he actually buys is one and the same whether his wife gave him the list or it is his own list; and that there
is a different relation when a list is made by a detective following him about. If he made the list itself, it was an expression
of intention; if his wife gave it him, it has the role of an order. What then is the identical relation to what happens, in
the order and the intention, which is not shared by the record? It is precisely this: if the list and the things that the man
actually buys do not agree, and if this and this alone constitutes a mistake, then the mistake is not in the list but in the
man’s performance (if his wife were to say: ‘Look, it says butter and you have bought margarine’, he would hardly reply:
‘What a mistake! we must put that right’ and alter the word on the list to ‘margarine’); whereas if the detective’s record
and what the man actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is in the record” (Anscombe 2000, g˘32).
4Searle (2010, p. 32) argues that intentional states with a presupposed fit can be regarded as reduced to types of inten-
tions with a specific type of fit. “Thus if one is proud to have won the race, then one must believe that one won the race
and one must want to have won the race” (ibid., p. 32).
5Searle (ibid., pp. 47–48) describes two cases: In the first case, a number of business graduates, following the idea of
the ‘invisible hand’, aim to benefit humanity by each trying to become as rich as possible. The graduates are mutually
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behavior I have to believe (or assume or presuppose) that others are cooperating with me. And
their cooperation will consist in their having intentions-in-action that specify the same goal as I
have but need not specify the same means to the goal”6 We can thus conclude that cooperation
does not refer to actual empirical cooperation between two persons, but rather denotes a belief:
the belief that others do their part (which may differ from my part) in achieving a specific collec-
tive goal. Combining both understandings of cooperation as moral obligation and as belief, we
can see that cooperation should not be understood as an empirical relation between individuals,
but merely as the individual (internalist, atomist) belief that others feel obliged to act accordingly.
What is real is not the relation, but only the content of individual minds.
This leads to the conclusion that individual and collective intentionality are quite similar no-
tions in the eyes of Searle (1990, pp. 406–407):
“Anything we say about collective intentionality must meet the following conditions of adequacy:
(1) It must be consistent with the fact that society consists of nothing but individuals. Since society consists
entirely of individuals, there cannot be a group mind or group consciousness. All consciousness is in indi-
vidual minds, in individual brains.
(2) It must be consistent with the fact that the structure of any individual’s intentionality has to be indepen-
dent of the fact of whether or not he is getting things right, whether or not he is radically mistaken about
what is actually occurring. And this constraint applies as much to collective intentionality as it does to in-
dividual intentionality. One way to put this constraint is to say that the account must be consistent with the
fact that all intentionality, whether collective or individual, could be had by a brain in a vat or by a set of
brains in vats.”
All intentions, be they individual or collective, must be contained in individual minds (cf.
Searle 2010, pp. 55, 60; Gilbert 1989). This explicitly refutes the existence of collective subjects
and group minds. Collective intentional states always have individual persons as subjects. And
since individuals might be mistaken in their intentions, they might hold a collective intention
in the form ‘we intend’ without another individual having the same intent. Consequently, single
individuals might have collective intentionality. The case of a single subject having the intentional
state “we believe that unicorns exist” provides an example. As no one else holds this belief in
the existence of unicorns, it is a case of mistaken collective intentionality. But it remains a state of
collective intentionality, nonetheless. “But I could have all the intentionality I do have even if I am
radically mistaken, even if the apparent presence and cooperation of other people is an illusion,
even if I am suffering a total hallucination, even if I am a brain in a vat. Collective intentionality
in my head can make a purported reference to other members of a collective independently of the
question whether or not there actually are such members”(Searle 1990, p. 407).
The Searle’s account of collective intentionality leads to the rather peculiar conclusion that
individuals can create social facts. Social facts are based on collective intentionality and collec-
tive intentionality must—following Searle—be an internal state of individuals, or even a single
individual. However, it seems rather strange to allow that the state of mind of a single individ-
ual constitutes a social fact. Rather, we should regard social facts as relational in the sense that
they are constituted by real relations between real persons and do not exist as intentional states
of individuals? Here we follow the critique of Meijers (2003, p. 179), who argues that collective
intentionality is necessarily inter-individual and irreducible to individual minds:
[States of collective intentionality] are relational states that have a foundation in the participating individ-
uals. Having a foundation means that the intentional states are one-sidedly dependent upon two or more
participants. In case these participants do not exist in the real world, there is simply no collective intention-
ality. There has to be somebody ‘out there,’ so to speak, for collective intentionality to be possible.
Collective intentionality simply must include relations between individuals. It is immediately
clear that a hallucination is different from a perception in that the latter requires the existence
of the observed object. The Searlean solipsist definition of collective intentionality cannot clearly
distinguish between ‘sharing’ and ‘believing to share’ a collective intentional state. If there were
aware of their plans, but “there is no cooperation. There is even an ideology that there should be no cooperation” Searle
(2010, p. 48). In a second case, all things are similar save one: This time, the graduates swear a pact to act as described. “In
this case there is genuine cooperation and genuine collective intentionality even though it is a higher level of cooperation
to the effect that there should be no lower level cooperation”(ibid., p. 48). In the first case, participation in the activity
of benefitting humanity is voluntary, even after leaving business school. In the second case, participation is obligatory.
This understanding of cooperation in activities has a strong normative dimension. Following this example, cooperation
implies the obligation to participate in a certain activity.
6Intention-in-action and bodily movements are the two components of an action. The intention-in-action describes the
psychological event that causes bodily movements. In addition, before the onset of an action, there sometimes exist prior
intentions (ibid., pp. 33–35, 50–55).
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only one person left on this world, the Searlean definition of collective intentionality might still
apply.
Apart from the immediate difficulty of accepting Searle’s internalist account, to do so would
entail a grave consequence: An internalist view must exclude the possibility of collective subjects
(cf. Schmid and Schweikard 2009, pp. 51–52). If intentional states are states of mind of individual
persons and if intentional states are defining features of agents, the possibility of the existence of
collective subjects is denied. In consequence, we will adopt an externalist and relational view.
4.1.3 Collective Intentionality as Shared Intentional States
A relationist approach is more adequate in capturing the essential features of social facts for two
reasons. First, it is intuitively sound. Restricting the meaning of ‘collective’ in collective inten-
tionality to the content of intentional states is not only counter-intuitive, but it also misses an
important characteristic of social facts. It is precisely the fact that an intention—such as the be-
lief in the value of money or in the legitimacy of a sovereign—is shared between a number of
individuals that endow social facts with their status. Moreover, only a relationist account allows
to demarcate cases of shared collective intentionality from cases where single individuals falsely
hold we-intentions (Meijers 2003; Zaibert 2003). A definition that omits the dimension of subjects
is not capable of differentiating both cases. An individual’s false and solipsist we-belief in the
existence of unicorns would be as much an instantiation of collective intentionality as a widely
shared belief in the value of money. Consequently, relations between intending individuals must
necessarily be included in the definition of collective intentionality.
How can we understand ‘relation’ in this relational account of collective intentionality? In the
synchronic perspective, relations can be defined as a state of affairs in which two entities share
a specific property. In the externalist and thus relational concept of collective intentionality, the
relation exists in the fact that at least two individual subjects hold the same intentional state. The
two related subjects of the collective intentional state need not necessarily be aware of that. For in-
stance, two individuals, A and B, might share the belief that a third individual, C, is the supreme
leader. The relation between A and B consists of the fact that content and object of the intentions
of A and B are identical. Nonetheless, sharing intentional states is different from sharing intrinsic
properties, such as in the case of hair color. Collective intentionality must involve relations, while
having a specific hair color does not. The fact that A’s intentional state counts as part of a collective
intentional state depends on the existence of B’s identical intentional state. Once B ceases to accept
C as supreme leader, A’s intentional state no longer constitutes a collective intentional state, but
rather becomes an individual belief. Hence, the relation of sharing an intentional state is consti-
tutive for collective intentionality. The constitutive status of relations for collective intentionality
goes well with our focus on the synchronic relation. It is not the case that relations are created at
some point in time after collective intentional states come into being. Collective intentional states
and the relation are equiprimordial.
We can thus define collective intentionality as follows: A collective intentional state is a state of
affairs where at least two subjects share an intentional state that is similar in content and object. The prop-
erty of an individual to have a collective intentional state is a relational property, because it constitutively
depends on another individual sharing the same intentional state.
If the notion of collectivity extends to the subjects of intentional states, what remains of the
pivotal definitional attribute that the content of intentional states must be in the form of we-
intentions? Is collective intentionality necessarily defined by collective we-intentions? As argued
above, the reference to a plural ‘we’ in the content of intentional states loses its status as a constitu-
tive attribute of collective intentionality. Rather, it becomes a criterion to differentiate two classes
of collective intentionality: Intentional states in the form of shared I-intentions are instances of
weak collective intentionality. Shared we-intentions are instances of strong collective intentionality (cf.
Searle 2010, pp. 56–58).7
7Searle mentions these two kinds of intentionality in a rather short passage in Searle (2010, pp. 56–58), where he
partly retreats from his position that ‘We-Intentions’ are a constitutive attribute of all forms of collective intentionality.
In contrast to his earlier views in Searle (1995), Searle (2010, pp. 56–58) allows for cases of collective intentionality in the
form of I-intentions. Although the concession is made in passing, it represents a far reaching consequence: In some cases,
collective recognition is a sufficient criterion. And collective recognition in turn, means I-intentions that are shared between
individuals. Thus, Searle drops the necessary condition that the content of collective intentionality in an individual mind
is in the first-person plural and irreducible to I-intentions.
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Figure 4.2: Categories of intentionality. Apart from being held by multiple subjects, all states of collective
intentionality are similar with regard to their content, object, and modus.
In summary, the present analysis argues in favor of a relationist and externalist account of col-
lective intentionality. The above discussion allows to develop a taxonomy of intentional states (see
figure 4.2). An intentional state is defined via its subject, content, object, and modus. An indi-
vidual intentional state is an intentional state that is uniquely held by a single subject. No other
individual holds an intentional state that is similar with regard to content, object, and modus. If a
similar intentional state is shared between at least two subjects, then it is a collective intentional
state. Similarity with regard to content, object, and modus as well as the number of involved
subjects is the criterion to differentiate the highest level in figure 4.2. On a second level, we can
differentiate whether the content is in the form of a we-intention or an I-intention (footnote 1). This
demarcates a weak form of collective intentionality from a strong form of collective intentionality.
For the sake of comprehensiveness, we could analogously demarcate a weak individual inten-
tionality and strong individual intentionality. The latter would count as collective intentionality
in the Searlean sense.
4.2 Social Position and Social Structure
We are now in a position to describe a synchronic account of social positions and of social struc-
ture based on a relational notion of collective intentionality. Regarding figure 4.1, we can now
progress to elaborate on the constitutive synchronic relation between intentional states of mind
and social structure. As pointed out in section 3.4, a structure consists of a number of elements
that are related with a certain amount of permanency. Social structure denotes a relatively stable
arrangement of related social positions. And positions, in turn, describe slots in the social struc-
ture to which specific powers and liabilities are attached through shared acceptance in society.
4.2.1 Institutional Fact
As defined by Searle (1995, 2010), social positions are institutional facts. Whereas we abandoned
the internalist conception of collective intentionality, Searle’s account of institutional facts is per-
fectly compatible with the externalist definition and well suited to define social positions. Institu-
tional facts are constitutively defined by attributes: collective intentionality and status functions.
With regard to the first attribute, institutional facts are most often based on weak collective
intentional states. However, they can also take the form of strong collective intentional states. In-
stitutional facts thus exist out of a number of people that share a specific intentional state. This
intentional state takes a specific form: status functions. A status function is “a function that is per-
formed by an object(s), person(s), or other sorts of entity(es) and which can only be performed in
virtue of the fact that the community in which the function is performed assigns a certain status
to the object, person, or entity in question, and the function is performed in virtue of the collective
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acceptance or recognition of the object, person, or entity as having that status” (Searle 2010, p. 94;
cf. Searle 2005, 7f, 2010, 58f, 94f). Thus, in the case that an entity were to perform a function, it
would not be able to perform without being ascribed this specific function is called a status func-
tion.8 Status functions “create and regulate power relationships between people” (Searle 2010,
p. 106) by assigning positive powers such as rights and permissions as well as constraints such
as duties and obligations (ibid., p. 9). The notion of powers bears close resemblance to the defi-
nition of ‘Macht’ by Weber (1921, p. 28): “Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen
Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese
Chance beruht.”9
Searle (1995, p. 41) summarizes his account as follows:
[W]e need to show the continuous line that goes from molecules and mountains to screw drivers, levers,
and beautiful sunsets, and then to legislatures, money, and nation-states. The central span on the bridge
from physics to society is collective intentionality, and the decisive movement on that bridge in the creation
of social reality is the collective intentional imposition of function on entities that cannot perform these
functions without that imposition.
A system of institutional facts forms an institution.10 Institution consist of a number of related
constitutive rules that allow for the creation of institutional facts (Searle 2010, p. 10, 2005, cf.). Insti-
tutional facts are manifestations of institutions. For instance, the institution of white flags denotes
the state of affairs that white flags in general are widely—at least in the Western hemisphere—
understood as symbols denoting surrender. A specific white flag then constitutes an institutional
fact.
The modified understanding of weak collective intentionality as shared I-intention is perfectly
compatible with Searle’s account of institutions and institutional facts: Institutions only make
a difference if they are recognized by a sufficient number of individuals. The strength and the
spatial extension of an institution are dependent on the number and location of those who create
and sustain it. Where the belief in an institution vanishes, institutions likewise—and instantly—
erode. Likewise, the construction of institutions is a demanding process, as it requires the creation
of collective intentionality. This is why we cannot simply transfer institutions between different
groups of people.
The main point to be derived from Searle’s account for our discussion is that institutional facts
are “intentionality-relative” (Searle 2010, p. 17). “As long as there is collective recognition or ac-
ceptance of institutional facts, they will work” (ibid., p. 106). This does not mean that institutional
facts are unrelated to physical objects. Institutional facts may be codified, e.g. as the written arti-
cles of a constitution, they may be linked to specific symbols, e.g. the uniform of a police officer, or
to specific people, e.g. Barack Obama. Institutional facts are thus ontologically Janus-faced: They
often exist materially and, at the same time, as institutional facts qua collectively shared states of
mind.
4.2.2 Social Position and Social Structure
The notion of institutional facts allows for a closer definition of social positions and social struc-
ture. Social positions are institutional facts (cf. Searle 1995, 2010). They constitutively depend on
collectively-ascribed status functions and are built upon shared (weak or strong) intentional states
of mind.11 The fact that social positions constitutively ground on collective intentional states ad-
dresses the desideratum identified at the end of section 3.4: Positions are defined as intentional
states and not through activity.
This can be demonstrated with the aid of the following example, which, while admittedly un-
realistic, nonetheless proves satisfactory in illustrating the point of constitutive relations. Imagine
8The assignment of status functions continues in a vertical and horizontal dimension. On a higher dimension, a status
function Y can become an object X to which other status functions can be assigned. Furthermore, institutional facts are
linked horizontally.
9“The core notion of power is that A has power over S with respect to action B if and only if A can intentionally get S
to do what A wants regarding B, whether S wants to do it or not” (Searle 2010, p. 151). In the present account, institutional
facts necessarily involve deontic powers. This excludes collectively accepted facts that are not related to deontic powers
per definitionem. A less restrictive account, which would not require institutions to be constitutive of certain powers, is
advanced, e.g., by Tuomela (2013). An account that includes powers, however, is very suitable for a definition of structures.
It allows us to understand structures as creating a system of super- and subordination between subjects based on their
relative powers.
10For a critical perspective on this account see Tuomela (1997).
11For a critical account on the foundation of social (and institutional) facts in intentionality see Epstein (2014).
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Bob is a police officer, i.e. Bob occupies the position ‘police officer’. His position comes with the
power of law enforcement, which constitutively depends on being accepted by a sufficiently large
number of community members. While Bob has yet to arrest a single person, given no one in his
community has knowingly violated the law, he still holds the power (sec.3.3). Imagine that one
day, the entire community leaves earth and Bob behind in a spaceship. Bob, now himself alone
in his community, still holds the powers of a police officer although spatial separation precludes
its enforcement. As long as the community in the spaceship maintains its belief in the position
of police officer, the powers remain and might be enforced upon the peoples return from space
travel. In the case of an explosion of the spaceship, however, Bob’s position instantly vanishes.
Instantly, and not causally, since the relationship between the shared belief (collective cognitive
intentional state) and the powers of Bob is constitutive. Even if Bob were to live his whole life
under the illusion of being a police officer, his social position would have already vanished at the
very moment of the spaceship explosion.
Grounding social positions on collective intentionality is not to say that material objects are ir-
relevant or that social positions are wholly subjective. Rather it is people who exercise the powers
that are attached to certain positions, andmaterial objects that gain certain powers through collec-
tive acceptance. Nonetheless, it is social acceptance that endows positions with powers and that
converts certain material objects into more than they are simply due to their material properties.
This also entails that powers attached to positions and emerging from collective acceptance
are spatiotemporally variable. A police officer, for instance, might be highly respected and hence
could have more power in one society (or region, or city, or community) than he has in another.
The powers of a police officer could similarly vanish over time if the degree of respect it com-
mands among the community dwindles.
Apart from the constitutive relation between shared intentional states and institutional facts, a
second type of relation can be identified: the relations that emerge from the arrangement of po-
sitions in a social structure. Here, the relation is not between certain individual characteristics
and collective intentional states, but between social positions. The definition of ‘Macht’ by Weber
captures this relational understanding quite well. The power to do that, which is attached to so-
cial positions, implies others who obey. Powers are thus relational properties that arise from the
configuration of positions.
The root of social position in collective intentionality and the importance of relative positions
can be illustrated with regard to inequality, a concept that plays a significant role in the theory
developed in chapter 8. Inequality first and foremost denotes that two things are different in some
regard. Inequality between individuals or groups exists with regard to an innumerable variety of
categories: size or weight, wealth, education, political rights, and so on. Some of these character-
istics certainly belong to the natural world and are intrinsic properties of individuals. However,
even those criteria that are exclusively material (such as size or weight), often gain their social rel-
evance through social ascription. This becomes even more evident when we progress toward cat-
egories such as wealth or political power. Situations in which wealth is measured by the amount
of money in a bank account is not surprising, given money is a paradigmatic example of an in-
stitutional fact. The powers arising from wealth might appear as natural, and money is certainly
among those institutional facts that most apparently have an object-like character. Without the
public trust in money, however, wealth instantly vanishes. Precious metals, such as diamonds, do
not gain their value primarily from their internal structure, but rather based on their collective
acceptance as valuable. Another example is the sphere of politics. The social position of individu-
als in the sphere of politics is dependent upon the volume of rights and influence on politics and
policies they are assigned. While these rights are written down, i.e. materialized, in constitutional
or national laws, they can only be exercised—in fact, they only really exist—if the majority col-
lectively recognizes these rights. In electoral political systems, for instance, individuals without
the right to vote have—ceteris paribus—less possibilities to influence politics and policies than
members of the electorate, while the latter have less influence on politics and policies than, e.g.,
members of parliament or ministers. The powers arising from wealth or political influence are
primarily resulting from relative positions.
4.3 Groups
The above discussion has presented the synchronic relation between individuals and social struc-
ture. It has argued that individuals collectively produce institutional facts and thereby social real-
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ity by sharing I-intentions with similar content and objects. The following section deals with the
concept of ‘group’. It concentrates on the following questions: If collective intentionality is inher-
ently relational, to what extent does this include the formation of groups? How do collectives fit
into the macro-micro-macro model of explanation? Should we regard groups as existent? Popper
(1959), for instance, called such a view naïve:
I shall first briefly mention two naïve theories of society which must be disposed of before we can under-
stand the function of the social sciences. The first is the theory that the social sciences study the behaviour of
social wholes, such as groups, nations, classes, societies, civilizations, etc. These social wholes are conceived
as the empirical objects which the social sciences study in the same way in which biology studies animals
or plants. This view must be rejected as naïve. It completely overlooks the fact that these so-called social
wholes are very largely postulates of popular social theories rather than empirical objects; and that while
there are, admittedly, such empirical objects as the crowd of people here assembled, it is quite untrue that
names like ‘the middle-class’ stand for any such empirical groups. What they stand for is a kind of ideal
object whose existence depends upon theoretical assumptions. Accordingly, the belief in the empirical exis-
tence of social wholes or collectives, which may be described as naïve collectivism has to be replaced by the
demand that social phenomena, including collectives, should be analysed in terms of individuals and their
actions and relations.
Based on the arguments of Albert (2010a,b), who bases his arguments on Simons (1987), the
following investigates to what extent the notion of groups might indeed be a mere shorthand
for an aggregate of individuals as Popper argues, or if it refers to existing social wholes. This
section argues that—in line with the overall argument of this chapter—a group is characterized
by the fact its members share the intention to be part of the group. Together with the argument of
irreducibility developed in section 4.4, we will see that collective subjects exist and are in a sense
more than the interrelated individuals. Likewise, agency by collectives is more than just plural
agency. Before coming to this conclusion, the present section develops a definition of group that
is based on collective intentionality and demarcates groups from mere aggregates that we will
denote as collectives.
4.3.1 Collectives
According to a simple view, groups constitute mere aggregates of individuals. Following this
view, a group is nothing but an abbreviation of “Individual1 + Individual2 + Individual3 + Individuali
+ Individualn.” Such a description is certainly adequate for a number of individuals walking
down a street, or a number of human beings sharing a property, such as possessing a specific hair
color. In the first example, the individuals of the collective are related spatiotemporally, i.e. they
are at the same place at the same time. In the second example, they are related by a common prop-
erty. But does such an understanding represent an exhaustive description of collectives that have
a name and a persistent existence over time? To be clear, it is certainly not inadequate to say that
groups exist of a number of individuals. But the term fails to capture essential attributes of groups.
Obviously, rebel groups or soccer clubs differ from people walking down a street or brown-haired
people. Some collectives, such as looting mobs, seem to stand somewhere between both ends of
the continuum. Mobs do not have the same permanency as, e.g., a rebel group. Nonetheless, a
mob seems to be different from a collective incidentally walking down a street. The following
discussion thus needs to shed light on those attributes that specify collectives as groups. It con-
cludes that groups are collectives whose members share the strong collective intentional state of
being part of a group. Characteristics like spatiotemporal proximity or shared traits allow for the
categorization of individuals into collectives, but they do not define groups. Consequently, let us
reserve the term ‘collective’ to denote the broader category of aggregates of people. ‘Groups’ then
represent a subtype of collectives.
4.3.2 Spatiotemporal Proximity
A second possible criterion to distinguish groups from mere aggregates might be spatiotemporal
proximity. This would differentiate collectives such as ‘all people with brown hair’ from mobs
or people walking down the street. Spatiotemporal relation seems to be a reasonable criterion,
since parts of a whole are often located in a confined space. Examples include the players of a
soccer team or rioters in a crowd. In general, we can expect that spatiotemporal proximity cor-
relates with mutual awareness, as well as facilitates inter-individual coordination. This implies
that correlation and facilitation are promoting factors for group formation. However, spatiotem-
poral proximity is not a constitutive attribute of groups. For instance, used as a criterion, it fails to
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correctly classify spatially-decentralized but highly-coordinated terrorist groups. Moreover, indi-
viduals might act as group members, on behalf of groups, and feel as representatives of groups
even though they are at a place far away from other group members. In comparison to physics or
even biology, the role of spatiotemporal proximity seems to be less important in the social sphere.
Here, technological innovation increasingly diminishes the role of spatiotemporal proximity for
interpersonal communication and coordination.
In short, spatial proximity is a facilitating factor, not a necessary condition for social relations.
It allows for the differentiation of mobs from arbitrary sets, such as all people with brown hair. It
fails, however, to correctly classify spatiotemporally scattered groups.
4.3.3 Collective Action
A third and visible strategy might be to denote groups as those collectives that act together. How-
ever, such a definition is precluded in the synchronic perspective. As discussed in subsection 3.4.3,
it is the objective of this chapter to elaborate on the constitutive elements of groups. Activity, in
contrast, is the hallmark of the diachronic perspective. The synchronic perspective must look at
what constitutes the existence of groups in between and apart from specific actions by the group.
This is not to say that collective action is irrelevant. It will be discussed in subsection 4.5.3.
4.3.4 Collective Intentionality
A more promising fourth route is to define groups as institutional facts. Following this idea, a
collective qualifies as a group, and not a mere aggregate, if it is collectively recognized. Put dif-
ferently, groups are instantiated by collective intentionality, i.e. a shared belief in the existence of
the group as content and the respective collective as its object.
In principle, two different groups of people might be the subjects of the respective intentional
states. Either the individuals who are part of the group hold the belief that they themselves are
part of a group or a sufficient number of people external to the circle of members hold respec-
tive beliefs. In the first case, the ascription of group membership would be self-referential, in the
second it would be external. This leads to two possible definitions.
1. The referential definition: A collective C1 is a group , if a collective C2 believes C1 to be a
group, where C1 ≠ C2.
2. The self-referential definition: A collective C1 is a group if C1 believes C1 to be a group.
In the referential definition, subject and object of the respective intentional states do not overlap.
In the self-referential definition, they are the same set of people. Accordingly, we might define a
collective as group if it is recognized as such, either by its to-be-members or by outsiders.
It is doubtful, that the referential definition is a sufficient criterion to determine the existence of
groups. To illustrate this point, consider the case of the so called Khorasan Group. In late Septem-
ber 2014, the United States Central Command (2014) issued the following press release:
Separately, the United States has also taken action to disrupt the imminent attack plotting against the United
States andWestern interests conducted by a network of seasoned al-Qa’ida veterans—sometimes referred to
as the Khorasan Group—who have established a safe haven in Syria to develop external attacks, construct
and test improvised explosive devices and recruit Westerners to conduct operations.
Although never having heard of the group before, officials and news agencies debated about
the threat it posed. This might indicate the fact that a sufficient number of people believed in the
existence of the group, an instance of the referential definition. After a while, however, serious
doubts about its existence emerged. Let us assume for the sake of the argument that the skeptics
are right and that the existence of the ‘Khorasan Group’ was invented by officials in order to
justify military action or other political reasons. Could one really say that the Khorasan Group
exists as a group (if wewere able to empirically identify a sufficient number of people still holding
this view), or existed (if the skeptics had convinced the public by now)? This view seems rather
strange. The referential definition does not seem to be a sufficient criterion to differentiate groups
and collectives. To clarify, the argument is not that the individuals who were believed to comprise
the group do not exist. Even if we assume that the Central Command was able to give a list
of members and that these people really existed, collective acceptance does not seem to be an
adequate criterion. If none of the individuals contained on the list know of their membership, then
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the group simply cannot be classified as such. Nonetheless, although possibly nonexistent, the
idea (or imagined existence) of the group might still serve as an efficacious entity in that the very
belief in its existencemight serve as ameans to legitimize certain actions. As (Thomas and Thomas
1928, p. 572) stated, “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”12
What about the self-referential definition? If it is not for the external ascription qua weak col-
lective intentionality that a group exists, it might be qua shared intentional states of its members.
Accordingly, a collective C is a group G if (a) there exists a collective C and (b) the members of C
share the intentional state that they are part of G. Following this path, groups define themselves
as groups. This view seems more adequate than the referential definition.
An extreme example of a group that fits the self-referential but not the referential definition
would be that, which successfully and strictly operates clandestinely. As might be true for total-
itarian regimes, such a group’s survival might depend upon not being recognized as a group by
outsiders. The collectivemight nonetheless constitute a group inwhich each of its members thinks
of themselves as part of the group. It seems reasonable to speak of such collectives as groups that
underscore the adequacy of the self-referential definition, while weakening the referential defini-
tion.
It might appear advisable to some to define groups via reference to individuals, i.e. in terms
of weak collective intentionality. In this case, subject and object of the intentional states would
be identical. But this time, they are individual persons. Consequently, we could define groups as
those collectives in which each of the individual members of the collective thinks that they themselves
are a member of the respective group. Drawing on this proposition alone, however, would lead to
a rather peculiar situation. To see why, lets take a closer look at the type of intentional state pro-
posed in this definition to define groups: ‘I am part of group G’. If this definition were applied,
there would be cases where individuals erroneously think to be part of a group but are in fact
not. If, for example, I think, in a state of strong mental confusion, to be part of the Italian Mafia,
but none of the real members—as defined by the self-referential definition with the group as its
object—thinks the same, then I am still not part of the Italian Mafia. This stays true even if I act
and think like a Mafiosi. This is obviously an unwanted result. We can thus conclude that the
individual membership in a group must be accepted by a sufficiently large part of the other mem-
bers of the respective group. The individual members must share the intentional state that they
themselves and the respective others are members of groupG forG to exist. This, in turn, is to say
that they need to share a we-intention. What underlies groups is strong collective intentionality.
The type of relation between the individual members of a group lies in the fact that they hold
the same intentional state. A comparable example can be demonstrated by friends that might have
lived apart for a while, but remain bound by the shared belief in their friendship. Collective inten-
tionality and relations are equiprimordial. My status as a group member necessarily depends on
the fact that others think alike. Other types of relations—such as, e.g., relations of superiority and
inferiority or spatio-temporal proximity—allow to describe specific properties of groups. They
are, however, not constitutive of groups.
Delving a bit deeper into the specific characteristics of such self-referential strong collective
intentional states, we can identify them as a cognitive intentional state with a mind-to-world di-
rection of fit. They are neither hopes nor feelings, but perceptions or beliefs. And they are true, if
they mirror a real state of affairs. The condition of satisfaction is thus that the respective collec-
tive in fact shares the self-referential collective intentional state of being a group. The collective
intentional state ‘we are G’ is true, if it is a collective intentional state. The existence of the self-
referential strong collective intentional state is itself sufficient to be adequate. The proposition of
being a group cannot be wrong. This, however, is unproblematic: Being a group is nothing more
than the shared intention to be just that.
Returning to the self-referential definition, we can see that it fits well with the wider literature
on collective identity. Collective identity can be defined as a shared collective self-concept (Mathiesen
2003; cf. Albert 2010b). The collective self-concept is shared because knowledge of the self-concept
is communally recognized in the given group; it is a collective intentional state. The shared self-
concept is collective, since it refers to a group of people and not single persons. Identity is defined
as a self-concept since identity is the result of self-referential allocation of meaning (Croissant,
12This is not to say that a non-existent entity can have an effect. In the hypothetical example of an empty but seemingly
existing group, it is the very idea that influences how people act. It is a case in which an institutional fact is unrelated to
physical objects or persons. It is nonetheless an object-like institutional fact. See section 3.4.
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Figure 4.3: Mereological variability of collectives. Whereas the individual members of a groupmight change,
the groups might persist.
Schwank, et al. 2009, p. 27). Thus, collective identity is a subtype of collective intentionality and a
criterion demarcating groups from mere aggregates.
4.3.5 Persistence
A fourth possible criterion to differentiate types of collective is persistence. Collectives might
in principle, though not necessarily, achieve a certain degree of independence from their con-
stituents. In these cases, a collective might continue to exist as the very same collective although
none of its parts likewise continuously exists. The soccer club Borussia Dortmund, for instance,
has existed permanently since its foundation in 1909, although the players—as well as other
members—have continuously changed and some are now dead. We can say that the club won
the championship in 1956, 1957, 1963, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2011, and 2012 although no single player
participated in all seasons. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to say that Borussia Dortmund as a club
has won the championship eight times.
We can generalize this idea to describe the relation between parts and wholes in collectives.
All collectives consist of parts, and the parts of a social collective are individual people. The per-
sistent existence of a collective, however, is not necessarily dependent on specific constituents. In
other words, some collectives are mereologically variable (Simons 1987) since their existence as
collectives is independent of a change of constituents (cf. Albert 2010a; List and Pettit 2011) (see
figure 4.3). The relation between parts and wholes can likewise be framed in terms of superve-
nience. Mereologically variable collectives supervene on their constituents: A change in collective
properties entails a change in properties at the individual level. The same, however, is not true
for the opposite. A change in individual constituents does not necessarily entail a change on the
collective level. Likewise, the individual parts of a collective might themselves change to a certain
degree without ceasing to be part of the collective. Enduring rivalries between groups are an ex-
ample. Whereas inter-individual conflict might only persist as long as both individuals are alive,
intergroup conflicts between the same groups might exceed the lifespan of the involved people.
Likewise, the so-called Islamic State (IS) exists as a group of people and as an idea. Nonetheless,
specific individuals might take part in it or leave it. And although none of the individuals mak-
ing up IS today may live in 100 years, the group could. In summary, the mereological variability
allows to explain the persistence of certain wholes.
In summary, groups are a subtype of collectives. As all collectives, groups consist of a set
of individuals. As laid out above, there are no empty or one-person collectives. What qualifies
collectives as groups is that they are based on self-referential collective intentionality. This gives
them a certain permanency and makes them mereologically variable.
4.4 Holism, Collectivism, and Emergence
Discussed thus far, intentional states of mind and social action are the pivotal elements at the level
of individuals. Mereologically variable collectives sharing a collective identity are groups. And
social structure denotes a set of social positions. Furthermore, the last section described how the
meso-level of groups and the macro-level of social structure supervene on individual intentional
states. What has not been addressed so far is the question of reducibility. If groups and structures
supervene on intentions, to what extent can they be reduced to individual intentional states? If we
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are to describe and theorize groups and structure, should we start from the constituent individu-
als, closely describe their properties, and then ‘aggregate our way up’ to the whole to understand
it? Or should we understand constituents as inherently relational and context-dependent? This
section thus addresses the degree to which the different levels depicted in figure 4.1 denote gen-
uine levels.
From a critical realist perspective, a discussion of reductionism is of utmost importance for
two reasons. First, a thorough investigation of the relation between the individual and the struc-
tural level—and this includes reducibility—allows the assessment of whether entities above the level
of individuals actually exist. If it is possible to reduce social structure or groups to the individual
level—just like we can reduce sand piles to an aggregate of grains of sand—talk of the supra-
individual level is not really meaningful. Referring to groups would just be a convenient short-
hand of statements about individuals or an explanatory useful category.
This leads to a second point: Only that, which exists, can have causal influence. Consequently,
for structures to have effects on individuals, the former must have an existence independently
of the latter. More specifically, the independent existence of social structure is a prerequisite of
downward causation in the diachronic perspective. This argument was turned on its head by
Bhaskar (1979) and Archer (1995). Their argument in favor of the independent nature of structure
from agency is temporal: Structure at t−1 is a prerequisite of what we are now at t; hence, struc-
ture is independent of and irreducible to agency. Extending our perspective to the synchronic
perspective shows, however, that the argument tries to establish what it in fact requires. As a
matter of course, we can establish the fact that something exists by showing that it has an effect.
The effect of a certain structure at t−1, however, first and foremost requires this very structure
to be independent from individual intentional states at t−1. Otherwise, the talking of structure
would be a mere shorthand of talking about causal relations on the micro-level. Structure would
be epiphenomenal at times t−1 and t.
The following three subsections address the question of holism and atomism. Subsection 4.4.1
defines two broad positions in this debate: atomism and holism. Subsection 4.4.2 presents two
arguments for holism. Both state that intentionality is not an intrinsic property of individuals but
necessarily requires the existence of others. Although both turn out inadequate as they do not
refer to synchronic relations, they allow to understand the formative influence of structures on
individuals. In search of a synchronic argument, we draw on the concepts of emergence, super-
venience, multiple realizability, and wild disjunction in subsection 4.4.3. The argument is that,
although things at a higher level (groups or social structure) supervene on kinds of things at the
lower level (intentional states), higher-level entities might not be reducible to lower-level entities,
as a kind of entity at the higher level relates to a possibly infinite number of different micro-states.
4.4.1 Atomism and Holism
The following debate takes the concepts of intentionality, groups, and structure as points of de-
parture. Investigating into how these concepts, which are located on different levels, are related,
the following tries to answer two specific questions:
1. To what extent depend intentional states of individuals on their social positions?
2. To what extent are intentional states of individuals dependent on group membership?
The two questions can be framed as the discussion about atomism and holism. In the present
context, atomism is the position that intentionality is an intrinsic property. According to this view,
intentionality is held by completely isolated individuals. Hence, collective intentional states—and
consequently groups and social structure—are mere aggregates of individual intentional states
and are the beliefs of individual persons. To be clear, atomists neither deny that relations between
individuals exist nor that relations are unimportant. They do argue, however, that intentional
states are intrinsic properties of individuals and do not constitutively rely on these relations (cf.
Albert 2010b; Esfeld 2002; Pettit 1996; Schützeichel 2008), An example of such an atomist posi-
tion is Searle’s account of collective intentionality as existent in a brain in a vat (see subsection
4.1.2). We can identify Searle’s concept of collective intentionality as individual we-intentionality as
depicted in figure 4.2 on page 45. It is held by single subjects. Atomism thus entails reductionism.
Holism rejects this view and regards intentionality as a property that necessarily relies on
being part of a social system. In other words, holists argue that having cognitive and practical
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intentional states necessarily depends on social relations. Holism can take two different forms:
Holism (or ‘holism from above’) states that individual intentions necessarily depend on the fact
that these individuals are a part of a whole. Relationalism (or ‘holism from below’) states that
individual intentions rely on relations between individuals (cf. Pettit 1996, pp. 111–112; Albert
2010b; Esfeld 2002; Schützeichel 2008). Holism thus entails irreducibility.
Social holism does not deny an individual’s influence on its own decision-making process.
Although it argues that at least some intentional states rest on the fact that subjects are part of
a whole, individuals are not over-socialized to an extent that would overcome their individual
intentional agency. Stated differently, holism does not entail collectivism and does not preclude
individualism. Just as all other arguments in this chapter, the argument for social holism refers
to a synchronic, not a diachronic perspective. The argument is that intentionality is an extrinsic
property in the sense that it requires the existence of something else to exist, not to come into exis-
tence. Otherwise, holism would be trivially true, since all people depend on others in a biological
sense (Pettit 2014). It is specifically this synchronic perspective that supplements the diachronic
arguments by Bhaskar (1979) and Archer (1995, pp. 147–149). As stated, both argue that, since
individuals find themselves vis-à-vis structures they have not personally created, agency cannot
be analyzed apart from structure. This argument, however, is not at stake here. In the synchronic
perspective, the past does not matter.
4.4.2 Two Arguments in Favor of Holism
Two influential arguments in favor of social holism exist in the literature. The first argument by
Pettit (1996) states that the ‘second-order capacity’ of intentional agents to monitor the formation
of beliefs and desires necessarily requires being embedded in relations. The second argument by
Tomasello (2014) argues that the cognitive capabilities that are specifically human are socially
constituted. As we will shortly see, both arguments are not synchronic arguments. They focus on
socialization and thus causal processes. Consequently, we would not regard them as arguments
in favor of holism but of collectivism. It is nonetheless worthwhile to quickly elaborate on both
arguments to further substantiate the process of downward causation.
The first argument can be summarized as follows (cf. Pettit 1996, ch. 4; Esfeld 2001, pp. 69–85).
A fundamental property of thought consists of deliberately forming intentions. This entails that
subjects have something one might denote as a ‘second-order capacity’ or an ‘evaluative system’
to monitor to what extent their intentional states, i.e. beliefs and desires, are appropriate. In the
process of the formation of beliefs and desires, subjects draw on rules, i.e. normative propositions
defining which beliefs are appropriate and which are not. Thus, thinking involves deliberate for-
mation of intentional states (beliefs and desires) based on rules.
The main argument is that rule formation requires social interaction. To see why, we need to
take a closer look at the emergence of rules. Subjects form rules by extrapolating from a finite set of
illustrating examples. This, however, entails a problem: Being confronted with a finite number of
examples, how can a subject discern the correct rule? Theoretically, an infinite number of possible
rules can be extracted from a finite number of examples (Esfeld 2001, p. 73). And, once a subject
has formed a rule, how can he, she, or they decide whether the rule was applied correctly to a new
case? As thought involves the capacity to evaluate the correctness of one’s beliefs, the ability to
detect false applications of a given rule is pivotal. A rule built upon a finite number of examples,
however, does not provide guidance towards this end.
Based on this problem, the core argument for social holism (what we would denote as col-
lectivism) states that a subject’s ability to follow rules depends on responses from others. The
second-order capability to monitor the formation of beliefs and wants necessarily relies on inter-
action. Only subjects that are or were embedded in social relations have this capability, since in-
teraction allows determining the meaning of rules. The reaction of others signals a subject correct
or incorrect use of rules. This is why the atomist reading of rule-following by isolated individuals
is wrong: Subjects are simply not able to discern what the correct rule is. Whatever an isolated
subject takes as a rule is the rule. In the atomist interpretation, ‘thinking to follow a rule’ equals
‘following a rule’. The ability of subjects to change beliefs about rules in interaction, however, al-
lows them to fix their understanding of a rule and to discern in what way rules are to be applied.
In summary, the argument on rule-following posits that only members of a community are
able to develop fixed beliefs based on a finite set of examples. Thus, the specific ability to form
and monitor cognitive and practical intentional states results from interaction.
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A second, a more empirically-oriented argument—debated as an argument in favor of social
holism but in our view constituting an argument in favor of collectivism—is brought forward
by Tomasello (2014). Based on anthropological reasoning, Tomasello argues that the cognitive
capabilities that are specifically human are socially constituted. In a first evolutionary step, human
beings have developed the skill of ‘second-personal thinking’. This trait allows the engagement
in joint activities, where participants each contribute their part to reach a common goal. It allows
to take the perspective of others in a given situation, to reason out the others’ intentional states,
and to adapt one’s own behavior in order to make engage cooperative endeavors. Coordination
and cooperation with others became necessary conditions to survive (ibid., pp. 137–138).
In a second step, humans were able to take a group perspective. They were able both to think
of themselves as members of a collective, and, consequently, to understand and enforce social
norms of their cultural group, as well as to understand and make use of collectively accepted
institutions. Of crucial importance then is the ability of humans to draw on existing institutional
reality present when they are born. We do not start from nothing but draw on a rich inventory of
symbols and language that enables complex thinking. Thus, “the most complex and sophisticated
human cognitive processes are indeed culturally and historically constructed” (ibid., p. 142). If it
were not for our institutional reality, which in turn rests on the ability to share intentional states,
then we would not be able to think as we do. As Tomasello (ibid., p. 143) points out:
Human perspectival and objective representations, recursive and reflective inferences, and normative self-
monitoring—the constituents of uniquely human thinking—do not just go away when humans are not
collaborating or communicating. On the contrary, they structure nearly everything that humans do, with
the possible exception of sensory-motor activities. Thus, humans use recursive inferences in the grammat-
ical structures of their languages, in mind-reading in non-communicative contexts, in mathematics, and
in music, to name just the most obvious examples. Humans use perspectival and objective representa-
tions for thinking about everything, even in their solitary reveries, and they are engaged in normative
self-monitoring whenever they are concerned about their reputation—which is pretty much all of the time.
We might also recall here skills of relational thinking, which are products of dual-level collaboration but
used more broadly, and skills of imagination and pretense, which are products of imagining in pantomime
but are now used in all kinds of artistic creation. Collaboration and communication may play the crucial
instigating roles in our story, but their effects on cognitive representation, inference, and self-monitoring
extend much more broadly to basically all of humans’ conceptually mediated activities.
The argument by Tomasello (ibid.) likewise posits that the specific human cognitive capacities
depend on the social environment. The human skill of collective intentionality is not a natural
trait, but rather results from the fact that we are born in an environment structured by institutional
reality. Put differently, collective intentionality results from being embedded in a social structure.
The necessary prerequisites for collective intentionality not only entail cooperation with others—
as was also established by the argument on rule-following—but also incorporation in a social
group with a specific institutional history (Tomasello 2014, pp. 145–146; cf. Albert 2010b). This
entails that the development of specific human cognitive skills depends on the existence of social
wholes that are in a sense more than just interacting individuals. Only if children are able to grow
up in an environment that is characterized by a sufficiently stable set of institutions—e.g. norms,
language, money and power relations—are they able to develop the skills that are characteristic
of humans.
The two arguments developed by Kripke (1982), Pettit (1996), and Tomasello (2014) stress the
social dimension of individual intentionality. Being embedded in relation is a prerequisite for our
specific human intentional abilities. This does not entail that individuals lose their autonomy in
making decisions. To the contrary: a subject’s autonomy grounds on the very ability to think, i.e. to
deliberately shape its own intentional states. This capability, in turn, is formed in social relations.
Thus, it seems that autonomy requires a social environment. To capture the social influence of
social structures on individual intentionality in social science theory, we will draw on the theory
of Pierre Bourdieu and socio-psychological arguments of self-categorization theory in chapter 8.
As has been alluded to, both of the above arguments do not refer to synchronic relations.
Both, Pettit and Tomasello argue by discussing how the specific human intentional abilities come
about. Both stress processes of socialization. They do not argue that individual intentional states
constitutively depend on relations to others. Neither of the two arguments entails that individuals
in temporary isolation from others lose the capability to think as long as they have been socialized
in a community. Our lonely police officer Bob (see page 46), is still able to think although he is
entirely alone on earth. Neither of both arguments thus gives an adequate characterization of the
synchronic perspective. This entails that they are not arguments in favor of holism but rather in
favor of a moderate collectivist position as developed in chapter 7.
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Rather, both arguments are specifications of the diachronic argument and lend support to
the diachronic arguments presented by Bhaskar (1979) and Archer (1995), as well as those by
Pierre Bourdieu. Consequently, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus will be employed in 8 to explain
the formative influence of structure on individual intentional states.
We are still in a need for a ‘synchronic complement’ with regard to the relation between the
micro-, meso-, and macro-level. The following subsection discusses the concept of emergence in
a search for a suitable complement. The argument turns out to be only partially satisfying what
makes us finally return to our externalist concept collective intentionality.
4.4.3 Emergence
The synchronic perspective on the relation between the micro-level of individuals and the macro-
level of relatively-enduring patterns of relations can be adequately described by means of the
concept of ‘emergence’. Colloquially, emergence denotes a process in which something comes
about. This is not what is meant here by emergence, since such an understanding would include
a causal process and temporal sequences. Instead, we focus on synchronic emergence (Stephan
2007, pp. 66–72).13 Emergence denotes a state of affairs inwhich a composite has certain properties
that are not possessed by the parts it comprises (cf. Elder-Vass 2010; Sawyer 2005; Stephan 2002).
Awidely used example is consciousness, a property not held by neurons. The twomost important
elements of the concept of emergence include supervenience and irreducibility (Kim 2006).
Supervenience describes a type of relation between two levels (cf. Davidson 1970; Kim 1999;
Sawyer 2005, p. 66). If a higher level supervenes on a lower level, two conditions hold: First,
any change at the higher level necessarily entails change at the lower level. Second, two identical
states at the lower level cannot instantiate two different states at the higher level. Thus, the term
supervenience describes a covariance of properties of a system and the structure of its parts. Su-
pervenience is a synchronic, constitutive relation: The properties of the higher level vary at the
very same moment in time as the structure of the parts. In the social sciences, the position can
be denoted as supervenience individualism (List and Spieckermann 2013, p. 632): “individual-level
facts fully determine the social facts; i.e., any possible worlds that are identical with respect to all
individual-level facts will necessarily be identical with respect to all social facts”. Adapted to the
present argument: institutional facts and groups supervene on individual intentional states in the
sense that any change of institutional facts or groups necessarily involves a change in intentional
states at the level of individuals. Moreover, intentional states of mind fully determine institutional
facts and groups. There is no extra-substance to institutional facts and groups than shared indi-
vidual intentions. Applied to political conflict, supervenience states that a political conflict cannot
change in its properties without any change at the level of the subjects that bring about the re-
spective conflict. For instance, a change in the issue of a conflict necessarily requires a change in
the intentions of the conflict actors. Although conflicts might have properties that are not held
by the subjects—such as the fact that conflicts are characterized by incompatibilities—there is no
substance apart from the intentions of the subjects that characterizes the emergent level of politi-
cal conflict. Relations of supervenience thus entail that higher-level entities are not composed of
anything else than (possibly related) entities at the lower level.
At first sight, supervenience entails explanatory reductionism: If shared individual intentional
states are the micro-foundation of institutional facts, it seems to follow that explanations of the
latter can be reduced to the former. However, supervenience is often employed in explanatory
frameworks that simultaneously argue in favor of irreducibility (Schützeichel 2010, p. 342; Kim
2006). In fact, supervenience neither entails reductionism, nor is it an argument in favor of irre-
ducibility. Irreducibility, as the second core component of emergence, requires more than a rela-
tion of supervenience.
Supervenient relations are irreducible in the case of multiple realizability and wild disjunction
(Sawyer 2002). Multiple realizability denotes a state of affairs in which kinds of things at a higher
level (macro-level) are related to a possibly larger number of kinds of things at the lower level
13Broad (1925, p. 61) put forward the now classic definition of emergence:“Put in abstract terms the emergent theory
asserts that there are certain wholes, composed (say) of constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each other; that
all wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A, B, and C in relations of the same kind as R have certain
characteristic properties; thatA, B, and C are capable of occurring in other kinds of complex where the relation is not of
the same kind as R; and that the characteristic properties of the whole R(A, B,C) cannot, even in theory, be deduced from
the most complete knowledge of the properties ofA, B, and C in isolation or in other wholes which are not of the form
R(A, B,C)”
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Figure 4.4: Multiple realizability. Although the macro state supervenes on the micro-states, the large number
of micro-state that instantiate a certain macro-state precludes meaningful reduction.
(micro level) (see figure 4.4).14 Wild disjunction denotes a state of affairs in which the different
micro-states that are related to a certain macro-state are not related to one another apart from the
fact that they all might instantiate the natural kind at the higher level. In this case, meaningful re-
duction fails. There are simply too many—a possibly infinite number—of micro-states that do not
share enough characteristics to be of a natural kind. Fodor (1974) (cf. Sawyer 2005) introduced this
idea to argue against the reduction of theories and type-type identity. For instance, monetary ex-
change might involve physical correspondents that have nothing in common, e.g. the exchange of
dollar bills, mussels, or electronic traces. In these cases, we might meaningfully describe the char-
acteristics of monetary exchange at a higher level without being able to reduce this to the possibly
endless different states at the micro-level. In analogy, a political conflict can be instantiated on the
micro-level in myriad ways. The large variety of these conflictual states on the inter-individual
level makes it impossible to give a sufficiently clear account of political conflict at the micro-level.
In cases of multiple realizability and wild disjunction, higher level kinds have no single corre-
sponding kind at the lower level. We can thus conclude that the fact that some macro-states are
describable under an large number of micro-states precludes meaningful reduction.15
There remains, however, a problem with regard to the notion of irreducibility in this context.
Does the fact that multiple realizability andwild disjunction precludemeaningful reduction really
preclude reduction in an ontological sense? The argument is primarily fashioned to work with
regard to types, i.e. kinds of things such as conflict or money, and seems to be valid. It does not
work, however, with regard to tokens, i.e. concrete instances of types such as a dollar bill.16
The emergentist argument that draws on multiple realizability and wild disjunction seems
to fail with regard to specific instances of institutional facts. There is, however, an argument to
be derived from the above said that fulfills all conditions that are of importance in the present
context: it should be a synchronic argument, it should apply to the relation between intentions
and institutional facts, and it should apply to specific instances (tokens).
If one defends an externalist approach with regard to collective intentionality, as was done in
section 4.1, and if one defines social positions as founded on collective intentional states, as done
in 4.2, then we can see that the powers attached to social positions are relational properties that
are dependent on being embedded in relations. These properties, e.g. of being endowed with the
power of law enforcement, is irreducible to the individual members of collectives. The powers
attached to a certain social position exist qua collective acceptance, which, in turn is defined via
relations. Collective intentionality in its most basic sense is ‘collective’ neither because of the con-
tent of the individual intentional state nor because of the fact that it is held by a collective subject.
Instead, it is due to the fact that an intentional state—possibly even in the form of ‘I belief’ or ‘I
intend’—is shared among individuals.
We can now come to a conclusion with regard to the question how intentional states, groups,
and institutional facts are related: In the diachronic perspective, the argument of rule-formation
14Mereological variability is a specific instance of multiple realizability that relates to part-whole relations.
15Fodor (1974, p. 103) summarizes his argument as follows: “The reason it is unlikely that every kind corresponds to
a physical kind is just that (a) interesting generalizations (e.g., counterfactual supporting generalizations) can often be
made about events whose physical descriptions have nothing in common; (b) it is often the case that whether the physical
descriptions of the events subsumed by such generalizations have anything in common is, in an obvious sense, entirely
irrelevant to the truth of the generalizations, or to their interestingness, or to their degree of confirmation, or, indeed to any
of their epistemologically important properties; and (c) the special sciences are very much in the business of supporting
generalizations of this kind.”
16For the type-token disctinction see Wetzel (2014).
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and the anthropological argument lend further support to the influence of social relations on in-
dividual intentions. Extending our view to the diachronic perspective Pettit (1996) and Tomasello
(2014) showed that individual intentional states characteristic for human beings depend on the
fact that we are embedded in collectives and interact with others. What we believe and what we
want is greatly influenced by our social environment. This needs to be reflected by theoretical
arguments and will be taken up in the formulation of the theory in chapter 8. In the synchronic
perspective, we can conclude that emergence, i.e. the combination of supervenience and wild-
disjunction, precludes meaningful reduction of social facts with regard to types. With regard to
tokens, wemade an even stronger argument that an externalist account of collective intentionality
precludes reduction to isolated intentional states.
The following subsection once again tilts the view toward social actions. As Mandelbaum
said, it is only via an analysis of thoughts and actions that we can understand the social world.
Both dimensions are equally important. Were one to reduce institutional facts to states of mind,
one would not be able to observe them.17 Thus, an analysis of the relation between intentions and
action is epistemologically important. Moreover, some activity seems necessary to bring about
shared intentional states of mind. Would one reduce the ontological basis of institutional facts or
social structures to activity, however, they would cease to exist once they were not embodied in
concrete practices.
4.5 Social Action
The notion that social facts are intentionality-relative does not entail that agency is not important.
To the contrary, it is essential in the diachronic perspective of structure and agency as it is agency
that creates, recreates, and alters social structures. This section develops an account of agency
and links it to the notion of intentionality. It proceeds as follows: First, it develops a definition of
agency focusing especially on the link between intentionality and action (cf. ch. 3). After having
argued for an understanding of social structure as intentionality-relative, the relation between
intentions and actions needs to be clarified. This very relation then leads back to the discussion of
the relation between structure and agency. As a result, the section presents desiderata for a realist
account of a theory of action. Second, the section brings forward a typology of types of action,
the latter differentiating singular and collective social action. Subsequently, focusing on collective
social action, it presents an account of collective agency. The section concludes with a discussion
of collective agents.
4.5.1 Agency
Agency can generally be defined by three constitutive definitional attributes: an agent, his cogni-
tive and practical intentional states, and some kind of activity linked to the practical intentions of
the agent (cf. Bhaskar 1979; List and Pettit 2011; Schmid 2008). We can derive a first understanding
of action based on his representation of the outer world, a subject does something, typically involving
bodily movements, because he, she, or they believes or believe that this activity allows reaching a
specific goal (see figure 4.5).
A look at the three defining attributes of action—agent, intentional state, and bodilymovement—
reveals a close link between intentions and actions. Behavior is only action if it was intended (cf.
Bhaskar 1979, p. 105). As intentions play a vital role in the definition of action—and, as we will
see below, in the explanation of action via reasons—a definition of agency can draw on the above
definition of intentional states. To do something and to intend to do something are fairly similar
things.
First, intentions and actions necessarily require an agent. Pertaining to intentional states, the
agent is denoted as ‘subject’. The logic, however, is similar. The same individual might be the
subject of an intentional state and the agent of an action.
Second, action necessarily involves cognitive intentional states in the form of beliefs and prac-
tical intentional states in the form of reasons (or motivations or goals). It is fairly obvious that
agents need to have some beliefs about the state of affairs in the world (List and Pettit 2011,
pp. 19–21). As established above, these representations do not by necessity fit the state of affairs
17Although one might argue that some methodological tools, for instance electroencephalography or interviews, are
able to reveal such states of mind.
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Action
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Figure 4.5: Social action. An action is defined by three constitutive attributes: an agent, his intentions, and
his behavior.
to which they refer and thus may be false. Among the beliefs involved in action, the agent needs
to consider the behavior involved in an action adequate to contribute to his goals. Aside from
beliefs, agents hold practical intentional states. Like beliefs, these are a subtype of the broader class
of intentional states in the form of propositions qualified by a specific modus. Unlike beliefs, rea-
sons represent a state of affairs to be reached. As described in section 4.1, the propositions entail
conditions of satisfaction that can be either satisfied or frustrated. As with all intentional states,
the intentional states that accompany actions refer to some object in the world, typically a state of
affairs to be produced.18
For our third point, attribute, activity, social action differs from intentional states. This is be-
cause action necessary involves behavior of some kind, while intentions are defined as states of
mind. Behavior is often equated with bodily movement (cf. Searle 2010, p. 33; Schmid 2008), al-
though one might think of omission as a kind of action (Weber 1921, g˘1).
For behavior to be part of an action, it must be linked to intentional states. This link is causal
in nature and is further discussed in the next section. For now, we can summarize the constitu-
tive understanding of action: Action consists in agents engaging in a specific behavior based on
practical and cognitive intentional states of mind.
4.5.2 Reasons as Causes
The definition of action draws heavily on intentional states. This leads to a central problem in the
theory of action that pertains to the relation between intentional states and actions: Intentional
states conceptually serve a double function with regard to action. On the one hand, intentional
states are constitutive elements of action (as indicated by the vertical line in figure 4.5). Behavior
only counts as part of an action if it is accompanied by practical and cognitive intentional states.
Behavior without intentions—such as reflexes or ‘things that happen to us’, like being struck
by lightning—is not considered action. On the other hand, practical and cognitive intentional
states—or ‘reasons’—serve as a cause for behavior (as indicated by the horizontal arrow in figure
4.5) (Davidson 1963; Bhaskar 1979, pp. 106–129). In short, agents do things because they have
reasons to act. The intentional states in actions cut across the synchronic and diachronic dimen-
sion. They are constitutive part and cause of action. This, in turn, is the well-known problem of
endogeneity.
Before proposing a solution to the problem, we have to take a closer look at reasons. Inten-
tions have been extensively discussed above. Reasons encompass unconscious as well as con-
scious states of mind (Bhaskar 1978, pp. 103, 120; Elder-Vass 2010, pp. 93–94). Reasons that are
causally efficacious, i.e. those intentional states that in fact brought about a certain behavior, can
be denoted as ‘real reasons’ (Bhaskar 1978, p. 117). These two statements taken together entail
that individuals are not necessarily aware of the intentional states that have brought about their
behavior. Moreover, individuals might hold false beliefs about their reasons. Thus, ‘real reasons’
are not necessarily what people give as reasons, e.g. in an interview looking back at something
they have done. Instead, real reasons are those intentional states that have in fact caused a specific
behavior. Thus, the definition of ‘real reasons’ via their causal efficacy allows the differentiation
18Besides cognitive and practical intentional states, actions often involve affective intentional states. Although empiri-
cally all three types of intentional states often occur together, practical and cognitive intentional states are necessary and
cumulatively sufficient conditions for actions.
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Figure 4.6: Taxonomy of categories of action (adapted with minor alterations from Schmid (2008)).
between real states of affairs and what people give as reasons. This allows to critically assess
individual perceptions and scientific theories about reasons (Bhaskar 1978, pp. 116–117). More-
over, only if reasons are causes of action does it make sense to say that individuals calculate costs
and benefits of a specific behavior and decide on how to act. If reasons would not be causally
efficacious, pondering different options would be meaningless or epiphenomenal.
Reasons are not necessarily formed right before someone engages in specific behavior, but
might enduringly exist and be relatively stable. Such long-standing reasons, i.e. reasons that are
not made up anew every time someone behaves in a certain way, can be denoted as dispositions
(Bhaskar 1979, p. 119). Dispositions are a subtype of reasons characterized by a certain perma-
nency. They are thus intentional states and might exist even when not exercised. For instance, a
certain individual might hold the disposition to sacrifice his life by committing a suicide attack
without ever actually doing so. Such an understanding of reasons as dispositions clearly estab-
lishes their independent existence from actions. Sequences of coherent actions—actions that are
linked to one another by serving an overarching goal—are expressions of specific dispositions. For
instance, the actions of individuals in economic markets, such as individual transactions, might
follow their disposition to maximize wealth.
Most importantly, the view of reasons as dispositions enables a solution for the inherent prob-
lem that intentions serve a double function with regard to action as causes and constitutive at-
tributes. While reasons—though not necessarily of the dispositional kind—are always a part of
actions, the opposite is not true: Dispositions exist in the absence of certain behavior (often ex-
pressed in bodily movement) and endure to exist between specific actions. This fits the shift
away from activity-dependence and toward intentionality-dependence of social structure. It is
intentional states and among them dispositions, not activity, that is ubiquitous and serves as the
foundation of social structure. This lends further support to the importance of the synchronic
perspective, even in the context of social action.
Linking this discussion back to causal explanation in critical realism illustrates the pivotal
importance of dispositions in social science explanation. Reasons and dispositions—the latter un-
derstood as tendencies (ibid., p. 121)—serve as the main explanantia linking characteristics of
subjects to actions. Thus, an adequate theory of action refers to dispositions as essential charac-
teristics of subjects.19
Taking up the arguments on the constitutive attributes of collective intentionality, namely the
fact that collective intentionality is a state of shared we-intentions, the following section develops
a concept of collective agency.
4.5.3 Collective Agency
Collective agency is a subtype of social agency (see figure 4.6). Instances of collective agency, i.e.
collective acts, are a troop of soldiers storming a hill, a soccer team playing the offside trap, or
two people walking together.
As a first guess, collective social agency might be defined via the number of agents involved.
Following this intuition, an action is a collective action if more than one person is involved. How-
ever, as Weber (cf. 2008, g˘1) already pointed out, all instances of social action involve more than a
19Trivially, reasons and dispositions are not the only explanatia to explain action. As with all types, causal relations in
open systems, other factors might interfere with the working of dispositions.
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single individual. Moreover, collective agency as understood here should refer to situations where
people act together in a coordinated fashion. For instance, defenders might coincidently advance
on the field without any coordination or joint intention to do so and thereby cause an attacker to
be ruled offside. Such a situation is evidently different from an employed offside trap, where de-
fenders act tactically as a team or at least as the defense. As the example illustrates, the number of
individuals involved in an action is not a sufficient criterion to demarcate singular from collective
action.
A second possible criterion would be the activity involved. However, the same type of activity
might be performed jointly or singularly, this is not an adequate criterion either. I can go for a walk
alone, play the offside trap as last defender, or even recapture a hill on my own. Consequently,
in light of the definition of action proposed above, and following the idea that classifications
should follow constitutive definitional attributes, the difference lies in the intentional states of the
involved individuals.
To differentiate singular and collective agency, I draw on the definition of strong collective
intentionality developed above (Meijers 2003; Schmid 2003, 2008). Following the externalist and
relationist account outlined in subsection 4.1.3, strong collective intentionality is defined as shared
we-intentions. Thus, the defining feature of playing an offside trap, going for a walk together, or
storming a hill, is that the involved subjects share the we-intention to act in a coordinated fashion
and that each of the involved believes that the respective others do their part in achieving the
goal (cooperation). What differentiates singular from collective agency is that the latter involves
collective intentionality of the strong kind. Put differently, strong collective intentionality in the
form of a shared practical intentional states, the belief in cooperation, and behavior that is related
to these intentional states are the constitutive feature of collective agency. This leads to the follow-
ing definition of collective social action: Collective action is action towards a goal that is shared
in the form of a strong collective intentional state.20
If collective social action is action by collectives, who acts? Do individuals disappear behind
group agents? Can we attribute the acts by collectives to individuals, to the group, or to both?
Following Schmid (2008), collective action entails ‘intentional autonomy’ but not necessarily ‘mo-
tivational autarky’. The former states that in terms of individual and collective social action, it
remains the individual who acts. Put differently, a specific behavior can always be attributed to
single persons. If a person behaves in a certain way, e.g. to ‘do his part’ in a collective action,
he is responsible for this behavior. This view needs to be separated from the position of motiva-
tional autarky. Motivational autarky is the position that the behavior of an individual is always
exclusively based on intentions of that very individual. Thus, while individuals are agents and
therefore responsible for their behavior, the behavior must not necessarily be exclusively founded
on their own intentions. Although the argument is stated at length by Schmid, it is not perfectly
clear what exactly differentiates intentional autonomy from motivational autarky.21 Because this
distinction sheds light on the defining features of collective agency, it is worthwhile to clarify the
meaning.
First of all, the difference does not lie between behavior and intentions. Every kind of behav-
ior that is part of an action involves intentional states: Even if group reasons lead to individual
action—as it is the case with motivational autarky—every instance of individual behavior is ac-
companied by individual intentional states. Consequently, the difference does not lie between
intentions and behavior, but between different types of intentions.
Following this line of thought, a distinction—introduced by Searle (1983)—between ‘prior in-
tentions’ and ‘intentions-in-action’ seems compatible to Schmid’s argument and allows for further
clarification. Prior intentions denote those intentions that precede and cause an action. Intention-
in-action describes the psychological event, which accompanies bodily movements. Applying
Searle’s classification of types of intentions within action to Schmid’s argument paints the follow-
ing picture: If an individual behaves in a certain way as part of an action, intentional autonomy
states that intentions-in-action must be held by the very same individual. Intentional autonomy
is what qualifies a certain behavior as an action. Motivational autarky, in addition, requires that
prior intentions must be held by the very individual. It is not, however a necessary definitional
attribute of action. Thus, one can act on the volitions of others.
20The definition is not tautolotical as the term ‘action’ can be substituted by the above definition.
21“Intentional autonomy refers to a very basic and elementary way in which individuals are responsible for their behav-
ior as agents, in which their behavior can be ascribed to them as actions, and in which they can to introduce a metaphor
which I will use repeatedly below claim ownership of their action” (Schmid 2008).
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An example of such cases is provided by the ‘agentic states’ as observed by Milgram (1974,
p. 133)(cf. Schmid 2008), i.e. “the condition a person is in when he sees himself as an agent for
carrying out another person’s wishes.” In the famous experiment, the participants were inten-
tionally autonomous but motivationally heterarchical. The participants themselves operated the
switch that ostensibly caused an electric shock to be administered to another person. Hence, they
were intentionally autonomous. They did not, however, form the intention to do so indepen-
dently. On the contrary, they were mostly opposed to conducting electric shocks. Hence, they
were notmotivationally autonomous.
In summary, we propose the following view, which draws upon a modified account of Schmid
(ibid.): While it is always individuals that behave in a certain way, the reasons causing a certain
behavior need not necessarily be those of the very same individual. This argument seems also to
be compatible with Bhaskar (1978, p. 118), who argues that reasons need not necessarily be pro-
vided by the person that acts. This distinction possibly validates the argument that individuals
might be responsible for their behavior despite not being the initial force behind their intention
to act. Such an understanding allows for the view that an individual’s behavior, though still his
own, might follow the wishes of others. Accordingly, individuals do not always act solely on
their own volitions, but might follow the intentions of others such as influential leaders. While
individual behavior that follows reasons of others seems to be rare between strangers, it plausi-
bly occurs far more frequently in groups. The specificities of collective social action by collective
agents constitutes the topic of the next section.
4.6 Collective Subjects
In our definition of collective action, we have only indirectly referred to the agents. They are part
of the definition since action always necessarily involves an agent (see figure 4.5). This leads us
to the question of who acts in cases of collective action. We have likewise seen that this question
might refer to two things: prior intentions or intention-in-action. The latter is always held by indi-
viduals since it accompanied a certain behavior, i.e. bodilymovement, and it is always individuals
that behave in a certain way. The former, however, are not necessarily held by the individual that
behaves in a certain way. The argument of this section is that these intentional states can be gen-
uinely collective. In this case, we can speak of the existence of collective subjects. These collective
subjects are in a sense more than the interrelated individuals and agency by collective subjects
is more than collective agency. Recently, Albert (2010b), List and Pettit (2011), Pettit (2003), and
Pettit and Schweikard (2006) have argued in favor of the existence of collective subjects.
4.6.1 Collective Subjects as Agents in Their Own Right
List and Pettit (2011) argue that agents can be considered as agents in their own right, i.e in a non-
reducible fashion, if they fulfill three conditions of agency: “representational states, motivational
states, and a capacity to process them and to act on their basis” (ibid., p. 20). In referring to the
account of action as presented in figure 4.5, the authors define agents as those entities that have
cognitive and practical intentional states and are able to act rationally on these intentional states
(ibid., pp. 24–25). Rational are agents that align their beliefs to empirical evidence, act suitably
based on their motivations, and achieve a consistent set of intentional states. The main argument
in favor of the existence of group agents brings together this conceptualization of rational agents
and the so-called discursive dilemma.
The discursive dilemma was originally formulated in jurisprudence (Kornhauser and Sager
1986, 1993) andmade fruitful for the discussion of group agency by List and Pettit (2002, 2011) and
Pettit (2003). The discursive dilemma emerges in situations where individual votes on connected
issues are aggregated to a collective decision. It takes the general form as depicted in table 4.1.
Each of the three individual positions is consistent, as no individual holds contradictory beliefs.
Once the propositions are aggregated by column in a majority vote, however, the outcome is
inconsistent. The majority holds the position that p and that p⇒ q, but not that q. The discursive
dilemma thus states that the aggregation of consistent positions on connected propositions via
majority vote gives inconsistent results. Assuming that consistency is a condition for rationality,
the dilemma supports the following negative claim: A consistent set of intentional states at the
level of a collective cannot simply be reduced to amere aggregate of individually consistent sets of
intentional states. If groups are to count as agents, however, they need to be able to form consistent
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p p⇒ q q
Individual 1 ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual 2 ✓ X X
Individual 3 X ✓ X
Majority ✓ ✓ X
Table 4.1: Discursive dilemma (cf. List and Pettit 2011, p. 45).
group attitudes. A simple aggregation function, which builds on the majoritarian position of each
proposition, does not lead to the emergence of group agents, as groupsmight hold an inconsistent
set of cognitive or practical intentional states.
Generalizing the discursive dilemma, List and Pettit (2011, pp. 49–58) argue that no aggrega-
tion function can simultaneously ensure the following conditions:22
1. Input of any type of internally consistent and complete individual position on a number of
propositions
2. Consistent collective outcome pertaining to all propositions
3. Equal weight to each individual
4. Collective position on each proposition derived exclusively from the positions of individu-
als
While no function allows aggregation satisfying all four conditions, the dilemma is solved
by relaxing each of the conditions. This might be achieved, for instance: by requiring only a cer-
tain degree of agreement among individuals; by forming a collective attitude only on selected
propositions; by introducing a dictator; or by deriving the position on some propositions from
the majority’s position on other propositions. The authors specifically address the last solution. A
possible instance of relaxing the last condition would be to introduce a premise-based solution. In
the example depicted in table 4.1, for instance, the premisses p and p ⇒ q would be aggregated
based on majority rule. The conclusion q, however, would be evaluated based on the aggregated
opinions on the premises and not on the individual opinions on the conclusion. Consequently,
p, p ⇒ q and q would be accepted. The argument leads List and Pettit (ibid., 5–6, 75, ch.1–3) to
argue that groups count as agents in a non-metaphorical sense: Groups can principally qualify as
agents if they are able to establish a coherent set of intentional states.
The criterion of rationality allows to differentiate between collectives acting and group agents.
It seems uncontroversial that a coherent structure of intentional states is a constitutive element
of agency. If a collective holds incompatible views without balking, it can hardly be considered a
group agent. The hallmark of groups as agents is that they aggregate the attitudes of their members
in a consistent fashion. While it might be acceptable for a collective of loosely related individuals
to hold inconsistent and even incompatible intentional states, this is not true for group agents
such as political parties, companies, or rebel groups. Whereas collectives might bring about a
certain state of affairs by a number of singular actions, group agents act on the basis of coherent
intentions.
We have seen above that it is always individuals who behave in a certain way. In the case of acts
of collective subjects, individual behavior follows the cognitive and practical intentional states of
the group. This is how groups act. This also entails that collective subjects to act collectively must
have certain procedures to identify those to act on behalf of the group.
If we can attribute to collectives a set of irreducible coherent beliefs and volitions, procedures
to ensure the coherence of these intentional states, and procedures to identify those, who are
entitled to act on behalf of the group, it seems plausible to talk about these collectives as collective
subjects.
The beliefs and volitions are irreducible because they are non-trivially related to attitudes of
group members. It is not possible to grasp the essential feature of a group agent in terms of the
intentional states of the individual members. Wemay thus very well say that a certain group has a
22The formulations are slightly simplified.
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belief or has a specific goal without adding that this speech is metaphorical. And this is not to say
that individuals are unimportant. To see why, we can refer back to our discussion of emergence
in subsection 4.4.3. Collective subjects stand to individuals in a relation of supervenience (List
and Pettit 2011, pp. 64–72). Collective subjects are supervenient upon their individual members,
because a change in belief or preference of the group necessarily involves a change at the level of
the individual members. No mysterious surplus substance exists.
Nonetheless, collective subjects have agency, more specifically the power to act rationally
based on an irreducible and collectively-consistent set of cognitive and practical intentional states.
Thus, collective subjects can be considered as agents in their own right.
At this point, we can merge the definition of groups and the account of collective social action.
1. Groups are mereologically variable collectives of individuals sharing a collective identity in
the form of self-referential we-intentions.
2. Collective social action is behavior by a collective sharing practical we-intentional states.
3. We-intentional states are relational properties that constitutively depend on the fact that
they are shared.
In summary, groups capable of collective social action can be denoted as collective subjects. In a
synchronic perspective, they are defined via self-referential we-intentions: a number of individu-
als sharing the belief of being part of the respective group. In the diachronic perspective, collective
subjects are characterized by sharing we-intentions toward collective social action: Each individ-
ual member of the collective subject takes a collective perspective in the form of we-intentions.
Taken together, this definition provides an adequate foundation to conceptualize non-state con-
flict actors.
4.7 Summary
In reaction to our criticism of the diachronic downward perspective, this chapter has developed
a synchronic account of the social world based on the notion of intentionality. This complements
the diachronic perspective and allows for an adaptation of the macro-micro-macromodel of social
explanation, which has to include constitutive and causal relations to be complete. Only from a
synchronic perspective are we able to understand that social structures—and a fortiori groups and
conflicts—continue to exist in between and apart from actions. The adapted explanatory model
guides the formulation of our theoretical argument in chapter 8.
Focusing on the synchronic perspective, we identified collective intentionality as key to un-
derstanding the social world. A collective intentional state is a state of affairs where at least two
subjects share an intentional state that is similar in content and object. We thus reject the rather
peculiar idea that single individuals can have collective intentional states and instead favor a re-
lationist understanding. All of the main concepts put forward in this thesis—group, collective
subject, social position, social structure, political conflict, and non-state actor—ultimately found
on this relational understanding of collective intentionality.
Working our way upward from the micro- to the macro-level, social positions describe slots
in the social structure to which specific powers and liabilities are attached through shared ac-
ceptance in society. Shared acceptance is a specific kind of intentional state in the form of shared
i-intentions. In contrast, groups, which are located on the meso-level, found on strong collective
intentional states in the form of shared we-intentions. This gives them a certain permanency and
makes them mereologically variable.
To describe the relation between the micro-, meso-, and macro-level, we turned to the debate
about holism. Here, two arguments in favor of holism by Pettit (1996) and Tomasello (2014) give
important insights into how intentional states are shaped by our social environment. The argu-
ment is that only individuals that are embedded in a relatively stable social environment are able
to develop the specific human ability to understand others as intentional beings which is in turn
a necessary condition of collective acts (Albert 2010b, p. 328). We take up these arguments in our
theoretical discussion in chapter 8. However, they turned out to be diachronic arguments just like
those by Archer (1995) and Bhaskar (1979). Discussing emergence, we found that supervenience
and wild disjunction capture important aspects of synchronic inter-level relations but might not
be ontological but rather epistemological arguments. Referring back to our relationist concept of
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collective intentionality, we furthermore found institutional facts to be irreducible to individual
intentions.
Tilting our view toward agency in the diachronic perspective, we defined social action via the
attributes agent, intentions, and behavior.We found that intentions are both constitutive as well as
causally related to social action. The latter are reasons or, if they are relatively stable, dispositions.
The hallmark of collective agency are shared goals. While in the case of collective agency it is
always individuals that behave in a certain way, individuals might follow the wishes of others.
Bringing together all of the above, we arrived at a notion of collective subjects. Collective
subjects are groups that are additionally qualified by the ability to act on a set of irreducible and
collectively-consistent beliefs and volitions. Thus, collective subjects can be considered as agents
in their own right.
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Chapter 5
Methodology
“An ontology without a methodology is deaf and dumb; a methodology without an ontology is blind.”
Margaret Archer
I see no greater impediment to scientific progress than the prevailing practice of focusing all our mathe-
matical resources on probabilistic and statistical inference while leaving causal considerations to the mercy
of intuition and good judgment.
(Pearl 2009, p. xvi)
Until this point, we have mainly focused on rather abstract ontological questions. This chapter
aims to demonstrate that the ontological work thus far provides a solid foundation for deriving
practical conclusions with regard to methodology.1 This entails that ontology and methodology
are not completely separable, but rather that the former can guide the latter. Here, we agree with
Archer (1995, p. 28): “An ontology without a methodology is deaf and dumb; a methodology
without an ontology is blind. Only if the two do go hand in hand can we avoid a discipline in
which the deaf and the blind lead in different directions, both of which end in cul-de-sacs.”
Research articles in quantitative comparative research on intrastate conflict typically do not
include discussions of the ontological implications of the choice of the specific methods. Many
authors jump straight to the methods. We hold that such an approach is mistaken. The following
example illustrates reasons for putting ontology first: John Stuart Mill introduced two methods
as the “simplest and most obvious modes of singling out from among the circumstances which
precede or follow a phenomenon, those with which it is really connected by an invariable law”
(Mill 1882). These methods—the Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference—are in-
cluded in many introductory textbooks as appropriate ways to attain knowledge about causal
relations in the social sciences.2 Although these methods appear to mirror our intuition and are
in many ways similar to contemporary applied research, they come with a heavy burden in terms
of ontological premises. If one applies these comparative methods and infers statements of causal
relations from them, one necessarily subscribes to a deterministic view of causation in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions, the absence of interaction effects, and an empiricist account
of causation (Lieberson 1991; Maniacs 2006, pp. 157–170). These are far-reaching consequences
that need to be made explicit in order to preclude unwarranted conclusions.3 Even if one chooses
to omit a discussion of the underlying philosophy of science, it does not simply evaporate.
The preceding chapters have established the basic ontological approach for the present anal-
ysis. Even if one agrees with the presented arguments, however, they do not provide an ‘out of
the box’ solution with regard to answering specific research questions. This chapter derives con-
crete implications from the ontological arguments with regard to definitions and explanations. It
thereby links philosophy of science and social ontology to practical methods. Section 5.1 first de-
scribes a realist account of concepts. It then develops four specific requirements for adequate ‘real
definitions’. These definitions are firmly rooted in the ontological premises and thereby address
1This chapter primarily focuses on methodology, not on methods. It discusses what kinds of methods are adequate in
light of the critical realist position developed in chapter 3. The specific instruments and techniques employed in actual
analysis are discussed where they are done in chapter 9.
2Strikingly, Mill himself was skeptical about the application of his methods and described their limitations (Mill 1882).
3For another illustration see Geddes’ 1990 critique of Skocpol (1979), or Mahoney (1999)
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a shortcoming identified in chapter 1: Whereas data availability and statistical methods have im-
proved at an enormous pace, definitions remain rather shallow. The one-sided focus on data and
the dominance of empiricist thinking (ch. 3) have led to intensive discussions about measure-
ment and statistical inference at the expense of research on the essential attributes of the objects
under observation. Both providing and applying criteria for adequate real definitions addresses
this shortcoming.
The discussion thus far has likewise shown that constitutive definitions can teach us how
objects behave, how they influence one another, and how this leads to events. Put succinctly,
concepts are essential for theory building. Neither does causal power arise from processes linking
explanans and explanandum, nor is it an illusion derived from constant conjunctions of events.
Rather, causal power is a ‘potency’ inherent in objects (sec. 3.3). From this one can derive the
critical realist understanding of explanation described in section 5.2.
5.1 Concepts
Concepts define the object under investigation and link a semantic declaration, e.g. ‘state’ or
‘conflict’, to a real world phenomenon. They are important for scientific research in two ways.
First, they contribute to the basic principles of science, namely logical and verbal precision, inter-
subjectivity, and justification (Druwe 1995, pp. 21–24). Second, concepts are the main building
blocks of theoretical arguments. The understanding of the properties of an entity is a necessary
condition if we seek to explain its causal powers. There are no meaningful explanations with-
out concepts. Thus, although many maintain the opposite (cf. Wonka 2007), concepts come be-
fore theory. This does not mean, of course, that research-inducing ideas completely abstract from
cause-effect relations. On the contrary, the great majority of scientific investigation begins with an
observed conjunction of events. However, meaningful theoretical analysis, i.e. an investigation
of the causal power of things, is not possible without having a thorough understanding of the
concepts under investigation.
Goertz (2006a) provides a thorough, concise, and—most importantly for our purposes—realist
account on concepts. We follow his terminology. A concept is a precise and comprehensive defi-
nition of the pivotal characteristics of a phenomenon and of the relations between these charac-
teristics. A concept refers to those attributes of a phenomenon that ontologically define it and are
causally relevant (Goertz 2006b, pp. 5, 27). It consists of three levels depicted in figure 5.1. The ter-
minus denotes the term that is used to refer to the definiendum. The attributes are the constitutive
elements or essential properties of the definiendum. The indicators operationalize the attributes.
Following the diachronic approach laid out in chapters 3 and 4, the relation between terminus
and attributes should be constitutive in nature. The attributes constitute the phenomenon to be
defined, they do not cause it. A causal relation may link the level of indicators to the level of
attributes in case the latter are hard to observe. For instance, we might employ the emission of
nightlight as a proxy for economic development in the empirical analysis in chapter 9. Having
clarified the terminology, the following develops criteria for adequate definitions.
5.1.1 Adequate Real Definitions
This section develops criteria revolving around the idea of ‘conceptual adequacy.’ The quality of a
social science concept—and, by extension, the empirical data generated by it—is proportional to
the extent to which the concept adequately captures reality. A real definition captures the essential
properties of an entity, i.e. properties that are indispensable for what an object is. Developing real
definitions therefore always involves considerations of ontology.
In conflict research, an instrumentalist stance prevails with regard to definitions. In this view,
concepts are nothing but tools (Neufville 2015). Their value lies in their practical usefulness, not
their meaningfulness in relation to reality. As will be shown in chapter 6, many definitions of
political conflict are de facto operationalizations. A real definition, however, should not stop at
enumerating empirical observables, but should rather focus on the very nature of conflict. A real
definition of conflict turns away from a predominantly pragmatic approach to conceptualization.
Based on these premises, we derive four requirements that an adequate concept must fulfill: com-
pleteness, comprehensiveness, symmetry, and depth.
A complete concept—as depicted in figure 5.1—comprises three distinct levels: the terminus,
constitutive attributes, and indicators (Goertz 2006b). Concepts that skip the second level—often
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Terminus
Attribute2Attribute1 Attributen
Indicator1 Indicator2 Indicatorn
Real
Empirical
Figure 5.1: Concepts, attributes, and indicators. A complete conceptualization comprises all three levels.
Purely operational definitions skip the level of attributes.
due to pragmatism—and that exclusively refer to indicators are defective ‘operational definition’
(cf. Sambanis 2004).
A concept should be comprehensive and take into account the double nature of the definiendum
as a progressive stream of actions (‘process’) and as a persistent state (‘structure’). This double un-
derstanding corresponds to the synchronic and diachronic nature of social reality (ch. 3,4). A po-
litical conflict, for instance, is continuously created, recreated, and altered through the unfolding
sequence of events and actions of agents. This is how conflicts (empirically) persist diachroni-
cally. Focusing on conflicts as structural phenomena stresses their persistence as constellations in
between, independent of, and possibly even without concrete interactions. Conflicts exist, syn-
chronically, among different layers of reality. An appropriate definition should thus grasp the
processual dynamics as well as the structural continuity of conflicts.
Concepts are of crucial importance in defining the universe of cases, as they determine what
falls into the segment of reality under investigation. This goes hand in hand with the issue of
deciding when cases fall outside of this segment (cf. Goertz 2006a). In other words, conceptual-
izations should be symmetrical. In peace and conflict research, this is widely debated pertaining
to the concept of peace. Moreover, it is of great practical importance as far as the beginning and
termination of conflicts are concerned.
A real definition should reflect the degree of extension and differentiation found in the definien-
dum. It should be broad enough to cover all empirical phenomena that are instances of the
definiendum. At the same time, it should be differentiated enough not to blur important dif-
ferences between these phenomena. Providing sufficient extension while mapping important dif-
ferences by virtue of a high degree of internal differentiation results in what we term conceptual
depth.
These four criteria allow for the evaluation of existing social science concepts as well as serve
as a guideline for developing new concepts. They therefore enable the implementation of a critical
realist position in practical research.Wewill employ these four criteria to develop a new definition
of political conflict in section 6.1.
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5.2 Explanation
This section deals with the question of explanation, an issue, which certainly lies at the heart of sci-
ence. In a recent article dedicated to research methods for conflict research, Schrodt (2014, p. 289)
criticizes the “disparaging of prediction as the criteria for validating a model.” Citing Hempel
and Oppenheim (1948), Schrodt (2014, p. 290) argues that explanation without prediction “isn’t
scientific at all!” This view is exemplary for the discipline of conflict research, which, with the
help of public institutions, increasingly aims to predict conflict dynamics. Mostly, these accounts
do not differentiate between explanation and prediction, but rather assume or—as in the case
of Phil Schrodt—stipulate their congruence. The view originates in the Deductive-Nomological
(DN) model: It requires an explanandum, a law, and antecedent conditions. In a prediction, one
deducts the explanandum from the other two elements prior to the occurrence of the phenomenon
to be predicted. “It may be said, therefore, that an explanation is not fully adequate unless its ex-
planans, if taken account of in time, could have served as a basis for predicting the phenomenon
under consideration” (Hempel and Oppenheim 1965, p. 138).
This section argues that this view is mistaken. It is closely linked to section 3.3, which in-
troduced the empiricist and the critical realist account of causation. In common understanding,
explanation and causation are similar: Explaining means nothing other than identifying causes.
As we have seen throughout the preceding chapters, however, the concept of cause is debated.
The same is true with regard to explanation (for an overview see Bartelborth 2007; Reiss 2009;
Salmon 1989; Woodward 2003).
This section elucidates the methodological implications of different conceptualizations of cau-
sation for scientific explanation. It proceeds in three steps. First, the following presents the most
influential empiricist model of scientific explanation, the DN-model. Second, it summarizes main
arguments against this model. Third, a realist account of scientific explanation is laid out. In sum-
mary, the section allows us to situate the critical realism account within the literature and to elu-
cidate why it is preferable to other accounts.
As a result, explanatory approaches can be classified according to their position on the onto-
logical status of causal powers. This criterion assists us in identifying two classes of approaches:
anti-realist and realist accounts (Woodward 2003, pp. 118–123; Bartelborth 2007, pp. 21–118; Chalmers
2007, pp. 172–180; Salmon 1989, pp. 4–5). The anti-realist camp comprises all approaches that aim
to leave metaphysical arguments out of the discussion of causality and explanation. The realist
camp argues that causality cannot be adequately framed without reference to metaphysical enti-
ties.
5.2.1 Regularity Approach to Explanation
This subsection presents the DN-model as the most influential approach to explanation in em-
piricism. It is a bit technical but ultimately allows for a detailed presentation of the problems of
the DN-model. The subsequent subsection then proceeds by rejecting the proposal advanced by
Schrodt (2014) to adapt such an approach in conflict research.
Empiricist or ‘regularity approaches to explanation’ belong to the anti-realist camp. Aiming to
leave metaphysical arguments out of the discussion of causality and explanation, they share the
view that causal laws are nothing more than recurring sequences of events: ‘if x happens, then
y (almost) always happens.’ This view of causation directly flows from the empiricist account to
causation. Hempel (1965) andHempel andOppenheim (1965) followed this approach to causation
in the development of the DN-model (cf. Woodward 2003, ch. 4; Bartelborth 2007, pp. 26–35;
Salmon 1989, pp. 4–25).
For empiricists, the main achievement of the DN-model was that the argument is exclusively
based on logical necessity: If the explanandum and the explanans are representations of true facts,
the DN-model links both in such a way that they form a scientific explanation. The conclusion is
deduced from the premises with logical necessity. The DN-model is probably the most widely-
known approach compatible with the empiricist concept of causation. The main idea is that the
explanation of a phenomenon, i.e. specific events or derivative laws, consists of its subsumption
under fundamental laws. For Hempel (1965, p. 337) the explanation of a phenomenon was to
show with the help of the DN-model that “the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected.”
The DN-model departs from two elements that are part of every explanation: an explanandum
and an explanans (Hempel and Oppenheim 1965, pp. 136–137). The explanandum is a sentence
68
5.2. EXPLANATION CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY
L(aw)1, L2, Ln
(Antecedent) C(onditions)1, C2, Cn
E(xplanandum)
Figure 5.2: The deductive-nomological model of explanation: An explanandum E is deduced by subsuming
it under universally valid lawlike statements L and, where appropriate, antecedent conditions C (cf. Hempel
and Oppenheim 1965).
that describes the phenomenon to be explained (E). The explanans contains the antecedent con-
ditions (C), i.e. conditions that need to be realized prior or simultaneously to the occurrence of
the explanandum, and general laws (L): “For all that a causal law asserts is that any event of a
specified kind, i.e. any event having certain specified characteristics, is accompanied by another
event which in turn has certain specified characteristics” (Hempel and Oppenheim 1965, p. 142).
The understanding of laws is very closely related to the Humean concept of causation (see figure
3.1 on page 24) and thus remains firmly rooted in empiricism.
A scientific explanation according to the DN-model has to fulfill three logical (1-3) and one
empirical (4) condition of adequacy:
1. The explanandummust be logically deducible from the explanans. In other word, the expla-
nation must be deductive. This circumvents the realist position of assuming the existence of
unobservable necessary connections between cause and effect.
2. The explanandummust contain laws, making the model of explanation ‘nomological’ (from
Greek nomos = law). Laws are described as “general and unexceptional connections be-
tween specified characteristics of events” (ibid., p. 139). They take the logical form ∀x(Ex→
Dx) (Bartelborth 2007, p. 27).4 Lawlike sentences need to be universally valid, must have an
unlimited scope, and should not refer to one or more particular objects, events, locations, or
points in time (cf. Salmon 1989, pp. 13–15).5
3. The explanans must have empirical content, i.e. it must be empirically testable.
4. The explanans must consist of true sentences.
Themodel usually takes the formdepicted in figure 5.2.6 In addition to the DN-model, Hempel
introduces deductive-statistical (DS-model) and inductive-statistical explanations (IS-model) (cf.
ibid., pp. 51–58). In the former, the law in the explanans is not anymore a universal than a sta-
tistical law, which takes the logical form p(G,H) (Bartelborth 2007, p. 27).7 The explanandum
consists of a statistical uniformity that is narrower than the statistical law in the premise. The
IS-model accounts for cases where a specific event is to be explained by a ’statistical law’ in the
premise. Thus, similar to the DS-model, a statistical law forms the explanans. In contrast to the
DS-model, the explanandum is a specific event. The occurrence of a specific event, however, can-
not be deduced from a non-deterministic law. It can just be stated that the explanandum is highly
probable.8 Accordingly, in the IS-model the conclusion is not logically deduced from the premise;
it is an inductive argument. In summary, Hempel brings forward four types of scientific expla-
nation that can be differentiated along two criteria: the explanandum and the law. Events are the
first kind of explananda. According to Hempel, they can be explained either by deduction from a
universal law (DN-model) or by induction from a statistical law (IS-model). Generalizations are
the second kind of explananda. Generalizations narrower than universal laws can be deduced
4This means in plain english: ‘For all x: if they are E, they are also D’. An example would be: ‘For all metals: if they are
heated they expand.’
5The formulation of an antecedent condition is not a necessary condition, since the DN-model might also be used to
deduct narrow generalizations from wider generalizations.
6The model as presented here is not generalizable to all kinds of explananda. If the explanandum takes the form of
a generalization (e.g., ‘oxygen expands when heated’), which is deduced from a more general generalization (e.g., gases
expand when heated’) and not an event, the argument does not require antecedent conditions in the explanans
7‘All x that are H are also G with the probability of p.’
8In fact, Hempel initially stated that statistical laws in the IS-model should have high p-values. Later, however, he
dropped that requirement due to problems that will be discussed below.
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from universal laws (DN-model), while statistical generalizations are deducible from statistical
laws (DS-model).
Schrodt (2014) particularly praised that the relationship between explanation and prediction
defended by the aforementioned account (cf. Salmon 1989, pp. 47–50; Maniacs 2006, pp. 11–12).
According to Hempel and Oppenheim (1965, p. 138), the difference between both is merely “prag-
matic”. Explanation and prediction have a similar form and are symmetric. They only differ in the
sense that the former occurs only after the explanandum, while the latter is given ex ante.
In summary, Hempel and Oppenheim advance that scientific explanations always, although
sometimes implicitly, consist of deductive or inductive arguments containing statistical or univer-
sal laws. The approach is firmly rooted in the empiricist framework of causation. Explanandum
and explanans stand in a relation to logical necessity, which does not entail any statement about
unobservables. In this view, laws describe deterministic or highly probable coincidences of events
and do not entail statements about causal powers of entities. In short, explanation is subsumption
under lawlike statements.
What does this mean for scientific practice? ‘Do not confuse correlation with causality!’ is one
of the pivotal lessons for today’s students in the social sciences. Put differently, successful expla-
nation requires the identification of accidental regularities from lawful regularities. According to
the DN-model, we would proceed as follows: When confronted with a statement that we assume
to be empirically true, we proceed to prove whether the statement is universal and general.9 If
that is the case, we can conclude that it is a general law and not an accidental regularity. We may
then use the lawlike statement to ’explain’ and ‘predict’ events or narrower generalizations.10
This is the model Schrodt (2014) proposed to guide future approaches in conflict research.
The following subsection shows, however, that this approach is mistaken. Most importantly, it
is not able to effectively differentiate between lawlike and accidental regularities. This evidently
proves to be of pivotal importance in explanations and predictions alike.
5.2.2 Criticism of the Deductive Nomological Model of Explanation
The DN-model was widely accepted after its publication (Salmon 1989, pp. xiii–xiv) and remains
highly influential to this day. More recent debate in the philosophy of science, however, finds
the model to be deeply flawed. Several arguments have undermined the explanatory value of
the DN-model. The first relates to the asymmetry of causal explanations. It is illustrated by two
examples that go back to Bromberger (1966, pp. 92–93, 108):
“There is a point on Fifth Avenue, M feet away from the base of the Empire State Building, at which a ray
of light coming from the tip of the building makes an angle of θ degrees with a line to the base of the
building. From the laws of geometric optics, together with the ‘antecedent’ condition that the distance is M
feet, the angle θ degrees, it is possible to deduce that the Empire State Building has a height of H feet. Any
high-school student could set up the deduction given actual numerical values. By doing so, he would not,
however, have explainedwhy the Empire State Building has a height of H feet, nor would he have answered
the question ’Why does the Empire State Building have a height of H feet?’ nor would an exposition of the
deduction be the explanation of or answer to (either implicitly or explicitly) why the Empire State Building
has a height of H feet. (...)
’From the laws of the simple pendulum and the length of a piece of string at the end of which a bob is
hanging and local free-fall acceleration, one can deduce the period with which that bob is oscillating. From
the same law and data about local free-fall acceleration and the period with which the bob is oscillating, one
can deduce its length. Yet a statement of the length is an answer to ’Why does the bob oscillate with such
and such a period?’ whereas a statement of the period of oscillation is not an answer to ’Why is the length
of the string at the end of which the bob is hanging so many inches long?’ ”
Both examples illustrate the failure of the DN-model to account for the asymmetric relation of
explanation. We might explain the length of the shadow of the Empire State Building from the
height of the building and the laws of the propagation of light.Wemight also explain the period of
the pendulum from the laws of gravity and the length of the string. It seems strange, however, to
explain the height of the Empire State Building by the length of the shadow. Likewise, we cannot
explain the length of the string by the period of oscillation. Explanation is asymmetric in the
way that causation is asymmetric. The DN-model of explanation is indifferent to the asymmetric
nature of causation.
9The statement ‘no sphere of uranium-235 has a mass greater than 100,000 kilograms’ is universal because it refers to a
uniform connection, and general because it is not restricted to a subset of pieces of uranium.
10In the case of narrower generalizations we have an explanation of something specific since narrower generalizations,
in contrast to laws, may refer to particulars (Salmon 1989, pp. 14–15).
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Another example illustrating various shortcomings of the symmetry thesis regarding expla-
nation and prediction is the following: The rapid falling of a barometer indicates the approach
of a storm. If one assumes the existence of a law between both events, the relation would fit the
DN-model of scientific explanation. However, although we would be perfectly able to predict the
occurrence of a storm while observing a rapid fall of the barometer, the fall of a barometer does
not explain the occurrence of the storm.
A second point regards ‘irrelevance’. Kyburg (1965) and Salmon (1971) provided the most
commonly-known examples to illustrate this criticism.
“This sample of table salt dissolves in water, for it has had a dissolving spell cast on it, and all samples of
table salt that have had dissolving spells cast on them dissolve in water” (Kyburg 1965, p. 147).
“John Jones avoided becoming pregnant during the past year, for he has taken his wife’s birth control pills
regularly, and every man who regularly takes birth control pills avoids pregnancy” Salmon (1971, p. 34).
Similar to the above examples, these two examples perfectly fit the DN-model brought forward
by Hempel. The laws ’humans who take contraceptives do not become pregnant’, and ’hexed
salt dissolves in water’ fulfill all conditions of a law, as formulated by Hempel. Nonetheless, the
explanans of both arguments is obviously irrelevant for the explanandum. Consequently, there
either needs to be more restrictions placed on the DN-model, or the model itself must be aban-
doned.
A third criticism pertains to the requirements that were formulated regarding lawlike state-
ments (Salmon 1989, pp. 14–16). To repeat, Hempel formulated the following conditions for law-
like statements: They need to be universal, general, and must not refer to particular objects. Now
consider the following two statements:
• “No sphere of pure gold has a mass greater than 100,000 kilograms.”
• “No sphere of uranium-235 has a mass greater than 100,000 kilograms.”
Both statements fulfill the conditions for lawlike statements as formulated by Hempel. If we
assume both statements to be true, they would represent general laws. They are universal, be-
cause they refer to a uniform connection between two aspects of an empirical phenomenon. They
are general because they are not restricted to any subset of the theoretically-infinite number of
pieces of gold or uranium in the world. Last, both statements do not refer to any particulars.
Both statements fulfill all prerequisites of lawlike statements. Furthermore, both could easily gen-
erate deductive arguments. However, they differ with regard to their explanatory power. It is
theoretically possible to construct a sphere of pure gold with a mass greater than 100,000 kg. Ac-
cording to current knowledge, however, it is physically impossible to construct a spherical piece
of uranium-235 larger than about 49 kilograms because of its critical mass. Thus, the DN-model
is fallible regarding the difference between lawlike statements and accidental regularities.
The approach to scientific explanation by Hempel and Oppenheim fails due to its indifference
towards causal asymmetry, the failure to exclude explanations that are causally irrelevant, and
its fallibility regarding the difference between accidental regularities and real explanations. These
counter-arguments show that the empiricist conception of explanation is flawed. The criteria that
are elaborated by empiricists do not provide adequate guidance for that, which constitutes a sci-
entific explanation. Founding the practice of conflict research on the arguments of Hempel and
Oppenheim, as was proposed by Schrodt (2014), is thus a dangerous idea.
5.2.3 Realist Explanation
Both the last subsection and the critique in section 3.3 show that the empiricist approach to sci-
entific explanation is not sufficient. The aim of the empiricist account was to omit any reference
to unobservables. This aim was made possible by founding the approach to scientific explanation
on the Humean account of causation. The present section describes the critical realist approach to
scientific explanation, which rests on a realist conception of causality.
Before we elaborate on a critical realist account of explanation, a reminder regarding the subtle
but important difference between ‘cause’ and ‘causal law’ is appropriate: The concept of ‘cause’
is more extensive than the concept of ‘law’. Laws comprise statements about tendencies and pos-
sibly refer to the structures and mechanisms bringing about these tendencies. Causes are more
extensive in that they cover not only the working of laws but also those events or processes trig-
gering the working of mechanisms.
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According to critical realism, neither the constant conjunction of events, nor our perception
of constant conjunctions of events form a necessary or sufficient condition to speak of causal
laws (Bhaskar 1979, p. 14). In the process of research, one should not stop observing correlations
between phenomena, but rather inquire into the ‘inner working’ of entities to elucidate what
makes them work as they do. “There is a real difference, quite independent of men, between the
fact that when I heat the kettle of water it boils and the fact that it boils when the time is half-
past two or the colour of my socks is blue. The necessary connections that bind some but not
other events together (which are the enduring mechanisms of nature) are quite independent of
our knowledge of them”(Bhaskar 2008, p. 191). We cannot describe a causal relation by simply
referring to constant conjunctions.
Instead, explanation has to take account of the transfactual character of causality. It has to
refer to the mechanisms, powers, and tendencies of things. In this sense, real definitions and
the critical realist approach to explanation are deeply linked. To define a thing means inquiring
into the constitutive attributes of entities. Constitutive attributes elucidate the structures giving
rise to mechanisms that subsequently endow entities with certain powers and tendencies. In this
sense, we can learn about theory and explanation from the close description of the objects under
observation. This is where case studies and thorough definitions have their place with regard to
explanation. We can very well understand the causal powers of objects by investigating them in
isolation. Critical realism thus underlines the importance of intensive analysis of the objects under
investigation.
Lawlike statements, “when their initial conditions are satisfied, make a claim about the activ-
ity of a tendency, i.e. about the operation of the generative mechanism that would, if undisturbed,
result in the tendency’s manifestation”(ibid., p. 88). Lawlike statements thus describe the way of
acting of powers. They do not cover external or internal conditions that might inhibit the actual-
ization of a specific power. Consequently, the scientific endeavor aims to identify laws. These are
“neither empirical statements (statements about experiences) nor statements about events. Rather
they are statements about the ways of acting of independently existing and transfactually active
things”(ibid., p. 42).
This does not entail that regularities are completely unimportant in the realist framework.
They do, however, have a significantly different status in scientific explanations. With the struc-
ture of concepts in mind (see figure 7.1), we can see that regularities have the status of attributes
in the empiricist framework. Laws are constant conjunctions. This is the implicit ontology of em-
piricism, as portrayed from a realist position. The realist approach to causation would dispose
of regularities as attributes due to the problems described above. Rather, regularities act as indi-
cators of causal powers. As all indicators, they are imperfect approximations and might lead us
astray, as in the cases described in subsection 5.2.2. Explanations always involve ontology.
The approach allows us to take a clear position in another related discussion. It is widely
held that theoretical parsimony is a criterion to assess the quality of theories (cf. Gerring 2012,
pp. 66–67). Loosely following the formulation of ‘Occam’s razor’, one might argue that theoretical
arguments should be formulated as parsimoniously as possible. An instrumentalist would put
the emphasis on ‘parsimoniously’. Why should we develop large-scale theories about an event, if
it can be ‘explained’ by a rather simple statement? A realist, in contrast, would put the emphasis
on ‘as possible’. Parsimony is not an end unto itself but rather an indicator that we have uncovered
a mechanism relating to a large number of empirical phenomena. In the end, it is the structure
of reality that determines whether or not a parsimonious description of a mechanism is valid.
A parsimonious theory is only adequate if it reflects the simplicity in the real world (cf. King,
Keohane, and Verba 1994). The very same logic applies to concepts.
5.3 Summary
In summary, we can derive several methodological implications.
Causality is best described via generative mechanisms. Causal powers are properties of things
existing independently of the observer. Being part of the domain of the real, causal powers are
neither exhaustingly defined by the occurrence of events, nor a mere construction by scientists.
When constructing theories, we should aim to provide the best possible description of the do-
main of the real. A good theory is not necessarily parsimonious but only in cases where reality is
likewise simple in structure. A good theory is a theory that is true, i.e. that describes the causal
powers of real objects. From this we can derive that theories should not—due to the asymmetry
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between explanation and prediction—be exclusively measured on grounds of their ability to fore-
cast; nor can they be sufficiently or exclusively evaluated on grounds of their correspondence to
events. Regularity is an indicator, not the essence of causality.
This is even more important in the open systems studied in the social sciences. Due to the
impossibility of observing causal mechanisms operating in open systems in isolation, regularities
in the domain of the empirical or the domain of the actual may differ from those that would follow
from causal mechanisms working in isolation. By differentiating social mechanisms from observ-
able events, critical realism thus illuminates necessarily existing limitations of empirical research.
A mere correlational approach is not sufficient to detect causality. This also entails that meth-
ods grounded in the concept of necessary and sufficient conditions, such as crisp-set qualitative
comparative analysis, are arguably even less applicable than statistical procedures that rest on
the concept of probability. We cannot falsify a theory by pointing out that certain events did not
happen, just as we cannot falsify the concept of gravity by studying objects isolated from other
masses.
What is needed here includes, first, carefully crafted ‘real definitions’ along the lines proposed
above. As the following chapter shows, they are rare in quantitative conflict research. Second, we
need valid indicators that correspond to the constitutive attributes of the object under analysis.
This can be achieved, e.g., by spatio-temporal disaggregation, which allows the alignment of at-
tribute and indicator as accurately as possible. This point will be taken up in chapter 9. Third, we
need theories that are ‘metaphysical’ in character, i.e. that make statements about the workings of
specific causal mechanisms of the entities involved. They need not be parsimonious, although the
latter might indicate a true theory. Such a theory can be crafted, e.g., along themacro-micro-macro
model, as is done in chapter 8. Fourth and last, we need more elaborated methods to account for
the interference of various causal mechanisms. One possible solution for this includes multi-level
models as applied in chapter 9.
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Chapter 6
Concepts
“Everything should be made as simple as it can be, but not simpler”
Albert Einstein
This chapter puts forward concepts of ‘political conflict’ and ‘non-state conflict actor’ that go
beyond the immediate observable and include a systematic hierarchy of attributes and indicators.
The concepts function as explananda and explanatia in the theory developed in the following
chapter 8.
As laid out in the last chapter, critical realist ontology emphasizes the importance of compre-
hensive conceptualizations of the objects under investigation. Concepts are more than just useful
heuristic devices; they provide an understanding of the causal properties of the objects under
investigation. Bringing forward real definitions, this chapter contributes to conflict research by
transcending the one-dimensional focus on issues of data collection and measurement (cf. ch. 1).
We must venture beyond operational definitions and place our focus on constitutive attributes.
Once the latter are defined, we can derive indicators from them. Jumping straight from semantic
declaration to indicators leaves out the most essential part of what it means to define a thing. This
is one of the core messages of critical realism.
Due to the close link between the structure of entities and their causal powers, much of a
theory is already contained in concepts. Causation is not something invented by human minds
but an objective relationship inhering in reality. And causal potency subsists in the properties of
real objects. Adequate definitions—as discussed in section 5.1—are thus a necessary condition
for adequate theories and thereby serve as the fulcrum of every scientific investigation. Once the
involved concepts have been described, a theory describes how the causal powers of the involved
entities cause the explanandum.
The three sections of this chapter put forward real definitions of three concepts of interest:
‘political conflict’ (section 6.1), ‘non-state actors’ (section 6.2), and ‘social space’ (section 6.3). The
concepts developed in this chapter form the foundation of the theory and empirical analysis in
chapters 8 and 9, respectively. Furthermore, let it be stated here that the development of these
concepts is geared toward a more general applicability, as to enable their use in numerous ways.
6.1 Political Conflict
War is a true chameleon, as Clausewitz observed. The same applies, a fortiori, to political conflicts
in general as they appear in highly diverse forms and might undergo many transformations. On
the side of concepts, Sambanis (2004) observed substantial differences between collections of civil
war data and showed that results of causal inference depend on the chosen dataset. While con-
flict research has since progressed significantly (cf. ch. 1), definitional, operational, and empirical
disagreements between data projects still remain.
This section does three things. First, it evaluates the conceptualizations of six leading conflict
data projects based on the criteria for adequate definitions developed in subsection 5.1.1. The eval-
uation identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the investigated approaches and points out the
direction of possible improvements. Subsection 6.1.2 presents the methodological approach de-
veloped by Christoph Trinn, Nicholas Schwank, and the author as one avenue to address the iden-
tified desiderata (Schwank, Trinn, and Wencker 2013; Trinn 2015; Trinn, Wencker, and Schwank
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2016; Wencker, Trinn, and Croissant 2015). It is one of the main contributions of the present anal-
ysis. The approach includes a refined measurement strategy systematically derived from a set of
explicit attributes of political conflict. Subsection 6.1.3 then evaluates this new approach against
the criteria for adequate definitions to carve out its added value for conflict research.
6.1.1 Extant Concepts of Political Conflict
Leading conflict data compilations are provided by the Correlates of War Project (COW), the Cen-
ter for Systemic Peace (CSP), the Minorities at Risk Project (MAR), the Political Instability Task-
force (PITF), the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)—in cooperationwith the Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO)—, and James Fearon and David Laitin (2003, hereafter F&L) (Wencker,
Trinn, and Croissant 2015). COW was initiated in 1963 by David Singer at the University of
Michigan and later transferred to Pennsylvania State University. CSP, founded in 1997, provides a
dataset on Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV). The MAR project is based at the Univer-
sity of Maryland and was founded by Ted Gurr in 1986. Closely related to CSP is PITF, a research
group initiated by Gurr in 1994. UCDP was established in the mid-1980s at Uppsala University.
Since 2004 it has closely cooperatedwith PRIO, whichwas founded in 1959. PRIO andUCDP have
increased the spatial and temporal precision of conflict data by introducing the Armed Conflict
Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED), respectively
(Raleigh, Cunningham, et al. 2006; Sundberg and Melander 2013).
In the following, we reconstruct the core definitions of the above mentioned conflict research
approaches by looking at relevant publications and codebooks and evaluate these definitions
against the criteria of adequate real definitions: completeness, comprehensiveness, symmetry, and
depth.
Conceptual completeness Addressing the first criterion regarding the existence of systematic
hierarchies of constitutive properties (‘attributes’) and measurable observables (‘indicators’), we
come to the following conclusions. COW defines war as “sustained combat, involving organized
armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related fatalities” (Sarkees and Wayman
2010, p. 49; cf. Small and Singer 1982). This definition comprises two attributes: sustained com-
bat and organized armed forces. The first attribute of sustained combat is not positively defined;
COW merely states that sustained combat is not one-sided violence and “hide-and-seek oper-
ations” (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, p. 49). It is operationalized as 1,000 battle-related, combat-
ant fatalities in a twelve-month period. The involvement of organized armed forces, the second
attribute, is defined as war participation of a member of the international system. System mem-
bership has the following necessary conditions: territory, minimumpopulation, sovereign control,
independence, and diplomatic recognition (ibid., pp. 18–19). War participation is measured by the
number of armed personnel employed (> 1,000 armed troops) and the number of battle-related
deaths (> 100). Regarding civil wars, Small and Singer (1982) reformulated the second attribute
as “effective resistance.” This is defined by two alternative, in themselves sufficient criteria: a suf-
ficient level of organization on both sides, which is not operationalized, and the ability “to inflict
upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains” Small and
Singer (ibid., p. 215). COWmeets our second criterion.
CSP’s MEPV are defined as “systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized
groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the course of the episode,” with
“a base rate of 100 directly-related deaths per annum” (Marshall 2014, pp. 2, 7). This definition
consists of two attributes and one indicator. The first attribute is the systematic and sustained use
of lethal violence, while the second attribute lies in the fact that the violence is used by organized
groups. The indicator is the number of battle-related deaths (100 per annum, 500 per conflict). We
infer that the indicator’s function is to operationalize the first attribute. It might be that the two
different fatality thresholds are linked to the two specifications of lethal violence as ‘systematic’
and ‘sustained’, respectively. The second attribute is left undefined and is not operationalized.
The rather vague approach to operationalization is a drawback of CSP’s conceptualization.
MAR exclusively gathers data on ethno-political conflicts, i.e. conflicts involving mobilized,
politically-active ethnic groups which make claims “against the state or against other political ac-
tors” (Gurr 2000, p. 65). Problematic is the double use of the word ‘conflict’ in the definiens and
the definiendum. Conflict itself is not directly defined. Rather, MAR’s five types of ethno-political
conflict discussed below—inter-communal conflict, intra-communal conflict, protest, rebellion,
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and repression—taken together implicitly define the conceptual space taken up by ‘conflict’. Eth-
nic, political, or identity groups are “people who share a distinctive and enduring collective iden-
tity based on a belief in common descent and on shared experiences and cultural traits” (Gurr
2000, p. 5). An ethno-political groupmust fulfill two criteria in order to be considered: “The group
collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-á-vis other groups
in a society. (...) The group is the basis for political mobilization and action in defense or promo-
tion of its self-defined interests” (ibid., p. 7). MAR covers only those conflicts which involve such
groups.
PITF analyzes three forms of ‘political instability,’ i.e. armed conflicts (or ‘wars’), mass killings,
and cases of contested regime change. We concentrate on the former two. “‘Wars’ are unique po-
litical events that are characterized by the concerted (or major) tactical and strategic use of orga-
nized violence in an attempt by political and/or military leaders to gain a favorable outcome in
an ongoing, group conflict interaction process.” (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2014, p. 4). Thus, three
attributes define war. First, it is characterized by the concerted use of organized, lethal violence.
This is measured by the number of fatalities (more than 1,000 over the course of the conflict and
more than 100 in at least one year). Second, armed conflict necessarily involves mobilized state
and non-state actors. International and subnational conflicts are excluded. Mobilization is proxied
by the number of participants (1,000 people by each conflict party). Third, actors aim at a favorable
outcome for themselves. For non-state actors, a favorable outcome is further specified as chang-
ing “the established political structure or status quo” (ibid., p. 5). Mass killings are also defined
via three attributes. First, they are “sustained policies” (ibid., p. 14). This is operationalized by the
duration of persistent activity (at least six month). Second, these policies must be executed or at
least consented by a government or, in civil wars, by the contending authorities. This is proxied
via the perpetrator and the actor who exerts control over the affected territory. Third, policies
must “result in the deaths of a substantial portion” of the targeted group (ibid., p. 1). A precise
threshold, however, is not provided. The victims of violence must be non-combatants. Where this
is hard to determine, the type of conflict measures, e.g. massacres, is taken into account.
UCDP collects data on three forms of violence: armed conflict, non-state conflict, and one-
sided violence (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al. 2002). All three are defined dyadically. Armed con-
flict is defined via three attributes. First, it is “a contested incompatibility which concerns gov-
ernment and/or territory” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2015; cf. Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al.
2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2014). Second, armed violence is used. Third, the conflict occurs
between actors of which at least one is a government. The first attribute is assessed on the basis
of the change demanded by the actor – either pertaining to the orientation or composition of the
central political system, or to the status of a territory. The second attribute is operationalized as
the use of physical violence by material means that results in at least 25 deaths per year. Third,
UCDP understands as ‘government’ the actor in control of a country’s capital. Non-governmental
groups must at least have a name and resort to armed force. Non-state conflicts differ from armed
conflicts in two ways (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2015; cf. Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012).
First, they occur between organized groups without government participation. Second, they are
not characterized by a specific type of incompatibility. Groups qualify as organized if they have
a name or if violent incidents form a clear pattern. Moreover, it is necessary that groups employ
violence against each other. In a similar vein, one-sided violence differs from armed conflict in
that the incompatibility criterion is not applicable and that armed force is used by a government
or a formally organized group against civilians (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2015; Eck and
Hultman 2007; Sundberg 2009). In sum, UCDP offers detailed and systematic definitions as well
as at least one indicator for each attribute. Operationalizations are generally consistent across the
different concepts.
Fearon and Laitin (2003, p. 76) focus on “violent civil conflicts,” i.e. fighting between state and
non-state actors who seek to “take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use
violence to change government policies,” claiming at least 1,000 lives over the entire period of the
conflict, at least 100 in the average per year and at least 100 concerning each conflict party. There
are three criteria: the involvement of a state against an organized, non-state group; the demand for
a change of government policies or of government or territorial control; and the number of fatali-
ties. In view of the fact that these criteria are already close to the level of empirical measurement,
they can be regarded as indicators. Therefore, this approach is a typical example of a purely opera-
tional definition. As indicators in the social sciences are mainly imperfect approximations that do
not fully grasp the sense of the operationalized attribute, operational definitions are problematic.
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It is in this sense that F&L’s approach misses an important dimension of conceptualization: the
essentials of political conflict. In summary, UCDP, PITF (at least with regard to wars), and COW
offer the most systematic and complete conceptualizations among the investigated projects.
Conceptual comprehensiveness The second criterion concerns the way in which the processual
and structural nature of conflict is recognized by the concepts in question. This loosely relates to
the differentiation between the diachronic and the synchronic perspective (cf. 4). Conflicts are
structures because they are, synchronically, a specific state of relation between at least two actors.
At the same time, conflicts are, diachronically, processes since the continuous or intermittent in-
teraction between actors brings about and reproduces this conflictive relation. Despite this close
link, both dimensions are analytically distinguishable: Attributes denoting successive acts and
communications are processual, while attributes denoting a relational state between actors refer
to the structural dimension. Almost all approaches consider conflicts in their processual dimen-
sion. CSP, UCDP, and PITF (in the definition of armed conflict) define conflicts via the use of
violence. COW and F&L use closely related formulations (‘sustained combat,’ ‘fighting’). PITF in
their definition of mass killings refer to ‘sustained policies.’ In MAR, discriminatory treatment
vis-á-vis other groups in a society is a defining feature of ethno-political groups. This attribute
can be considered processual, as ‘treatment’ implies actions; however, it might also be structural
as a state of relative deprivation.
The structural dimension of conflict is only found in UCDP. Its notion of incompatibility, how-
ever, only appears in the definition of state-based ‘armed conflicts.’ Pertaining to these, incompat-
ibilities are defined as “stated (in writing or verbally) generally incompatible positions” (Uppsala
Conflict Data Program 2015). Although dependent on specific acts, incompatibility signifies rela-
tively permanent relations between actors.
The majority of definitions includes specifications regarding the degree of the internal organi-
zation of actors. While this might be classified as a reference to structures, it does not refer to the
structure of conflicts but merely to the internal structure of the actors involved. Likewise, PITF’s
notion that actors in conflict aim at a favorable outcome for themselves cannot be understood as
an incompatibility in a relational sense as it reduces incompatibility to a property of individual
collective actors. A similar reduction is found in MAR’s reference to group claims.
This overview reveals an imbalance towards processual definitions. It is another instance of
the widespread neglect of synchronic relations in the social sciences. Focusing processes is reason-
able given the dynamic nature of conflicts and the fact that conflicts are primarily observed via a
systematic assessment of conflict measures. One should not, however, dismiss the importance of
the structural dimension. Conflicts might or might not persist during periods where conflictual
interactions are absent. A structural view accounts for the persistence of conflicts during such pe-
riods. More specifically, a reference to, e.g., sustained incompatibilities allows to assess whether
a specific conflict has ended or paused: As long as an incompatibility of intentions exists, a con-
flict subsists. An integration of the structural dimension can thus guide the coding process with
regard to the determination of when a conflict ends.
Conceptual symmetry According to the third criterion, it is particularly crucial to specify as
clearly as possible the transition of a case from the conceptual set of conflict to the set of non-
conflict, or in other words: the termination of political conflicts. The baseline approach is to negate
the attributes of conflict: A conflict is considered to have ended when at least one necessary at-
tribute becomes absent (cf. Goertz 2006b).
Most data projects combine the analysis of specific types of events indicating conflict termi-
nation with fatality thresholds: COW (< 1,000 deaths and either truce, defeat, or petering out),
Fearon and Laitin (2003, footnote 4) (“victory, wholesale demobilization, truce, or peace agree-
ment followed by at least two years of peace”), and PITF (< 100 deaths and either decisive conclu-
sion, such as victory and settlement, or petering out). While in PITF mobilization is a necessary
condition to identify a conflict case (‘event’), it is not explicitly mentioned in the context of con-
flict termination. This could be relevant in a case where an actor continues to inflict more than
100 casualties in a year although its size falls below 1,000 members. UCDP is exemplary in that
it considers all three attributes of armed conflicts (incompatibility, armed, fatal violence, and or-
ganized actors) (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2015). With regard to incompatibility, it looks at
specific events: peace agreements, victory, and ceasefires. However, UCDP’s definition of termi-
nation only extends to armed conflicts, not to non-state conflicts and one-sided violence. In con-
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trast, CSP’s approach is purely event-based, seeking to capture the “transformative ‘moments”’
(Marshall 2014, p. 7) of conflict termination. It relies on expert opinion and not on empirical indi-
cators. MAR equates non-conflict with anything that falls below the lowest intensity level of the
respective type.
Conceptual depth Depth is achieved by a balanced combination of extension and differentia-
tion. Concepts of conflict should be broad and differentiated at the same time. They should cover
all forms of political conflict without blurring substantial differences between them. Concepts
whose extension is large but whose internal differentiation is weak are empirically broad but pro-
vide no or few attributes for generating typologies. In contrast, narrow concepts cover only a
limited segment of reality.
Some approaches set up several conceptual ‘bins’ without integrating them under amore com-
prehensive concept. It seems plausible, however, that different phenomena such as wars or dis-
putes, inter-, intra-, or non-state conflicts, one-sided violence, or protests share enough common
characteristics to be regarded as species of a more general kind (cf. subsec. 6.1.2). The existence
of cross-species properties both allows and warrants conceptual integration. From a pragmatic
point of view, the problem is reflected by the fact that some data projects are indeed dedicated
to an overarching research topic, but do not specify what this topic is. This results in what we
term ‘silo solutions,’ which frequently manifest in separate datasets for particular phenomena
(Schwank, Trinn, and Wencker 2013).
Considerations of depth are also important with regard to conflict intensity, which is of pivotal
relevance with regard to the empirical analysis in chapter 9. Specifically, the extension of conflict
intensity should not be as narrow as to include the consequences of conflict—and fatalities, in
particular—at the expense of the means of conflict. As with the concept of conflict in general, a
concept of intensity should be broad but internally differentiated. In this context, differentiation
refers to the number of intensity indicators.
Based on the type of the actors involved and the territories affected, COW uses an elaborate
scheme of differentiating the overarching concept of war. The project differentiates inter-state
wars (between states), intra-state wars (either between national or regional government forces
and domestic or foreign non-state actors, or among non-state actors within a given state), extra-
state wars (states against outside non-state actors, one of its colonies, a small or unrecognized
state, a pre-state territory or non-territorial non-state actors), and non-state wars (among non-
state actors, either across states or within colonies or other non-state territories). With respect
to inter-state conflicts, COW moreover recognizes the concept of ‘militarized interstate disputes’
(MID), comprising conflicts in which violence is threatened but which remain below the level of
war (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). Although COW’s war concept is rather comprehensive,
it is not a universal concept of political conflict since it excludes all conflicts with less than 1,000
annual battle deaths. However, interstate wars are complemented by the concept of MID below
the level of war, collected in a separate dataset. This is a typical ‘silo solution’ because there is no
integrating concept of interstate conflict.
Turning to intensity, COW confines its compilation to killed combatants. It thereby applies the
most restrictive approach to intensity of all the projects investigated: It does not consider non-
combatant fatalities, let alone other dimensions of conflict consequences, and does not look into
the means of violence.
Even though CSP’s fatality thresholds are significantly lower than COW’s (100 per annum,
500 per conflict), an MEPV is far from being a ‘universal’ concept of political conflict, as the ter-
minus itself explicates. CSP differentiates between inter- and intra-state conflicts, subdividing the
latter in civil and ethnic conflicts. These types are further specified as episodes of violence, wars
or attempts at independence. ‘War’ differs from ‘violence’ in that the war participants seek to
impose their will unilaterally. This two-level typology results in seven subtypes. While the cat-
egories of violence and war can be attached to international, civil and ethnic episodes, attempts
at independence always belong to the international domain. With regard to intensity or ‘magni-
tude,’ CSP is notable for assessing the consequences of an MEPV through six dimensions, each
comprising a multiplicity of highly qualitative but well-defined indicators: (1) human resources
(direct and indirect casualties, sexual violence); (2) population dislocation (physical, psycholog-
ical, economic, financial, political and military costs of displacement and migration); (3) societal
networks (disintegration of identities and interpersonal relations); (4) environmental quality; (5)
infrastructure damage and resource diversions; (6) diminished quality of life and non-reciprocal
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resource transfers (short- and long-term effects to the aesthetic and humanitarian quality of life,
future prospects, financial and human capital outflows, devaluation, socio-psychological conse-
quences). Evaluation of these dimensions results in ten ‘warfare categories:’ sporadic/expressive,
limited and serious political violence, serious, substantial/prolonged, extensive, pervasive, tech-
nological and total warfare as well as extermination/annihilation (Marshall 2014, pp. 9–11). This
scheme leads to a considerable amount of internal differentiation. However, while its considera-
tion of conflict consequences is much broader than, say, COW’s, CSP does not take into account
the means of violence.
As far as the dimension of actors is concerned, MAR’s core concept, ‘ethno-political conflict,’
is the narrowest amongst those considered here as it only includes conflicts involving politically
active ethnic groups. Considering the actors and the measures they employ, MAR distinguishes
inter- und intracommunal conflicts, protests and rebellions of, as well as state repression against,
ethno-political groups. The distinction between these types is, to the best of our knowledge, not
explicated but can be reconstructed from Gurr (2000), the MAR codebook and from the intensity
indicators (cf. below). The types result from successive classifications. Government participation
serves as a first criterion. Where the government is the subject of conflict activities, MAR codes
this conflict as a case of repression. Where the government is the object, we find either rebel-
lion or protest, depending on whether arms are used or resistance remains primarily non-violent.
Ethno-political conflicts without government involvement are in turn distinguished into intra-
and intercommunal conflicts. This distinction ultimately hinges on how to demarcate individual
groups. Groups are different if they are treated and perceived as such Gurr (ibid., p. 8). MAR’s
classification scheme does not employ an equal number of criteria across its different branches.
While, for instance, protest is defined by three attributes (government participation, direction
against the government, and non-violent resistance), intercommunal conflicts use only two cri-
teria (government involvement and infighting). The attributes underlying the taxonomy are not
explicitly operationalized. For instance, it is unclear how initiation is identified to differentiate
repression from protest/rebellion. It appears that MAR primarily focuses on conceptualizing the
various types as such and not on developing a systematic, explicit taxonomy. Consequently, the
indicators used to assess the severity of each conflict type give a ‘phenomenological’ idea of each
type.
To each of the five conflict types, MAR applies a unique intensity assessment scheme with five
to seven levels. Indicators differ between schemes as well as between levels of the same scheme.
This reduces the comparability of cases across the five conflict types and effectively creates opera-
tional ‘silos.’ Severity assessments are done per calendar year, combining rather qualitative indi-
cators (e.g. weapon types, symbolic acts, strikes, affected area, territorial control) with occasional
quantifications (e.g. number of clashes, fighters, or protesters) (Center for International Develop-
ment and Conflict Management 2009). Unlike most of the other projects, MAR takes a substantive
look into the means of violence, especially the weaponry and the number of participants. How-
ever, means and consequences are not always clearly separated (consider area control or effects
on property). MAR is notable for its broad take on intensity by also including non-violent inten-
sity levels of intercommunal conflicts, protests, and repression. MAR recognizes very low levels
of violence (excluding intracommunal conflicts and rebellions).
We encounter the ‘silo’ problem also in PITF, where armed conflicts are conceptually sepa-
rated from mass killings without explicitly defining the overarching term, political instability.
This problem, however, does not arise within these two concepts. Armed conflicts are differenti-
ated into revolutionary and ethnic wars along the dimensions of participating actors and conflict
issues. With regard to mass killings, genocides are distinguished from politicides on the basis of
the targeted group. The definition of armed conflict is rather narrow (100 fatalities per annum
and 1,000 per conflict, 1,000 mobilized persons; intrastate conflicts only; restricted catalogue of
issues).
In assessing the conflict ‘magnitude’ of wars, PITF uses three indicators: (1) the number of
rebels, (2) the annual number of fighting-related deaths among combatants and non-combatants,
and (3) the portion of a country directly or indirectly affected by fighting. PITF thus combines
both intensity dimensions: the means of conflict and its consequences. PITF differs from COW in
that it takes into account non-combatant fatalities. Each of the three indicators is assessed on an
ordinal pentatonic scale and is omitted in case of insufficient information. The annual magnitude
equals the average of the scores. PITF also covers genocide and politicides, i.e. “the promotion,
execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents—or in
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the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—that result in the deaths of a substantial
portion of a communal group or politicized non-communal group” (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff
2014, p. 14). While politicides target opposition groups, genocides are directed against ethnolin-
guistic or religious groups. Fatality figures form the basis of an eleven-point ordinal magnitude
scale.
UCDP recognizes three different forms of violence: armed conflict, non-state conflict, and one-
sided violence. Whereas armed conflicts involve government actors on at least one side, non-state
conflicts are fought exclusively between organized non-state actors. In cases of one-sided vio-
lence, a government or organized group uses violence against civilians. Armed conflict is addi-
tionally qualified by the fact that it is “a contested incompatibility which concerns government
and/or territory” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2015). UCDP further classifies armed con-
flicts according to whether they are intranational, internationalized intranational, extra-systemic
(mostly colonial), or international in character. What is missing, however, is an overarching con-
cept of conflict. This leaves the three basic types of violence as conceptual ‘silos.’ Sharing a thresh-
old of 25 battle-related deaths per year, each of these concepts is rather broad. However, non-
violent conflicts or very low levels of violence are excluded. In GED the threshold is lowered to at
least one battle-related death per event, considerably increasing the extension, albeit not beyond
the scope of violence. Similarly to PITF, but unlike COW, UCDP covers combatant as well as
non-combatant fatalities. It does not, however, take into account other dimensions of conflict con-
sequences or the means of violence. As outlined above, the concept of armed conflict is narrowed
down by the ‘issues’ of contestation.
Based on the number of fatalities, UCDP distinguishes two intensity levels of armed conflicts:
‘Minor armed conflicts’ lie above a threshold of 25 fatalities but below the threshold of war, fixed
at a death toll of 1,000. This differentiation, however, is not applied to non-state conflicts and
one-sided violence. UCDP offers data on the minimum, maximum, and most reliable number of
fatalities per year.
‘Violent civil conflict’, the comparatively narrow and undifferentiated core concept of F&L,
is defined by quantitative thresholds (1,000 fatalities per conflict, 100 per annum, 100 on each
side), which are in place to exclude short-term, one-sided, unorganized, and marginally violent
or non-violent conflicts. The authors allow for non-state actors’ objectives “to take control of a
government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies” (Fearon
and Laitin 2003, p. 76). They do not look into dimensions of consequences other than combatant
and civilian deaths, or into the means of violence.
Comparative assessment The comparative evaluation yields the following results. With regard
to conceptual completeness, COW, UCDP, and PITF (for armed conflict) provide the most system-
atic hierarchies of defining attributes and indicators. Inter-level specifications of CSP, in contrast,
are incomplete and lack detail. MAR focuses on subtypes without explicitly defining conflict.
F&L’s definition is purely operational. Concerning conceptual comprehensiveness, we observe
that nearly all approaches exclusively focus on conflicts as processes. Only UCDP adequately
recognizes the structural dimension of conflict by considering states of incompatibility.
While all of the examined concepts are symmetric in that they address conflict termination in
some way, there are differences. MAR does not positively define or operationalize it. CSP takes
a purely event-based approach without explicating reliable indicators. COW, PITF, UCDP (for
armed conflicts) and F&L combine threshold- and event-based strategies. Whereas the termina-
tion criteria of COW and UCDP are sufficiently linked to the attributes defining conflict, this only
partially applies to PITF. F&L’s operationalization of conflict ends fits their conflict indicators.
Pertaining to the conceptual depth of the definitions of political conflict, we observe the fol-
lowing. Due to its high fatality threshold, the extension of COW’s concept is very narrow. While
CSP, PITF, and F&L exhibit a medium degree of extension, UCDP’s concept is relatively broad.
Despite the fact that MAR likewise includes conflicts without violence, it is narrow due to its
focus on ethno-political conflicts. Some projects differentiate conflict types without integrating
them under a more comprehensive concept. We observe such ‘silo’ solutions in COW, PITF, and
UCDP.While CSP collects data on different types of ‘political instability,’ this term is not explicitly
defined. F&L do not internally differentiate their concept at all.
With respect to the depth of the concepts of conflict intensity, COW, CSP, UCDP, and F&L
are narrow because they exclusively focus on consequences of violence at the expense of the
employed means. In this group, CSP is the most differentiated since it uses a large number of
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Concept Completeness Comprehensiveness Symmetry Depth: conflict* Depth: intensity**
COW + - + -/- -/-
CSP - - - -/+ -/+
F&L - - - -/- -/-
PITF + - (+) -/- +/+
MAR - - - (+)/- +/-
UCDP + + + (+)/- -/-
Table 6.1: Comparative assessment of concepts of political conflict. * = broadness and differentiation; ** =
dimensionality and number of indicators.
indicators. The remaining three projects only consider fatality figures. A second group comprises
MAR and PITF. Both cover means and consequences. MAR employs a different set of indicators
for each of its five types of ethno-political conflict as well as for each intensity level. PITF uses
three indicators and a pentatonic scale. With regard to the depth of the intensity concept, PITF
arguably offers the best solution here.
Table 6.1 summarizes these results. It shows that overall UCDP performs best among the in-
vestigated projects. Nonetheless, the evaluation reveals two remaining desiderata revolving around
conceptual depth: First, to address the ‘silo’ problem of conceptual differentiation, and second, to
formulate a multi-dimensional and multi-indicator concept of conflict intensity. Both issues are
of considerable relevance for empirical research because they affect the ability to capture conflict
transformation, on the one hand, and the validity of intensity assessments, on the other. Of spe-
cific importance in view of the empirical analysis, however, is the second desideratum (cf. the
second aim identified in chapter 1). A multi-dimensional concept of conflict intensity is a sine qua
non to empirically assess profiles of violence.
6.1.2 The Heidelberg Approach
The concept of political conflict as described in Schwank, Trinn, andWencker (2013), Trinn (2015),
Trinn, Wencker, and Schwank (2016), and Wencker, Trinn, and Croissant (2015) addresses both
these desiderata as well as perceived shortcomings of the accuracy, replicability and reliability of
the former Heidelberg approach (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012, p. 352). The revised approach
has also been adopted by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) in
its yearly publication (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2016). This subsec-
tion introduces the basic concept of political conflict and the definition and operationalization of
conflict intensity.
Political conflict is a perceived incompatibility of intentions between individuals or social groups defined
by three constitutive attributes: First, it refers to an issue that is of relevance to society as whole. Second,
the conflict is carried out by conflict ‘measures,’ i.e. communications and actions. Third, involved in the
conflict are actors that are significant.
Conflict actors are internally coherent collectives, as evidenced by a consistent preference
structure. Collective actors comprise states, international organizations, and non-state actors. These
are significant if they are taken into account by other conflict actors in their decision-making pro-
cesses. The significance of an actor is thus not defined by its endowment with resources or its
fighting capacity, but through the opponent’s reaction. The distinction between state and non-
state actors results in three basic conflict types: international conflict (between states), intrastate
conflict (between a state and a non-state actor), and subnational conflict (between non-state ac-
tors).
Conflict measures comprise all actions and communications carried out by a conflict actor, lie
outside established procedures of regulation and, possibly in combination with other measures,
threaten a core state function or the international order, or render such a threat probable. Estab-
lished procedures of regulation are those mechanisms of conflict management that are recognized
as such by the actors involved and are performed without resorting to the use or threat of physi-
cal violence. Core state functions are the maintenance of (a) the physical security of a population,
(b) territorial integrity, and (c) a political, socioeconomic or cultural order. A measure threatens
a core state function or the international order if their maintenance is rendered improbable in
the perception of a conflict actor. Conflict issues (cf. O’Leary 1976) are material or immaterial
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Actors Measures Issues 
Internal cohesion 
outside est. 
procedures of 
regulation 
(im)material goods significance threat to core state function / int. order 
consistent preference 
structure shared recognition aspiration by actor 
influence on decision-
making of opponent 
perceived improbability 
of maintenance 
Political Conflict 
Figure 6.1: Concept of political conflict.
Violent Conflict Intensity 
Means 
Weapons Personnel 
Consequences 
Casualties Refugees Destruction 
Figure 6.2: Concept of conflict intensity.
objects which are aspired by actors using measures and which have relevance for society as a
whole because of their relation to the coexistence of human beings in a society or of states in
the international system. In principle, every object might constitute a conflict issue. Relevance for
society as a whole does not inhere in an object per se, but arises from its being pursued by mea-
sures. Thus, measures have a two-fold function: They constitute conflicts as processes and endow
objects with relevance. Ten categories of conflict issues are differentiated, representing common
goals of conflict actors. The three conflict attributes—actors, measures, and issues—together form
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of political conflict (see figure 6.1).
Conflict intensity is a property of a sum of conflict measures in a geographical and temporal
space. The primary units of analysis are the calendar month and the ‘region,’ i.e. the first-level
subnational administrative unit of a country. Five intensity levels are distinguished: dispute and
non-violent crisis (non-violent conflicts), violent crisis, limited war, and war (violent conflicts).
A dispute is a political conflict carried out without the use or threat of physical violence. In a
non-violent crisis, actors threaten to use violence. This includes violence against objects without
taking the risk to harm persons, sanctions, the refusal of arms surrender, or pointing weapon
systems against each other.
The assessment of violent intensity levels uses five indicators measuring the means and con-
sequences of conflict measures. Means are operationalized via the deployment of weapons and
personnel. Consequences encompass the numbers of fatalities and refugees and the amount of
destruction (see figure 6.2). Each indicator is scored on a ternary scale. The intensity of a region-
month is determined by aggregating the five individual scores. This results in an eleven-point
intensity scale which is in turn aggregated to the three violent intensity levels.
The weapons indicator determines whether light or heavy arms are used (e.g. handguns or
hand grenades vs. artillery or heavy bombs). Regarding the extent to which the fighting capacity
of heavy arms is exploited, restrictive and extensive use is differentiated. The personnel indicator
is a count of the highest number of persons representing an actor in a single violent measure.
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Indicator 0 1 2
Weapons use of light weapons restrictive use of heavy weapons extensive use of heavy weapons
Personnel < 50 50 - 400 > 400
Fatalities < 20 20 - 60 > 60
Refugees < 1,000 1,000 - 20,000 > 20,000
Destruction massive in no dimension massive in 1 or 2 dimensions massive in 3 or 4 dimensions
Table 6.2: Intensity indicator thresholds. Each indicator is rated on a ternary scale.Where reliable quantitative
data is not available, a catalogue keywords is employed.
Fatalities comprise the number of deaths from violent measures or their direct consequences.
Persons dying due to indirect effects, e.g. starvation or disease, are not counted. The fourth in-
dicator measures the number of refugees and displaced persons. Displacement is defined as the
migration of human beings provoked by the fear induced by conflict measures using or threat-
ening violence. Taken into account are flow, not stock data. Finally, the destruction is evaluated
in four dimensions considered essential for civilians: infrastructure, accommodation as well as
economic and cultural structures. Each of the five indicators is given a score between 0 and 2 (see
table 6.2).
Data collection rests on publicly available sources, including academic publications, news
agencies, major newspapers, and television broadcasts as well as the local press. As international
and local media may be susceptible to distortions due to sensationalism, unbalanced coverage,
or partisan bias (cf. Moeller 1999), country-specific knowledge is of utmost importance, comple-
mented by a whitelist of international and local sources.
The assessment of destruction and the use of arms requires a subjective appraisal. However,
quantitative information regarding conflict personnel, fatalities, and refugees might not always
be reliable, as well (cf. Weidmann 2014b). To ensure valid measurement, codings are re-examined
by experienced staff and external country experts. If quantitative data is not available, a catalogue
of quantifying keywords is employed.
Apart from considering marginally violent conflict, the Heidelberg approach also covers non-
violent conflicts and conflict phases, i.e. disputes and non-violent crises. One of the greatest prac-
tical challenges is to demarcate non-violent conflict from non-conflict. Specifically, the concept of
dispute elucidates by its negation what non-conflictual controversies are. Controversies which
take place within established procedures of regulation or which do not have relevance for society
as a whole are not political conflicts. This is particularly important for conflict termination (Hegre
2004), i.e. the transition of a case from the set of conflict to the set of non-conflict. The Heidelberg
approach considers a conflict to have ended either if (a) an agreement between the actors has
been reached, solving the incompatibility of intentions pertaining to an issue, if (b) all actors on
one side have become extinct, or if (c) interactions exclusively occur within established regulatory
procedures or cease to be of societal relevance.
6.1.3 Conceptual Assessment of the Heidelberg Approach
The Heidelberg approach fulfills all four criteria of conceptual adequacy and addresses the two
desiderata identified above. First, the Heidelberg conceptualization is complete since it offers a
systematic hierarchy of constitutive properties and measurable observables (see figure 6.1). The
terminus ‘political conflict’ is defined by the three constitutive attributes actors, measures, and
issues. These are broken down into five sub-attributes, which are in turn operationalized by one
indicator each. Second, the definition is comprehensive. Political conflict is defined as a structure
of incompatible intentions. The processual nature of conflicts is included in the notion of conflict
measures. Structure and process are thus both constitutive elements of the approach. In other
projects this is only found in UCDP. Third, the approach is symmetric by explicitly conceptualizing
the termination of conflicts. It does so by defining empirical conditions that each indicate the
absence of one of the constitutive attributes.
Turning to the fourth criterion—conceptual depth—, we address the added conceptual value
of the Heidelberg approach. It encompasses all forms of conflictive political interaction, whether
highly, marginally or non-violent, inter-, intra-, sub-, or transnational, ethnic, civil or terrorist
in nature, short- or long-term, organized or ‘unorganized,’ one-, two-, or many-sided, involving
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any relevant issue. In comparison, although being relatively broad, MAR is restricted to ethno-
political and UCDP to fatally violent conflicts. Integrating various types of conflict under a single
term, the Heidelberg approach avoids the disintegration of the real phenomenon into conceptual
‘silos.’ While it might be argued that this amounts to lumping together essentially different phe-
nomena, the approach allows for the systematic derivation of subtypes of conflicts along the three
constitutive attributes (cf. Angstrom 2001). This contributes to the analysis of different types of
conflict (cf. Le Billon 2001).
The assessment of violent intensities under the Heidelberg system is multi-dimensional, tak-
ing into account both the means of conflict and its consequences. Whereas COW, UCDP, and F&L
exclusively focus on fatality figures, CSP considerably broadens the dimension of consequences.
Only MAR, PITF, and the Heidelberg approach also account for conflict means. However, MAR
is inherently unsystematic in this regard. Compared to PITF, the Heidelberg measurement is
broader, taking into account not only fatalities and personnel but also weaponry, refugees, and
destruction. This puts the intensity measurement on a broader and more solid footing than a sole,
and widely debated (Obermeyer, Murray, and Gakidou 2008), focus on fatalities.
In summary, this section has presented a new concept of political conflict developed on the
foundations of a critical realist perspective and illustrated its added value in comparison to exist-
ing approaches. The following section more closely focuses on one of the constitutive attributes
of intrastate political conflict: conflict actors.
6.2 Non-State Conflict Actors
Conflict actors are constitutive elements of political conflict. Actors bring about conflicts through
their own efforts, whether that is defining the topics and items of conflict by via communication
and volitions. Moreover, their reciprocal interaction determines conflict dynamics. The present
section develops a concept of non-state conflict actors built around the social-philosophical con-
cept of collective subject (cf. ch. 4), the concept of political conflict presented above, and the ex-
isting literature. This strategy aims to provide a definition that not only mirrors the critical realist
perspective of the social world, but also stands in compatibility with the concept of political con-
flict, while highlighting the commonalities and differences with existing approaches.
This section relates the concept of ‘conflict actors’ to ‘political conflicts’ and advances a typol-
ogy of non-state actors. In this effort, the following proceeds with three steps: First, subsection
6.2.1 gives an overview of existing research concerning the conceptualization of non-state conflict
actors (NSCA). Second, we take the smallest common denominator of existing definitions as my
point of departure in developing a more elaborated conceptualization of NSCA in 6.2.2. The new
definition rests upon those of chapter 4 to carve out essential attributes of NSCA. The third and
final step discusses conflict-relevant characteristics of NSCA and presents a taxonomy of conflict
actors in subsection 6.2.3.
6.2.1 Extant Concepts of Non-State Conflict Actors
Current research on non-state actors in political conflict can be divided broadly into two types:
On the one hand, quantitatively oriented research analyzes the role of non-state conflict actors
(NSCA) using large samples of conflict data (cf. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009b;
Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Gent 2011; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). Due to practical
reasons, however, the descriptions of NSCA mostly remain shallow and rely not only on handy
definitions to cope with the needs of coding reliability, but also on the extensive amount of data
to be processed and the problem of lacking information. Mostly, news databases such as Lexis-
Nexis or other media releases are used as a source for coding information on NSCA. This heavily
restricts the amount of information on NSCA. Qualitatively oriented research, on the other hand,
focuses on the role of a single or a small sample of non-state conflict actors in specific conflicts
(cf. Gates 2002; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Weinstein 2007). These approaches generally
characterize NSCA under investigation in greater depth, e.g. analyze dynamics within non-state
actors or focus on characteristics of individual members of the collective actor. Research methods
comprise interviews and field studies. Thus, while quantitative research often lacks elaborated
concepts and can be criticized for a lack of validity, qualitative research often fails to establish
universal definitions and quantifiable indicators, which are prerequisites for comparative anal-
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Figure 6.3: Relative share of articles on non-state actors in the literature on intrastate political conﬂict 2000-
2015. Results are from the Social Science Citations index.
yses. Keeping these shortcomings in mind, the following gives a broad overview of the state of
research on non-state conﬂict actors.
For our ﬁrst step, we identify the population of scientiﬁc works in a bibliographical analysis
(see ﬁgure 6.3).1
As the temporal overview of those publications listed in the Social Science Citation Index ex-
hibits, scientiﬁc interest in the role of non-state actors has been on the rise (also see results in
chapter 2). Since 2000, the total number of newly published articles both on non-state conﬂict
actors and intrastate conﬂict has greatly increased. The ratio of publications on NSCA to all pub-
lications on intrastate conﬂict has risen from 3.5 percent between 2000-2004 to 6.8 percent between
2010-2014.
Given the high interest in the topic under analysis, a review of the conceptualization of NSCA
used in research on intra-state conﬂict provides an opportunity to assess the state of the research,
compare different concepts, and evaluate their usability for the purposes of quantitative and qual-
itative research. A screening of scientiﬁc works for their respective deﬁnition of non-state actors
shows that many fail to give one. It is common practice to refer to codebooks in case of quantita-
tive analyses. However, the concepts of non-state actors should at the very least enter discussion.
The following summarizes extant deﬁnitions of non-state conﬂict actors from the literature.2
From these, we can get an idea of the common understanding of the term within the research
community and derive relatively undisputed core characteristics.
The smallest common denominators are that the non-state actor is an entity comprised of several individ-
uals and that it has some form of organizational structure (be it formal, as in e.g. rebel groups or more
traditional, as in e.g. ethnic groupings) (Harbom and Sundberg 2009).
[T]he main characteristics of armed groups can be described as follows: (...) The combatants are organized
according to a basic command structure and follow its instructions. (...) The group is engaged in a political
struggle, that is an attempt to redeﬁne the political and legal basis of society through the use of violence.
(...) Independence from state control. [However], [t]he issue of state control is often problematic (Bruderlein
1The bibliographical analysis was conducted using Web of Science with the following search terms on articles:
TS=(“non-state actor$” OR “NSA” OR “terrorist group$” OR “Armed group$” OR "rebel$”) AND TS=(“civil war$” OR
“intrastate conﬂict$” OR “domestic conﬂict$” OR “internal war$” OR “internal conﬂict$” OR “domestic war$” OR “intra-
national war$” OR “intranational conﬂict$”).
2Deﬁnitions of NSA employ different termini: Non-state actor, armed group, non-state armed group, and organized
armed group. One can argue, however, that they all relate to very similar empirical phenomena and can therefore be
compared. Such a comparison serves as an adequate starting point to address the issue of conceptualization of NSCA.
85
6.2. NON-STATE CONFLICT ACTORS CHAPTER 6. CONCEPTS
2000).
[B]y ‘armed groups’ we mean groups that are armed and use force to achieve their objectives and are not
under state control (Petrasek 2001, p. 5).
This Protocol (...) shall apply to all armed conflicts (...) which take place in the territory of a High Contract-
ing Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which,
under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol (International Committee of
the Red Cross 1977).
We propose that rebel groups will be better understood if they are seen as predatory organizations focused
on resource extraction and survival. (...) We examine three key elements of a group’s character: command
structure, level of militarization, and responsiveness to community (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009, pp. 627–
630).
Non-state armed groups are classically defined, in Weberian fashion, as “violent challengers to the state’s
monopoly of legitimate coercive force” (Policzer 2005, p. 8). Among the vast universe of such groups, the
scope of enquiry of this paper is reduced to a sub-set of actors who pursue primarily political (as opposed to
economic or private) agendas; understand the use of force (often seen as a last resort) to be a legitimate and
pragmatic tool of resistance against clearly defined opponents (i.e. as opposed to indiscriminate terror); are
formally organised and have hierarchical, accountable structures (and often distinct military and political
organs); and exercise some degree of territorial control (where they develop their own parallel governance
structure) (Dudouet 2012, p. 98).
We define a nonstate actor as an organized political actor not directly connected to the state but pursuing
aims that affect vital state interests (Pearlman and Cunningham 2012, p. 3).
As a first approximation, the following core characteristics can be extracted from the defini-
tions of non-state conflict actors. Non-state conflict actors
• consist of multiple individuals,
• have a certain degree of organization,
• are not part of an internationally recognized state.
These three relatively undisputed attributes refer to the internal organizational structure of
NSCA, their structural embedding, and to their practices, respectively. Together, they form the
smallest common denominator of what constitutes non-state conflict actors. As it will turn out, it
is reasonable to regard these attributes as a necessary definitional attribute of NSCA.
While these three definitional attributes are relatively undisputed, the above definitions also
mention three characteristics often part of the definition, albeit disputed among scholars. These
are clearly specified goals, the exercise of territorial control, and armament as well as the employ-
ment of violent means.
Concerning the first disputed definitional attribute, Beardsley and McQuinn (2009, p. 627)
proposes to conceptualize rebel groups as “predatory organizations focused on resource extrac-
tion and survival” . Bruderlein (2000) and Dudouet (2012), on the other hand, do not completely
neglect the role of materialist incentives, but notably diminish this role to other means of more di-
rected political purpose. Similarly, Pearlman and Cunningham (2012) see the affectedness of vital
state interests as necessary attributes of non-state actors. Schlichte (2009b) empirically finds that
the employment of violence by those armed groups that are included in his study always remains
geared toward changing or overtaking political power in the specific national or local arena.3
The lack of agreement concerning the definitional attribute of a specific goal is comprehensi-
ble. Epistemologically, it is often hard to assess the (primary) motivation of conflict actors. Groups
may write political slogans on their flags while pursuing material incentives and vice versa (Col-
lier and Hoeffler 1998). And the line between political and criminal non-state actors is not always
clearly cut. Pablo Escobar, leader of the Medellin Cartel, not only was the head of one of the
world’s largest drug trafficking organizations, but also likewise pursued political goals running
for the Columbian parliament. One could question whether his candidacy for parliament gave
expression to his political will to reduce inequality, or merely provided a means to further his
economic incentives. Of course, a combination of the two would also stand as a reasonable as-
sumption. Based on the arguments laid out in section 4.5, we can state that excluding motivation
3It remains possible, however, that the empirical result stems from the focus of research. If political motivation was a
defining characteristic guiding case selection, then this result is a methodological artifact.
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per se from the definition is not an option. Shared intentions are an essential property of collective
subjects. From a critical realist perspective, the constitutive role of shared intentions outweighs
methodological problems of assessing motivations in the social sciences. We cannot simply re-
move constitutive attributes from definitions due to a lack of empirical knowledge in specific
cases. Epistemological concerns aside, the specific motivation of an actor (in contrast to a further
unspecified shared intentionality, which is constitutive for any collective subject) provides a use-
ful criterion to distinguish different types of actors. For instance, political non-state actors could
be denoted as those that aim to influence, take part in, or take over the state functions of fashioning the
political, socioeconomic, or cultural order of a state. Even where actors do not openly pursue political
goals, criminal organizations might become so powerful that their doing affects core state func-
tions. Mexican drug cartels, for instance, threaten the security of the population and question the
state’s monopoly on the use of force. Following this idea, it is not the motivation of actors, but
whether they affect core state functions that makes them political. This corresponds to the notion
of political in the definition of political conflicts (cf. sec. 6.1). In summary, motivation is an essential
property of collective subjects and its specific form, albeit at times difficult to identify, allows the
differentiation of actor types.
Concerning the second defining characteristic in dispute, territorial control, the debate is less
problematic. In states such as Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka (until 2009), Syria, or Iraq, the gov-
ernment’s monopoly on the use of force may be or was disputed by non-state actors in certain
territorial areas or policy fields. This, however, is an empirically seldom phenomenon and full-
fledged state-like control by non-state actors almost never occurred. This leads to the insight that
territorial control should not be considered a necessary definitional attribute of NSCA. It is, how-
ever, a suitable indicator in determining the strength of NSCA as well as a useful attribute in
developing a typology of NSCA. We will pick up this property of non-state actors as a way to
measure their strength.
The third disputed definitional attribute of non-state actors concerns their armament and the
employment of violence. Both attributes are considered in tandem due to their resemblance. Most
likely the availability and use of weaponry is included in definitions to delimit non-state conflict
actors from other actors such as political parties or civil society actors, i.e. groups that are, to a
large extent, not actively engaged in political conflicts. This corresponds to the widely shared
view that political conflict is widely equated with violent conflict (cf. sec. 6.1). As argued exten-
sively above, this thesis follows a different approach. The line between non-conflict and conflict
is crossed at which point measures lie outside of established procedures of regulation. Political
conflict might take place between unarmed actors and even where violence is absent. Applied to
the definition of non-state actor, the availability and/or use of arms should not be included as a
definitional attribute of non-state conflict actors. The arguments are similar: It allows us to track
the development of non-state actors over time through periods in which arms are taken up or
laid down. Furthermore, this development can be tracked through phases in which conflict per-
sists but violence is absent. As long as actors are involved in political conflict, they fall under the
definition of non-state actors.
At the bottom line, a composition of multiple individuals, a certain degree of organization, and
non-stateness are definitional core characteristics of NSCA that are relatively undisputed in the
extant literature. The other discussed criteria serve as a means to differentiate types of non-state
actors, but are not definitional attributes: Territorial control and armament allow for the assessment
of the strength of NSCA, the specific goals of non-state actors allow for the differentiation, e.g.
between criminal organizations and political non-state actors.
6.2.2 A Real Definition of Non-State Conflict Actors
The discussion thus far has primarily built on the extant concepts. The working definition derived
thereof mirrors the state of the literature. All of them more or less meet the requirements of an
operational definition. As argued above, however, operational definitions do not suffice. What is
needed is a real definition, a definition that meets the criteria of real definitions: completeness,
comprehensiveness, symmetry, and depth (cf. sec. 5.1).
The framework developed in chapter 4 allows precisely that. This subsection applies the in-
sights from the philosophical discussion on intentionality to conceptualize non-state actors. De-
parting from the list of widely acknowledged core attributes derived from the literature, the fol-
lowing discussion puts forward a real definition by elaborating on the constitutive attributes of
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non-state conflict actors. This obviates loss of contact with the extant literature while putting
forward a real definition. To make the concept fruitful for quantitative and qualitative analyses,
indicators for all constitutive attributes are developed. In illustrating its empirical applicability,
the approach can be illustrated by its application to the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS).4
To define non-state conflict actors, we begin by focusing on the noun: actors. Subsequently,
the specifying attributes of ‘non-state’ and ‘conflict’ are discussed.
The first point of discussion leads with the statement that the NSCA are groups. Based on the
self-referential definition developed in section 4.3, we can state that groups exist at any point in
time as being the state of affairs of a number of individuals sharing the we-intentional state of
constituting a group. We can further specify that this idea recurs according to the constitutive at-
tributes of intentional states, as laid out in subsection 4.1.1: The subjects of the intentional states are
the respective individuals. They share the we-intention, i.e. strong collective intentionality, with
the content ‘we are part of group C’, where C denotes the respective group. Since this intention
qualifies as a perception or belief, its modus is cognitive.
It is this belief that ‘carries actors over time’, even at times when they do not act as collec-
tively, and when no interaction between group members takes place. This approach to defining
non-state actors entails that neither external ascription (e.g., the press, government officials, or sci-
entists stating the existence of the group), nor spatiotemporal proximity of the individual group
members, nor collective action (such as a committed attack), nor a specific degree of persistence
(as indicated, e.g. by mereological variability) are necessary definitional attributes of groups.
To be clear, all of these four attributes might be properties of empirically-existent non-state
conflict actors or groups more generally. Governments aspire to gain intelligence of most existing
non-state actors operating on their territory, and often this expectation is met. Spatiotemporal
proximity greatly facilitates communication between group members and often precedes group
formation (Schlichte 2009a). Collective actionmost often serves the purpose of founding or joining
a group, e.g. to eliminate or at least reduce inequality within a society. Finally, well-organized
groups might attain a long-term existence, outliving their founders, such as in the case of Al-
Qaeda, which survived the death of its founder and leading figure Osama Bin-Laden in 2011.
Although important and shared by many, these properties are nonetheless non-constitutive. We
might well think of short-lived, clandestine groups preparing for an attack while at the same time
being spread over different continents. Following the proposed definition, such actors would—
conditional upon the additional constitutive attributes developed below—still qualify as non-
state actors.
Themembership of individuals in an established group can bemeasured via all forms of mem-
bership declaration by its affiliates. Most importantly, the respective instrument used to establish
the number of individuals that think of themselves and of the other putative members of any
given group as group members must operate with sufficient certainty.
Suitable instruments are documents that present the command structure of non-state actors;
apparent symbols such as tattoos, a uniform, or membership cards; instances of verbal or written
self-incrimination that are confirmed or at least unopposed by other group members. The qual-
ification of the last point, i.e. the need for some reciprocity, is important in the discrimination
against cases of erroneously assumed group membership (one of the rare cases of individual we-
intentionality, see figure 4.2 on page 45) from real membership as constituted by a shared belief
(strong collective intentionality).
With regard to the case of IS, several instruments are available. One example points to Excel
tables listing members of IS obtained by US-officials (Shapiro 2014). These lists give a fairly broad
overview of the size of the group listing each of its members, their role in the organization, their
salary, and the number of dependents, i.e. wives and/or children. Most importantly, such lists
indicate the mutual awareness and shared knowledge of membership in the organization. The
documents furthermore illustrate—although hardly surprising given the size of the group—the
administrative effort to organize IS.
4IS is not part of the the Disaggregated Conflict Actor Database compiled for the present analysis, as it is not located
in Asia and Oceania. IS is nonetheless chosen as an illustrative case considering the availability of original data on its
internal structure. This makes this example an ideal case for illustrative purposes. Moreover, the definition of non-state
conflict actors put forward in this chapter is designed to be applicable to all world regions, making the example of IS
thereby further representative of the definition’s universal utility.
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The membership of specific individuals in IS can be assessed via the pledge of allegiance
bay’a.5 In contemporary times, bay’a plays an important role in the indication of individual mem-
bership in Islamic organizations. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded 1928 by
means of the bay’a. Moreover, states such as Kuwait and Morocco maintain properties of the
bay’a for legitimization (Marsham 2013). As for the case of membership in IS, individual pledges
of allegiance are available on video. Examples include the German jihadist Abu Mudschahid al-
Muhadschir al-Almani, who pledged allegiance to Baghdadi after defecting from Al-Nusra, i.e.
another Sunni Islamist non-state actor fighting against the Syrian government (Live Leak 2014);
the bay’a by Philip Bergner, aka Abu Usama al-Almani (Live Leak 2013); and Denis Cuspert who
talks about his pledge of allegiance to Baghdadi (At-Tibyan 2015). The mutual relation created
by the Islamic pledge of allegiance is documented in the proclamation of Baghdadi as caliph by
al-Shami (2014), the official spokesperson of IS:
In light of the fact that the Islamic State has no shar’i¯ (legal) constraint or excuse that can justify delay-
ing or neglecting the establishment of the khila¯fah such that it would not be sinful, the Islamic State—
represented by ahlul-halli-wal-’aqd (its people of authority), consisting of its senior figures, leaders, and
the shu¯ra¯ council—resolved to announce the establishment of the Islamic khila¯fah, the appointment of a
khali¯fah for the Muslims, and the pledge of allegiance to the shaykh (sheikh), the muja¯hid, the scholar who
practices what he preaches, the worshipper, the leader, the warrior, the reviver, descendent from the family
of the Prophet, the slave of Allah, Ibra¯hi¯m Ibn ‘Awwa¯d Ibn Ibra¯hi¯m Ibn ‘Ali¯ Ibn Muhammad al-Badri¯ al-
Ha¯shimi¯ al-Husayni¯ al-Qurashi¯ by lineage, as-Sa¯murra¯‘i¯ by birth and upbringing, al-Baghda¯di¯ by residence
and scholarship. And he has accepted the bay’ah (pledge of allegiance).
As described above, it is important to rule out cases of one-sided declarations of group-
membership. With regard to the case of attacks in San Bernadino, California, on December 2,
2015, for instance, the two attackers had, supposedly, pledged allegiance to IS prior to the shoot-
ing. Both, however, were probably not known by other IS members. Thus, although their attack
might have been inspired by a similar body of thought as proclaimed by IS, and both attackers
might even have thought of themselves as IS members, they are not considered members of the
organization according to our definition.
Thus far, we have focused on the synchronic perspective and discussedwhat comprises NSCA
groups. Now, we turn to those procedures within groups that allow them to engage in plural
action. Taking up the arguments in sections 4.5, collective action describes the act of collectively
pursuing a common goal. As we saw in section 4.6, the ability to act ‘as one’ additionally requires
coherent beliefs and volitions. It might be true that conflictive events involve ‘collectives acting’.
An prime example for this would be communal riots between loosely-defined collectives that
might share no more than a certain physical trait or the London riots in August of 2011. For a
collective to gain a certain permanency, however, it seems pivotal to establish procedures to bring
about coherent intentions. If we follow this view, non-state actors are more than just groups that
act collectively: They are collective subjects.
To say that NSCA are collective subjects spurs several consequences with regard to their con-
ceptualization. More specifically, engaging in plural action as a collective subject requires groups
to develop three kinds of procedures:
1. Procedures to form consistent and adequate cognitive intentional states.
2. Procedures to form consistent practical intentional states.
3. Procedures to determine individuals to act on behalf of the group.
Every group necessarily requires the development of these three features in order to act as a
collective subject. As laid out in section 4.6, for groups to act rationally, their beliefs must mir-
ror true facts, while their motivations must not be mutually exclusive. Only actors that are able
to build consistent sets of cognitive and practical intentional states are capable of goal-oriented
behavior and reasonable employment of their assets (cf. List and Pettit 2011). Groups holding
contradictory beliefs about current states of affairs–such as widely separated positions on what
to achieve and how to achieve it–lack the ability to act as a collective.
This has a direct impact on the process of identifying NSCA. It allows for the derivation of
clear-cut indicators to identify and differentiate NSCA. These indicators permit the qualification
5Bay’a is an Islamic ritual where an individual or a group pledges allegiance, verbally or in writing, to a religious
leader on the condition that the latter faces up to his responsibilities towards the former and that the leader obeys the
rules of Islam. In Sunni Islam, bay’a has largely replaced other means to legitimize the caliph such as designation by
predecessor or popular vote. While bay’a first appeared in the Quran as a political-religious terminus technicus, it had
existed in pre-Islamic times (cf. Marsham 2009; Rosiny 2014).
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of a certain group as a collective subject and thereby the determination of the body of cases under
analysis. The indicators are:
1. A certain degree of internal organization.
2. A consistent order of preferences as evidenced in a clearly communicated (and ideally doc-
umented) list of intentions that are not mutually exclusive.
3. Verbal or non-verbal symbols used by individuals that link their actions to a group.
All of these three elements are necessary conditions to identify a given group as an NSCA. These
indicators differentiate NSCA from ad-hoc mobilized groups.
The formation of consistent intentional states is dependent on some form of organizational
structure within the group. These procedures need to be institutionalized to a certain degree,
i.e. sufficiently accepted, to allow NSCA to come to a consistent worldview and to decide on
collective goals.
The formation of consistent and adequate cognitive intentional states requires two things: the
means to acquire knowledge about the group-external world, and a way to interpret this reality.
At best, NSCA have their own intelligence units that are entrusted to collect, filter, and convey
information within a group. IS, for instance, allegedly installed a rather sophisticated structure
to gather information on the situation in the extended territories under its control (Barrett 2014;
Reuter 2015a). Based on documents allegedly obtained by non-jihadist Syrian rebels from the
house of leading IS figure Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi aka Haji Bakr, the German news
magazine DER SPIEGEL describes the procedures within IS (also see figure 6.4):
[T]here is a constantly recurring, core theme, which is meticulously addressed in organizational charts and
lists of responsibilities and reporting requirements: surveillance, espionage, murder and kidnapping. For
each provincial council, Bakr had planned for an emir, or commander, to be in charge of murders, abduc-
tions, snipers, communication and encryption, as well as an emir to supervise the other emirs – “in case
they don’t do their jobs well.” The nucleus of this godly state would be the demonic clockwork of a cell
and commando structure designed to spread fear. From the very beginning, the plan was to have the intel-
ligence services operate in parallel, even at the provincial level. A general intelligence department reported
to the “security emir” for a region, who was in charge of deputy-emirs for individual districts. A head of
secret spy cells and an “intelligence service and information manager” for the district reported to each of
these deputy-emirs. The spy cells at the local level reported to the district emir’s deputy. The goal was to
have everyone keeping an eye on everyone else. (...) [S]pies also ensured that IS leadership was constantly
informed of where the population was weak or divided or where there were local conflict, allowing IS to
offer itself as a protective power in order to gain a foothold.
Aside from implemented procedures to gather information, IS has an intolerant and illiberal,
but consistent worldview. This worldview is deeply linked to its collective identity. Most impor-
tantly, IS follows a specifically strong version of monotheism (Reuter 2015a). On the one hand,
it strictly prohibits worshipping any god or gods other than Allah. On the other hand, the strict
monotheism of IS is directed against worshipping any other entities besides Allah such as found
in the veneration of saints in Shi’ism.
The second necessary requirement to engage in plural action includes procedures to form
consistent practical intentional states. NSCA must determine what they aim to achieve and how
best to act accordingly. Just as in the determination of coherent cognitive intentional states, the
formulation of goals requires an organizational structure.
The decision-making itself involves the determination of ends and adequate means. It takes
place on different levels of abstraction. While contemporary military doctrines differentiate many
different levels of warfare, it generally suffices to differentiate between two: strategy and tactics.
Clausewitz (1980) famously argued that violence is always employed as a means to an end and
is never an end in itself (cf. van Crefeld 1998). Based on this assumption, tactics denote the use of
armed force toward the end of a victory in a single battle (‘Gefecht’). Extending the understanding
of tactics to include violent and non-violent means, Clausewitz’ classification can be adapted to
the concept of political conflict as described above.6
Strategy, on the other hand, describes the implementation of battles toward the end of victory
in war. Thus, a strategy puts single battles into context and directs them toward the more general
goal pursued by conflict actors. In political conflict, these goals are defined as the conflict items.
6A typology of profiles of violence alongwith a latent class analysis of empirically-frequent types of tactics is developed
in chapter 9.5.1.
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Figure 6.4: Proposed structure of the so called ‘Islamic State’ (Reuter 2015b).
Let us now apply these ideas to our running examples. The strategy of IS is influenced by two
core themes: the establishment of a caliphate in accordance with Islamic law and the eschatologi-
cal theme of the apocalypse (Reuter 2015a; Wood 2015).
The aim to establish a caliphate requires state-like territorial control: “The Islamic State, by
contrast, requires territory to remain legitimate, and a top-down structure to rule it” (Wood 2015).
This is why IS gears much of its efforts toward expanding the territory under its control and
establishing a legal system following Sharia law.
The strong eschatological motif finds expression, for instance, in the great lengths to which
IS conquered of the town Dabiq.7 Moreover, its strong monotheistic worldview is put into force
via systematic persecution of adherents of other religious groups. This is evidenced by perform-
ing such upon the Yazidis, a Kurdish religious minority predominantly living in Northern Iraq
(Amnesty International 2014). Another examples can be found in the systematic destruction of
sanctuaries that belong to those adhering to a different faith as well as to other branches within
Sunni Islam. IS explicitly justifies the destruction of artifacts by referring to the Prophecy (Coles
and Hameed 2015).
A third requirement to act is the ability to determine which individuals will act on behalf
of the group. As laid out in section 4.6, while groups may have volitions that are irreducible to
individual volitions, individuals may act upon group rationale in cases of motivational heterar-
chy. Since qualitative evidence on the basis of interviews is seldom available (cf. Humphreys and
Weinstein 2008) and its collection would present an insurmountable challenge in a comparative
analysis, the identification of procedures that determine individuals to act on behalf of the group
must be based on the use of symbols by acting individuals. These symbols might take different
forms: a specific uniform, a flag, a plausible claim of responsibility that is supported, or at least
unchallenged, by leading figures of the respective group. These symbols signify that the acts of
certain individuals were executed in the name of the respective NSCA and aimed at pursuing a
collective goal.
7Dabiq is a small town in northwestern Syria which—as Prophet Muhammad is believed to have said—is the place
where the armies of Romemeet the armies of Islam for a final battle before the victoriousMuslims conquer Constantinople.
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Returning to the case of IS, an often-used symbol is a monochromatic flag that is believed to
resemble the battle flag of Prophet Muhammad.8 Although not being unique to IS in its general
design, its specific design does have unique characteristics. According to McCants (2015), the
group itself used a quote of Ahmad Cevdet Pasha, an Ottoman scholar, to explain the choice of
the flag: “The secret in creating a flag is that it gathers people under a single banner to unify them,
meaning that this flag is a sign of the coming together of their words and a proof of the unity of
their hearts. They are like a single body and what knits them together is stronger than the bond
of blood relatives”. The purpose of the flag thus clearly alludes to the uniformity of the group
and—where it appears in the context of acts by individuals or small collectives—links these acts
to the greater group.
In summary, a certain degree of organization, a consistent order of preferences, and symbols
linking individuals to a group are indicators that qualify groups as actors. This essentialist view
of groups stands in direct opposition to individualist perspectives.
6.2.3 A Taxonomy of Conflict Actors
The above discussion proposes a real definition of the term ‘actor’ by referring to the concept
of ‘collective subject’. As we aim to develop a definition of non-state conflict actors, however, we
need to further elaborate on this notion. It might seem far-fetched to elaborate on a definition of
an empirically-confined phenomenon, such as that of NSCA, on the grounds of conceptualizing
a ubiquitous concept such as ‘group’ or ‘actor’. The formation of concepts of lower generality
(e.g. classical subtypes in contrast to diminished subtypes) in intensional classification, however,
follows exactly this procedure: After conceptualizing the more general phenomenon, concepts of
lower generality are defined via the specification of properties of the more general phenomenon
(cf. Marradi 1990, p. 132).9 The following applies thismethod by confining the phenomenon under
analysis by adding the terms ‘conflict’ and ‘non-state’.
The former specification is only briefly touched upon, as conflict actors were defined above.
The latter specification, however, allows us to build a taxonomy of actor types demarcating two
types of actors that are not state actors, i.e. non-state conflict actors and militias, from state actors.
An advantage of a systematic approach to conceptualization thus lies in a systematic mapping of
the conceptual space.10
We can define ‘conflict actors’ as those actors that are part of a political conflict in the above
defined sense. This entails that they have an incompatibility of intentions with at least one other
actor, are relevant, and act outside of established procedures of regulation. By being part of a
conflict, actors are as per definitionem political actors, since their volitions or actions directly affect
core state functions or the order of the international system. As briefly discussed above, it is
not the specific motivation of groups, but rather the fact of their affect on core state functions
that makes them political. Obviously, groups can enter and leave the universe of conflict actors
throughout their lifespan.11
Focusing on the universe of conflict actors, non-state actors can be differentiated from state
actors and militias. More specifically, non-state actors are a taxon derived from the root concept
8 Called ‘standard’ or ‘banner’, it bears a version of the Islamic testimony of faith, the Shahada: “I declare that there is
no deity but Allâh and that Muhammad is the prop. het of Allâh.” (Newby 2002, p. 193). The design of the seal, displayed
on the bottom of the flag, resembles the design of what is believed to be the seal used by Prophet Muhammad.
9An alternative route would be ‘extensional classification’. Here, one departs from a number of empirical objects or
events and sorts them into sets according to at least one property of the objects or events. Extensional classification differs
from intensional classification, as it does not depart from a concept but from empirical objects or events. In light of the
arguments in chapter 3, intensional classifications seem to be the more adequate procedure based on a critical realist
philosophy of science. However, we also apply the method of extensional classification in the empirical analysis in chapter
9, where we draw on Latent Class Analysis.
10We here exclusively apply a classification that leads to the formation of categories with a smaller empirical extension
(cf. Goertz 2006b) than the root concept. This is typical for many approaches to classification (Collier, LaPorte, and Sea-
wright 2012; Collier and Mahon Jr. 1993; Sartori 1970). Specifically problematic from a critical realist view would be to
pursue the idea of ’part-whole’ hierarchies in combination with the idea of diminished subtypes, as proposed by Collier
and Levitsky (2009). Applying this combination leads to subtypes that entirely lie outside of the conceptual space of the
root concept.
11This entails that the empirical analysis in chapter 9 does not analyze how collectives become conflict actors instead
of becoming political actors, but rather under what circumstances NSCA emerge. Analysis of the inclusion of collective
subjects that are not conflict actors, e.g. political parties or non-governmental organizations, is a possible extension for
future research.
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Figure 6.5: Taxonomy of conflict actors.
t’actor’ by repeated intensional classification in a three-level taxonomy (see figure 6.5).12 The two
criteria that define the property space of the respective classes at each fork of the taxonomy are
the affiliation of the group members and the cooperation of the respective actor with the government of a
state.
The criterion for the affiliation of members of a group allows for the differentiation of two taxa
of actors: state actors and societal actors. Affiliation is a characteristic of the individual members
of a group and can be operationalized by individual employment status. Accordingly, state actors
are those actors that are primarily composed of direct employees of a state. An example is the
military. State actors are often directly lead by members of the executive branch of a state and
are state-financed. Societal actors comprise individuals that are not directly employed by the state.
This includes actors of the civil society, criminal organizations, and corporations.
The taxon of societal actors can be further differentiated by determining whether the respec-
tive actor cooperates with the government or not. In accordance with the above discussion, co-
operation can be understood as a form of strong collective intentionality. Two actors cooperate
if they share a we-intention toward a common goal and if each of them feels obliged to do his
part of the collective endeavor.13 Applying this criterion allows to differentiate societal actors
into militias and NSCA.14 Militias are societal actors cooperating with the government. An exam-
ple for this can be illustrated with the Sudanese Janjaweed. NSCA are societal actors not formally
cooperating with the government such as IS.
In summary, non-state conflict actors are collective subjects engaged in a political conflict that
are not cooperating with the government of the state in which they primarily reside. Collective
subjects are groups capable of plural action. Groups are collectives of persons sharing a self-
referential strong collective intentional state of being part of the respective group. They are ca-
pable of plural action if the group holds a strong collective practical intentional state (possibly
irreducible to individual volitions) to act toward a common goal. This is also the case if each (or
at least a significant number) of the members of the group is willing to do his part in reaching the
collective goal.
The empirical analysis that follows in chapter 9 primarily focuses on non-state conflict actors.
The discussion thus far might appear too extensive. Indeed, why use a sledgehammer to crack a
nut? The motivation behind tackling the phenomenon of non-state actors as precisely as possible
within a critical realist framework lies in the fact that it allows for the elucidation of the inner
workings of these actors. We can better understand what makes collective groups and what pro-
cedures allow non-state actors to act as collective subjects. It directs the analytical view toward
those features of NSCAs that are essential in their very being. By including concrete indicators
12Taxonomies are multi-level classification schemes. In contrast to classification schemes, taxonomies are based on more
than one criterion. In contrast to typologies, the order of application of fundament is highly relevant. The further down
we go in a taxonomy, the larger the number of taxa (Marradi 1990).
13Note that cooperation here denotes cooperation between two different groups and not cooperation within a single
group. Thus, the decisive criterion is a shared practical intention to act toward a specific goal and not a shared belief of
group membership. Trivially, the latter cannot be the case since in order for groups to cooperate, they necessarily must
exist as different groups.
14A certain ambiguity is introduced in those conflicts that affect more than one state. In these conflicts, actors might
cooperate with one government, but not with the other. Depending on what actions within a conflict are analyzed, actors
might qualify as militias or as non-state actors. If a given societal conflict actor needs to be unambiguously classified, the
criterion can be specified to mean cooperation with the government of that state in which the respective group primarily
resides.
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and linking the rather abstract characteristics of what constitutes collective subjects to measur-
able indicators, as well as by applying the attributes to derive a taxonomy of actors, the above has
illustrated the added value of such a realist approach. Returning to the issue of conceptualizing
non-state conflict actors as collective subjects, the following elaborates on those characteristics of
non-state conflict actors that are not constitutive attributes.
Whereas the above has laid out all non-trivial essential features of non-state actors, the follow-
ing presents characteristics that can be derived from these definitional attributes. To carve out a
core definition, these characteristics were not included in the above definition. They are, however,
important, when it comes to mechanisms and the functioning of NSCA.
From the above discussion, we can derive the following characteristics of NSCA:
• NSCA, qua being groups, have a specific type of collective identity that is shared among
their individual members.
• NSCA, qua being actors, follow certain goals.
• NSCA, qua being collective subjects, are characterized by a specific form of relational struc-
ture that enables them to form coherent goals.
• NSCA, qua having an existence over and above their individual members, are mereologi-
cally variable.
These four characteristics are addressed in turn together with the implications for the typology of
actors and the subsequent empirical analysis.
Collective Identity
The self-referential strong collective intentionality constituting NSCA as groups can likewise be
denoted as a specific type of collective identity, i.e. a shared collective self-concept (Mathiesen
2003; cf. Albert 2010b). Whereas collective identity per se is a constitutive feature of all groups,
the specific form of collective identity can serve as a category to classify groups.15 In light of the
pivotal importance of the content of collective identity—as a facilitating factor of plural action,
a potential cause for intergroup conflict, a topic in cultural conflicts, or as a way to differentiate
different actors—it appears important to determine the content of the collective identity of actors.
To do so, the NSCA database codes the collective identity for each of the included actors. For
each of the included actors, the collective identity is identified. The classification draws on an
analysis of symbols, documents, or even a specific habitus (cf. Albert 2010a). The variable can
take five values: religious, economic, ethnolinguistic, political, and environmental. The different
contents of collective identity are not mutually exclusive and can be coded in any combination.
Based on the above description, for instance, the Islamic State’s collective identity can clearly be
identified as being religious.
Orientation
Collective identity relates to group-internal relations. As conflict actors, however, NSCA likewise
pursue certain goals. In the context of political conflicts, these goals often contradict goals of state
actors and become conflict issues. Conflict issues can be categorized according to the concept
of political conflict as presented in section 6.1. On a more abstract level, however, the practical
intentions of NSCA might be described as their orientation. This orientation need not necessar-
ily be the object of contention, as is the case with conflict issues. The term orientation is coined
to more generally classify the aims of collective subjects. Collective identity and orientation are
often closely related. This is hardly surprising given the close link between how one sees and in-
terprets the world and what one wants to achieve or change. The shared identity of groups often
translates into a specific orientation. This, however, need not necessarily be the case. For instance,
A group might base its collective identity purely on religion, while its orientation faces fighting
against environmental degradation. Collective identity and orientation are different concepts that
15The notion of collective identities in the context of political conflicts appears in four different ways. First, collective
identity constitutively underlies groups and facilitates plural action. Where individuals identify with groups allows them
to overcome problems of collective action (Wendt 1999, p. 242). Second, collective identities might cause (Huntington 1996;
Kaufman 2006) or facilitate (Gurr 1974) the onset of conflict. Third, collective identity is deeply linked to the concept of
cultural conflicts since everything “was von einer Gesellschaft zur Hervorbringung undWahrung der kollektiven Identität
konstruiert und sodann von den Akteuren in einer Kommunikationssituation als Kontext aufgebaut wird, gehört zum
Bereich des Kulturellen. (Croissant, Schwank, et al. 2009, p. 27). Cultural identitymight thus be the topic of communication
in intergroup conflict. Fourth, being a constitutive element of groups, identities at least allow a differentiation of groups
(Esteban and Ray 2008).
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both allow differentiating collective subjects. Cases in which two groups have a different collec-
tive identity or different goals might connote their cooperation. They cannot be part of the same
collective subject, however. Thus orientation, just as collective identity, serves as a suitable means
to categorize NSCA. As above, five kinds of orientation are discerned: religious, economic, ethno-
linguistic, political, and environmental. These types can occur singularly or in any combination.
The necessity of procedures to build coherent intentional states is reflected in the internal or-
ganization of NSCA. At one end of the continuum are NSCAwith a purely hierarchical structure,
where competencies are clearly allocable from top to bottom. One leader exists, or a small clique
of leaders, who set the agenda and organize the implementation, while the subordinates at the
bottom of the hierarchy implement these agendas without much decisional autonomy. In these
classes of NSCA, few are motivationally autarkic since only the elite formulate preferences and
the respective means to be employed. Such organizations are often geographically concentrated,
i.e. usually act in a specific confined space. Different functions of the organizations are bundled at
the top of the hierarchy. Decentralized actors rest at the other end of the continuum with no clear
hierarchical structure. In such actors a multitude of centers of authority exists in which policies
are designed and implemented. Such actors are often geographically fragmented, acting transna-
tionally or even globally. As a consequence, motivational autarky is distributed over a larger
number of decision-making centers, usually complicating the formation of consistent intentions.
Consistent intentions, however, are a prerequisite for plural action. It can thus be expected that de-
centralized actors are more likely to fragment than centralized actors. As discussed, the dividing
line between a single decentralized and multiple actors is marked by a consistent set of cognitive
and practical intentional states as evidenced by a common orientation, a common identity, and
the existence of mechanisms to enable coherent practices. Indicators to assess whether NSCA are
centralized or decentralized encompass the existence of a single central authority and geographic
concentration.
Since non-state actors are collective subjects, they are usually mereologically variable. With
regard to non-state actors, mereological variability states that neither existence nor persistence
of NSCA is dependent on specific individual members. While all members of a collective subject
may have changed, the collective subject itself might stay the same. The mereological variabil-
ity of NSCA entails consequences for methodology. An approach, which compares NSCA with
a wide longitudinal and cross-sectional scope, should rather focus on groups and position them
within the social structure, as well as describe their internal organization, i.e. the internal position-
ing of individuals, without referencing to specific individuals (Smith and Fetner 2007, p. 16). While
it may be true that some leaders, e.g. Che Guevara or Osama bin Laden, have deeply shaped the
organizations they have built, one should not overestimate individualist traits of leaders. Simi-
larly, the death of individual NSCA members—be it by suicide bombing, battlefield combat, or
targeted killing—might even strengthen NSCA. NSCA are more than their individual members.
They are tied together by a shared intention. And arguably, the glorification of martyrdom is di-
rected towards the goal of strengthening exactly this collective identity. Emphasizing a difference
between ‘them and us’ allows for strengthening of collective identities. The example of martyrs
scarifying their lives for the collective endmight foster the will of others to do the same. Likewise,
individuals leaving an organization or being killed in battle do not necessarily affect the working
of a collective subject. Groups persist not by specific individuals, but a collective that shares a spe-
cific collective identity. And although a collective identity cannot persist without being shared, it
might survive longer than a lifespan.
6.2.4 Conceptual Assessment
The definition of NSCA fulfills all four criteria of conceptual adequacy. Just as the Heidelberg
conceptualization of political conflict, the definition of NSCA is complete, as it offers a system-
atic hierarchy of constitutive properties and measurable observables. NSCA are defined via three
constitutive attributes: they are societal actors not cooperating with the government (‘non-state’),
conflict actors (‘conflict’), and collective subjects (‘actors’). Each of the attributes can be further
disaggregated to more specific constitutive attributes as described above. Indicators for each of
the three attributes where likewise formulated above and need not be repeated here. Second,
the definition is comprehensive. Non-state conflict actors are defined synchronically by the fact that
they are groups, as further specified in the self-referential definition. The processual nature is cap-
tured by those procedures that are necessary for the formation of consistent beliefs and volitions.
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Third, the approach is symmetric by specifying and discussing entities that might be regarded sim-
ilar to NSCA but do not qualify as such under the proposed definition such as, e.g. mobs, rioters,
or militias. With regard to conceptual depth, the approach is likewise broad as well as internally
differentiated. It is broad since it does neither include specific volitions (cf. Beardsley and Mc-
Quinn 2009; Bruderlein 2000), nor territorial control (cf. Dudouet 2012; International Committee
of the Red Cross 1977), nor the use of armed force (cf. Bruderlein 2000; Petrasek 2001) as constitu-
tive attributes. At the same time, it is differentiated since the thick description of NSCA based on
the arguments in chapter 4 allows us to derive characteristics to differentiate NSCA along multi-
ple lines: size, internal organization, weaponry, territorial control, ideology, orientation, and their
relations to other actors. All of these characteristics are coded in the NSCA-database originally
designed for the present analysis on grounds of the reasoning of this section.
In summary, this section has presented a new concept of political conflict developed upon the
foundations of a critical realist perspective. Furthermore, this section has illustrated the added
value of the concept of political conflict in comparison with existing approaches. The following
section more closely focuses on one of the constitutive attributes of intrastate political conflict:
conflict actors.
6.3 Natural and Social Space
Following the now-classic approach to social explanations, most social science research distin-
guishes two different levels of analysis: a micro-level encompassing the acting ‘parts’, and a
macro-level referring to the context of actors (Coleman 1990; Esser 1993; Greve, Schnabel, and
Schützeichel 2008). The specific empirical phenomena to which these levels relate differ between
approaches: The micro-level often comprises individuals or groups, while the macro-level com-
prises the structures in a single state or the international system. In the framework of this thesis,
the micro-level is populated by individuals, and the meso-level by collective actors. This section
systematically describes the macro-level of analysis.
Proposed in what follows is that conflict studies—and possibly other approaches dealing with
inter-group relations within societies—should conceptualize the macro-level as consisting of mul-
tiple overlapping material contexts and social fields. Whereas contexts are material or natural in
nature, fields are social in that they constitutively depend in their existence on collective inten-
tionality. This approach to conceptualize the macro-level is first and foremost a method to system-
atically approach multi-level theoretical analysis. Still, it permits the interweaving of the complex
nature of natural and social reality in a coherent theoretical argument. This argument is presented
in the following chapter 8.
6.3.1 A Taxonomy of Structures
Aiming to explain the emergence of conflict actors and their strategic and tactical decisions, we
are mostly interested in those factors that are important for the preference formation of actors.
Conflict research to date has put almost every conceivable and reasonably plausible variable un-
der scrutiny (cf. sec. 2). To assess the role of factors located on the macro level—and, more practi-
cally, to determine adequate control variables for the empirical analysis—a systematic approach is
advisable. To do so, the following description categorizes macro-variables in a taxonomy. The tax-
onomy applies the understanding of the social world as proposed in chapter 4 to systematically
classify explanatory variables of interest in conflict research.
On the first level, we can differentiate between the natural space and the social space based
on the criterion of whether the respective entity is ontologically dependent on collective inten-
tional states (see figure 6.6).16 If every individual in a population lost its memory and with it
the collectively-shared intentional states, the natural space would continue to exist unaffected.
It is entirely constituted by material matter. The social space, on the other hand, is ontologically
dependent on collective intentional states. As Bourdieu (2002, p. 176) pointed out:
Après tout, qu’est-ce qu’un pape, un président ou un secrétaire général, sinon quelqu’un qui se prend pour
un pape ou un secrétaire général ou plus exactement pour l’Église, l’État, le Parti, ou la nation? Seule chose:
ce qui le sépare du personnage de comédie ou dumégalomane, c’est qu’on le prend généralement au sérieux
et qu’on lui reconnaît ainsi le droit è cette sorte “d’imposture légitime” comme dit Austin.
16The differentiation bears resemblance to the differentiation of three worlds by Popper (1978).
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Entities populating the social space, most of all institutional facts, are often embodied or linked
to material objects (which are part of the natural space). Their essential properties, however, are
determined by the fact that they are shared intentional states, i.e. by their mode and content (cf.
sec. 4.1). Stated as it is here, this differentiation is too broad to function as an analytically useful
concept. Thus, bringing explanatory variables of empirically-oriented research and abstract onto-
logical discussions closer together, the following taxonomy formulates more specific subtypes for
both spaces.17
Two subtypes, or ‘contexts’, within the natural space can be discerned: The geographic context
refers to the physical geography. It encompasses the distribution and types of natural resources,
topographical properties, and the climate as well as meteorological phenomena. Of greatest in-
terest in the field of conflict studies is the presence of oil, diamonds, and drugs, as well as the
inhospitability of an area (cf. ch. 2 and Ross (2004)).18 The anthropological context describes human-
related but not socially-constructed characteristics of populations. This encompasses settlement
patterns and demographic characteristics of populations. In the field of conflict research, the size
of the population has attracted by far the most attention, proving to be of greatest explanatory
power. Showing only mixed results in the research synthesis in chapter 2, but of importance, are
youth bulges (Croissant, Schwank, et al. 2009).
The social space is constituted by what has been described here as the social structure. It com-
prises relations between social positions, which in turn are constitutively dependent on collective
intentionality. A useful and—due to its spatial analogies—analytically fruitful view of the social
space was formulated in the field theory of Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1982, 1985, 2001; Bour-
dieu and Wacquant 1992). Without buying every aspect of Bourdieu’s theoretical approach, we
can adapt the spatial analogies of his definition of social fields. Following this idea, the social
space can be differentiated in connected, but relatively autonomously functioning social fields. A
field, in turn, can be understood as a spatial model of relative social positions. More specifically,
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 97) defines a field as
a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively de-
fined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions,
by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or
capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by
their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.).
As laid out in section 4.2—and here we can tie back the notion of fields to our earlier dis-
cussion on collective intentionality—social positions are constitutively dependent on collective
intentional states. This synchronic relationship likewise entails that the structure of a field is not
dependent on interaction or even collective action. For instance, a relation of subordination be-
tween the German Chancellor and his or her ministers exists even if it is not instantiated by as-
sociated actions. Positions are objective in that they are able to bear causal powers. They bestow
those individuals holding certain positions with powers otherwise not wielded.
Thinking of positions as being located on a spatial field allows for the introduction of ana-
lytically useful relations. Pertaining to different positions on a single field, we can differentiate
between proximity and distance as well as between super- and subordination. Moreover, we can
compare the position of individuals between different fields. Individuals might hold similar po-
sitions across multiple fields, a case of ‘homology’, or different positions, a case of ‘heterology’.
This requires the existence of multiple fields, linking back to our effort to propose a taxonomy of
macro-level entities.
We can differentiate three fields in modern nation states as subtypes of the social space.The
political field is constituted by the distribution of chances or powers to influence and articulate
policies by participating in politics. Relatively stable and empirically common types of distri-
butions are identified by political regime typologies among the most-widely used explanatory
factors analyzed in conflict research (cf. ch. 2). To define political power as ‘direct influence on
political processes qua holding office’ would be too narrow a definition of political power, as it
would exclude the majority of the population. In modern political systems, political influence is
17Here, again, we follow the logic of classification described above and discussed in footnote 10.
18The specification of these two contexts reveals that the classification between the natural and the social space is not
always clear cut. With regard to the geographic context, for instance, the classification of valuable resources such as
diamonds into the natural space is dubious. Although plausible at first sight, some of the essential features that make
diamonds important with regard to conflicts include their value. This value, in turn, is socially constructed and rests upon
the collectively accepted view. Thus, diamonds are in a sense more than a carbon compound. On the other hand, the value
of diamonds is a result of its material characteristics and its rarity.
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Figure 6.6: Taxonomy of macro phenomena.
seldom direct but mediated via representation. Political elites can thus be viewed as represen-
tatives of populations. This does not necessarily require democratic procedures. Where political
elites act on behalf of certain populations, the former’s status within the political system indirectly
determines the influence of the respective group on political processes.
The economic field consists of the distribution of wealth in a population. The economic field is
well suited to illustrate the difference between absolute and relative field positions. A low abso-
lute position in the economic field is captured by the concept of poverty. Inequality, in contrast,
describes a situation where wealth, irrespective of its absolute amount, is unequally distributed.
In global comparison, the population of the United States holds high absolute positions in the
economic field. At the same time, however, the economic field remains characterized by a com-
paratively high degree of inequality. Typical indicators are the gross domestic product and the
Gini index.
The cultural field distributes identity through the three cultural domains of language, religion
and historicity (Croissant, Schwank, et al. 2009). From a normative perspective, the cultural field
differs from the political and the economic field in its ‘nominal scale’: It is impossible to rank a
given religion, language or origin higher or lower with regard to others. What is possible, how-
ever, is to group individuals sharing cultural characteristics together. Thus, analogous to settle-
ment patterns in the geographical context, we can locate individuals on the cultural field. Typical
explanatory variables in conflict research pertaining to characteristics of central importance in
the cultural field are the religious and ethnolinguistic fragmentation of a population. However,
this view reduces culture to individual ‘ethnic markers’. It fails to take into account an essential
characteristic of culture: “the production and reproduction of meaning” (Allan 1998, p. 37; cf.
Croissant, Schwank, et al. 2009; Goldblatt, Held, and McGrew 1999).
The social field represents the distribution of embodied cultural capital (cf. Bourdieu 1986) in
the population. Cultural capital describes the knowledge and education of individuals. Common
quantitative indictors include literacy or educational attainment. Cultural capital greatly influ-
ences individual chances in life such as participation in the labor market or political participation.
6.3.2 Analytical Value of the Field Theoretic Approach
While these fields all coexist in societies, they differ in importance, i.e. their relative impact on
the lives of individuals and groups. In the words of Stewart, Brown, and Mancini (2010, p. 10):
“what is important are the elements that seem most significant to the people involved, i.e. what
they believe to be central – indeed, in the extreme, the kinds of things which people will fight
over.” Dominant fields do, despite the relative autonomy of fields, even influence dynamics of
other fields.19
The relative importance of fields usually remains relatively stable over time. However, in times
of crisis and deep structural change, shifts in relative importance may occur, and often, rapidly.
19An example for an account of a dominant field is the theory of Karl Marx, who postulated the dominance of a specific
field. He conceptualized the means of production as decisive in determining the course of history and diminished the role
of, e.g., religion to be the “Überbau” and thus having no decisive influence on historical processes.
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Examples for rapid change can be considered in terms of changes in the political regime or eco-
nomic structure through external intervention and decisive shifts in the distribution of cultural
identity in a society, such as after the partition of Pakistan in the 1970s. More important for cross-
sectional analyses are differences between societies.
The conceptualization of social space as a combination of different fields serves the aim of
endogenization and disaggregation. The former is addressed by highlighting the constitutive
connection between collective intentional states and social positions. Fields as configurations of
social positions supervene on collective intentional states that subsequently are constitutively de-
pendent on the existence of others (compare section 4.4). Although social positions supervene on
similar intentional states shared by a number of individuals, however, they cannot be reduced to
individual intentional states due to multiple realizability.
In summation, the taxonomy of the macro-level offers a means to systematically integrate ap-
proaches to the explanation of political conflict. It allows us to transcend a purely geographical
understanding of space, revealing the view of relative positions in different fields. Furthermore,
the taxonomy allows us to analyze similarities and differences between different fields, the rel-
ative importance of fields, and changing patterns over time. The analytical value of this under-
standing reaches beyond the focus of this thesis in which only some of the analytical possibilities
are translated into praxis.
6.4 Summary
Instrumentalist strategies and operational definitions do not suffice to serve as a foundation for
valid and reliable data. The practical value of data depends on thorough conceptualizations. A
clear understanding of the attributes of conflicts, non-state conflict actors, and the natural and
social space allows for the deduction of valid indicators, as well as the investigation of the causal
interactions of conflicts with other phenomena.
Expanding the recent debate on practical issues of data quality and measurement, this sec-
tion has evaluated extant concepts of political conflict and non-state conflict actors based on their
underlying definitions. Employing realist criteria of conceptual adequacy, it concludes with re-
gard to political conflicts that all existing data projects have specific advantages and drawbacks.
Due to its instrumentalist stance, the dataset by F&L appears problematic from a critical realist
perspective. While MAR and CSP are much more substantive, their conceptual structures lack
systematicity. Whereas COW and PITF fulfill some requirements, UCDP performs best according
to our criteria. However, weak points of UCDP include the narrowness and poor differentiation
of its concepts of conflict and, especially, of intensity. Regarding the latter, PITF fares much better.
The evaluation identifies a broad, yet differentiated and integrative, conception of conflict, as
well as a multi-dimensional and multi-indicator approach to intensity as remaining desiderata.
By addressing these, the Heidelberg approach opens new avenues for empirical research. Possible
applications encompass the empirical analysis of the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation; an
integrative analysis regarding various levels of violent and non-violent conflicts conceptually sep-
arate from the question of conflict onset and termination; an analysis of a broad range of possibly
varying conflict issues; and an investigation into conflict transformations.
With regard to non-state conflict actors, we found that quantitative research often lacks elabo-
rated concepts whereas qualitative research often fails to establish definitions that can guide data
collection. Drawing on extant definitions, we found that a composition of multiple individuals,
a certain degree of organization, and non-stateness are definitional core characteristics of NSCA.
Applying concept developed in chapter 4, we identified NSCA to be collective subjects. This en-
tails that they are groups (in the synchronic perspective) that are able to act as a collective (in
the diachronic perspective). To act collectively, they must develop procedures to form consistent
beliefs and volitions as well as determine individuals to act on behalf of the group. In contrast
to other kinds of conflict actors NSCA are not affiliated nor cooperating with the government of
the state in which they primarily reside. From this real definition of conflict actors, we can de-
rive that NSCA are characterized by a collective identity, a specific orientation, a specific kind of
organizational structure, and are mereologically variable.
With regard to the macro-level, we differentiated between the natural and the social space.
The natural space can be further discerned into the geographic and the anthropological context.
The social space consist of the political, the economic, the cultural, and the social field.
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Taken together, these concepts form the building blocks of the theoretical approach of this
thesis. Before we turn to the theory, however, we situate our approach in the field. This is done in
the next chapter.
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Chapter 7
Explaining Conflicts
Explanations exist; they have existed for all time; there is always a well-known solution to every human
problem–neat, plausible, and wrong.
Henry Louis Menken
This chapter identifies, compares, and criticizes three explanatory approaches that dominate
conflict research. Such an account does not exist in the field of conflict research. While the theoret-
ical reviews presented in chapter 2 illuminate the field from various angles and are sufficiently ex-
haustive in their respective domains, they do not divide the field along explanatory approaches.
Some comparable approaches exist for theories of international relations (Bennett 2013), social
movements (Opp 2009), and path dependence (Mahoney 2000). Each of the approaches, however,
is different to the one pursued here.
Taking theoretical arguments to the centre stage addresses the widespread shortcoming of too
broad representations of essentially complex theoretical accounts. More often than not, theoretical
discussions play a minor role in the large-n comparative literature on civil war. A focus on data
and methodology in the quantitative literature is defensible in light of the limited space of journal
papers. Most studies with an empirical focus, however, do not exclusively aim at giving a de-
scriptive historical account. For instance, Collier (2000a) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) even derive
policy advises from their results. This presupposes the generalizability of identified mechanisms
as well as their significance in future conflicts. In this sense, even empirically focused papers are
rarely a-theoretical.
Theoretical aspiration, on the one hand, as well as brevity of description and lack of compara-
tive assessments, on the other, lead to a state of tension in the literature. Leaving aside theoretical
underpinnings makes it difficult to understand, systematize, and criticize existing approaches
and thus hinders progress in explaining political conflict and the formation of non-state actors. To
exclude theoretical work and focus on empirical issues is not an option. As was outlined above,
theoretical arguments are a sine qua non if one adheres to the nomothetic approach of science,
i.e. the aim to formulate generalizable statements about classes of entities. Consequently, the fol-
lowing account addresses the theoretical ambiguity in a critical comparative account of existing
theoretical approaches.
Highlighting the peculiarities of existing explanatory approaches and reframing them in a
single terminology allows to elucidate where the theoretical approach of this thesis builds on or
departs from existing approaches. We will proceed as follows. Section 7.1 compares selected con-
tributions to the study of conflict occurrence, onset, and duration. It focuses on three influential
strands of research: the grievance perspective focusing on the causal link between inequality, dis-
content, and (violent) political action; the economic perspective, which portrays rebels as utility-
maximizing rational actors; and the feasibility perspective, which refers to the explanatory power
of opportunity structures. These three schools dominate the theoretical debate in conflict research.
Section 7.2 takes a more general look on these perspectives and relates them to three explana-
tory approaches. An explanatory approach here denotes a certain stance with regard to the di-
achronic relations between structure and agency. More specifically, the following comparison fo-
cuses on two core nomological components in theories on intrastate conflict: The first relates to
enabling, constraining, and forming effects of structures on individuals. The second deals with
the theory of action to explain individual and collective participation in violence. Based on how
these two nomological components are defined, three explanatory approaches can be identified:
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• the individualist approach of the economic perspective
• the structuralist approach of the feasibility perspective
• the moderate collectivist approach of the grievance perspective
The former term with regard to each of these three pairs denotes the explanatory approach. The
latter term denotes how the three explanatory approaches are usually referred to in the context of
conflict research.
Each of the following two sections contributes to the goals of this thesis. Section 7.1 allows
to situate the theoretical approach of this thesis within the wider theoretical debate of conflict
research. Revealing a divide between slim economic theories, complex grievance-oriented ap-
proaches, and over-simplistic structural approaches, it allows to find an adequate position within
the field of research. Section 7.2 provides guidance with regard to the path to be pursued in future
theories on political conflict. It argues in favor of realist, and against instrumentalist theories as
well as in favor of an approach where theoretical and empirical foci overlap. Arguably, this is the
moderate collectivist approach.
7.1 Three Approaches
A detailed reconstruction of theories is an extensive endeavor. Consequently, it is impossible to
account for the majority of the literature. To select the universe of publications for review, I dis-
tinguish the grievance perspective, the economic perspective, and the feasibility perspective. This
threefold differentiation fits the literature and is broadly in line with the theoretical reviews dis-
cussed above. To structure the discussion of theoretical approaches, the presentation of each the-
oretical approach proceeds in three steps.
• In a first step, we select the publications to review for each perspective. A legitimate strategy
is to identify the most influential works of research traditions (cf. Opp 2009). These are those
works that shaped a specific tradition and are predominantly cited as ‘founding fathers’.
This complements the broad perspective of our research synthesis in chapter 2.
• In the second step, we review the theoretical arguments. Theories consist of statements de-
scribing the relationship between concepts. Accordingly, we analyze the conceptualization
of the most important independent and dependent variables. Questions of operationaliza-
tion are only discussed if it necessary to understand the theoretical argument. Moreover, the
theoretical argument is rephrased in terms of the micro-macro-micro model of explanation
(Coleman 1990; Esser 1993). This includes a thorough analysis of the nomological statements
within and between levels.
• In a third step, we summarize recent developments within the three perspectives.
7.1.1 Grievances
The first influential strand of research to be portrayed emerged in the 1960s and 1970s with Davies
(1962) and Gurr (1974). It highlights the role of grievances felt by individuals when explaining the
emergence of protests and civil war. In this strand of research, collective identities play a pivotal
role. Gurr (2000), for instance, focuses on ethnopolitical groups as the main unit of observation.
It would be misleading, however, to denote such approaches as purely ‘ethnic’ or ‘identitary’.
Although collective identities are of central importance, the approaches by far reach beyond the
scope of ethnic identity as they include arguments on mobilization and opportunity structures.
The pivotal explanatory factor in the explanation of political conflicts, however, are perceived
grievances that motivate individuals to engage in collective violence.
Following the outline defined above, the following discussion illustrates the foundations of
the research tradition in the 1960s and 1970s as well as more recent advances. First, it describes
the concepts and theoretical arguments of Gurr’s seminal contributionWhy Men Rebel. Second, it
discusses themost important changes to the overall grievance argument appearing in Gurr (ibid.).
Finally, recent contributions to the debate are presented together with advances in the economic
and the feasibility perspective in subsection 7.1.4.
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WhyMen Rebel
The key explanatory variable of Gurr’s theoretical argument is relative deprivation. Relative de-
privation is famously defined as the “perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations
and value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people
believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think
they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them.” (Gurr
1974, p. 24).
Relative deprivation is a psychological state pertaining to the perceived disparity between
expectations and subjectively estimated capabilities. The emphasis on the subjective nature of rel-
ative deprivation entails that the latter can—at least logically—be at odds and even diametrically
opposed to objectively given inequality. Both, capabilities and expectations relate to the current
state of a person and to its future prospects.(ibid., p. 27) Accordingly, expectations denote what one
justifiably expects to keep as well and what one justifiably aims to attain. Capabilities refer to the
values a person actually possesses and to the amount of values he thinks he is able to achieve in
the future.
Relative deprivation is genuinely a psychological property of individuals and thus located
on the micro-level. Political violence—the dependent variable of Gurr’s theory more closely de-
fined below—refers to the use or threat of violence by a collective. This entails the question of
aggregation. Briefly addressing this issue, Gurr defines a group’s expectation or capability as the
aggregated average of the individual value positions (ibid., p. 27). This way, the concept of rel-
ative deprivation can refer to both “individual states of mind and their collective distribution”
(ibid., p. 44) While the intensity of relative deprivation is “a psychocultural variable [and] the
basic unit of analysis is the individual” (ibid., p. 83), it can be analyzed as an aggregated mean of
groups.
Expectations and capabilities are both related to values, i.e. “desired events, objects, and con-
ditions for which men strive” (ibid., p. 25). Values are further specified and encompass welfare
values contributing to “physical well-being and self-realization” (ibid., p. 25), power values de-
termining one’s autonomy to act and the influence on the acts of others, and interpersonal values
such as one’s status in the society, the embeddedness in a community, as well as “the sense of
certainty that derives from shared adherence to beliefs about the nature of society and one’s place
in it, and to norms governing social interaction” (ibid., p. 26). These three value types demarcate
the spectrum of individual incentives.
How is relative deprivation linked to inequalities between groups? On the one hand, rela-
tive deprivation is based on intra-individual comparisons over time. This is evidenced by Gurr’s
(ibid., pp. 64–65) reference to the Cantril scale. Cantril (1965) asked individuals to compare their
past, present, and future positions. On the other hand, relative deprivation is not completely in-
dependent from inter-group comparisons. The expectations of the members of a group may rise
with the upward mobility of other groups (Gurr 1974, p. 105). Nonetheless, the focus constitutes
the central difference between the concept of relative deprivation and the concept of horizontal
inequality (cf. Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Stewart 2008). The former refers to a
relation between individuals or even intra-individual comparison over time. The latter denotes
inter-group relations.
Bringing together the temporal dimension and the level of aggregation, relative deprivation
of groups can be analyzed as a state of affairs as well as over time. Analyzed statically at any
point in time, relative deprivation is characterized by its scope and its intensity (Gurr 1974, p. 29):
Scope denotes the relative proportion of people affected by a state of relative deprivation. Among
the concepts discussed thus far, this is the first variable that genuinely relates to the meso-level.
It makes no sense to speak of the scope of relative deprivation of an individual person. Inten-
sity captures the amount of discontent (or synonymously anger (cf. ibid., p. 21)) resulting from
relative deprivation (ibid., pp. 29, 60). Analyzed over time, Gurr differentiates four types of rela-
tive deprivation based on the development of expectations and capabilities (see table 7.1) (ibid.,
pp. 46–56).
In parts, the terms as used by Gurr (ibid.) are misleading. It is confusing that Gurr speaks
about the “intensity of R[elative] D[eprivation]” (ibid., p. 29) and in the same sentence defines it
as “anger to which it [, i.e. relative deprivation,] gives rise”. Anger, discontent, and ‘intensity of
relative deprivation’ thus become synonymous as all of them refer to a consequence of relative
deprivation. It would have beenmore intuitive to denote the degree of discrepancy between value
expectations and capabilities as ‘intensity’. This would have allowed for more parsimony with
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Expectations
↘ → ↗
Capabilities
↗ – – –
→ – – aspirational
↘ – decremental progressive
Table 7.1: Types of relative deprivation.
Relative
Deprivation
Perceived
discrepancy
Value Expectations Value Capabilities
Power ValuesWelfare Values Interpersonal Values
Figure 7.1: Concepts, attributes, and indicators.
regard to the variety of terms denoting the psychological consequence of relative deprivation. The
ambiguities bear problems pertaining to the clear demarcation of explanans and explanandum in
one of Gurr’s central hypotheses: “The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the
intensity and scope of relative deprivation (RD) among members of a collectivity.” (Gurr 1974,
p. 24) Since ‘potential for collective violence’ and ‘discontent’ are synonyms (cf. ibid., pp. 320, 324)
and likewise ‘intensity of relative deprivation’ and ‘discontent’, the hypothesis becomes partially
redundant. A better definition of intensity and greater terminological parsimony would have
increased the clarity of his approach. This underlines the importance of clearly explicated and
well defined concepts as advocated by critical realism.
In summary, the term relative deprivation denotes a subjective discrepancy between the wel-
fare, power, and interpersonal values a person thinks he or she ought to possess and what the
person thinks he is able to achieve. Analyzed as a group-level variable, relative deprivation de-
scribes the average intensity of relative deprivation, which is a result of relative deprivation, and
the proportion of affected group members.
The main dependent variable is political violence, defined as “all collective attacks within a
political community against the political regime, its actors—including competing political groups
as well as incumbents—or its policies.” (ibid., pp. 3–4). Violence is not restricted to the actual
use of violence but also includes threats to use violence (ibid., p. 4). Besides this rather broad
definition of violence, several types of violence are differentiated.
As can be inferred from the definitions, Gurr (ibid., pp. 9–12, 334–335) differentiates types
of violence based on two criteria: the level of organization and the amount of popular partici-
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Popular Participation
limited widespread/substantial
Degree of Organization
unorganized – Turmoil1
organized Conspiracy2 Internal War3
1 “Relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial popular participation, including
violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions.” (Gurr 1974, p. 11)
2 “Highly organized political violence with limited participation, including organized political assassinations,
small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coups d’etat, and mutinies.” (ibid.)
3 “Highly organized political violence with widespread popular participation, designed to overthrow the
regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and
guerrilla wars, civil wars, and revolutions.” (ibid.)
Table 7.2: Forms of political violence (own figure based on Gurr 1974, p. 11). The criteria differentiating the
three types and the definitions of the types vary throughout the book.1
pation. Originally, the three types of political violence that are differentiated by Gurr—turmoil,
conspiracy, and internal war—were not deduced from definitional attributes. Instead, they were
inductively constructed based on factor analyses by Rummel (1965) and Tanter (1965). Gurr (1974,
p. 334) argues that the typology is almost exhaustive as it would captures “almost all occurrences
of political violence”.
Each of the three identified types of political violence can be analyzed with regard to its mag-
nitude. Magnitude is defined via three attributes: the scope, i.e. the number of involved persons,
the intensity, i.e. the level of destruction, and the duration of violence.
This multi-dimensional approach to the definition of the dependent variable allows Gurr
(1968) to empirically test hypotheses relating to a wide range of different specifications of the
dependent variable. Gurr (1974, pp. 317–359) formulates hypotheses regarding the incidence, the
magnitude, and the form of political violence, thus combining a binary, a quantitative, and a qual-
itative view. The argument on the magnitude of violence is described below.
The theoretical arguments of Gurr (ibid.) are by far more complex than the theoretical ar-
guments presented in the last section on the economic perspective. The following description
illustrates the complexity by showing all variables that are included in the model to explain the
magnitude of political violence. Theoretical arguments on the origins of the different forms of po-
litical violence as depicted in table 7.2 are not discussed. They are, however, comparable in their
level of complexity (cf. ibid., pp. 334–347).
For the sake of clarification and to allow comparison to other models, Gurr’s argument ex-
plaining the magnitude of political violence is restructured along the macro-micro-macro model.
This elucidates the interplay between levels as well as the specific importance of the individual
level. Gurr (ibid., pp. 12–13) summarizes his main argument as follows.
The primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politi-
cization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors.
Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for partici-
pants in collective violence.
In the following, Gurr’s argument is approached from two perspectives. First, the micro-
mechanism is described, which arguably forms the core of his argument. Second, the overall
argument explaining conflict magnitude is discussed.
The micro-mechanisms advanced in Gurr (ibid., pp. 22–58) draws on social psychological the-
ory (cf. Berkowitz 1962; Dollard et al. 1939). It links relative deprivation as independent vari-
able to aggressive behavior as dependent variable. The first link in the causal chain connects
relative deprivation and frustration. If individuals perceive that they are or will be deprived of
goods and conditions of life they think they are entitled to, they are frustrated. Here, frustration
is understood as an interference in one’s goal-directed behavior and not primarily in the sense
of ‘desolation’ (cf. Dollard et al. 1939). Second, Gurr focuses on the link between frustration and
aggression. Frustration caused by relative deprivation may lead to a number of responses that are
aimed at relieving the frustration. One of them is aggression. However, aggression is more than
an arbitrary response to frustration. “The disposition to respond aggressively when frustrated
is parts of man’s biological makeup; there is a biologically inherent tendency, in men and ani-
mals, to attack the frustrating agent.” (Gurr 1974, p. 33) Thus aggressive responses to frustration
are part of the conditio humana. Last, the instigation of aggression is only actualized, i.e. only
leads to concrete behavior, if an external cue appears that represents the source of frustration.
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Relative Deprivation
Frustration
Instigation to aggression (syn. discontent, anger)
Aggressive Behavior against source of frustration
Figure 7.2: Frustration-aggression mechanism following Dollard et al. (1939) and Gurr (1974).
Frustration-aggression theory specifically differs from the micro-mechanisms assumed by ratio-
nal choice approaches: “discontent provides an innately nonrational (but widely rationalized)
impetus to violence, empirically and analytically distinguishable from actors’ estimations of the
utilities of violence”(Gurr 1974, p. 326; cf. Gurr 1974, pp. 210–2011)
Even though extensively drawing on psychological research, Gurr (1974, p. 12) claims that his
argument should not be interpreted as “wholly or primarily psychological” since the independent
and dependent variables were situated on the level of society, i.e. the macro level. This is certainly
true and also pertains to a large number of other variables included in his model. Nonetheless,
important concepts and the nomological core of his argument linking relative deprivation and ag-
gression lie—as shown above and as clearly set out by Gurr in the introduction to the recent edi-
tion ofWhy Men Rebel—on the micro-level. As Victoroff (2005) observes, the frustration-aggression
theory developed by Dollard et al. (1939) is not restricted to an understanding of group behav-
ior but also explains individual behavior. I would go further by arguing that Gurr, even though
he focuses on collective violence, primarily employs the frustration-aggression mechanism to ex-
plain the tendency of individual’s to engage in violent acts. Group organization, size, and relative
capacity do play a role in some parts of his arguments. They are not systematically integrated,
however, with frustration-aggression theory. Nothing in the theoretical argument linking depri-
vation to aggression genuinely relates to group processes. Put succinctly, “men are quick to aspire
beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove inadequate” (Gurr 1974,
p. 58). Where deprivation, aggression, and violence are related to groups, Gurr follows a simple
aggregative logic as illustrated in the definition of scope and intensity above.
To explain the magnitude of political violence, Gurr draws on a large number of psychological
and social variables. The argument entails three argumentative steps that revolve around discon-
tent, justifications for political violence, and the capacity to act. If people are discontented, regard
violent political action normatively justified as well as pragmatically useful, and the balance of
power between dissidents and the government is about equal, highly violent political violence is
most probable. In each of the three steps, psychological and societal variables constitute important
factors.
Discontent (syn. anger, intensity of relative deprivation) is determined by four psychological
and several social variables.2 Value capabilities, the second reference point of relative deprivation
varies with the degree to which values are flexible and consequently in how far value distribution
is a zero-sum game, the value gains of reference groups, past value losses, and open value oppor-
tunities (Gurr 1974, pp. 123–154). In summary, the psychological and societal variables together
determine how the value expectations of individuals develop and in how far individuals perceive
that they can attain and maintain value capabilities. Disregarding the redundant formulation of
the hypothesis (compare discussion above), the frustration-aggression theory depicted in figure
7.2 then explains how relative deprivation leads to discontent.
Gurr’s theory does not aim to explain any type of violence, but a subtype of violence that is
further defined as being directed against the political regime, its actors, or its policies, i.e. political
violence. To lead to political violence, discontent must be focused on the polity, politics or policies
2The psychological variables include the degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value ca-
pabilities, the strength of motivation to attain the respective value with respect to which discrepancy is experienced, the
proportion of value classes where capabilities do not meet expectations, the number of remaining substitutes to attain
value capabilities, and the time period for which a discrepancy exists. Societal variables that influence if and in how far
groups are susceptible to rising value expectations encompass the realistic chance to attain the new value expectations,
the value gains of reference groups, past value gains, and the equilibrium between value positions (Gurr 1974, pp. 92–
122). Figure 7.2 ignores self-enforcing effects. For instance, Gurr (ibid., p. 101) argues that the individual susceptibility to
rising value expectations is dependent on existing relative deprivation. As value expectations are part of the definition of
relative deprivation, this is de facto a self-enforcing effect.
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of a state. This, in turn, only applies if discontented individuals regard violence against the regime
as normatively justified and useful. Thus, assuming existing discontent, norms and perceived
utility are the two pivotal variables influencing the propensity that violence becomes political.3
Politicized discontent is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for political violence. In a
third and last step, Gurr includes the balance of coercive capacity4, comparable with Weber’s
definition of Macht, and institutional support5 between the regime and its opponents in his ex-
planatory framework. In short, the smaller the difference in scope and extent of coercive control
and the smaller the difference in institutional support between conflict parties, the greater is the
likelihood of highly violent internal conflict.
In summary, the third step introduces the balance of power in a wider sense. Given a sufficient
amount of discontent directed against the polity, politics, or policies of a given state, the relative
balance between the regime and its opponents determines the expected magnitude of violence.
In this third step of the argument, Gurr mainly focuses on organizational capacity and popular
support of the conflict parties. Arguably, this third step in the argument is the one that focuses
most on the meso-level as it includes variables that are not trivially aggregated but are genuinely
located on the level of collective actors.
The summary of Gurr’s argument elucidates its great complexity. Some 30 variables are in-
cluded in the theoretical model to explain the causal link between relative deprivation, discontent
and its focus on the political, and the magnitude of political violence. All in all, Gurr derives 82
hypotheses linking the main concepts of his theory.
Peoples versus States
Thirty years after formulating relative deprivation theory, Gurr (2000) published his book Peoples
versus States in which he further elaborated his argument. The argument of Peoples versus States is
not presented here in the same level of detail as Gurr’s earlier contribution. Instead, this section
discusses the main advances and specifies some of the drawbacks of his argument. All in all,
three differences stand out. They relate to the independent variable, the dependent variable, and
the unit of analysis on the micro-level.
First, the argument integrates theories focusing on resource mobilization (cf. Tilly 1978), op-
portunity structures (cf. Esman 1994;McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994), and rational-choice approaches
to collective action problems (cf. Lichbach 1998) prevalent in the greater literature on social move-
ments (cf. Gurr 2000, 350, fn. 3). Theoretical arguments from these strands of research are com-
bined in a more coherently formulated theoretical argument linking ethnic identity and ethnop-
olitical conflict. In summary, Gurr (ibid., pp. 65–95) argues that ethnopolitical conflict can be ex-
plained by four sets of factors: Salience describes the importance of cultural identity for people
sharing cultural traits. It is determined by cultural dissimilarities and status differences between
groups as well as past or ongoing conflicts (ibid., pp. 66–69). Incentives denote the motivation of
individuals to act on behalf of a group. Groups are more prone to act collectively if they suffer
from inter-group inequalities with regard to their economic, political, and cultural status; have
lost political autonomy; and are or were forcefully repressed (ibid., pp. 69–74). Capacities refer to
the cohesiveness of a given group and its ability to mobilize. Salience of collective identity and
collective incentives are the most important determinants of a group’s capacity. Thus, capacity,
salience, and incentives are not mutually exclusive sets of factors. The latter includes the for-
3Normative and utilitarian justifications for political violence are hypothesized to be strong and/or widespread if so-
cialization in a society emphasizes the tendency of individuals to blame others instead of themselves in case of frustration,
violence has occurred frequently and with a great magnitude before, the regime has shown to be capable of alleviating
relative deprivation before, the regime has unequally distributed resources in its efforts to alleviate relative deprivation,
and the political regime has a low legitimacy, the degree to which doctrines/beliefs/ideational systems link relative depri-
vation with political targets and portray political violence as an effective way to alleviate relative deprivation, the extent
to which political violence has proved conducive in the past, the success of other groups with political violence, the spread
of aggressive political symbols, and the proliferation of means of communication (Gurr 1974, pp. –225).
4The coercive balance is influenced by the spread of a regime’s instruments of surveillance; the size, resources, train-
ing, and loyalty of the security and dissident forces; the severity and consistency of sanctions already in place; and the
geographic concentration of dissidents (ibid., pp. 232–273).
5 Relative institutional support, i.e. the possibility to achieve compliance without resort to violence, is determined by
the spread of membership in pro-regime and pro-dissident organizations, the cohesiveness and organizational differentia-
tion (complexity) of these organizations, the amount of resources available to these organizations, the opportunities these
organizations open up for their members, and the provision of channels of anti-regime protest by these organizations
(ibid., pp. 274–316). Not all arguments imply linear relationships. Expected curvilinear relationships are not specifically
indicated in this summary.
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mer two. Moreover, existing networks of organization, territorial concentration, organizational
ties between collective actors, and authentic leaders hypothetically strengthen group capacities
for ethnopolitical action (Gurr 2000, pp. 74–79). Opportunities relate to a set of factors that are
different from the three sets of factors denoted above. Opportunities exclusively refer to group-
extrinsic properties in the domestic and international sphere. Domestically, state power, regime
type, regime or leader change, as well as prevailing norms of a political order are important de-
terminants of opportunities. Internationally, foreign support as well as transnational relations of
groups, spillover effects, and global doctrines influence the opportunity structure (ibid., pp. 79–
92).
Second, the definition of the dependent variable considerably changed. While the theory ad-
vanced in Why Men Rebel aimed at explaining political violence, Peoples versus States focuses on
ethnopolitical conflict, i.e. “conflict in which claims are made by a national or minority group
against the state or against other political actors.” (ibid., p. 65) By restricting the type of actors in
the definition of conflict to ethnopolitical groups, the extension of ethnopolitical conflict is signifi-
cantly smaller than the extension of political violence.6 Ethnopolitical conflicts are thus primarily
defined as ethnic by specifying the non-state actors involved. The specific issues at stake need not
necessarily revolve around cultural issues such as, e.g., language or religious rights. Whereas the
extension of the main explanandum is narrower, the advanced typology is simplified. Having dis-
tinguished three different types along two dimensions in his earlier work, Gurr (ibid., p. 70) dif-
ferentiates between two strategies of political action: protest and rebellion. It is not entirely clear
which criteria differentiate both types. Protests are based on a show of support while the strategy
of rebellion is defined as the mobilization of coercive power (ibid., p. 29). Following theMinorities
at Risk project, the distinction hinges on whether arms are used or resistance remains primarily
non-violent (cf. Gurr 1996). Moreover, neither of the two publications explicitly operationalizes
the criteria that are used to differentiate types. The primary focus lies on conceptualizing the types
as such and not on developing a systematic, explicit typology. In consequence, the differentiation
is not entirely clear. Apart from these shortcomings, the modification of the dependent variable
determines the explanatory scope of the theory, i.e. the number of of phenomena it seeks to ex-
plain. While Why Men Rebel set out to provide a general explanation of political violence, Peoples
versus States brings forward a medium-range theory (Merton 1949) that claims explanatory power
regarding the decision of ethnopolitical groups to engage in ethnopolitical conflict. This step can
be interpreted as a reaction to criticism against the relative deprivation argument. As, among oth-
ers, Tarrow (1994) and Tilly (1978) pointed out, grievances are rather ubiquitous whereas conflict
is not and thus the former is an insufficient condition for the latter.
A third difference is that the argument more clearly focuses on collectives and not individuals
as main actors. While the psychological micro-mechanism linking deprivation and aggression
formed the nomological core inWhy Men Rebel, Gurr (2000, p. 7) defines ethnopolitical groups as
the main unit of analysis. Although the empirical interest of the earlier work likewise involved
groups, the focus on the meso-level is terminologically and theoretically much more pronounced
in Gurr’s recent work.
A fourth difference pertains to a mismatch between theoretical and empirical focus. The theo-
retical focus and likewise the explanatory interest is defined by the research question, i.e. “When
does ethnic identity lead to political action?” Gurr (ibid., p. 6) The given answer puts the argu-
ment in a nutshell: “When ethnicity has collective consequences for a group in its relations with
other groups and with states. More exactly, to the extent that ethnicity is a major determinant
of a people’s security, status, material well being, or access to political power, it is likely to be a
highly salient part of their identity.” (ibid., p. 6) The problem is as follows: The scope of the theory
includes individual mobilization based on ethnic identity, as evidenced in the above quote. The
research design, however, de facto limits the empirical analysis to the question: when do groups
that are already politically active decide to engage in violent action. This, however, is not a delib-
erate decision. Instead, the narrower focus results from a selection bias that in turn follows from
the definition of ethnopolitical groups. Ethnic groups are defined as collectives whose individ-
ual members share the belief that some of their common traits such as language, religion, origin,
shared custom, or common place of living sets them apart from other collectives (cf. ibid., p. 8).
In short, ethnic groups are collectives with a shared cultural identity. Ethnopolitical groups are
a subtype of ethnic groups, i.e. ethnic groups “whose ethnicity has political consequences result-
ing either in differentiated treatment of group members or in political action on behalf of interest
6‘National peoples’ and ‘minority peoples’ are the two main types of ethnopolitical groups (Gurr 2000, pp. 16–17)
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Ethnopolitical
Group
Shared collective ethnic
identity Political consequences
Differential treatment Political Action
Figure 7.4: Definition of ethnopolitical group (Gurr 2000, p. 5).
groups.” (Gurr 2000, p. 5) Political consequences of ethnic identity in the form of either differential
treatment or political action additionally characterizes ethnopolitical groups (see figure 7.4). The
precise analysis of the concept of ethnopolitical groups is not—as it might appear—a quibble. To
the contrary, it has important consequences for the whole research design. The problem is that
groups that are not differentially treated are not part of the universe of cases. Consequently, theo-
retical arguments on the effects of differential treatments cannot be tested empirically. In a recent
publication, Birnir et al. (2015) address the problem by extending the sample to include groups
that are ‘socially relevant’.
In summary, Peoples versus States significantly improves the earlier argument inWhyMen Rebel.
It reacts to criticism by integrating insights from the literature on political opportunities, strength-
ens validity of the theory by restricting the explanatory scope, and explicates its focus on groups
more clearly. Last, the complexity of the argument is reduced. Although still being complex in
comparison to the wider literature, Gurr has significantly reduced the number of explanatory
factors and mechanisms making his argument more manageable.
7.1.2 Economy
One of the most influential approaches to the explanation of intrastate conflict is the economic
perspective. The economic research tradition has been very influential in the academic discussion
as well as influenced the decision of policy makers in the United Nations (Berdal 2005), a fact
that may also stem from the authors’ affiliation to the World Bank. The publications that lay out
the main arguments are Collier (2000a) and Collier and Hoeffler (1998). In Collier and Hoeffler
(2004), the authors adjust their initial theoretical argument and initiate a shift from individualist
to structuralist arguments that is finally completed in Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009). Due
to the major theoretical adjustments in 2009, it makes sense to take the publications between 1998
and 2004 as a main source to portray the economic research tradition. Moreover, the following
discussion sheds some light on the origins of their economic perspective. When constructing their
argument, Collier and Hoeffler cite the theoretical work of Azam (1995) and Grossman (1991,
1995). Thus, these works are briefly addressed.
On economic causes of civil war
Themain explanandum is rather broadly defined as the “causes of civil war” (Collier andHoeffler
1998, p. 563), “the origin of civil war” (Collier 2000a, p. 92) or “the outbreak of civil conflict” (Col-
lier and Hoeffler 2004, p. 563). A closer look on the operationalization of the dependent variable
illustrates a lack of precision concerning different types of dependent variables. The 1998 paper
investigates “the occurrence and the duration of civil war” (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, p. 567), the
2000 book chapter tries to retrodict “whether each country has a civil war during each five-year
period” (Collier 2000a, pp. 92–93), and the 2004 paper tries to retrodict “the risk that a civil war
will start” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, p. 572). Two things can be said about the specifications of
the explananda. First, the three specifications represent three different types of phenomena: oc-
currence, duration, and onset of civil war. The extension of the three explananda taken together
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indicates that the authors attribute great explanatory power to their theoretical argument. How-
ever, the alternation of explananda may not have been fully intended but was due to a conflation
of concepts as admitted by Collier and Hoeffler (2004, p. 564). Second, the authors limit their
theory to wars, i.e. highly violent conflicts. This limitation is understandable by the limited avail-
ability of data at that time. Last, the exact specification of the dependent variable remains unclear
in Collier and Hoeffler (1998). It might be a dummy that measures conflict onset for five-year
periods as in Collier (2000a), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009).
The central nomological statement in Collier and Hoeffler (1998) clearly reflects its origin in
economic theory as it takes the form of a rebel’s utility function. War is ultimately explained as
the result of a situation where the probability and value of winning, on the one side, outweigh
the costs of rebellion, on the other. Put simply, the rebels’ utility function is defined by Collier and
Hoeffler (ibid., p. 565) as follows:
Decision to Rebel = (Probability of Victory×Gains) − (Opportunity+Coordination Costs)
The nucleus of the theoretical argument by Collier and Hoeffler (ibid., p. 563) is simple: “War
occurs if the incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to the costs”. The formulation un-
mistakably indicates that the authors build their main argument on rational choice theory, as the
relative distribution of costs and benefits for actors does the main explanatory work. Moreover,
the analytical focus lies on the macro-level as the dependent variable war and the independent
variable incentive structure are both structural entities. As is typical for methodologically individ-
ualist arguments, the theoretical work is primarily done on the micro-level. In the case of Collier
(2000a) and Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), the main mechanism describes the choices of indi-
viduals according to an exogenously assumed theory of action.
Three statements further specify the argument and clarify its main concepts: (1) “The objective
of rebellion is either to capture the state or secede from it”(Collier and Hoeffler 1998, p. 564). (2)
“In general, the incentive for rebellion is the product of the probability of victory and its conse-
quences.”(ibid., p. 564). (3) “[T]he costs of rebellion (...) [are] made up of the opportunity costs of
conflict and the cost of coordination”(ibid., p. 567).
The first statement is a deterministic axiom. It postulates that the motivation of non-state con-
flict actors in civil war lies in the exercise of governmental power; either by violently attaining
government in a political unit that already exists or by the formation of a new one. At this point,
the aim of rebels seems to be primarily political: governmental power. The second and the third
statement further break down the concepts of incentives and costs, respectively.
The second statement defines the incentives to engage in rebellion. The difference between
objective and incentive lies in the fact that the former is postulated as fixed, while the latter is liable
to change as it is determined by two other variables. To explain individual incentives, Collier
and Hoeffler (ibid.) draw on the probability of victory and the expected material benefits in case
of a hypothetic victory. The former is determined by the “capacity of the government to defend
itself” (ibid., p. 564). This view is rather simple, as one might argue that it is not exclusively
the capacity of the government but rather the balance of power between the government and the
rebels that counts. The exclusive focus on government capability is adapted fromGrossman (1991)
who argues that the military options of rebel groups are per se limited to a low level. The second
determinant of incentives, i.e. the consequences of victory, are determined “by the capacity of a
future rebel government to reward its supporters” or, more specifically, “the potential revenue of
the government” (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, p. 564).
The third statement defines the costs of rebellion. Fighting is costly “due partly to the oppor-
tunity cost of rebel labour and partly to the disruption to economic activity caused by warfare”
(ibid., p. 565). Moreover, as non-state conflict actors are collective actors and “war-making is the
decision of a collective” (ibid., p. 564), transaction costs are added to themodel that account for the
“passage from individual interests to collective decisions.” (ibid., p. 564) The costs of rebellious
activity are thus composed of opportunity costs, i.e. the foregone income through peace-time pro-
duction and the breakdown of the economy in the event of civil war, and the coordination costs
of forming a collective actor (ibid., p. 565).
At this point, it is necessary to extend the discussion to the level of indicators to identify three
shortcomings. The first shortcoming pertains to a conceptual aggregation on the level of indica-
tors. When turning their view to the measurement of variables, Collier and Hoeffler (ibid., p. 564)
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argue that both, the military capacity of the state and the potential revenue from capturing or
erecting government are determined by the taxable base of the economy. They conclude that be-
cause the taxable base “both reduces the probability of victory and increases the gain in the event
of victory, its net effect on the risk of war is a priori ambiguous.” Thus, when switching from the
level of concepts to the level of indicators, the authors argue that two concepts—the probability
and the reward of victory, that together determine one of the central variables of the theoretical
argument, i.e. rebel incentives—can be operationalized via the very same indicator: the taxable
base. Pertaining to the revenue, the tax base represents the prize itself. Pertaining to military ca-
pacity, the tax base determines the possibility to attain military might. Thus, where conflicts are
fought about government, the research design does not allow to analytically distinguish between
the probability and the hypothetical reward of victory. The theoretical distinction at the level of
the attributes is not adequately mirrored on the indicator level. The re-aggregation occurring be-
tween the level of attributes and the level of indicators is illustrated in figure 7.5.
A similar tension between the conceptual and the indicator level exists with regard to popula-
tion size. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 564) argue that in secessionist conflict it is not the taxable
base but the size of the population of the respective region that constitutes the ‘prize’. Arguing
that the objectives to capture the state or to secede may coexist in the very same conflict, Collier
and Hoeffler (ibid., p. 565) model population size and taxable base as aggregative effects. Popu-
lation size—together with ethnolinguistic fragmentation—is likewise an indicator of the costs of
coordination within collective actors (ibid., p. 567). Coordination is assumed to be more difficult
in highly diverse and in very homogenous countries as well as when the population is large. In
consequence, population size simultaneously measures incentives and costs of rebel groups. The-
oretical terms that seem to be clearly distinguishable turn out to be rather similar on the indicator
level.
A third shortcoming is the obscure role of ethnic fractionalization. The authors hint towards
the role of ethnic fractionalization as the main mechanism explaining incentives in secessionist
conflicts: “The effect of population size on the desire for secession is most apparent when con-
sidered at the extremes. Were the global population contained within a single nation, linguis-
tic and cultural disparities would be likely to generate continuous violent conflicts. By contrast,
were there as many nations as socio-cultural groups, the desire for secession would presumably
be much diminished.” (ibid., p. 564) In this argument, the authors implicitly introduce two ax-
ioms: First, that a large population coincides with linguistic and cultural disparities. Second, and
more importantly, that ethnolinguistic diversity spurs secessionist conflict. At the same time, it
is assumed that ethnolinguistic diversity makes coordination more difficult. In consequence, the
role of ethno-linguistic diversity remains theoretically obscure: Its influence on incentives via the
size of population as an indicator for revenues is not clearly stated. Nor is ethnic diversity used
for measurement. Instead, it is assumed to correlate with population size. On the other hand,
ethno-linguistic fragmentation is used as an indicator of coordination costs. The main problem is
that different arguments are not consistently included in the conceptualization of core variables.
Under the hood, the formulation and operationalization of the utility function becomes rather
complicated.
Until here, we have clarified the main concepts and the nomological core of the economic ap-
proach. We now turn to agency: Who calculates costs and benefits of rebelling? On the one hand,
Collier and Hoeffler (ibid.) often use the term "rebel groups" or "rebels" to denote the collective
that “faces the choice between remaining peaceful and fighting a war”(ibid., p. 566). Following
this formulation, the formal model seems to represent the decision-making process of existing
rebel groups whether to rebel or stay peaceful. On the other hand—departing from Grossman
(1991) who only includes foregone income—Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 565) include the costs
of coordination in their model and elaborate on the link between individual interests and collec-
tive decisions. Following this trace, the agent seems to be the individual that decides to either
partake in rebellious activity via the formation or participation in a rebel groups or to stay put.
Another possible conclusion when following this trace could be that the authors think of an un-
organized collective—defined by cultural commonalities(ibid., p. 567)—that somehow decides to
invest the coordination costs to come up with a collective decision to either rebel or not. If the
authors think of fully organized and “black-boxed” rebel groups that can be treated as unitary,
it would not make great sense to include coordination costs as a way to problematize the aggre-
gation between individuals and collective non-state actors. If the authors think of individuals as
main agents, the costs of coordination would need to be invested before the group is able to de-
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cide whether to rebel or not. In this case, the model would have to entail two steps, where the
costs of coordination are a necessary condition to come up with a decision as a group. A closer
look on the works by Grossman (1991) and Azam (1995) does not provide any further insight as
they conceptualize the non-state actor side as “peasant family” or “the opponent”, respectively.
Moreover, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 567) summarize their theory in a way that does not refer
to any specific actor type.7 As a result, it is not entirely clear whether the micro-level, i.e. the level
of the social actor, is populated by individual or by collective agents. It remains unclear who de-
cides whether to rebel or not. Whereas the aggregation process is theoretically problematized, it
is not included in the formal model.
At this point, it is necessary to refer back to the objective of rebel actors as defined by the
authors. These were introduced above as hard-wired and postulated to constitute either secession
or governmental power. After discussing the decision process in detail, it becomes clear that these
objectives are not really axioms that are introduced ex-ante. Rather, they confine the universe of
means available to actors which in turn are assumed to always aspire material benefit. In other
words, to secede or to topple the government represent two strategies of acquiring wealth in
cases where the benefits of rebellion outweigh its costs. Theoretically more important is the more
abstractly defined, “hard-wired”, and postulatedmotivation of actors to maximize their economic
wealth. Taking control of government or seceding from an existing state are merely means to
strive for material benefit.
Summing up, the occurrence and length of conflicts is—according to Collier and Hoeffler
(ibid.)—dependent on the decision of a wealth-maximizing rational actor (be it an individual,
a rebel group, or an unorganized collective) to engage in rebellion to reach one of two objectives,
i.e. secession or acquiring government. Actors decide to rebel when the benefits, as a function of
the probability of victory and the amount of post-conflict revenues, outweigh the costs of organi-
zation and foregone income due to fighting. Thus, the very same theoretical mechanism equally
explains the occurrence and length of civil wars (see figure 7.6).
After having discussed the early works of the economic perspective, I now turn to subse-
quent works that had great influence in the scientific debate. The central empirical result remains
unchanged in Collier (2000a, p. 110): “the evidence on the causes of conflict points to economic
factors as the main drivers of conflict. (...) Greed seems more important than grievance”. The au-
thor still argues that political conflicts are mainly caused by individuals who decide to take up
arms due to their economic agenda. Although Collier (ibid.) does not state his theoretical argu-
ment in great detail—the chapter rather intends to give a more accessible account of the economic
perspective—there are some important deviations in terms of theory that can be identified. These
changes do not decisively depart from the arguments made in Collier and Hoeffler (1998), but
initiate a change that will become fully pronounced in Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009).
First and foremost, Collier (2000a, p. 91) restates his model of rational actors: “rebellions might
arise because the rebels aspire to wealth by capturing resources extralegally”. This micro-theory
of greedy individuals is contrasted with an explanatory model that focuses on grievance. Here,
rebels “aspire to rid the nation or the group of people with which they identify of an unjust
regime” (Collier 2000b, p. 91). As was indicated above, Collier favors the former theory of action
as having a greater significance to explain the emergence of political conflict. Where Collier (ibid.)
departs from Collier and Hoeffler (1998), however, is the way in which the mechanisms below the
macro-level are specified.
Apart from restating the model of a rebel’s utility function as it was introduced in Collier and
Hoeffler (ibid.) in a starkly simplified way, Collier introduces an new argument that explains why
greed-oriented rebellions occur more easily than rebellions motivated by grievances. His argu-
ment stems from collective action theory and relates to the link from the micro to the macro level,
viz. explains individual (non-)participation in rebellions. According to Collier (2000b, pp. 98–99),
grievance-based rebellions face three obstacles: The free-riding problem pertains to the public goods
character of the relief from grievances. Individuals may enjoy the abolishment of, e.g., political
exclusion without participating in the rebellion. The coordination problem relates to problems of
actor formation. As small rebellions only have a small chance of success and are more dangerous
for the individual members, individuals are not willing to participate. Consequently, the forma-
tion of large rebellions fails in its early stages. The time-consistency problem describes the fact that
7“To summarise, we propose a formulation in which both the probability of civil war and its duration are a function of
the gains from rebellion, made up of the probability of rebel victory and the gains from victory (state capture or secession),
and the costs of rebellion, made up of the opportunity costs of conflict and the cost of coordination.”
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rebels need to fight before they are able to reap the fruits of their labor. Once aims are achieved,
however, rebels cannot be sure that the new leaders will stick to policies they have advertised
before the aims were achieved. This hinders the emergence of grievance motivated rebellions (see
figure 7.7).
In light of the above mentioned criticism of an insufficiently described process of actor for-
mation, the discussion of collective action problems in emerging rebellions is an improvement.
By theoretically investigating the logic of aggregation, Collier fills a gap that was left open in his
1998 formulation of the economic perspective. This step, however, ipso facto also leads to a shift
in his explanatory approach. The main theoretical argument in favor of the economic perspective
is not—as it was in 1998—that rebels first and foremost follow a utility function. To the contrary,
the grievance perspective is accepted as an equally plausible description of individual motiva-
tion (Collier 2000b, pp. 92, 100, 110). Where the grievance perspective loses explanatory power
pertaining to the emergence of civil war, however, is in the explanation of processes of individual
participation in rebellions. The main nomic argument is not that all men are homines oeconomici
but that only homines oeconomici participate in rebellious activity due to collective action problems.
While Collier and Hoeffler (1998) had a clearly specified model of individual decision-making,
Collier (2000b) bases his model of explanation on two coexisting motivations on the micro-level.
Extending the view toward methodology and empirical investigation, there is no large differ-
ence between the two works. Both, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Collier (2000b) de facto operate
on the macro-level in terms of empirical investigation. In the latter, however, methodological re-
strictions are more clearly expressed and are reflected in a more modest and less specified theory.
Thus, although both works share a limited empirical focus, the gap between theoretical ambition
and methodological approach appears smaller in Collier (ibid.). Neither publication problema-
tizes the emergence of individual motivation, as is typical for rational choice arguments. Collier
and Hoeffler (1998) assume rebels to act on the basis of a utility function, while Collier (2000b)
introduces the two motivational types and explicates his agnosticism regarding further specifica-
tion. The shift in the argumentation that is accompanied by a cut-back regarding the description
of decision-making processes of actors can thus be interpreted as a result of epistemological con-
straints. While Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 565) offered a very detailed formal model of rebel
utility function, Collier (2000b, p. 92) expresses doubts on the very possibility to analyze decision-
making processes on the micro-level. Accordingly, he explicitly states his approach to infer the
motivation of actors, i.e. a micro-level entity, from correlations on the macro level. More specif-
ically, he investigates the relation between structural conditions that either alter the cost-benefit
analysis of profit-oriented rebels in favor of rebellion or motivate actors to rebel against existing
grievances, on the one hand, and the incidence of civil war, on the other. He argues that all those
factors that promise material revenue from extralegal activity will lead to extralegal activity and
thus rebellion. Here, Collier admits the restricted validity emerging from his structural empirical
focus. He solely relies on correlations on the macro-level to infer causal links on the micro-level. 8
7.1.3 Feasibility
The feasibility approach gained in importance with the publication of Greed and Grievance in Civil
War. It is the second most-cited papers in research on civil war and intrastate conflict and con-
stitutes an important turning point in the debate.9 The paper caused a huge debate, subsumed
under the catchphrase “greed or grievance”, on whether individuals fight for individual profit or
against injustices. Both arguments clearly allude to the micro-level. Accordingly, it appears incor-
rect to single out this paper as pivotal for the feasibility thesis. We argue, however, that the title is
a misnomer and does not reflect the theoretical model, which in fact focuses on the opportunity
of rebellion.
8This is not an ecological fallacy, i.e. a logical fallacy that occurs when variables on the micro-level are inferred from
variables on themacro-level. Ecological fallacies pertain to situations where themacro-micro link is analytical, e.g between
mean values that describe a population and characteristics of individual members of that very population. In Collier’s
argument, however, the link between the macro- and the micro-level is causal, as he argues that individuals will not
pass up economically lucrative situations. Here, an economically lucrative situation occurs and actors then decide to act
accordingly. Graphically, causal links are illustrated by arrows.
9Citations following the Social Science Citation Index with the search term “ ‘Civil War’ OR ‘intrastate conflict’ ”. The
most cited paper is Fearon and Laitin (2003).
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Figure 7.7: Explanatory model of Collier (2000b).
Greed and Grievance in Civil War
In their 2004 paper Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) shift their theo-
retical view from the micro- to the macro-level. The shift toward opportunity structures as the
sole decisive variables is rooted in the fact that Collier and Hoeffler (ibid., pp. 464–565) introduce
the concept of misperceived grievances, i.e. subjective perceptions of unfair treatment that are not
rooted in objective conditions such as economic inequalities. Individuals are no longer assumed to
be perfectly informed about structural conditions but may misrepresent them. While the theoret-
ical model in Collier (2000b) differed from Collier and Hoeffler (1998) regarding the micro-macro
link (collective action problems), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) introduces an argument that pertains
to the macro-micro-link (misperception) (see figure 7.8).
Collier had introduced the concept of collective action problems as an argument against the
grievance perspective. He argued that even if grievances objectively existed and were perceived
by actors as such, rebellions simply would fail to gain enough leverage. By introducing the con-
cept of misperceived grievances, the authors now pursue a diametrically opposed argument.
They do no longer mention collective action problems anymore but argue that even misperceived
grievances may lead to civil war (ibid., p. 589). Thus, individual participation in civil wars may be
motivated by grievances that do not really exist (ibid., pp. 564–565). Pertaining to themicro-macro
link they argue that for both, greed- and grievance motivated rebellions alike, opportunity of re-
bellion is a necessary condition, “ ’opportunity’ and ’viability’ describe the common conditions
sufficient for profit-seeking, or not-for-profit, rebel organizations to exist.” (ibid., p. 565) Further-
more, Collier and Hoeffler (ibid., p. 564) assume the ubiquity of individuals motivated by greed
and grievance motivated individuals. Pertaining to greed, they take up the Machiavelli Theorem
by Hirshleifer (2001) according to which “no one will pass up a profitable opportunity to exploit
someone else” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, footnote 2). Pertaining to grievance they assume that
“[m]isperceptions of grievances may be very common” (ibid., p. 564).
Tied together, these arguments lead to the conclusion that the specification of individual moti-
vation is only of secondary importance. What counts is the mere possibility to engage in violence.
Consequently, the authors exclusively focus on the opportunity (or synonymously viability) of re-
bellion as sole explanatory factor. Whether or not objective grievances exist does not decisively in-
fluence the emergence of civil war as the micro- (subjective grievances) andmacro-level (objective
grievances) are uncoupled. Consequently, the emergence of civil war is exclusively determined by
the opportunity structure. Thus, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009, p. 2) do not adequately por-
tray their own approach when they write that the 2004 paper “was still rooted in the traditional
focus on the motivation for rebellion.”
The focus on structure is additionally justified by epistemological restrictions. Aware of the
fact that indicators are still restricted to macro-level entities, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue
that rebellions that are caused by the mechanisms of misperceived grievances and greed are ob-
servationally indistinguishable.
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Figure 7.8: Explanatory model of Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009).
Feasibility Civil War
Figure 7.9: Explanatory model of Collier and Hoeffler (2004).
Beyond Greed and Grievance
In Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009), the authors finalize their theoretical turn away frommicro-
level theories of action to economic opportunity structures. The theoretical change culminates in
the feasibility hypothesis: “Factors that are important for the financial and militarily feasibility of
rebellion but are unimportant for motivation decisively increase the risk of civil war” (ibid., p. 3).
The roots in economic theory that had inspired Collier and Hoeffler (1998) to model individual
decisions with the help of a utility function, are finally cut in favor of an account that purely fo-
cuses on structures.Whereas in 1998 the authorsmodeled the decision processes of actors en detail,
the specific motivation becomes arbitrary in Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009). In fact, the 2009
model resembles ecological arguments as the existence of structural niches is decisive in explain-
ing the emergence civil war. Following Weinstein (2005), the authors propose a possible causal
link between characteristics of structural niches and the type of motivation of emerging non-state
actors. The link, however, is not substantially specified nor empirically investigated in Collier,
Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009). In summary, neither a micro-mechanism nor the links between the
macro- and the micro-level are specified or explained (see figure 7.9). Where mechanisms below
the level of structures become arbitrary they too become meaningless. As a result, the theoretical
argument can no longer be attributed to the camp of methodological individualism. This depar-
ture constitutes the most significant break with the early economic theory of Azam (1995) and
Grossman (1991, 1995) and the arguments specified in Collier and Hoeffler (1998).
A side effect of this theoretical turn is that the theoretical and empirical focus entirely overlap.
As the feasibility hypothesis does not entail a statement about the perception of actors, a specific
theory of action, or the aggregation of individual acts to collective outcomes, the authors do not
need to measure these factors empirically. Due to the restrictions of empirical investigations into
the working of rebel groups, the feasibility hypothesis appears as a tempting offer to sideline
methodological difficulties. At the same time, however, it loses empirical scope, i.e. it does not
allow to make any substantial statements about the type of emerging actors, their motivation, or
the link between individual participation and collective outcomes. What remains is a very simple
theory of conflict emergence based on the existence of ecological niches.
7.1.4 Recent Advances
This section sketches recent advances in the debate on greed, grievance, and opportunities. The
works by Gurr and Collier & Hoeffler influence the debate until today. Concerning Gurr’s con-
tribution, Østby (2013) observes that “relative deprivation theory remains the most prominent
explanation that connects inequality (...) with conflict”. Likewise, the greed and grievance di-
chotomy (or greed, grievance, and opportunity trichotomy) introduced by Paul Collier and Anke
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Hoeffler—although increasingly criticized(Keen 2012;Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009)—still forms
a focal point in the debate 10
Shortly after Gurr’s seminal contribution in the 1970s, alternative explanations questioned the
explanatory power of grievance-oriented explanations. This strand of research on social move-
ments tilted the view toward economic incentives and feasibility. Availability of and control
over material and immaterial resources were proposed as crucial for mobilization (McCarthy and
Zald 1977). Others highlighted the importance of group-external political opportunity structures
(Eisinger 1973).
Besides rising interest in the economic perspective, the link between collective identity and
conflict was further investigated. Among the most fruitful ideas was to investigate into inequal-
ities between identity groups. Along these lines, Horowitz (1985) differentiates between ranked
and unranked ethnic systems depending on whether social class coincides with ethnic origin. A
similar argument were presented by Petersen (2002).
Until a few years ago, economic approaches seemed to have the empirical evidence on their
side. Among the earlier approaches, Weede (1981) could not find a relationship between house-
hold inequality and violence. Likewise, indicators of inequality such as ethno-linguistic fraction-
alization did not fare well in quantitative studies aimed at explaining intrastate conflict (cf. Fearon
and Laitin 2003). Taydas, Enia, and James (2011) observe that although “well theorised, grievance
factors such as inequality and repression have not found systematic, cross-national support from
research.” Likewise Blattman and Miguel (2010) hold that “[p]roxies for political grievances per-
form far more poorly at predicting individual behavior than economic factors in these cases. Ex-
isting data on political grievances are admittedly quite coarse (...), but this provides evidence
against the view that political grievances are always decisive determinants of participation in
armed groups.” The turn away from grievance and toward resource mobilization and political
opportunity was thus empirically substantiated.
Recently, however, the picture has changed. Grievance-based explanations and especially the
role of inequality have re-emerged as research topic. This seems to be part of a greater trend, as
inequality has also attracted great interest in other social science disciplines. For instance, Piketty
(2014) presents a historical account on the development of income and wealth. Although not
specifically addressing political conflict, Pikkety discusses the undermining effects of inequality
on democracy. In their research on regime change, (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003;
but also see Haggard and Kaufman 2012) find evidence that inequality influences the chance of
democratization. Moreover, research at the Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative has
recently also contributed to the debate on multidimensional poverty management (Alkire et al.
2015).
In conflict research, the concept of horizontal inequality has proved to be the greatest challenger
to the opportunity thesis. The concept of horizontal inequality, i.e. inequality coinciding with “iden-
tity based cleavages” (Østby 2008, p. 143), shifts the focus from changes in relative positions over
time to synchronic inter-group inequalities (Boswell and Dixon 1990; Østby 2013). It constitutes
one of the most important contribution to the recent debate on greed, grievance, and opportunity.
Stewart (2000), working at the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity at the
University of Oxford, recently brought these issues into the debate. In essence, the concept of hor-
izontal inequality merges measures of ethnic diversity and inequality. This allows to empirically
assess the influence of inter-group inequalities.
Stewart’s research spurred a number of empirical investigations into the role of horizontal in-
equality. Murshed and Gates (2005) present evidence that horizontal inequality influenced the in-
tensity of theMaoist conflict in Nepal. Mancini (2008) finds influences results for ethno-communal
conflict in Indonesian districts. Stewart (2008) presents several in-depth studies on the link be-
tween horizontal inequality and conflict. Studies with larger sample sizes complement the pic-
ture. Østby (2008) finds evidence that horizontal social inequality affects the risk of conflict in
an analysis of 36 developing countries. Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) extend the
empirical analysis to the global scale and find evidence that relatively deprived as well as ad-
vanced groups engage in conflict more often. Based on a sample size of 100 countries, Gubler
and Selway (2012) argue that conflict is more likely where ethnic identity, socio-economic status,
and settlement patterns overlap. Taken together, the concept of horizontal inequality proved its
explanatory power in case studies as well as large-n comparative analyses.
10The Social Science Citation Index counts almost 100 citations in 2015 alone.
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Horizontal inequality, however, is a concept and not a theory.11 We have seen in chapters 3 and
5, that concepts and theories are closely connected. However, we still need to make clear where
the conflict-inducing effects of the structural configuration of horizontal inequality lies. And here,
we can refer to some of the arguments of the grievance perspective as will be done in chapter 8.
7.2 Comparative Assessment
The above discussion has laid out three influential strands of research that dominate conflict re-
search: grievance-based approaches explain the causal link between inequality, discontent, and
(violent) political action; the economic perspective focusing on greedy actors; and the structurally
oriented explanatory model that refers to the explanatory power of opportunity structure. These
three schools have characterized the debate in recent years (cf. Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Ben-
sted 2011; Berdal 2005; Irvin 2004; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009; Saxton and Benson 2008).
In this section we compare the three approaches in abstract terms. We argue that each ex-
emplifies a more general explanatory approach. Carving out explanatory approaches allows for
systematizing existing research. This is done in the following subsection 7.2.1. The subsequent
subsection 7.2.2 discusses the level of complexity of the three explanatory approaches. As it turns
out, the feasibility and the grievance approach, respectively, represent the lower and upper end on
the continuum between simplicity and complexity. The economic approach lies in between. The
last subsection 7.2.3 critically evaluates the three explanatory approaches from a critical realist
perspective.
7.2.1 Three Explanatory Approaches
The economic, the feasibility, and the relative deprivation approach each exemplify a specific
explanatory approach:
• The economic approach as advanced in Collier and Hoeffler (1998) follows the individualist
explanatory approach.
• Relative deprivation theory (Gurr 1974, 2000) advances a moderate collectivist explanatory ap-
proach (cf. Albert 2005).
• The feasibility hypothesis as formulated by Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) is an in-
stance of the collectivist explanatory approach.
Besides their differences, all three explanatory approaches share two properties. First, the ex-
planandum of all approaches is located on the macro-level. Political conflict is a collective phe-
nomenon (cf. sec. 6.1). Second, all approaches not only refer to the collective explanandum but
also to individuals and their motivation. As the following discussion shows, explicit reference to
individual action is a sine qua non for the individualist andmoderate collectivist perspective. Both are
characterized by their individualist foundation. The holist paradigm is different. Although Collier,
Hoeffler, and Rohner (ibid.) refer to motivations, it is not, in theoretical terms, a meaningful part
of holist explanations. Apart from these two—or at least one and a half—common features, the
explanatory approaches are markedly different.
The individualist explanatory approach regards motivation as given. Actors are assumed to
strive for specific goods, often economic resources and/or power. The micro-mechanism then
models the decision of rational actors to participate in rebellion. This micro-mechanism stems
the explanatory load of the whole explanatory model. Individual rationality is often assumed to
constitute a useful assumption that allows formulating parsimonious and elegant theories. The
economic tradition of conflict research, at least as portrayed here, does not regard it as a useful
assumption but merely as an adequate portrait of reality. This becomes obvious in the writings of
Collier (2000a, p. 92):
Successful rebel organizations place considerable emphasis on good public relations with the international
community. Narratives of grievance play much better with this community than narratives of greed. A nar-
rative of grievance is not only much more functional externally, it is also more satisfying personally: Rebel
leaders may readily be persuaded by their own propaganda. Further, an accentuated sense of grievance
may be functional internally for the rebel organization. (...) By playing upon a sense of grievance, the orga-
nization may therefore be able to get additional recruits more cheaply.
11We will develop our own measurement strategy in chapter chapter 9.
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Although Collier assures that his argument should be interpreted mainly epistemologically
in the sense that motivation cannot be inferred from narratives, his argument sets the tone for
the theory of action advanced by the economic perspective. Where conflict participants justify
conflict participation by pointing to grievances, these should not be interpreted literally. Rather,
a reference to grievances should be seen as a means to further individual economic or power
interests. This might even go as far as to obscure the strategic orientation for the strategic actors
themselves. Following this view, even the utility-maximizing actor himself might think to act for a
greater good although he objectively follows egoistic motives.12. Epistemologically, the principles
guiding individual action are concealed. Behind the veil, however, actors are strategic automata.
Put differently: Irrespective of what people say, their real motivations are fixed. The economic
approach thus constitutes an individualist rationalist explanation in pure form.
Within the rationalist framework, structures constitute immediate strategic landscapes. In the
process of implementing a utility-maximizing decision, actors take into account the respective
structural environment. Typically, individual perception of structure is assumed to be perfect.
There is thus no subjective dimension to the causal power of structural changes. Where structures
change, cost-benefit ratios for individuals change. If, in consequence, certain courses of action, e.g.
individual participation in rebellion, become a superior strategy, these are immediately pursued
by actors.
Collective outcomes of individual decisions—in this case rebellion—are explained as a re-
sult of aggregated individual decisions. Individual decision-making and collective outcome are
directly linked. The only factor that genuinely relates to the micro-macro link are the costs of co-
ordination. Even these, however, are not external to the decision-making process of individuals
but are integrated into their individual rational decision-making as transaction costs.
In summary, individualist explanation is exclusively substantiated by the micro-mechanism
of rational choice theory. Neither do structures exert any formative role on individuals, nor does
their emergence include anything unforeseen that might stand outside of the perception of actors.
The feasibility hypothesis abstains from specifying a specific micro-mechanisms. It is thus di-
ametrically opposed to individualist explanations. To defend their exclusive focus on the macro-
level, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009, p. 3) point to the multiplicity of possible individual
motivations: “The feasibility hypothesis leaves the motivation of the rebel group unspecified, its
initial agenda being determined by the preferences of the social entrepreneur leading whichever
organization is the first to occupy the niche.” This notion is an instance of one of the two holist
arguments for irreducibility portrayed in section 4.4.1: multiple realizability.13 In this context, it is
employed as an argument to exclude the micro-foundation from the explanation of civil war. This
allows to bypass those mechanisms that are usually part of individualist explanations: What are
individual preferences and what principles guide individual decision-making? To what extent do
structures influence individual preferences and/or individual decision-making processes? How
do individual decisions and acts aggregate to collective outcomes? Consequently, holist expla-
nations are often much more parsimonious than individualist or moderately holist explanations.
Whether they are adequate is another question, which is discussed below.
Although both theories substantially differ, relative deprivation theory is similar to economic
rational choice theory in that it explicitly models the micro-level. Due to this fact, the differences
between the grievance approach and the feasibility approach are far greater from the perspec-
tive of explanatory models. This is surprising since the feasibility approach and the economic
approach are advanced by similar authors.
Gurr’s dismissal of holist explanations is obvious. In a recently published 40th anniversary
edition of his doctoral thesis “Why men rebel”, Gurr (2010) looks back at his argument revealing
a stark opposition to purely holistic arguments such as those brought forward in Collier, Hoeffler,
and Rohner (2009):
I was convinced then, and am convinced now, that to build more peaceful and secure societies, we need to
begin by analyzing theminds ofmen—andwomen—who oppose bad governments and unpopular policies.
But equally we need to know about the societies in which they live, their beliefs and cultural traditions, and
the governments they oppose. (...) I continue to think that people, with all their diverse identities, desires,
12The assumption that individuals are not fully aware of the social or psychological principles generating their decisions
and guiding their actions is an argument that is often found in moderately holist theories of action (cf. Bourdieu 1977,
pp. 18, 79)
13Beyond that, Collier and Levitsky (2009) also refer to the possibility that structures might influence motivation. This
is usually characteristic of moderate collectivism. Since the authors do not further pursue this argument nor include it in
their theory, it is ignored here.
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and beliefs, should be central to our analyses of conflict. This means that individuals should be the prism
through which to examine the effects of social structures, beliefs, and the possibilities for mobilization and
political action. (...) [T]he essential first step in any analysis is to understand what people’s grievances are
and where they come from. This brings me to my second point, which is that to understand grievances
we must first examine where people stand in society and what goods and bads they experience. It is not
enough to point to economic and social structures as the ’explanation’. We need to understand how people
interpret the situations in which they find themselves.
In Gurr’s view, it is crucial to always formulate causal arguments in reference to the beliefs
and the motivation of individuals. In this regard, the individualist and the moderately holist
perspective agree. Both explicitly theorize decision-making processes. Due to this similarity, the
following discussion carves out the grievance perspective in direct comparison to the economic
perspective.
The rational orientation of individual actors in the economic perspective and the frustration-
aggression mechanism are in both approaches assumed to be part of the conditio humana. With
regard to the specification of individual preferences, however, both accounts substantially differ:
In the economic approach, individual preferences are narrowly defined and the logic of decision-
making is straightforward. The grievance approach, in contrast, is more firmly rooted in social
psychological research and describes individual preference formation in greater detail. In direct
comparison, rational choice theory is themore sparing theory pertaining to themicro-mechanism.
Differences with regard to aims or the logic of decision-making alone, however, do not con-
stitute a decisive criterion to allocate the economic and the grievance perspective to different ex-
planatory approaches.Whether the assumption of individual rationality or frustration-aggression
theory adequately represent individual decision-making processes is an empirical question. Most
likely, both mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Be that as it may, the fact that the grievance
theory is classified as a moderate collectivist theory is not grounded on the frustration-aggression
theory. The latter is just an exogenous assumption of individual rationality.
The main difference between the individualist and the moderate collectivist framework lies in
the specification of the macro-micro link. Individualist approaches regard structures exclusively
as immediate strategic landscapes in which actors choose their actions based on fixed prefer-
ences. Moderate collectivist approaches likewise assume that individuals take into account their
environment when making decisions. On top of that, however, they integrate formative effects of
structures on individuals (Albert 2005, 2010a). The formation of individual preferences through
structures—likewise a characterizing feature of constructivist approaches in international rela-
tions theory—is found in several parts of the grievance perspective.
First, Gurr assumes that value expectations are not entirely fixed. He denotes ‘values’ as those
entities for which people strive. Self-evidently, some basic values such as, e.g. physical well-being,
constitute non-alterable individual preferences. These types of values are thus not socially but
biologically determined and are part of the conditio humana. Apart from that, however, value
expectations—i.e. values to which individuals “believe they are justifiably entitled” (Gurr 1974,
p. 27)—are not exogenously assumed but subject to change. This process is called conversion:
“the abandonment of some or all the norms and beliefs that establish existing expectation levels
(...) and their replacement by new beliefs that justify increased or different expectations” (ibid.,
p. 101).
The possibility for value expectations to change is a necessary but not sufficient conditions for
downward causation. They leave open the question of how preferences are shaped. Here, Gurr
refers to the role of beliefs. The influential role of beliefs in the formation of preferences is a
characterizing feature of constructivist theories (cf. Wendt 1999). Gurr likewise underlines the
importance of how individuals interpret the world (cf. Gurr 1974, p. 135). Beliefs are the key in-
dividualist variable to explain the transmission of societal norms to individual preference. The
frustration-aggression mechanism provides an example. Violence is directed against what individ-
uals believe to be the sources of deprivation (ibid., p. 13). As a second example, beliefs likewise
form the basis for normative justifications, i.e. the justification of acts because they hold an intrin-
sic value.
Beliefs, in turn, are shaped by societal factors. An example of the formative effects of structure
on beliefs and thus indirectly on individual preferences is exemplified in the conversion effect.
The conversion effect denotes a change of value expectations that might occur due to the con-
frontationwith newmodes of life or the exposure to ideologies (ibid., pp. 92–122). Themechanism
works through learning: “Men feel deprived with respect to what they have learned to value and
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Individualist Collectivist Moderate Collectivist
Theory of Action Rational Choice NN Collectivist
Incentives Fixed Excluded Variable
Aspired Goods Narrow Arbitrary Broad
Point of Reference Individual Structure Group
Table 7.3: Comparison of three explanatory approaches
to what they have learned to do. The beliefs and symbols that determine the timing, forms, and
objects of violence are learned.” (Gurr 1974, p. 36)
In summary, relative deprivation theory assumes that societal factors are able to significantly
alter individual beliefs which in turn influence values and preferences. This mechanism of down-
ward causation is the pivotal difference between methodological holist and individualist theo-
ries. In moderate collectivist theories, individual preferences are susceptible to change, while in
economic theory they are regarded as fixed. Where rational choice theory focuses on individual
material well-being as well as power, the grievance perspective advances the notion of beliefs and
value expectations. What sets apart the economic and the grievance perspective is the endogene-
ity of preference formation and the definition and width of aspired goods (see table 7.3).
The fact that moderate collectivist theories allow downward causation while rational choice
theory exogenizes motivation has profound consequences in the explanation of collective action.
Rational choice theory assumes that individuals always act for their own profit. This entails im-
portant consequences for the explanation of collective action (Olson 1965). In the individualist
perspective, individual participation in collective action, in general, and in conflict, in particular,
must be rooted in individual incentives. Individuals simply do not act for a common good on
behalf of a collective if they are able to attain that specific good without doing their part.
By including downward causation, grievance theories takes a decisively different approach.
Individual rationality becomes one possible form of motivation among many. It is entirely possi-
ble that individuals calculate their profits before making a conscious decision. Likewise, however,
the formative influences of values might lead individuals to see beyond their own nose. Gurr
(2000, p. 67) explicitly addresses this phenomenon:
It is true enough that claims made by ethnopolitical groups include material and political demands as
well as claims based on their ethnocultural interests. But I do not think that what ‘really’ motivates the
leaders and members of such groups is the quest for material benefits or power. The decisive factor is that
ethnopolitical groups organize around their shared identity and seek gains or redress of grievances for the
collectivity.
In line with the above discussion, the decisive notion in this quote is not the discrepancy
between ‘hard’ material benefits and ‘soft’ grievances. Rather it is the notion that individuals
might act for a collectivity although it might not be the best decision in terms of individual utility.
In comparison, Grossman (1991) underlines his firm roots in rationalism:
The theory emphasizes the expected private returns to insurgents. Specifically, the analysis assumes that
only active insurgents share in the booty taken in a successful insurrection. In this respect, the present the-
ory contrasts sharply with theories that assume that successful insurrections produce mainly social benefits
from which active insurgents cannot exclude nonparticipants. These social-benefit theories stress the im-
portance of such factors as ‘ideology,’ class identification, and anomie in overcoming the free-rider problem
associated with nonexcludability.
In summary, the choice of theory is an expression of significantly different views of the social
world. This is especially true pertaining to the explanation of collective endeavors and thus the
question of mobilization and individual participation in intrastate conflict.
7.2.2 Theoretical Complexity
Gurr’s relative deprivation theory is among themost complex explanatory approaches in the field
of conflict research. Especially his early contributions include a very large number of explanatory
variables. The feasibility model of Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009), in contrast, embodies sim-
plicity. Thus, both theories are positioned at different ends of the continuum between complexity
and simplicity. It is not sufficient, however, to judge the complexity of a theory exclusively on the
number of explanatory variables. What counts is the balance of explanatory means and conse-
quences. Pertaining to theories, means comprise explanatory variables and mechanisms whereas
122
7.2. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 7. EXPLAINING CONFLICTS
consequences denote the number of testable hypotheses and the empirical scope of dependent
variables. Based on this criterion, the difference between both theories becomes smaller. Gurr
derives over 80 testable hypotheses from his theory and the empirical scope of his theory en-
compasses the intensity as well as the type of political conflict. Furthermore Gurr formulates
hypotheses pertaining to the micro-level as well as inter-level relations. The explanatory scope
of the feasibility approach is decisively smaller. First, the motivation of individual or collective
conflict actors, a variable that forms the core of relative deprivation theory, is explicitly excluded
from the theory: “The feasibility hypothesis proposes that where rebellion is feasible it will oc-
cur: motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever agenda happens to be adopted by
the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche, or itself endogenous to the opportunities
thereby opened for illegal income” (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009, p. 24). Second, the au-
thors restrict their dependent variable on conflict onset. In summary, relative deprivation theory
is by far more complex than the feasibility approach but likewise allows the formulation of more
testable hypotheses with regard to a more extensive set of empirical phenomena.
7.2.3 Instrumentalism and Realism
Gurr (1974, p. 357) explicitly defends the complexity of his theoretical approach:
From one epistemological point of view, the logical coherence, parsimony, and elegance of a theory are the
criteria by which its adequacy is judged; its accuracy is both indeterminate and inconsequential. There is
however a compelling need in the real world to be able to anticipate political violence and the consequences
of various responses to it, a need common to rebels, incumbents, and those who simply want to live their
lives in peace. Where I have faced what seemed to be a choice between “telling it as it seems to be” and
the dictates of coherence, parsimony, or elegance, I have chosen the first on grounds that, given the present
inadequacy of and need for systematic understanding of violence, it is the more fruitful and useful course.
What Gurr describes is basically the distinction between an instrumentalist position and a re-
alist conception of explanation. According to the former, theories are tools. Empirical adequacy is
irrelevant. What counts are good predictions. According to the latter, theories should reflect the
real world. Applied to the discussion about theoretical parsimony, a realist account judges parsi-
mony relative to ontology (cf. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, p. 20). A simple account is not per se
better than a more complex one even if it produces similar expectations. It is only preferable if the
empirical evidence indicates that it matches reality better. Gurr decides against an understanding
of parsimony that regards the simplicity of a theory as an end in itself. Instead, he includes all fac-
tors deemed relevant for the onset of political violence in his explanatory framework. The result
is a theoretical framework that exhaustively models the emergence of political violence.
The feasibility argument is similar to relative deprivation theory in that it regards individual
motivation per se as a necessary condition to explain political conflict. Nonetheless, Collier, Hoef-
fler, and Rohner (2009) exclude any notion of motivation from their formulation of the feasibility
hypothesis. The argument is that the ubiquity of motivation makes it irrelevant as an explanatory
factor. From a critical realist perspective, the omission of a variable that is regarded as causally
relevant is problematic. This must not go as far as to include every single variable with any influ-
ence on a explanandum. In the end, the availability of oxygen is likewise a necessary condition
for conflict and yet it would be plain silly to include it in a theory on conflict. Individual (and
in our framework also collective) motivation, however, is the very mechanism that explains why
subjects participate in political violence. It lies at the heart of a theoretical model of political vio-
lence. One cannot infer the hypothesis thatmotivation is ubiquitous from an exclusively structural
empirical analysis. A regression of highly aggregated variables capturing macro-level properties
simply cannot tell us enough about the micro-level. To understand why a sufficient number of
individuals engages in violence, we need to investigate the very mechanisms that lead to their
voluntary or coerced participation.
Referring to the argument of multiple realizability, one might argue that the multitude of
functionally equivalent motivations at the micro-level preclude their formulation as meaningful
theoretical statements. As discussed above: Where mechanisms become arbitrary, they become
meaningless. In how far individual motivations are too numerous to be modeled meaningfully
in theoretical terms, however, is an empirical question. As discussed in subsection 7.1.4, the ev-
idence has shifted in favor of accounts that explicitly include motivations. Case study research
has shown the explanatory value of grievance approaches both in qualitative case studies and in
larger comparative designs. This turn away from structures is an indicator that individual mo-
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tivations, although complex and differentiated, can be reduced to theoretically meaningful and
sufficiently general theoretical mechanisms.
In summary, theoretical parsimony is only adequate if the real world corresponds to the the-
ory. Moreover, essential properties should not be the candidates to exclude from a theory. Put
differently, the theoretical and empirical focus must must overlap to produce suitable scientific
explanations.
7.3 Summary
This chapter has taken a new perspective on the conflict research by focusing on explanatory
approaches. Primarily based on our discussion in chapters 2, 3 and 5, we argued that theoretical
discussions play a toominor role in current conflict research hindering progress with regard to the
explanation of political conflict. To close this gap, we chose influential scholars in conflict research
and focused on their theoretical work by closely examining their publications.
Focusing on two core nomological components of the respective theories—the influence of
structures on (collective or individual) actors and the theory of action—allowed us to identify
three explanatory approaches in conflict research: the individualist explanatory approach, the
moderate collectivist explanatory approach, and the collectivist explanatory approach.
The individualist approach regards structures exclusively as strategic environments. It’s core
feature is a theory of action that exogenously assumes actors to be rational. Since individual incen-
tives carry the explanatory load of the model, they are often quite narrowly defined. According
to this approach, actors swiftly adapt to a changing strategic environment. Collectivist explana-
tory approaches, on the other hand, completely abstain from any nomological statements on the
micro-level. Their view on structures resembles ecological arguments of structural niches. The
moderate collectivist explanatory approach is similar to the individualist approach in taking into
account structures as strategic environments. However, it also includes a formative influence of
structures on individual intentions. Thus, the macro-micro link is divided. The moderate collec-
tivist explanatory approach puts a specific focus on the downward causation. It fits well with
the arguments on downward causation developed in the preceding chapters. A drawback of the
moderate collectivist approach might be its complexity. However, theoretical parsimony is only
adequate if the phenomena under study are simple. In the case of intrastate political conflict and
non-state conflict actors this is likely not the case.
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Chapter 8
Theory
This chapter joins the strands of the preceding chapters in developing a theoretical framework,
which will in turn be tested in the subsequent empirical analysis. The main aim of what follows
is to transfer our rather abstract ontological discussions into a concrete theoretical argument with
specified explanantia.
The theory aims to explain under what circumstances non-state conflict actors emerge and
what determines the dynamics of intrastate violent conflict. Given the large empirical extension
of the phenomena to be explained and the great scientific and public interest in the topic of polit-
ical conflict, it is evident that conflict research has addressed both questions from any imaginable
perspective. One of the main arguments in the following explanatorymodel is that inter-group in-
equalities induce conflict. The role of inter-group inequality has been studied not only in conflict
research—under the terms of relative deprivation (Gurr 1974), ranked ethnic systems (Horowitz
1985; Petersen 2002), and horizontal inequality (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Stew-
art 2008)—but also in related fields of political science such as social movements (Melucci 1988).
In a similar direction go cleavage theories on party formation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In view
of the vast literature on inequality and conflict (cf. Østby 2013), what can the following discussion
contribute?
First, it adds systematicity to the existing debate. Drawing on a differentiated version of the
macro-micro-macro model, our discussion clearly locates concepts on different levels of analysis
and discusses how they are related. This greatly facilitates the understanding of the different
concepts and the causal pathway of explanation.
Second, it takes the notions of emergence and downward causation seriously. Introducing the
concept of the collective subject, i.e. groups that have beliefs and volitions that are not necessarily
reducible to the beliefs and motivations of their individual members, the following discussion
defines the lower limits of the widely heard call for disaggregation (cf. Cederman and Gleditsch
2009). Interestingly, those who have propagated the need to empirically and theoretically hone in
on the micro-level have predominantly argued that mobilization into rebel groups is a question of
material incentives and of overcoming problems of collective action (Humphreys and Weinstein
2006; Kalyvas 2006; Lichbach 1998). Against these micro-level, rational-choice, and bottom-up
perspectives, this thesis discusses the effects of emergent and irreducible social structures and
collective subjects. This is not to say that we should come back to purely structuralist, collectivist
theories. The point at which disaggregation leads to atomism, however, goes one step too far.
There is more to groups than the individuals they comprise.
Third, the following more clearly demarcates constitutive and causal relations. For instance,
a shared belief in group membership is not leading to group formation but rather is a group. Fur-
thermore, conflicts should not be equated with interaction, but rather with an incompatibility of
intentions. Causal and constitutive relations need to be more clearly differentiated. This is the
undertaking of the following explanation.
Fourth, the following neither exclusively focuses on groups, i.e. people sharing a collective
identity, nor exclusively on non-state actors, i.e. organized collective actors. It rather addresses
the formation of groups and of collective subjects as two distinctive steps on the way to the onset
of intrastate political conflict. This theoretically connects the debates on inter-ethnic conflict and
non-state conflict actors.
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Figure 8.1: Macro-micro-macro model
8.1 Basic Model and Theory
8.1.1 The Explanatory Model
As laid out in chapter 6, most social science research distinguishes two levels of analysis: a micro-
level, encompassing the acting ‘parts’, and a structural macro-level. The theoretical argument of
this thesis follows a qualified version of the macro-micro-macro model as reprinted in figure 8.1.
The diagram represents an abstract model of the theory. It allows to structure the argument and
to visualize the explanatory approach. Lines with an arrow symbolize causal relationships. Hor-
izontal lines indicate same-level causal relationships. Diagonal lines stand for inter-level causal
relationships. Downward pointing diagonal lines indicate downward causation (the ‘logic of sit-
uation’), and upward pointing diagonal lines upward causation (the ‘logic of aggregation’). This
is the ‘standard approach’ to modeling theoretical explanations (Coleman 1990; Esser 1993).
The standard approach is extended by two elements: First, constitutive relationships are de-
picted by double lines. The vertical double lines refer to constitutive inter-level relations, such as
the relation between the intentionality of individuals (micro-level) and social positions (macro-
level). Since they depict constitutive relationships they have no extension on the ‘x-axis’, which
can be regarded as a time-axis. Second, a meso-level of collective subjects is introduced. This is not
only due to the fact that the emergence and tactics of collective subjects are the main explananda
of the model, but also because they exist in their own right. This leads to the following picture:
The micro-level consists of individuals, the meso-level of collective subjects, and the macro-level
of the natural and the social space. The natural and social space can be further differentiated in
contexts and fields, respectively.
The concepts and their constitutive relations have been discussed in the previous chapters.
This chapter focuses on linking the different concepts causally by elucidating the main theoretical
mechanism that leads from specific configurations of the social and natural space to individual
cognitive (beliefs) and practical (motivations) intentional states and then to the emergence of col-
lective subjects.
8.1.2 Joined Strands
The theoretical model essentially builds on three pillars: First, it strives for providing a theory
which takes the nature of the social world seriously (cf. ch. 3 and 4). From the critical realist
perspective, we can derive the need to engage in a more serious debate on the ontological foun-
dations of conflict, conflict actors, and collective action. Satisfying these requirements, the second
chapter laid out a theory that identified individual and collective intentionality as a constitutive
element of the social world, in general, and groups and inter-group conflict, in particular. The
extensive treatment of theory, constitutive relations, and concepts contrasts with the predomi-
nantly empirically—and practically—oriented view dominating conflict research. In journal ar-
ticles, hypotheses often stand on weak, or at least vague, theoretical foundations. At times they
even appear as mere side effects of expansive methodological and empirical discussions. Second,
the theoretical argument aims at integrating the theoretical approaches laid out in chapter 2. This
requires locating the argument in the wider landscape of theoretical debate and enunciating its
innovative and adopted parts. Third, the theory arranges the concepts defined in chapter 6 in a
coherent theoretical context. The pivotal challenges of theory formation rely on clearly demarcat-
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ing the different concepts, positioning them within a more general explanatory framework, and
investigating their conjoint and reciprocal causal effects.
8.1.3 Explananda
The thesis focuses on two explananda that are derived from the typical life cycle of collective
non-state conflict actors. The first step in the ‘life’ of a collective non-state conflict actor, and our
first explanandum, revolves around formation. Following up on the work on relative deprivation,
cross-cutting cleavages, and horizontal inequalities (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011;
Gubler and Selway 2012; Gurr 1974, 1993, 2000; Østby 2008; Stewart 2008), I argue that synchronic
inter-individual inequalities (Østby 2013, p. 214) trigger the formation of non-state conflict actors.
Based on a moderate collectivist stance, I hypothesize that the formation of non-state conflict
actors (NSCA) is facilitated by the overlapping of positions among individuals in the natural and
social space. Where individuals are similar in various ways, they form collectives. Of course, such
collectives do not necessarily engage in any forms of conflict. Being part of a group and acting
together are two separate modes, the differentiation of which is expressed by the terms ‘groups’
and ‘collective subjects’.
The second explanandum concerns the tactics of non-state actors and emerging profiles of vi-
olence. Although group formation is often a lengthy process, tactics within existing conflicts are
often swiftly adaptable. I argue that the amount of resources at the disposal of non-state conflict
actors, the internal organization of non-state conflict actors as well as features of their geograph-
ical surroundings determine the characteristics of conflict measures in intrastate conflicts. In an-
alyzing conflictual interactions, the focus shifts from enduring structural patterns to the highly
variable relationships and interactions between actors in political conflicts.
8.1.4 Sociological and Psychological Theories
The most advanced and empirically-tested theoretical arguments tackling group formation are
developed in social psychological research (for a general overview see Forsyth (2010)). Conse-
quently, the mechanisms proposed in this section primarily draw on this field of research yielding
two main advantages.
First, socio-psychological theories are especially well suited for formulating micro-level the-
ories, as states of mind and behavior constitute their main focus. Socio-psychological theories
are thus closely related to methodological individualist theorizing in the social sciences. Despite
the prevalence of methodological individualism in conflict research, however, the description
of micro-level mechanisms often remains surprisingly vague. This gap can be filled by socio-
psychological research. If one accepts the pivotal role of intentionality in explaining conflict-
related phenomena, a shift toward social-psychological research is particularly relevant. Whereas
the first chapters have extensively discussed the intentional underpinnings of the social world,
they have not elaborated on cognitive processes.1 Although the constitutive link between shared
intentional states should have become clear, little has been said about how beliefs or motivations
come about. Social-psychological research is perfectly suited to provide answers.
Second, resting the theoretical focus of social-psychological research upon the micro- and
meso-level fortifies the foundation of empirical research. Given the difficulties of conducting
micro-level studies in situations of violent political conflict, empirical research has predominantly
focused on establishing macro-level regularities.2 Obviously, psychological research faces the
same obstacles. It can contribute to conflict research, however, by bringing in empirical results
of social experiments. Evidently, experimental research brings up the question of external va-
lidity, specifically in conflict research. Moreover, founding the explanation of macro-sociological
explananda on experimental research might be tricky, as causal forces might cancel each other
out outside of experimental settings. This would not invalidate experimental results, but rather
preclude expected results. From a critical realist perspective, however, these two objections do not
loom large. Critical realist methodology demands a thorough development of concepts and a pre-
cise analysis of the inner functioning of the entities under analysis. Being aware of the mismatch
1This is due to the fact that the constitutive relations between the micro-level of intentional states, on the one hand,
and the meso- and macro-level of groups and institutions, on the other, have not yet been adequately theorized. The
structure-agency debate has predominantly focused on causal relations and widely neglected—or at least not adequately
delineated—constitutive relations.
2A notable exception is the work of Humphreys and Weinstein (2008).
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between the operation of causal mechanisms and constant conjunctions, critical realism re-orients
theoretical research away from analyses of covariance and towards the mechanisms that underlie
causal powers. In summation, social-psychological research allows for the mitigation of a pivotal
problem in conflict research: the mismatch between theories formulating causal mechanisms on
the micro-level, and empirical results exclusively focusing on macro-level regularities.
In light of these two arguments, the following applies Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, et al. 1987) to explain the emergence of groups and the formation of collective sub-
jects, respectively. The theory was developed with an interdisciplinary focus in mind and repre-
sents psychology’s turn towards the social world (Reicher, Spears, and Haslam 2010). SCT thus
seems specifically applicable in the present context.
Whereas Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986) primarily focuses on inter-
group relations, SCT thoroughly investigates processes of group formation (Turner, Hogg, Oakes,
et al. 1987, p. 42). More precisely, SCT focuses on “mechanics of group identification, asking what
exactly, psychologically speaking, a group is and what basic social-cognitive processes gener-
ate group identification and associated group processes and behaviors” (Levine and Hogg 2010,
p. 729). Consequently, where SIT has been drawn upon to explain inter-group conflict, SCT is
more appropriate to explain group formation. In general, however, SCT and SIT are closely linked.
8.1.5 Psychological Research on Conflict Participation
This is not the first study applying socio-psychological theories to conflict research. Some ap-
proaches referring to social psychology have been discussed in chapter 2. Examples include the
frustration-aggression mechanism in Gurr (1974) or the reference to SIT in the theory of horizon-
tal inequality (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Stewart 2008). It would be worthwhile
to provide a structured overview of psychologically-oriented research along the lines of the sys-
tematic evaluation of explanatory approaches presented in chapter 2. However, due to the sheer
number of publications, the scope of this section will only provide a broad overview.
Psychological research on non-state conflict actors has predominantly focused on terrorism.
Since terrorist groups are a subtype of non-state armed actors, study results can generally be
assumed to have a certain degree of external validity with regard to the argument presented here.
Just as in social science conflict research, psychological research on terrorism has put to test a large
variety of independent variables andmechanism. This section aims to further delineate what kind
of socio-psychological arguments are best suited for explaining individual participation in conflict
actors. Furthermore, the following aims to provide mechanisms of group formation.
A first focus of psychological and psychiatric research has been placed on the role of mental
disorders. Crayton (1983), Laqueur (1977), Lasch (1979), and Pearlstein (1991) have linked terror-
ist activity to narcissist traits. For Pearce (1977), a terrorist is often “an aggressive psychopath”.
Cooper (1978) argues that terrorism is a means of release for select psychopaths that do not find
other outlets. Other approaches have linked terrorism to childhood abuse (deMause 2002; Feuer
1969; Kent andNicholls 1977; Post 1984). Many of these findings, however, lack validity since they
are not based on reliable diagnostics (Corrado 1981) or suffer from a general lack of empirical data
(Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Silke 2008).
Crenshaw (1981), Ruby (2002), and Taylor and Quayle (1994) conclude that terrorists are gen-
erally not preponderantly affected by mental disorders. Heskin (1984) supports these findings in
a study of members of the Irish Republican Army. Expanding the view from mental disorders
to personalist traits more generally, Harris, Gringart, and Drake (2014) conclude that the “inabil-
ity to form psychological profiles of individual members across a variety of extremist groups, as
well as the recognition in extremism and terrorism research indicates that no adequate personal-
ity profile exists.” Kruglanski and Fishman (2006, p. 193) conclude that “[t]errorists do not seem
to be characterized by a unique set of psychological traits or pathologies.” Thus, the majority of
current research on terrorism seems to reject explanations based on mental disorders.
This yields, ex negativo, further support for an approach that takes into account the effects of
social structure and groups. As Crenshaw (1988, p. 12) argues: “actions of terrorists are based
on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. Perceptions of the po-
litical and social environment are filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences
and memories.” Presenting twelve social-psychological mechanisms of radicalization, McCauley
and Moskalenko (2008, p. 415) state that “radicalization occurs in a context of group identifica-
tion and reaction to perceived threat to the ingroup.” In a similar vein, Silke (2008, p. 118) states
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that a “sense of personal identity and social networks of potential recruits are both extremely im-
portant factors. Most terrorists become radicalized as members of a small group of like-minded
individuals.” This claim is also supported by Bakker (2006) and Sageman (2004) who argue that
processes of radicalization stem from strong social identities tied to extremist groups. The only
individual-level traits that seem to be robustly correlated to violence, although not exclusively
terrorist activity, is youth (Budd, Sharp, and Mayhew 2005; Schönteich 1999; cf. Silke 2008).
Based on this overview, we can conclude with sufficient certainty that engagement in rebel
groups is not an act of maniacs eluding any explanatory claims applicable to the mentally sane
population. Psychopathological factors seem of no primary explanatory value. In contrast, socio-
psychological theories that further investigate the interaction of individuals with their environ-
ment and focus on strong collective identities seem to hold more explanatory value.
8.2 The Formation of NSCA
Political conflict is an inter-group phenomenon. Likewise, political conflict necessarily involves
some kind of interaction to emerge. Thus, for political conflict to exist, collective subjects must
exist. Collective subjects, in turn, are a subtype of groups and empirically often emerge from
groups. We thus formulate two distinct research questions:
1. What leads to the formation of groups?
2. Under what conditions do groups become collective subjects?
Both questions are addressed in succession.
8.2.1 The Social Dimension of Intentionality
Before delving deeper into the explanation of group formation, we must first clearly define our
point of departure. Following the arguments in favor of moderate collectivism (cf. ch. 4), a theory
on group formation cannot fall short of this meta-theoretical position. Beliefs and volitions as well
as the specific human intentional traits depend on being related to others (Esfeld 2001; Tomasello
2014). Therefore, the theoretical point of departure is not the isolated, ‘atomist’ individual as in
the individualist explanatory approach. Instead, an adequate explanatory model must take into
account that our beliefs and volitions do not exclusively result from the biological makeup. It is,
a fortiori, inadequate to model individual decision-making processes as being purely determined
by biological needs, such as survival or a universal hard-wired predisposition to act on cost-
benefit calculations (and this holds true with regard to whatever costs and benefits are measured).
The ability to form adequate beliefs of the external world is dependent on there being others.
Beliefs derive from our social environment, from what a sufficiently stable social collective holds
to be an adequate interpretation of the world. The process of how individuals attach meaning to
their perceptions is a result of their social environment. This allows to formulate an assumption
that specifies the constitutive relationship between the micro- and the macro-level in our general
explanatory model:3
The assumption of moderate collectivism: The specifically human intentional abilities necessarily de-
pend on social relations.
From this we can derive specific requirements for the general explanatory model: An explana-
tory approach that discards the social embeddedness of individuals is misguided. The same is true
for an invariable theory of action, i.e. a theory of action that is assumed to be universally valid in
spatial and/or temporal terms. An adequate theory of action should not exclusively focus on the
intrinsic structure of individuals, but must take into account their social embeddedness, as well.
The assumption of moderate collectivism allows us to further specify three nested constitutive
relations representing social conditions of which every individual is a part.
1. Individuals are embedded in the social space. There is no world in which an isolated indi-
vidual with specific human mental abilities would be able to exist.
3Assumptions are here understood as probabilistic nomological statements that are not empirically in this thesis.
129
8.2. THE FORMATION OF NSCA CHAPTER 8. THEORY
2. Individuals are contingently part of groups. Having a sense of group belonging is not a
necessary, but an empirically ubiquitous fact.
3. Individuals are contingently part of collective subjects. With the exception of solitary ‘lone
wolves’, individuals are often part of collective subjects on whose behalf they act.
These three relations are depicted as vertical double lines in figure 8.2. Last but not least, the col-
lectivism assumption reminds us to theorize both macro- and micro-levels. Psychological mech-
anisms at the micro-level are key to understanding the phenomena of institutions, groups, and
conflict. The macro-level allows us to understand how beliefs and intentions come about.
8.2.2 From Homology to Groups via Self-Categorization
The first causal mechanism to be explained is the link between the social space and psychological
processes at the level of individuals which lead to group formation. The link between the configu-
ration of positions in the social space and individual intentional states is an instance of downward
causation, as indicated by the left-hand diagonal line in figure 8.1.4 Linking sociological and psy-
chological research, this subsection draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Self-Categorization
Theory (SCT). Both enable the understanding of the link between the configuration of relative po-
sitions in society and the development of certain intentional states.
From Bourdieu’s work, we can derive two appearances of structure: First, structures as im-
mediate strategic landscapes taken into account by actors in their decision-making processes.
Second, structures as configurations forming relatively stable cognitive and practical intentional
states over longer periods of time. Both aspects need to be taken into account in an integrative
explanatory approach. However, due to his partly obscure language, Bourdieu’s theoretical argu-
ments often lack precision. Therefore, the specific mechanisms of group formation will be derived
from SCT. This leads to a division of labor: While the broader conception of the macro-micro link
is primarily based on the theory of Bourdieu, more specific mechanisms and empirical evidence
are derived from socio-psychological research. In combination, both strands can be used to in-
terweave the concepts of social and natural space, (collective) intentionality, group and collective
subject, tactics, and political conflict.
The duality of structure
The move from similarities with regard to certain individual characteristics to identification with
other individuals as a group or, more generally, to developments of a certain mind-set, is a central
topic in sociological theory. It is found as early as in the traditional concepts of class according
to Marx and Engels (1977) and Weber (2008). Whereas the focus on the economic dimension in
class concepts reflects the pivotal importance of economic classes in the 19th century, the general
question regards that of group formation, namely: Under what circumstances do classes trans-
form from the state of a ‘Klasse gegenüber dem Kapital’ to a ‘Klasse für sich selbst’ (Marx and
Engels 1977, pp. 180–181; cf. Vester 2008).
Bourdieu (1985, 1990) takes up these arguments. Although not completely disposing of the
concept of class, he transcends the one-dimensional perspective on economic relations by intro-
ducing the logic of ‘fields’ (Bourdieu 1984b). Bourdieu’s notion of fields fits well within the overall
argument of this thesis, as it is inherently relational. In order to understand fields, it would not
suffice to understand the properties of the individuals populating the field. Rather, it is impor-
tant to set the occupants of positions in relation. Positions always must be theorized as relative
positions. In this regard, Bourdieu’s notion of fields as ‘fields of forces’ is most intuitive:
Dans la mesure où les propriétés retenues pour construire cet espace sont des propriétés agissantes, on peut
le décrire aussi comme champ de forces; c’est-à-dire comme un ensemble de rapports de force objectifs
qui s’imposent à tous ceux qui entrent dans ce champ et qui sont irréductibles aux intentions des agents
individuels ou même aux interactions directes entre les agents (ibid., p. 3).
We have already discussed the definition of field in section 6.3 where we adapted the more
general idea of fields as a spatial model of relative positions. In the present context we are not
4This is different from the link between the micro- and the meso-level. Since groups are defined as collectives sharing
the belief of constituting a group, the link between the individuals and groups is not causal but constitutive. Once a number
of individuals believe to constitute a group, then that group exists in the capacity of this collective intentional state.
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interested in what fields are in general but rather how they impact individual and collective sub-
jects. This is the question of downward causation.
The single most important insight of Bourdieu with regard to the formulation of theories—in
the present context as well as with regard to social science theory more generally—is that we can
differentiate two distinct manifestations of structure. First, structures constitute immediate strate-
gic environments within which individual and collective subjects decide how to act based on their
beliefs and volitions. We have identified this analytical perspective as typical of the individual-
ist explanatory approach in sections 7.1 and 7.2. Second, however, Bourdieu reminds us that there
is always another presence of structure he calls “incorporated structure” (Bourdieu 1990, p. 41),
which is expressed in the concept of ‘habitus’.5 The habitus, as “a product of history (...) ensures
the active presence of past experiences (...) deposited in each organism in the form of schemes
of perception, thought and action” (ibid., p. 54). Bourdieu develops the concept of habitus to ex-
plain the asynchronicity between structural change and a change in practices. “He draws on the
basic insight of the classical sociological tradition that maintains that social reality exists both
inside and outside of individuals, both in our minds and in things” (Swartz 1998, p. 96). The
concept of ‘habitus’ can thus be understood as the individualist/subjective pendant to the rela-
tional/objective conception of fields in the social space.
The concepts of habitus and field conceptually separate the blurred line between analytical
levels. The often faint differentiation between the micro-level and the social dimension of the
macro-level (the social space) directly results from fact that they are inherently linked by inten-
tionality (cf. ch. 4). From an analytical perspective, however,—and we deal here primarily with
levels of analysis—it is advisable to keep the levels separate.
Whereas structures in their role as immediate strategic landscapes do not fundamentally alter
intentions of (individual or collective) subjects, the configuration of social fields causes the habitus.
Here, we deal with genuine downward causation:
The conditions associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of
durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures,
that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the
operations necessary in order to attain them (Bourdieu 1990, p. 53).
Consequently, the habitus can be defined as a relatively stable set of cognitive and practical in-
tentional states, as “a system of cognitive and motivating structures” (ibid., p. 53). It allows us to
grasp how similar field positions possess the propensity to develop similar cognitive and practical
intentional states. A pivotal difference between both manifestations of structure is the temporal
lag between cause and effect. The notion of structures as strategic environments captures those
structural influences that are short-term and to which subjects quickly adapt. This is different
with regard to the habitus: There is a temporal lag between the formative influence of structures
on individuals, on the one hand, and the situation in which the habitus becomes active and largely
determines perception and motivation, on the other. Considering both perspectives, the necessity
to modify the macro-micro-macro model of sociological explanation becomes evident. This is de-
picted in figure 8.1. More specifically, we need to differentiate between two separate macro-micro
links. On the one hand, structures act as immediate strategic environments; on the other hand,
structures form practical and cognitive intentional states in the long term. Bourdieu’s focus on
formative effects of structures sets his theory apart from both individualist approaches with a
strong focus on micro-level assumptions, and holist approaches that abstain from any descrip-
tions of the micro-level (cf. section 7.2). Based on these arguments we can formulate the following
assumption that is characteristic for the moderate collectivist perspective (Albert 2010a):
The assumption of duality of structure: Structures always exist as immediate strategic environments
and, resulting from past downward causation, as incorporated structures.
Before applying this assumption, it should be noted here that the notion of habitus has been
subject to criticism. One of the most fundamental points of criticism surrounding the notion of
habitus includes determinism (cf. Evens 1999; King 2000). The argument is that since structure
forms the habitus and the habitus recreates structures, there is not much room to break out of this
5This view of structure bears resemblance to the constructivist view in International Relations theory (Wendt 1999) or
the social identity approach in social movement research (Melucci 1988).
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circle. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus thus seems to entail a strong form of collectivism in which
individuals merely reproduce rather than shape structures. Bourdieu’s theoretical approach, as
well as others that argue in favor of downward causation, such as the present author, have to deal
with such criticism (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).
First of all, a formative effect of structures in the form of downward causation neither entails
that actions are predictable, nor that structures are always reproduced unchanged. Specific ac-
tions are not predictable, as they result from the interplay between incorporated structures and
the immediate strategic landscape, despite the influence of individual beliefs and motivations via
socialization. Incorporated structures are dispositions to act specifically according to a certain sit-
uation. They do not, however, limit the plausibly infinite amount of possible reactions in specific
situations. Thus, the explanation of action is never a mere reduction to incorporated structures,
but rather always takes into account the given situation. This leads to a second point. Where
individuals act together, as is the case in all kinds of social action, the complex aggregation of in-
dividuals acting together can lead to trans-intentional effects on themacro-level. Collective results
are often unforeseeable and partly governed by chance. The cycle of structure-habitus-structure,
and downward causation more generally, thus does not imply the absence of change.
Bourdieu puts forward another argumentwhich sets him apart from rational-choice approaches
and has led to his view that structures tend to reproduce, namely, that individuals are mainly un-
conscious of their own habitus. In fact, the creation of practices on the basis of embodied rules
rather than on conscious decisions is one of Bourdieu’s central arguments: Human beings are
conceived as 34 automata (Bourdieu 1984a). This leads to the following picture: Bourdieu evades
the ‘determinist trap’ with regard to downward causation by leaving us 14 of autonomous decision
making. However, the dividing line between being a slave of our dispositions, on the one hand,
and being an autonomous agent with a clear self-perception, on the other, is not well elaborated.
This is surprising, as this differentiation serves as the key to the mediation between structuralist
and individualist theorizing. For the aim of this thesis, however, this fair criticism of Bourdieu’s
notion of habitus does not loom large. The present analysis rather focuses on objective indicators
of social position without directly measuring intentions. The specific methodological approach
thus allows us to navigate around this pitfall. Any research design that includes surveys on per-
ceptions and volitions, however, needs to explicitly discuss this issue.
From the perspective of theoretical parsimony, one might object that including both perspec-
tives is unnecessary or even that both approaches aremutually exclusive. However, strictly speak-
ing, both types of macro-influences exert a causal effect in any situation, and should thereby both
be employed in adequate theories (cf. sec. 7.2). However, depending on the respective explana-
tory focus, the relative weight of both perspectives varies. If one aims at explaining generalizable
mechanisms about the formation of groups, long-term formative effects of social structures are
comparatively more important. If the focus lies on specific decisions of collective subjects—such
as the decision of a non-state conflict actor to perform a certain violent act—a more confined view
on structures as strategic environments is more appropriate. In the latter case, formative effects
on structures may be exogenized on methodological grounds but should not be ignored. Exoge-
nization then takes the form of assuming motivations to be constant but not necessarily similar
among actors. This allows for concentrating on interaction processes and concrete decisions by
particular collective actors.
Having dealt with the most important objections against Bourdieu’s approach, the follow-
ing adapts the essential insight obtained in order to conceive of structure as immediate strategic
landscapes and as forming the habitus. The assumption of the duality of structure allows us to
systematically integrate the theoretical approaches presented in chapter 2.
In light of these more general contributions to adequate theoretical approaches in the so-
cial sciences, we can ask how valuable Bourdieu’s theory is in the context of group formation.
Bourdieu (1985, p. 725) argues that his theory interlinking social fields and habitus is capable
of “explain[ing] and predict[ing] the practices and properties of the things classified – includ-
ing their group-forming practices”. In fact, Bourdieu’s work provides significant insights into the
co-evolution and perception of social structures, as well as how they influence practices. More
specifically, Bourdieu (ibid.) formulates some expectations regarding the link between positions
in the social space and groupings. He argues that groups of individuals who are similarly posi-
tioned are more stable. He reminds us of the difference between groups that are similarly posi-
tioned in the field (groups that exist on paper (Bourdieu 1990, p. 36), groups with a ‘theoretical
existence’ (Bourdieu 1985, p. 725), or ‘practical groups’ (Bourdieu 1991, p. 130)) and groups that
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are aware of their collective identity (‘instituted groups’ (Bourdieu 1991, p. 130)). He likewise dis-
cusses in detail how the subjective dimension of social structure enables researchers to challenge
the dominant logic, the ‘doxa’, of fields by redefining the categories of what constitutes a low and
a high relative position. He reiterates the social construction of collectives as existing “in thought”
(Bourdieu 1985, p. 741) and underlines the importance of those who speak on behalf of groups.
All these contributions are valuable. When it comes to formulating specific hypotheses, how-
ever, Bourdieu’s writings lack clarity.We can verywell derive the necessity of adapting themacro-
micro-macro model of explanation to account for the two logics of situation. But we cannot derive
from it specific hypotheses as to the properties of social structure or as to determining which spe-
cific individuals bond together. As described above, this is the point at which social psychological
research can be of assistance. For it is not only more thoroughly based on experimental research,
but it also specifically deals with the question of group formation in sufficient clarity.
Self Categorization Theory
The mechanisms of group formation are described in Self-Categorization Theory (SCT). Building
hypotheses based on SCT provides an added value for three reasons. First, it investigates into
the cognitive mechanisms leading to a shared belief in group membership, thereby extending
the sociological view by a psychological perspective. Second, it provides empirical support for
the thesis of a double presence of structures that are characteristic of moderate collectivist ex-
planations. Structures influence individual intentional states via both socialization and immedi-
ate environments. Third, SCT provides empirical support against the rational-choice perspective
of cost-benefit-oriented individuals. It shows that neither mutual nor individual benefit, nor in-
teraction constitute necessary conditions of group-formation or group-oriented behavior. Taken
together, SCT allows us to understand how macro-configurations of positions in the social and
natural space lead to the formation of individual belief in group membership on the micro-level.
The key term of self-categorization theory is ‘categorization’. Categorization is the process
of grouping according to ‘homophily’: grouping individuals like persons. More specifically, self-
categorization describes cognitive processes of how individuals situate themselves with regard to
others. SCT builds on the basic assumption that each individual has a self-concept in the form of
self-categorizations, i.e. “cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of stimuli as the same (...)
in contrast to some other class of stimuli” (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, et al. 1987, p. 44; for the following
see Turner, Hogg, Oakes, et al. 1987, pp. 42–67). There exist multiple self-categorizations at each of
a number of nested levels.6 Two levels of self-categorization are of specific importance: the social
self-categorization between in-group and out-group and the personal self-categorization between
oneself and others.7
Self-categorization follows the process of meta-contrast: entities are grouped as to maximize
perceived intra-category and to minimize perceived inter-category correlation with regard to
those entities (stimuli) on which the categorization is based. The greater the perceived similar-
ity of elements within a certain category in comparison to those entities outside of it, the more
clearly demarcated a category becomes. Thus, it is not strictly the similarity between units within
groups that counts, but also its ratio to inter-category differences. Put differently, all perceptions
of similarity are made against an external standard. The more similar collectives perceive them-
selves to be in comparison to others, the higher the probability that they think of themselves as
a group. The shared belief to be a group, in turn, constitutes a group following the definition of
groups as collective intentional states laid out in section 4.3. Applying the principle to populations
as a whole, we can assume that group-formation practices in populations follow the principle of
minimizing mean pair-wise differences within groups. Based on this reasoning, we can formulate
the following assumption:
The assumption of self-categorization: Self-categorization follows the principle of meta-contrast.
Self-categorization takes place both spontaneously and by processes of internalization (Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, et al. 1987, pp. 52–54, 55–56). This provides further support to the adequacy of a
6Self-categorizations thus mirror a taxonomy with a number of classical subtypes on each level (Marradi 1990).
7Other levels, e.g. the self-categorization as a human vs. non-human are not of importance with regard to the explana-
tory goal.
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moderate collectivist approach and against purely individualist rational choice approaches. Ex-
amples of group formation are indicative of the importance of spontaneous self-categorizations
through designation based on trivial characteristics in the minimal-group paradigm (Billig and
Tajfel 1973; Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Billig 1974; Tajfel, Billig, et al. 1971). Even if individuals are as-
signed to groups on an arbitrary, ad-hoc basis, this leads to patterns of in-group favoritism and
out-group discrimination. What is important in this context, i.e. with regard to the macro-micro
link, is not that we can observe group behavior. It is rather how little is needed to create groups.
Having been assigned to groups, the individuals in the experiment thought and acted as group
members although they neither interacted, nor were they aware of the personality of the other
participants. Furthermore, these individuals gained no personal benefits. Nonetheless, partici-
pants in the experiment allocated significantly more resources to members of the in-group than
to out-group members. This supports the definition of groups as collective intentional states. Nei-
ther interdependence nor mutual benefit are necessary conditions for group membership to have
an effect (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, et al. 1987, pp. 64–65). Other studies by Turner, Hogg, Turner, et
al. (1984) have confirmed that group formation and cohesion are not dependent on group success.
In a similar vein, McGuire andMcGuire (1998) show that social self-categorizations are important
in self-descriptions, adding further empirical evidence to the idea that people think of themselves
as group members and not solely as individuals.
Individuals simultaneously hold several social and personal self-categorizations. For instance,
I think of myself as a member of my department and at the same time as a doctoral student,
differentiating me from the professors and students. Moreover, both types of self-categorizations
exist at several levels. Due to this multitude of self-categorizations, it is important to identify
which bears greatest importance. This consideration relates to the question of ‘salience’.
Depending on the context, different levels of self-categorizations become salient. Whether we
categorize ourselves as individuals or as group members is dependent on the context. An impor-
tant factor in making a social self-categorization salient is the presence of out-group members.
Given a specific situation, those characteristics that are similar among the members of a collective
(defined by spatio-temporal proximity) are important drivers of social self-categorization therein.
However, once out-group members are present, social self-categorizations become salient.
The salience assumption: The salience of social self-categorization is context-dependent.
A salient self-categorization accentuates the perception of similarity and dissimilarity within
and between groups, respectively. This entails that perceived differences and similarities at other
levels lose significance (Onorato and Turner 2004). If, for instance, social self-categorizations are
salient in a certain situation, differences between individuals within the group are perceived to
be comparatively smaller. The salience of levels of self-perception thus can be located on a con-
tinuum between the social and the personal level of self-categorization. In situations where I
move toward social self-categorization on the continuum (i.e. social self-categorization becomes
salient), this leads to depersonalization, “whereby people come to perceive themselves more as
the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities” (Turner, Hogg,
Oakes, et al. 1987, p. 50). In other words, individuals engage in self-stereotyping.
Similar to categorization, the mechanism of depersonalization pertains to oneself and others.
Thus, in a situation of inter-group comparison, I do not only perceive members of an out-group
according to a specific stereotypical image. I also perceive myself to resemble certain stereotypical
characterizations typical of my group. This leads to the following assumption:
The depersonalization assumption: Salient social self-categorization leads to a higher perceived simi-
larity with in-group members and accentuates differences with members of other groups.
In summary, self-categorization theory describes the cognitive mechanisms that lead to the
development of salient social self-categorization and thereby group formation.
Social Space, Categories, and the Self
Bringing together the two-fold view on structures as strategic landscape and as habitus, on the
one hand, and the social-psychological research on cognitive mechanisms of group formation, on
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the other, permits the linkage of the macro-level, as constituted by the natural and social space,
with the micro-level of individuals. An individual’s relative position in the economic, cultural,
and political field are the predominant categories underlying social self-categorizing processes.
Following the concept of meta-contrast, homological positions of individuals on multiple fields,
as well as a large contrast to other individuals (macro-level), provide stimuli for individuals to
categorize themselves in a group (micro-level). This thereby makes group formation (meso-level)
more likely.8
Suitable candidates for social self-categorization following the principle of meta-contrast are
specifically two types of fields: the cultural and the economic field. There is ample evidence for the
assumption that cultural stimuli such as language, religion, and heritage are important stimuli in
self-categorization processes. Generally, cultural difference between individuals are more stable
than other types of identities (Gurr 2000). This specifically pertains to heritage, but also extends to
language and religion. Moreover, language is the most fundamental means of social interaction
(Croissant, Schwank, et al. 2009). Psychological studies have added further empirical evidence
for this claim by showing that individuals tend to inevitably categorize others based on the social
categories of race, age, and sex (Quinn and Rosenthal 2012). It is likewise reasonable to assume
that the relative position on the economic field is important in self-categorization processes. It is
hard to deny that occupational status, the level of income, and the standard of living constitute
pivotal elements to situate the self relative to others. Similarly to the cultural identity, economic
status is often immediately apparent through status symbols, specific recreational activities, and
many other situations in daily life.
Two conditional factors can be derived from the assumption of meta-contrast and the salience
assumption. The former implies that categorization is a question of degrees. It is not always easy
to tell people apart based on their differences, just as it is not always obvious to which group one
belongs. However, the greater the differences and the larger the number of fields being available
for discrimination, the easier categorization becomes. The salience assumption reminds us that
categorization always depends on the local context. Social self-categorizationsmight be important
in one area of a country and unimportant in another. In this sense, studies that focus on the nation-
state might lose important local variance.
Speaking of group formation, a boundary condition applies:Where groups have already formed
along the above-hypothesized mechanism, the probability of new group formations are greatly
reduced. Apart from situations of swift societal changes—such as mass migration, technical inno-
vation affecting configurations on the economic field, or revolutions—the overall configuration of
positions in the social space changes gradually rather than swiftly. This specifically pertains to eth-
nic differences—language, religion, and descent are hard to change—-but often also to structural
economic and political disparities. Thus, apart from situations in which populations go through a
period of rapid transition, we can assume group identities to be stable over decades. The forma-
tion of new groups is thus not an empirical phenomenon to be expected frequently.
It is important to state that this reasoning pertains to the structural and not the individual level.
Individuals might very well change their position in the social space throughout their lives and,
following the above mechanisms, this likely affects their social self-categorization.9 Due to the
multiple realizability of groups as collectives, such changes do not, however, necessarily change
the overall configuration of groups in a society. We can summarize the above in the following
assumption:
The homology assumption: Groups form along similar positions in the social space.
8.2.3 From Groups to Collective Subjects
What mechanisms explain the emergence of collective subjects? The most obvious argumentative
step to explain individual participation in collective subjects would be to follow the mechanisms
8The basic idea resembles the concept of imagined communities by Anderson (1988). In his eyes, nations are cultural
artifacts grounded in collective acceptance rather than interaction. What differs, however, is the level of analysis. Whereas
Anderson focuses on the bonds between individual members of nations, this theory focuses on inter-group conflict. We
could thus speak of ‘imagined groups’.
9An example of such a trajectory is captured by the proverb: ‘Not to be a rèpublican at twenty is proof of want of heart;
to be one at thirty is proof of want of head’.
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described above. Following this idea, we would expect that just as a similarity in social positions
between individuals increases their chances of belonging to a single group, it would also increase
their chances of forming a collective subject. Put succinctly, “the probability of mobilization into
organizedmovements (...) will be in inverse ratio to distance in this space” (Bourdieu 1985, p. 726).
Whereas this position might hold true for the emergence of collective subjects on a general
level, it seems insufficient to base our reasoning for individual participation in collective subjects
that engage in political conflict simply on personal similarities with regard to socio-economic,
cultural, and political characteristics as well as living proximity. Although the minimal-group
paradigm shows that group membership leads to discriminating behavior, it would be too im-
plausible to assume that inter-group relations are necessarily conflictual. This would suggest that
there is a direct link between the formation of groups and political conflict. Certainly, such an
automatism is inadequate, as only a fraction of inter-group relations are characterized by political
conflict.
Building on the assumption of a duality of structure, it rather seems adequate to define two
necessary conditions that increase the probability of the emergence of collective subjects:
1. A shared we-intention to act on behalf of a group.
2. A strategic environment that allows the establishment of those procedures that characterize
collective subjects.
The Emergence of Shared ‘We-Intentions’ Through Grievances
The first mechanisms describe the formation of a shared we-intention to act on behalf of a group.
This means that we need to identify the factors creating a shared disposition of collective action
among group members (compare section 4.5). Based on the discussion of different theoretical
approaches to conflict research, two kinds of theoretical arguments are conceivable: the rationalist
and the moderate collectivist view.
According to the instrumentalist view, the formation of collective actors is grounded in indi-
vidual cost-benefit calculations (cf. Rabbie 1991). According to this nomological assumption on
the micro-level, individuals act on behalf of groups when it suits their individual needs. Forma-
tion and disintegration of collective subjects thus becomes a function of aggregated individual
benefits. A number of empirical results from psychological research, however, cast doubt on this
perspective. First, we can again refer to the empirical findings of the minimal-group experiments
that pertain to behavioral adaptation. The experiments show that groupmembership significantly
affects individual behavior. Once individuals become members of a group, this leads to in-group
favoritism and negative discrimination against other groups. Types of in-group favoritism in-
clude the maximization of resources of the own group and differences to other groups as well as
the minimization of resources of other groups (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Billig
1974; Tajfel, Billig, et al. 1971). Thus, the simple fact of thinking as a group member alters an indi-
vidual’s logic of selection. Since group membership is ubiquitous, a purely instrumentalist view
ignores a common feature of social relations. Second, research has shown that individuals seem
to stay in unsuccessful groups although they would have been able to leave (Ellemers, Spears,
and Doosje 1997). Turner, Hogg, Turner, et al. (1984) find that if a group is to fail in a collective
action, then its members even become more dedicated toward the group. The positive relation
between failure and cohesion is contrary to what we would expect from individually rational
group members. These empirical results are incompatible with rational choice theory, as the latter
assumes the logic of selection to be constant, taking the form of cost-benefit calculations. Indi-
vidualist rational-choice arguments thus preclude macro-determination of the logic of selection.
In rational-choice accounts the assumption of rationality is introduced as part of the conditio hu-
mana. The empirical evidence in favor of mechanisms that describe cases of downward causation
thus support amoderate collectivist perspective and speak against a rationalist view in explaining
individual intentions in groups.
Instead of focusing purely on individual cost-benefit calculations, we should turn toward the
interplay between the micro-, meso-, and macro-level to understand how an individual’s dis-
position to act on behalf of groups emerges. A precondition is to agree that groups exist in the
immediate environment. As described above, thinking as a group member accentuates in-group
similarities and between-group differences. This results in a greater coherence with regard to cog-
nitive and practical intentional states and leads individuals to adopt the values and norms of their
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in-group. As Stewart, Brown, and Mancini (2010, p. 7) correctly state, “in many conflicts people
are primarily motivated by their group identity—their religion or ethnicity—and consequently
group motives are a vital driving force. For this to happen, group boundaries must be clearly
defined and have some continuity over time.”10
If we accept that similarity with regard to field position is a contributing factor but not a
sufficient condition for the formation of conflict actors and that the empirical evidence speaks
against the rationalist perspective, we are in need of a mechanism which explains the formation
of conflict actors. The argument developed in the following section specifies that the main factor
leading to the emergence of a shared we-intention to act on behalf of the group is defined by
grievances. This argument can be derived from the recent and empirically well-founded research
on “horizontal inequalities” (Cederman,Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Gubler and Selway 2012;
Østby 2008; Stewart 2008). The notion of ‘horizontal inequalities’ describes disparities coinciding
with “identity based cleavages” (Boswell and Dixon 1990; Østby 2013). The grievance mechanism
links a specific configuration of inter-group positions on the macro-level with inter-individually
shared dispositions to act collectively via grievances.
Just as individuals, groups can also be characterized by their relative positions on the social
space. It was argued above that the position on the cultural field, i.e. language, religion, and
heritage, are of primary importance for group formation. The concept of horizontal inequality
now broadens the view to include the political, the social, and the economic field. Horizontal
inequality is defined as a situation in which groups, in different fields simultaneously, are either
deprived or advantaged in comparison to other groups.
An example for this can be found regarding the racial group “Blacks” in South Africa dur-
ing the Apartheid era. They constituted a relatively clearly demarcated group, were deprived of
political participation, and were generally poorer and less educated than “Whites”.
Configurations of horizontal inequality on the macro-level lead to grievances at the level of
individuals. There are several arguments for why this might happen. Tajfel and Turner (1986) ar-
gue that social groups compare their status with other groups. More importantly, groups aim to
maintain a positive social identity. Where the own group has a comparatively low status, indi-
viduals may follow different strategies. Apart from trying to switch groups with higher status or
redefining the situation in a more positive light, they may strive to improve the relative position
of their own group. The main mechanism that links relative status to grievance is thus that indi-
viduals inherently strive for a positive image of their own group. The results of theminimal group
experiments showed that in inter-group competition for scarce resources, the dominant strategy
was to maximize the difference to other groups without maximizing absolute gains. A relative
advantage of one’s own group vis-à-vis other groups thus seems to be a key force in individual
action.
Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013, pp. 39–40) base their argument upon LeVine and
Campbell (1972), Sherif and Sherif (1953), and Williams (2003). They argue that under condi-
tions of scarce resources and the existence of clearly demarcated groups, differential treatment
of groups leads to grievances. In essence, the mechanism states that unfair treatment along eth-
nic lines leads itself to grievances. Østby (2008) argues that horizontal inequalities both lead to
frustration and simultaneously facilitate mobilization to overcome collective action problems.
She thus argues to combine grievances (frustration) with opportunities (mobilization) (cf. Gurr
2000; Olson 1965; Stewart 2008). Although not explicitly founding his argument on the concept
of horizontal inequality, Gurr (1974) argues that a mismatch between expectations and actual at-
tainment of “goods and conditions of life” increases the chances of rebellion. The process that is
assumed to underlie these alleged macro-level regularities is the frustration-aggression mecha-
nism (cf. Dollard et al. 1939). Horowitz (1985) reminds us of a close link that might exist between
social self-categorization and inequality. He argues that the identification of an individual with
an ethnic group is highest for those individuals that have a lower socio-economic status. Such
effects should further strengthen the cumulative effect of social self-categorization and horizontal
inequality.
Following these arguments, we can define the grievance mechanism as follows.
10At this point, SCT can be linked back to the argument of rule-following in favor of holism. SCT assumes that individ-
uals follow the norms and values of their in-group and thus identifies it as a human trait to conform to those standards
that are collectively created within a group.
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Grievance Mechanism: Horizontal inequalities, i.e. a configuration of homologically unequal positions
in the political, economic, and social space, lead to the disposition to act against the sources of inequal-
ity.
It should be noted that Bourdieu proposed an important objection against this argument. He
argues that through the formative effects of structure on individuals, occupied positions in the
social space appear natural. Low relative positions in the social space are thus not necessarily the
source of revolutionist thought. As Bourdieu (1985, p. 728) writes:
The categories of perception of the social world are, as regards their most essential features, the product of
the internalization, the incorporation, of the objective structures of social space. Consequently, they incline
agents to accept the social world as it is, to take it for granted, rather than to rebel against it, to counterpose
to it different, even antagonistic, possibles.
This ties in with the discussion of determinism in Bourdieu’s theory. His argument directly
challenges the proposed grievance mechanism. Following Bourdieu we would assume that, as
long as configurations of positions at the macro-level are stable, they appear as ‘set in stone’ and
not as a source of the disposition to alter the given order. From this follows a possible focus on
social change: We would assume social change—for instance where social mobility increases or
social order breaks down due to conflict—to lead to a higher awareness and reflectiveness of
one’s own position. This argument cannot be further pursued here, however. The focus remains
on relative positions and dispositions rather than on trajectories of sudden changes.
With regard to the overall argument, the grievance mechanism forms the socio-psychological
underpinning, which links a specific configuration of groups in the social space to the individ-
ual level of intentional states. It argues that individual group members have the disposition to
compare themselves with other groups and strive for a comparatively good position of their own
group. Where groups have a low position in the social space, i.e. if they are politically excluded,
economically deprived, or culturally marginalized, they form the disposition to change the con-
figuration on the macro-level. In order to capture the idea of a group consisting of individuals that
share the disposition both to act against existing horizontal inequalities and thus also to change
the status quo of inter-group positions in favor of the own group, we can use the term ‘aggrieved
group’.
In line with the overall argument, the disposition to act on behalf of the group needs to be
clearly differentiated from a purely atomist cost-benefit calculation. It is not assumed, e.g. along
the lines of the collective-action problem (Olson 1965), that individual reasons to act on collective
grievances are predominantly motivated by individual gain. To the contrary: It is the group that
is deprived and it is for the promotion of the ends of the group that individuals share a disposi-
tion to act. In a sense, strong social self-categorization together with horizontal inequality leads
individuals to develop a form of collective rationality. They cast off the blinkers of individual cost-
benefit calculations and begin to think as group members. This allows for the understanding of
how people come to form or join groups that are engaged in violent conflict. Violent conflicts are
situations where individual risks are specifically high. In line with this, why should individuals
join an armed group—be it the army or a non-state conflict actor—knowing that this decision
might risk their lives? If we assume collective rationality to supersede individual rationality, then
individual conflict participation can be understood.
We can rephrase the argument in the language of the critical realist framework: All individuals
hold the power, though not the tendency, to partake in collective violence. Salient social self-
categorization and horizontal inequality are two mechanisms at the meso- and the macro-level,
respectively. Taken together, the two mechanisms change individual practical intentional states
via downward causation. As an effect, individuals develop the tendency to act against the source
of the inequality.
Collective Subjects
Aggrieved groups are still mere groups. They are thus not able to act as collectives per se. The
ability to act is the defining feature of collective subjects. Agency of a collective, in turn, requires
procedures to form adequate cognitive intentional states (i.e. beliefs that more or less mirror the
real state of affairs), practical intentional states (i.e. consistent order of preferences), and mecha-
nisms to identify individual members to act on behalf of the collective subject.
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In cases where the propositions on which to decide are logically connected, and assuming that
all members of a group have their say, the functions to develop group intentions can become com-
plex (List and Pettit 2011). In these cases, groups can adopt views that might even go against the
majority of the views of their members. In these cases, it makes sense to speak of genuine collec-
tive subjects. Collective subjects are more than aggregates of individuals and they are more than groups.
Due to the irreducibility of the beliefs and motivation of collective subjects to the individual cog-
nitive and practical intentional states of their members, the formation of collective subjects entails
a step from the micro- to the meso-level.
Drawing on the assumption of the duality of structure, we argue that whether an aggrieved
group forms a collective subject is a question of the immediate strategic environment. What is
important to have in mind is that we deal with conflict actors. These actors are characterized by
an incompatibility of intentions with each other and are willing to challenge the existing order
outside of established procedures of regulations (cf. sec.6.1). This entails that it is in the intrinsic
interest of the state to prevent the formation of non-state conflict actors. Since motivations are suf-
ficiently given by aggrieved groups, what determines the step from groups to collective subjects
is the ability to create the necessary organizational capacity.
To conceptualize the strategic environment, we draw on our taxonomy of the macro-level (cf.
sec. 6.3) and here specifically on the natural space. More specifically, we argue that the transfor-
mation of aggrieved groups into collective subjects becomes more likely if group members are
sufficiently close as to enable interaction (anthropological context), if there is a relatively large
share of youth among the population that can be mobilized (anthropological context), and if the
natural environment provides enough cover from being dismantled in the early phase of forma-
tion (geographic context). The following elaborates on these three variables.
A shared geographic position, which belongs to the anthropological context since it is human-
related, is a necessary condition for the formation of collective actors as it facilitates the interac-
tion necessary for the organization of collective subjects. While it is possible for actors to adopt
a decentralized relational structure once formed, such a structure is not feasible for the process
of formation itself. One may argue that the status of geographical proximity as a necessary con-
dition has been weakened by the growing importance of new media. While this is certainly an
important empirical trend not to be overlooked by research on mobilization, current research on
the role of new media in the context of the revolts in Northern Africa, however, warns against
overemphasizing the role of the media at the cost of other important factors: Personal interaction
between individuals is a sine qua non concerning the internal organization of collective actors.
Although literature on the formation of non-state conflict actors that investigates processes of
interaction is rare, there is evidence that close relationships are a key driver in the formation of
groups. Schlichte (2009a) empirically demonstrates that groups are often formed by people that
know each other from other settings such as school, university, or the army. Staniland (2014, p. 9)
argues that “[i]nsurgent groups are built by mobilizing prewar politicized social networks”, and
that these pre-war forms of organization largely determine the further development of groups.
These results thus point to the importance of interaction within existing organizations before the
emergence of non-state conflict actors. Consequently, we would expect that the link between hor-
izontal inequality and the formation of non-state conflict actors is a local, rather than a national
process. Whereas grievances might be felt nationally, the ability to act upon them collectively
depends on personal interaction.
A second factor that might explain the emergence of collective subjects is youth bulge, i.e. a
demographic profile characterized by a relatively large share of young people. Conflict research
has argued that youth bulges are linked to higher risk of political conflict (Goldstone 1991; Hein-
sohn 2003; Huntington 1997; Urdal 2006; Wagschal, Metz, and Schwank 2008). The specific causal
mechanism that links youth bulges to conflict is a subject of debate. Specifically, two general lines
of arguments can be discerned (Østby and Urdal 2014). A first approach argues that youth bulges
reduce recruitment costs, as opportunity costs of young people in large cohorts are generally
lower and thus facilitate mobilization of fighters into armed groups (Collier 2000b; Collier and
Hoeffler 2004). A second approach focuses on frustration that arises from bottlenecks in the la-
bor market (Cincotta, Engelman, and Anastasion 2003; Goldstone 1991). All causal mechanisms
share the expectation that youth bulges will increase the probability of conflict. Systematizing the
causal mechanisms with the help of the explanatory approach proposed in this thesis allows for
the systematization of two different loci of influence. First, we expect youth bulges to facilitate
the formation of non-state conflict actors, since young people are physically more able to fight,
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and since their opportunity costs to join a collective subject are generally lower. These arguments
hint toward youth bulge as a property of the strategic environment in the explanatory step from
aggrieved groups to collective subjects. Second, we expect younger people to be more receptive
with regard to grievances due to inequality. Concerning the explanatory model, we would thus
expect that the grievance mechanism is more effective where we deal with younger populations.
A third factor related to the anthropological factor is the size of the population. According to
our systematic review in chapter 2, it is one of the factors that is most robustly related to political
conflict and is therefore introduced as a control variable.
Besides geographical proximity, youth bulges, and population size, the nature of the terrain is
an important determinant in the formation of collective non-state actors as is likewise evidenced
by our research synthesis in chapter 2. Buhaug (2010), Buhaug and Gates (2002), Buhaug, Gates,
and Lujala (2009), Buhaug and Lujala (2005), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that rugged
terrain limits the ability of states to project their power. This is due to a lack of infrastructural de-
velopment, more complicated access by vehicles, and a resulting difficulty of police and military
control. Building effective procedures to deliberate on strategies and tactics, to define and discuss
goals, and to establish mechanisms to form adequate beliefs about the strategy of other actors
requires a place of secure refuge. This is specifically important for non-state conflict actors. Areas
with a dense infrastructure that facilitate policing by the state will generally hinder the forma-
tion of collective subjects. Where government control is tight, this requires aggrieved groups to
develop in secret. Drawing on these arguments we can thus expect that inaccessibility of terrain
facilitates processes of formation of collective subjects. Thus, we would generally expect that the
transformation of aggrieved groups to non-state armed conflict actors takes place predominantly
in rugged areas. Where actors form in environments that make them prone to be discovered, it is
very likely that they are only loosely organized, act in great secrecy, and do not establish territorial
bases.
A second possible mechanism that links terrain to the formation of non-state actors is that it
complicates the effective provision of public goods. Following this argument, terrain ruggedness
leads to negative externalities that indirectly affect the populationswilling or unwilling to support
non-state actors. Populations that are deprived of public goods might be easier to mobilize and
more likely to turn against the state themselves11 (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Since we are able to
measure the provision of public goodsmore directlywith individual-level indicators of inequality,
however, we can assess these effects more directly on our empirical analysis. Thus, whether or not
this effect is valid, it is captured in the empirical analysis.
Following these arguments, we can define the opportunity mechanism as follows.
Opportunity mechanism: Strategic environments facilitating interaction, mobilization, and organiza-
tion make the transformation of aggrieved groups into collective subjects more likely.
Bringing together the grievance mechanism and the opportunity mechanism, we can formu-
late the following hypothesis concerning the formation of non-state conflict actors:
H1a: Horizontal inequalities make the formation of non-state conflict actors more likely.
H1b: A strategic environment that facilitates interaction, mobilization, and organization makes the
formation of Non-State Conflict Actors more likely.
8.3 Dynamics of Violence
Having described the formation of non-state conflict actors, we now turn to the explanation of
conflict intensity. As described in section 6.1, conflict intensity is a property of a sum of conflict
measures in a geographical and temporal space. In chapter 2, we learned that the great majority
of quantitative comparative conflict research focuses, in decreasing order, on the explanation of
11The possibility of a close empirical link between the inaccessibility of a terrain and its socioeconomic development
makes it necessary to check for cross-correlation in statistical analyses.
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conflict onset, incidence, and termination. In contrast, intensity dynamics to date have almost
completely been neglected (cf. ch. 1).12
Given the lack of research, the study of intensity dynamics should have a more central role
in conflict research. Based on the concept of political conflict, we can see that whereas conflict
items and conflict actors mainly represent the structural, synchronic dimension of conflict, conflict
intensity is inherently linked to the processual dimension of conflict. Certainly, new actors might
join a conflict and replace others, actors may switch sides, and the items of conflict may change in
the course of a conflict. All these changes might be subsumed under ‘conflict dynamics’. Conflict
intensity, however, is the only property of political conflict that is hard to grasp in the synchronic
perspective. As a property of an aggregate of conflict measures, it can only be understood with
reference to a temporal and geographical space. Because it directly results from acts, it can only
be studied in a diachronic perspective (cf. ch. 4). This makes conflict intensity the ‘most dynamic’
attribute of political conflicts.
Conflict intensity is located on the macro-level, as it is a property of an aggregate of conflict
measures that subsequently emerge from the interaction of different conflict actors. One of the
main challenges is to adequately model the relation between decisions and acts taking place on
the meso-level and conflict intensity. The simplest approach would be to conceive the latter as a
simple result of individual decisions. Such an approach, however, fails to take three characteristics
of the logic of aggregation into account: the multiple realizability of conflict intensity, the fact that
intensity is constitutively defined by the means and consequences of conflict measures, and the
results of interaction.
Conflict measures and conflict intensity stand in a relation of supervenience, as there cannot
be a change in conflict intensity without a change in conflict measures. At the same time, how-
ever, the same intensity level can be instantiated by highly diverse kinds and combinations of
measures. Multiple realizability is even found in two relations: between measures and the five
intensity attributes, and between these attributes and the overall intensity level. This entails two
things: Since conflict intensity supervenes on conflict measures, it suffices to analyze the acts of
the involved actors and their consequences. Due to the multiple realizability, however, we cannot
simply reduce conflict intensities to conflict measures. The fact that intensity includes the con-
sequences of conflict measures entails that conflict actors cannot always foresee results of their
actions. Intensity does not exclusively result from what actors do, but also from how it impacts
their environment.13 In summary, an adequate analysis of conflict intensity starts with the aims
and actions of conflict actors, but does not end there. It also needs to take a closer look at the
specific profile of violence, i.e. the specific configuration of means and consequences leading to a
certain conflict intensity, as well as structural characteristics that influence the impact of actions
and communications by conflict actors.
From what has been said so far, the analysis of conflict intensity appears to be a complex
endeavor. The complexity stems from the aggregation from the meso- to the macro-level. There
is, however, also a factor that reduces explanatory complexity: Downward causation only plays a
minor role. Although formative effects shape actors’ dispositions, they generally do not change in
the short term. This view is also supported byWeinstein (2007), who argues that the conditions in
which rebel groups emerge—specifically available resources—lead to a strong path dependence
with regard to organizational features. Following this line of reasoning, the explanation of conflict
intensity can thus primarily focus on actor characteristics and structures as immediate strategic
environments.14
8.3.1 Natural and Social Space and Conflict Intensity
Before delving deeper into the relations between NSCA and conflict dynamics, we formulate
hypotheses on the basis of existing research. We do not intend here to theoretically discuss the
12Much research focuses on specific conflict types, such as one-sided violence or terrorism (Wencker, Trinn, and Crois-
sant 2015). However, these phenomena are often introduced as separate concepts and then put under scrutiny with the
usual approach, leading to analyses of the onset of one-sided violence, the incidence of terrorist events, and so on.
13Means, on the other hand, are largely explainable via reference to actor characteristics. The employed personnel and
weapons are largely determined by the availability of man- and firepower and the choice of tactics.
14Within a critical realist framework such an approach is not entirely satisfying (cf. sec. 5.2). However, as evidenced by
the literature, there are good empirical reasons to primarily focus on an individualist framework. Moreover, an adequate
study of how varying motivations of individuals affect dynamics of violence would require in-depth case studies. This
lies beyond the scope of the present analysis.
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entirety of proposed relations between characteristics of the macro-level and conflict dynamics.
This is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, we briefly discuss results of previous analyses
based on our summary of chapter 2 to put the subsequent theoretical arguments on the relation
between NSCA and conflict dynamics on a more stable footing. With data availability in mind,
the discussion focuses on a subset of explanatory factors.
We have already elaborated on the link between the anthropological and the geographical con-
text, on the one hand, and NSCA formation, on the other hand, above. It makes sense to assume
that these factors, which relate to the immediate strategic environment, also affect conflict inci-
dence. Therefore, we can formulate the following hypotheses with regard to the anthropological
and the natural space:
H2a: Youth bulges make the occurrence of violent intrastate conflict more likely.
H2b: Rugged and inaccessible terrain make the occurrence of violent intrastate conflict more likely.
With regard to the explanation of conflict dynamics, two more fields seem to be of importance
as previous research shows (cf. ch. 2): the economic field and the political field. Regarding the
economic field, our research synthesis points toward the importance of economic development
and the existence of resources. Concerning the former, existing research has identified a strong
negative relationship between economic development and conflict (cf. ch. 2). Concerning the lat-
ter, Ross (2004, p. 352) concluded in his theoretical review (cf. h. 2) that the presence of oil seems
to make conflict onset more likely, whereas gemstones, opium, coca, and cannabis would prolong
wars. We should therefore keep in mind that different resource types can have different effects. In
our empirical analysis in chapter 9, we are able to test for differences between different resource
types. This leads to the following hypotheses:
H2c: Violent intrastate conflict is less likely in economically developed regions.
H2d: The presence of resources makes the occurrence of violent intrastate conflict more likely.
With regard to the political field, research has largely focused on the regime type and here
specifically on the quasi-linear Polity index. Two main arguments stand out. First, although in-
trastate political violence occurs more often in autocratic regime, this does not necessarily entail
a causal relation. And in fact, our research synthesis in chapter 2 shows that research has failed
to identify a robust relationship between both variables. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre,
Ellingsen, et al. (2001) argue that anocracies, i.e. regimes that are neither purely democratic nor
starkly autocratic regimes, are more prone to experience violence. This finding was an important
and often replicated result of conflict research as evidenced by our research synthesis. Recently,
however, the argument has come under heavy criticism due to endogeneity (Vreeland 2008) and
can thus be considered a statistical artifact. The empirical analysis tests for the effect of regime
type as well as for the effect of anocracies based on a modified regime variable proposed by Vree-
land (ibid.). We should certainly not conclude that the regime type is irrelevant given the yet
unexploited potential of new regime typologies (cf. Fjelde 2010). With regard to the rather undif-
ferentiated approaches based on the aggregated Polity Index, however, we should be skeptical
of any relation. In light of the theoretical ambiguity, measurement issues, and methodological
problems, we shall refrain from formulating any hypothesis. We expect, however to find no effect
when using the Polity index as well as the revised anocracy measure based on Vreeland (2008).
8.3.2 Relative Strength
We may now turn to more specific hypotheses that explicitly take into account conflict actors.
This subsection argues that the strength of NSCA, i.e. their ability to reach their goals with vio-
lent means, shapes their tactics and thereby conflict intensity (cf. Wencker 2010). The explanation
comprises three steps: the perception of relative strength by conflict actors (macro-meso link), the
tactical decisions of conflict actors (meso-meso link), and the effect on conflict intensity (meso-
macro link).
We can generally expect collective subjects to be well informed about their relative strengths.
Two arguments are most important in this context. First, collective subjects need to form a consis-
tent structure of beliefs and volitions to ‘act as one’. This requires processes of deliberation within
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the group, which in turn can be assumed to improve the perception of their immediate environ-
ment. We can furthermore assume that individual misperceptions cancel each other out in the
aggregates; the so-called ‘wisdom of the crowds’ (Galton 1907). An argument against this line of
reasoning, however, points to psychological mechanisms that lead to a convergence of perception
within groups. Where individual decisions are not independent from one another, the median
estimates of groups loses precision due to a reduction of diversity and overconfidence (Lorenz
et al. 2011). These processes run counter to the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ mechanism.
In light of this ambiguity, we can turn to a second argument. Conflicts are situations of great
mutual awareness and often involve a high level of interaction. These interactions yield infor-
mation on relative strength. Following this argument, we can expect the perception of relative
strength to be quite good. From this the following assumption can be derived:
The assumption of quasi-perfect information: Opponents in intrastate conflicts are generally well in-
formed about their relative strength.
Having described the macro-meso link, we can now turn our view to agency. Whereas the
specific goals of NSCA may largely differ, as is expressed by their different orientations and the
conflict items, the specific choice of tactics can be assumed to follow cost-benefit calculations. The
assumption of collective rationality guiding the choice of tactics might not be true for unorganized
collectives such as mobs. It can, however, be assumed to hold true for collective subjects, since
these have procedures to form and pursue coherent preference structures. It is thus reasonable to
assume that conflict actors employ their means in a way that best suits their strategic goals. Such
an assumption might appear trivial. It does, however, differentiate our theoretical approach from
those who argue that violence in war is an end unto itself (cf. Crefeld 1998).
The assumption of collective rationality: conflict actors qua being collective subjects employ their
means to best suit their strategic goals.
To systematize the wealth of different tactics of NSCA, we can carve out three different types
of tactics in intrastate political conflict (Wencker 2010):
• Avoidance, i.e. the attempt to stay away from any direct confrontations with the enemy.
• Guerilla, i.e. the attempt to harm the respective opponent while at the same time avoiding
open confrontation.
• Confrontation, i.e. the attempt to openly confront the enemy.
Bringing together the assumption of quasi-perfect information and the assumption of collec-
tive rationality, we can assume conflict actors—not necessarily only NSCA—to chose their tactics
based on a consideration of relative strength. It is reasonable to differentiate between three types
of configurations of relative strength.
Where conflict actors are farmore inferior in strength, these actors pursue a tactic of avoidance.
Not having the necessary means to stand against the enemy in a violent encounter, it is best to
fall back on a tactic of evasiveness. A high level of mobility, the use of the civil population as
camouflage, dispensing the use of any symbols such as flags or uniforms, concealing weapons,
and reducing the communication to a minimum are forms of a tactic of avoidance.
Cases in which conflict actors are slightly inferior in strength, they pursue a guerrilla tactic. In
a situation of slight inferiority, conflict actors know that they would not stand a situation of direct
confrontation but are at the same time aware of the fact that they are able to hurt the respective
enemy. They therefore engage with the enemy but do so with specific tactics allowing them not
to “fight on the same plane” (Kalyvas 2005, p. 91). Typical instances of a guerrilla tactic include
the use of small units that are able to move quickly and to hide when necessary, the use of small
arms that cannot be easily destroyed by the respective opponent, and hit-and-run tactics rather
than set battles.
Situations of parity and superiority in strength lead to confrontational tactics. In the case of
superiority, it is obvious that conflict actors will try to engage the enemy directly. In set battles,
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the superior side can be confident in its own victory, as it is easy to identify the enemy. Moreover,
the combat area is clearly demarcated facilitating the use of heavy weapons.
The choice of tactics in a situation of parity is less clear. In structural realism of International
Relations theory, an equal distribution of power between state coalitions is assumed to lead to
stability. This is especially true for proponents of ‘defensive realism’ (cf. Waltz 1979) but likewise
holds for ‘offensive realists’ (cf. Mearsheimer 2001). Transferring this argument to the realm of in-
trastate conflict would lead to the assumption that situations of power parity lead conflict actors
to refrain from violent action. Whereas the validity of structural realism in the realm of inter-
national politics is debated, it is highly inadequate to explain the choice of tactics in intra-state
conflict. First, chances of success in battle increase with relative power. Consequently, inferior
conflict actors will try to not throw all resources into battle, but rather to efficiently dose their
use of violent means, i.e. weaponry and personnel. The more equal actors become in terms of
strength, however, the more confident an actor becomes that his use of resources will bring him
a comparative advantage. Second, clashes between actors of equal strength are far more impor-
tant with regard to the overall outcome of a conflict than clashes between actors that are highly
asymmetric in terms of power. In cases where small differences can tip the balance in one’s favor,
putting to use the entirety of available means is important. Third, in situations of power parity,
conflict actors usually control territory. Territorial control, in turn, needs to be defended. Avoid-
ance or guerrilla tactics are obviously not well suited here. In light of these arguments, we can
expect that in situations of superiority or parity, actors choose confrontational tactics.
The assumption of tactical decisions: The choice of tactics of conflict actors is largely determined by
relative strength. Far more inferior conflict actors choose a tactic of avoidance, slightly inferior conflict
actors choose a guerrilla tactic, and conflict actors that are en par or superior choose confrontational
tactics.
Having described the choice of tactics in dependence of the distribution of power, we can
now turn to the question of how the choice of tactics affects conflict intensity. The motivating
assumption behind the logic of aggregation is that the inferior actor can largely determine the
way in which a conflict is fought. A confrontational tactic simply cannot be implemented against
an opponent who aims to evade precisely such kinds of confrontations. Where inferior actors
hide from the opponent possibly among the civil population, heavy weapons are of no use. Thus,
whereas confrontation might be dictated by the choice of conflict actors, implementation hinges
on the tactics of the inferior party.
The ‘David Assumption’: The weaker side determines how a conflict is fought.
Bringing together the assumption of quasi-perfect information, the assumption of collective
rationality, the assumption of tactical decisions, the David Assumption, and the three types of
tactics, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: The more balanced the distribution of power between conflict actors, the more likely higher conflict
intensities are.
8.3.3 Rebel Governance
In a last analytical step, we can derive hypotheses on the role of territorial control and organi-
zational structures of NSCA (cf. Kalyvas 2006).15 In contrast to our above hypothesis, we do not
focus on the aggregated conflict intensity, but formulate expectations about what kinds of vio-
lence dominate intrastate political conflict.
We have argued in section 6.2 that organizational structures to develop consistent beliefs and
preferences as well as to identify individuals to act on behalf of the group are a fundamental at-
tribute of collective subjects. The Disaggregated Conflict Actor Dataset (DISCA) which is used in
15As argued in chapter 6, territorial control should not be considered a constitutive but a contingent property of NSCA.
This allows us to empirically assess variance in territorial control.
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the empirical analysis differentiates between hierarchically-organized and decentralized NSCA.
In the former, competencies are clearly allocatable from top to bottom. In the latter, no clear hi-
erarchical structure exists. We can expect a decentralized structure as well as a lack of territorial
control to complicate the employment of violent means by NSCA. The employment of troops re-
quires their coordination and with larger numbers comes greater organizational complexity. This,
in turn, requires efficient organizational structures and/or territorial control for adequate train-
ing. Likewise, only NSCA that control territory are able to maintain heavy weapons. They are
certainly not well suited for NSCA that hide among the local population. We can thus formulate
the following hypothesis:
H4a: Non-state conflict actors that are centrally organized and control territory are more able to act in
larger units and to operate heavy weapons than those NSCA that are decentralized and lack territorial
control.
Furthermore, territorial control by NSCA might also affect the local population. In fact, the
relation to the local population is of great importance since it affects mobilization and resource
extraction (Weidmann 2014a, p. 60). As shown in the literature (Balcells 2011; Humphreys and
Weinstein 2008; Kalyvas 2006), reasons for civilian targeting by NSCA are manifold and can range
from secretive targeting of individuals to indiscriminate violence. Overall, it seems plausible that
territorial control by rebel groups leads to flight at least among parts of the population. Hence,
we can formulate our final hypothesis:
H4b: The higher the degree of control over a certain territory by a non-state conflict actor, the higher
the number of refugees or internally displaced persons.
8.4 Summary
As a result stands an explanatory model that details the synchronic and diachronic relations
between the micro-, meso-, and macro-level to explain the formation of NSCA and profiles of
violence in intrastate political conflict. On grounds of a moderate collectivist argument—the
hallmark of which is to differentiate between structures as embedded in habitus and strategic
environment—we formulate an integrative explanatory model that explains actor formation and
profiles of violence in three main steps.
First, we need to understand group formation. We argue that group-formation processes in
populations follow the principle of minimizing mean pair-wise differences (meta contrast) within
groups leading to social self-categorization. Depending on the context, self-categorizations be-
come salient and lead to depersonalization, i.e. a higher perceived similarity with in-group mem-
bers. In the conceptual framework developed in chapter 6 this leads to the arguments that groups
form along similar positions in the social space.
In a second step we seek to explain how groups become collective subjects. Here, the main
argument is that horizontal inequalities, i.e. a configuration of homologically unequal positions
in the political, economic, and social space, lead to the disposition to act against the sources of
inequality. In cases where the strategic environment allows aggrieved groups to develop proce-
dures to form beliefs and volitions as well as mechanisms to act through individuals, collective
subjects in the form of NSCA emerge.
In the explanation of profiles of violence in a third step we can ignore the micro-level since
NSCA are genuine actors. In contrast to the explanation of actor formation, strategic considera-
tions determine the choice of one of three main strategies: avoidance, guerrilla, or confrontation.
Since in intrastate conflicts the weaker side can largely determine how conflicts are fought, the rel-
ative strength of NSCA determines conflict dynamics. Moreover, internal characteristics of NSCA
and their immediate environment influence profiles of violence. The arguments derived from
these considerations are put under scrutiny in the following empirical investigation.
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Chapter 9
Empirical Analysis
Having described the state of research, laid out the philosophical, ontological and methodolog-
ical groundwork, and formulated a theoretical approach, we can now put our argument to an
empirical test. This chapter demonstrates that the realist approach proposed in this analysis and
the real definitions derived thereof are more than a philosophical game; they directly contribute
to bettering our understanding of dynamics of intrastate conflicts.
The present chapter is divided into two parts. The first part describes the empirical measure-
ment of the pivotal concepts. It specifically addresses the first and the fourth aim of the present
analysis: By developing measurement strategies and both discussing and implementing data col-
lection, the following discussion complements the real definitions developed in chapter 6.
The second part puts the data to use by empirically testing the arguments developed in the
last chapter 8. It thereby illustrates that the realist approach defended in this analysis directly
contributes to current questions in research on intrastate political conflict.
The first part consists of three sections. Section 9.1 develops a new approach to the measure-
ment of horizontal inequality. It draws on the world’s largest population database holding spa-
tially disaggregated microdata from census record (Minnesota Population Center 2013), making
some 178 million individual-level data points available for Asia and Oceania. Since the concept of
horizontal inequality describes a relationship between collectives, the individual-level data need
to be carefully aggregated. Based on survey statistics, the section discusses sources of statistical
error in detail and describes how they are accounted for in the final measure. This allows for
specification as well as possible future improvement on the measure. As a result stands a multi-
dimensional measure of horizontal inequality stands that allows the assessment of horizontal
inequality on an unprecedented level of detail.
The subsequent section 9.2 uses highly disaggregated data on the natural space. Based on the
most recent disaggregated population data, it first develops indicators of population size and
youth bulge that are geographically precise. Second, drawing on satellite data on land classes, it
advances a new variable to measure terrain inaccessibility that has not been tested before. Third,
it integrates a measure of terrain ruggedness by Nunn and Puga (2012) and data on resources
from varying sources.
Section 9.3 briefly introduces DISCA, a new database on 78 non-state conflict actors in Asia
and Oceania since 1945 which was specifically developed for this thesis. It gives an overview of
the coded variables and shows possible applications.
The second part begins with section 9.4. Investigating the empirical relationship between hori-
zontal inequality, the strategic environment, and the emergence of non-state conflict actors, it puts
all four sources of data described to an empirical, comparative test of H1.
Section 9.5 presents a comparative analysis of profiles of violence drawing on the the newDIS-
CON dataset (Trinn, Wencker, and Schwank 2016). DISCON brings forward a multi-dimensional
measurement of conflict intensity on a subnational and monthly level. This addresses the fourth
aim of complementing current conflict research by a multi-dimensional and multi-indicator ap-
proach of conflict intensity. A latent class analysis allows for the identification of four genuine
profiles of violence that characterize political conflicts in Asia and Oceania between 2000 and
2014. A multi-level model finally allows to test our hypotheses H2a-d
147
9.1. HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY CHAPTER 9. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A final analytical step brings together data on non-state conflict actors and political conflicts
in an effort to bring forth one of the first comparative empirical analyses investigating the link
between characteristics of non-state conflict actors and dynamics of violence (cf. Wencker 2010).
In summary, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the complex processes that gov-
ern the emergence of conflict actors, the dynamics of violence, and the ways in which NSCA fight
in intrastate political conflicts.
9.1 Measuring Horizontal Inequality with Survey Data
9.1.1 Survey Data
The measurement of the independent variable of horizontal inequality draws on survey data pro-
vided by IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population Center 2013). The dataset integrates data
from 36 surveys. In the following, the calculation of the independent variable of horizontal in-
equality is illustrated by one of the samples: the survey in the Philippines in 2000. The calculation
for other surveys only differs with regard to the survey designs that need to be taken into account.
The Philippine survey of 2000 provides an adequate illustration, as it follows a design that is typ-
ical for most of the surveys used in this study. Ten percent of the households were systematically
sampled following a one-stage cluster sampling plan. The sample includes 7,417,810 individuals
and 1,511,890 households.
A comparative analysis of samples is based on three prerequisites. First, similar variables
should be comparable across samples. Second, values of different variables should be comparable
across variables. Third, means and standard errors need to be adequately computed based on the
sample design. Among these three points, the former two can easily be addressed. Conversely,
achieving the third prerequisite involves a rather complex process. Comparability of variables
across samples is facilitated by the fact that IPUMS has integrated similar variables across sam-
ples. This study exclusively focuses on these integrated variables.1 Comparability of values across
variables is achieved through recoding:
• Columns containing information regarding ethnic identity and mother tongue were sum-
marized in the columns ethn and mtong, respectively.
• Values for missing data were harmonized across variables by setting them to NA.
• Names of country, subnational unit, mother tongue, and ethnic identity were added and
merged in one column.
• Variables were harmonized as follows: Variables indicating the availability of a radio, a
television set, a toilet, and electricity, as well as those indicating the literacy and employment
of a person were harmonized and dichotomized with ‘1’ and ‘0’ indicating the presence or
absence, respectively. All those individuals with at least secondary education were coded
as ‘1’, all those with primary or less than primary education as ‘0’. Concerning employment
status, those coded as ‘inactive’ (e.g., students or housewives) were coded as ‘1’ together
with those that were ‘employed’.2
After these steps, all datasets have a harmonized structure. The third prerequisite, i.e. the calcu-
lation of means and standard errors on grounds of the integrated data, is described as follows.
9.1.2 Horvitz-Thompson Estimator
In survey analysis, population characteristics are inferred from a probability-based sample. The
inference founds on the idea that an individual unit of observation ui is sampled from the pop-
ulation with a specific probability pi (notations are summarized in table 9.1). In the rather simple
1 The following IPUMS variables are used in the analysis: country = unique country id; year = year of survey; sample =
unique sample id; serial = unique household (hh) id; hhwt = hh weight; geolev1 = unique id for subnational unit; electric,
tv, radio, toilet = availability of electricity, at least one television set, at least one radio, or a toilet in hh; perwt = individual
weight; age = age of respondent; religion(d) = religion; lit = literacy; edattain(d) = educational attainment; empstat(d)
= employment status; countryname = country name; geoname = subnational unit name; ethn = name of ethnic group,
mtong = name of mothertongue; The ‘d’ suffix indicates a more detailed classification of the respective variable.
2Due to dichotomization, values of other variables were also collapsed: for the variable tv, information on the number
of television sets and their quality (black-white or color); for toilet, information on the quality (flush or latrine).
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Population values or parameters
ui i
th element in the population
X Variable in the population
Xi Value of variable X for ith element in the population
N Population size
μX Mean of population values of X
τX Total of population value of X
σX Standard deviation of population variable X
σ2 Variance of population variable
M Number of clusters/strata in the population
Nk Number of elements in kth cluster/stratum
Sample attributes or statistics
n Sample Size
x Variable in the sample
xi Value of ith element in the sample
S Set of samples
pi Probability that element ui is selected from population in a single draw
πi Probability that element ui is in the sample
πij Probability that elements ui and uj are in the sample
x¯ Mean of sample values of x
μˆX Estimate of mean of population values of X
σx¯ Standard deviation of sample mean
σˆx¯ Estimated standard deviation of sample mean
SE Standard error of the mean
s Standard deviation of a variable in the sample
τˆ Estimated total
Table 9.1: Notation.
case of random sampling with replacement from a population of N, the probability that a given
unit ui is in a sample of n can be calculated as
πi = 1− (1− pi)n
where the selection probability pi refers to the probability that ui is selected in a single draw.3
The majority of survey research—and the IPUMS International (IPUMS-I) samples used in
the subsequent statistical analysis constitute no exception—does not employ random sampling
with replacement. Instead, units are sampled without replacement and selection probabilities are
unequal between units of observation. These two deviations from simple random sampling with
replacement complicate the calculation of sampling probabilities (Horvitz and Thompson 1952).
This leads to a more general formulation of the calculation of sampling probability. Given a sam-
ple size of n from a population of N units of observation and taking into account the order of the
draw, there exist n! Nn
⎡
= S possible samples. A speciﬁc unit of observation ui is included in a
subset of n! N−1n−1
⎡
of these samples. Accordingly, the probability that a unit of observation ui is
included in a sample can be expressed as the sum of the probabilities of the individual samples
in the subset.4
πi =
∑
S:i∈S
P(S).
A general formulation to estimate population characteristics from a sample population is the
estimator proposed by Horvitz and Thompson (ibid.). It applies to a large variety of different
sampling designs and takes different sampling probabilities of units of observations as well as
3For instance, if two out of three units are randomly sampled (selection probability = pi = 1/3) with replacement, ﬁve
of the nine possible resulting samples include the ﬁrst unit of observation,u1: [u1,u1][u1,u2][u1,u3][u2,u1][u3,u1]. The
sampling probability is π1 = 1−(1− 1/3)2 = 5/9.
4For example, if 2 out of 3 units are sampled without replacement and the order of sampling is taken into account, there
exists an overall of 2! 32
⎡
= 6 possible samples: [u1,u2][u1,u3] [u2,u3][u2,u1][u3,u1][u3,u2]. A subset of 2!
3−1
2−1
⎡
= 4
samples includes a speciﬁc unit of observation, sayu1:[u1,u2][u1,u3][u2,u1][u3,u1]. The sampling probability ofu1,π1,
is given by summing up the probabilities of the samples that include u1: 1/3× 1/2+ 1/3× 1/2+ 1/3× 1/2+ 1/3× 1/2 = 4/6.
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sampling from finite populations into account. According to the Horvitz-Thompson estimator, a
population total τX is estimated as
τˆX =
n∑
i=1
xi
pii
where n refers to the sample size and xi to the ith observation in the sample. To estimate a
mean, the estimator is given by:
µˆX =
τˆX
N
=
1
N
n∑
i=1
xi
pii
Simple random sampling, for instance, can be subsumed under the Horvitz-Thompson (H-
T) estimator as a special case, illustrating its general applicability. Since pii = n/N in random
sampling, the H-T estimator for the mean of a population variable becomes
µˆX =
1
N
n∑
i=1
xi
n
N =
n∑
i=1
xi
n
= x¯i.
In many designs, however, pii differs between units in the population. The more general for-
mulation of the estimator adjusts for these differences. As the formula shows, the larger the sam-
pling probability of a unit in the sample, the smaller the influence of the unit’s value on the es-
timated population value. In this way, the estimator corrects for unequal sampling probabilities.
In summary, the H-T estimator allows to adequately estimate population totals and population
means in cases of sampling without replacement and unequal selection probabilities.
As can be illustrated with the data on the Philippines for the year 2000, the estimation of totals
and means is simple since sampling probabilities are provided in the IPUMS datasets.
This allows us to compute some basic statistics: The total population is estimated to be 76,313,481.
and the mean household can be estimated to consist of 4.906 people. This illustrates the generally
large sample sizes of the census data. Table 9.2 illustrates the estimation of means for subpop-
ulations. It lists the share of individuals owning a radio by religious belief and the size of the
subpopulations. Whereas the estimation of means and totals is rather straightforward, the sam-
pling error greatly complicates the analysis. The following subsection discusses sampling errors.
religion radio avail. size
No religion 0.54 61,161
Buddhist 0.82 56,021
Muslim 0.68 3,823,147
Christian 0.77 70,712,647
Other 0.69 1,420,103
Table 9.2: Size and radio availability for religious groups in the Philippines
9.1.3 Sampling Error
Aside from estimating values for population variables such as the mean or the total, survey statis-
tics need procedures to estimate the precision of these estimates. Sample estimates might differ
from population values, as the former are derived from a subset of units from the population.
This difference is the sampling error (cf. Lohr 2009, pp. 16–18; Krotki 2008). Generally, two types
of sampling errors exist: sampling variance and sampling bias. The former refers to the random
fluctuations of estimates in different samples. The latter describes systematic deviation of sam-
ple values from population values. Although certain estimators—such as the H-T estimator (cf.
Horvitz and Thompson 1952)—are unbiased, sample estimates that are derived from samples
smaller than the population necessarily vary. Consequently, this section focuses on the estimation
of the variance of sample estimates.5
5Even population values might differ from true values, as the former are subject to non-sampling errors (Kish 1965,
p. 9). Examples for non-sampling errors are errors in reporting, data processing, or non-response.
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The variance of sample estimates is mainly inﬂuenced by the way the units in the sample
are selected. Put differently, the survey design mainly determines the precision of sample-based
inference. A useful way to express how great estimated values deviate from a population charac-
teristic is the standard error of the mean. Standard error and standard deviation are two mathe-
matically related but distinct informations that are not always clearly differentiated A few words
on their speciﬁcation and notations are needed (cf. Buskirk 2008; Kish 1965; Little 2008). For in-
stance, we might want to estimate the mean μ of a given variable. To do so, we draw a sample
of n instances of the variable from the population. For example, if we are interested in the mean
household income, μX, in a given country, we draw a sample of n households and identify the
income. Assuming equal sampling probability, the estimated mean income of the population μˆX
is the mean of our observations: μˆX =
x1+x2+...+xn
n = x¯. If we drew many samples, we would get
many different values for x¯. The distribution of these values is the sampling distribution express-
ing the variance of the sample means. If n is large enough, x¯ ≈ μX. The deviation between the
means of our equally sized samples is inversely related to the size of the samples. In other words,
the smaller the size of the samples, the greater the difference between their means. To quantify
this deviation we can refer to the standard error of the mean, SE. It describes the precision of
our sample mean, x¯, in dependence of the sample size n. More speciﬁcally, the standard error of
the mean equals the standard deviation of the sample means of equally sized random samples
from the population: SE = σx¯. A large standard error of the sampling distribution indicates that
sample means are not very precise estimates of the population mean. A small standard error, in
contrast, indicates that an estimated mean, x¯, is close to the real mean of the population. If we had
the information, we could calculate the standard deviation of sample means from the standard
deviation of the population means, σX, and the sample size: σx¯ =
σX√
n
. As the formula indicates,
larger sample sizes lead to a smaller standard deviation of sample means. 6
However, the standard deviation of the respective population variable, σ, is usually unknown,
as we often only have information on our sample. Consequently, the population standard devia-
tion is estimated (as indicated by the hat) based on the standard deviation of the sample, s. This
gives the following formula for the estimate of the standard deviation of sample means: σˆx¯ = s√n .
Put differently, we draw on the standard deviation and the size of our individual sample to esti-
mate the precision of our estimates. Consequently—and this is the source of some confusion—the
standard error of the mean, often simply called standard error (SE), equals the standard deviation
of the sampling distribution of the sample means (σx¯) and is estimated (σˆx¯) by the quotient of the
standard deviation and the square root of a single sample ( s√
n
). Hence,
SEM = SEx¯ = σx¯ =
σ√
n
≈ σˆx¯ = s√
n
.
In the following, we refer to this as the ‘standard error’.
Generally, the standard error of an estimate is the square root of the variance of that estimate.
To calculate it according to the H-T estimator, we need the probability that two units ui and uj
are in a single sample, the joint sampling probability πij. For random sampling the joint sampling
probability is7
πij = πi + πj − (1− (1− pi − pj)n).
For sampling without replacement the joint sampling can be calculated as8
πij =
∑
S:i∈S∧j∈S
P(S).
With the joint sampling probabilities at hand, we can calculate the variance for the H-T esti-
mator (Horvitz and Thompson 1952) of a population total:9
6Note thatσx¯ refers to the standard deviation of the sample means (= standard error of the mean) and is thus a descrip-
tion of samples and dependent on the research process. σX, in contrast, refers to the standard deviation of the population
variable X and describes a population characteristic (hence the use of small and large Roman letters, respectively).
7In the simple example that was introduced above, two of the nine possible resulting samples include u1 and u2:
([1,2][2,1]). We can calculate the joined sampling probability as π1∩2 = 5/9+ 5/9−(1−(1− 1/3− 1/3)2 = 2/9.
8In the example of selecting two out of three units without replacement, there exist 2! N−2n−2
⎡
= 2 samples that includeu1
andu2: [u1,u2][u2,u1]. The sampling probability π1∩2 is the sum of both sample probabilities: 1/3× 1/2+ 1/3× 1/2 = 1/3.
9If the joint sampling probabilities are not known, an alternative estimation methods is proposed by Hájek (1981). Here,
πij is estimated via πi and πj. In some cases, the Horvitz-Thompson estimator for the variance yields negative values.
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ˆvar(τˆX) =
n∑
i=1
1− πi
π2i
xi
2 +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
j=i
πij − πiπj
πijπiπj
xixj
The variance estimator for a population mean is
ˆvar(μˆX) =
1
N2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
n∑
i=1
1− πi
π2i
xi
2 +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
j=i
πij − πiπj
πijπiπj
xixj
⎣
√√⎢
Both variance estimators only work for sampling without replacement and if each element
of the universe has a chance to become an element of the sample, i.e. πi > 0. This condition is
fulﬁlled in the samples used in the present study. For the t-tests used later in the analysis, standard
errors are needed. They can easily be calculated by taking the square root of the variance of the
Horvitz-Thompson estimator:
σˆτˆ =
√
ˆvar(τˆX)
σˆμˆ =
√
ˆvar(μˆX).
As, ceteris paribus, the standard error is inversely related to sample size, the following analysis
beneﬁts from the relatively large sample size—usually ranging between ﬁve and ten percent of the
population—of the IPUMS-International samples (see table 9.6). However, some characteristics of
the estimation make sampling errors non-negligible. First, inferences are drawn about subunits of
the sample, such as religious groups and subnational units. If these subunits, also called domains,
are small, the effect of the sample size becomes an issue. Second, inferences of characteristics of
individuals are affected by clustering: in the majority of cases, not individuals but households
are selected. Subsequently, all members of the selected households are included in the sample.
The clustering of units of analysis decreases the precision of estimates. Primarily for these two
reasons, the effect of the sample design must be taken into account in order to minimize the
danger of invalid inferences due to sampling error.
9.1.4 Sample Design
The sample design of the surveys used differs both between countries and years. The type of
sample design inﬂuences the probability that a given unit in the universe, usually a household or
an individual, is in the sample. For example, in a simple random sample, every unit in the pop-
ulation has the same sampling probability, π1 = π2 = ... = πN = n/N. The sampling probability
inﬂuences the variance between samples and thus determines the precision of estimates (Cleve-
land, Davern, and Ruggles 2011; Lumley 2010). To correctly interpret and to ensure comparability
across samples, three common characteristics of sample designs need to be taken into account:
1. relative sample size
2. clustering, i.e. groups of units of analysis
3. adjusted sample sizes for pre-deﬁned strata
The importance of sample sizes, clustering, and stratiﬁcation and how each affects the precision
of estimates of population parameters is described in the following. The discussion presents the
strategies to incorporate the three characteristics in the estimation of population values. Differing
proportions of samples relative to population are accounted for by ﬁnite population correction,
clustering by speciﬁcation of the primary sampling unit (PSU) and—if applicable—the secondary
sampling unit (SSU), and stratiﬁcation by adding information on the strata. We address each of
the three strategies in turn, beginning with sample size.
On the practical side, all estimations are done with the ‘survey’ package for R by Lumley
(2015). As above, the practical implementation is included in the following discussion as a run-
ning example.
Due to this, some have argued that it would be better to estimate the variance via the estimator proposed by Yates and
Grundy (1953). The ‘survey’ package for R allows to estimate variance according to Horvitz and Thompson (1952) and
Yates and Grundy (1953) by speciﬁcation of the svydesign object. (Lumley 2015)
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Sample Size
In contrast to most statistics, the statistics of survey sampling builds on the fact that a ﬁnite popu-
lation is sampled (cf. Neyman 1938). If the sample size n, i.e the number of units of observation in
the sample, is large relative to the population N, this reduces variance between samples and the
uncertainty of inferred population characteristics. This has to do with the fact that the variance
which is calculated for the estimated population value is only applied to the unobserved part of the
ﬁnite population (Lumley 2010, p. 18; Kish 1965, pp. 43–45; Knaub 2008). Put differently, the lack
of precision that results from the fact that we only have a sample of the total population expresses
the lack of accurate knowledge about the unobserved part. Consequently, variance estimates vary
inversely with relative sample size.
The reduction in standard error estimates is reﬂected by the ﬁnite population correction (fpc)
fpc =
N−n
N− 1
.
The ﬁnite population correction factor can be integrated into the formulas to estimate standard
error estimates. To estimate the standard deviation of the sampling variance in random sampling
without replacement and for ﬁnite populations, we simply multiply the fpc with the respective esti-
mate for sampling with replacement:
σˆx¯ (with fpc) =
s√
n
N−n
N− 1
.
Thus, the fpc simply adjusts standard error estimates in dependence of relative sample size.
Strictly speaking, missing values reduce the relative sample size and the fpc needs to be adjusted.
To take missing data into account, the fpc is adjusted by subtracting missing values from the
relative sample size. As we will see below, in case of the illustrating example, 18 percent of the
observations of the variable ‘educational attainment’ are missing (see table 9.4). This effectively
reduces the relative sample size and leads to an accurate fpc of fpc− (0.18× 0.1) = 0.082 instead
of 0.1.
How great is the effect of the fpc? In a census, for instance, the sample size equals the popu-
lation size, n = N. In this case, the standard deviation of sample means and hence the standard
error becomes zero. This makes sense, since there is no sampling error in samples that equal the
population. There is simply only one possible sample. A substantial reduction of standard errors
begins with about 5 percent of the population being sampled. In the case of random sampling,
a sampling proportion of n/N = 0.05 reduces standard error estimates by ≈ 2.5%, a sampling
proportion of 0.1 leads to a reduction of ≈ 5%, and so on. As the majority of IPUMS-I samples
encompass ﬁve percent or more of the population, we correct for ﬁnite population sampling.
The reduction of standard errors through ﬁnite population correction can be illustrated by the
H-T estimator as implemented in the ‘survey’ package. Estimating the mean radio availability for
the Muslim population in Western Mindanao with and without ﬁnite population correction with
the svymean function of the survey package yields the same estimates of means with different
standard errors.10 Figure 9.1 illustrates the different estimates of standard errors by showing the
estimated means and the 95% conﬁdence intervals. The ﬁgure shows that the estimation of means
is precise due to the large absolute sample size as indicated by the small margin of the conﬁdence
intervals. In large sample, the gain by introducing ﬁnite population correction is existent but
small. It reduces the width of the conﬁdence interval by only 4.2 percent.
Clustering
All of the samples included in the analysis, except Pakistan 1981, follow a one-stage cluster de-
sign: Households are selected as primary sampling units (psu), and all members of the household
are sampled as secondary sampling units (ssu).11 Clusters are natural groups of individual pop-
ulation units that are relatively similar with regard to the variables of interest. Cluster designs
make use of the fact that units of observation in the population are clustered in larger units by
randomly sampling psus and then observing all ssu in a selected cluster.
10The estimation of subsets of the population—in this case, all Muslims in Western Mindanao—takes the overall sam-
pling design into account.
11This differs from two-stage cluster designs, where only subsets of individual population units within clusters are
selected.
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Figure 9.1: Effect of ﬁnite population correction on estimation of mean radio availability of Muslims in West-
ern Mindanao. The large sample size leads to small conﬁdence interval and only a small effect of ﬁnite
popuation correction.
Typically, cluster designs minimize survey costs but increase the standard error of estimates
(Lumley 2010, p. 40; Lohr 2009, pp. 165–218; Kish 1965, pp. 148–216). If individuals in the popu-
lation were sampled randomly, interviewers would need to travel from household to household
between interviews. With clustering, however, all individuals in selected households are inter-
viewed, greatly reducing costs. This is of speciﬁc importance with regard to nation-wide surveys,
such as those used in the present analysis. If clusters were relatively similar representations of
the population, cluster sampling would be an efﬁcient strategy to yield precise estimations. How-
ever, clusters rarely resemble a true ‘microcosm’ of the greater population. This is speciﬁcally true
to households. Many of the variables of importance in the present analysis—religion, language,
ethnicity, level of education, literacy, and educational attainment—do not vary greatly between
individuals within the same household. Some variables—such as the availability of a radio, a
television, or electricity—are only observed at the household level and thus cannot vary within
households per design. The estimation of standard errors for variables that are highly correlated
between household members is most heavily inﬂuenced by clustering. In summary, cluster de-
signs make the sampling process more convenient, but allow to extract less information per ob-
served unit. Put differently, the reduction in costs brings a reduction of precision as a pay-off.
Due to the loss of precision in cluster designs, the standard error estimates need to be adapted,
whereas the estimators for population values remain largely unchanged. To estimate population
totals based on a sample of m out of M clusters, we simply summarize the cluster totals:
τˆX =
m∑
k=1
τXk
πk
where τXk denotes the total of the values of variable x in the k
th cluster and πk the sampling
probability of the kth cluster.12 Since in one-stage cluster sampling, all secondary sampling units
within a cluster are observed, the totals are known. If we assume that the sampling probability of
clusters, πk, is equal among clusters as is the case in random sampling of clusters, i.e π1 = π2 =
... = πm, then we can simplify the estimation of totals as follows
τˆCluX =
M
m
m∑
k=1
τXk .
The adapted estimation of variance, and thus standard errors, for estimates of totals in one-
stage cluster designs is also unproblematic. Since all units within sample clusters are observed,
the selection of secondary sampling units in one-stage cluster sampling does not add uncertainty
to our estimation. As above, we are able to draw on the population value of τXc and not on its
12The total of a cluster τXk is denoted with a large X since the population value of a given variable within a given
cluster is known.
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estimate τˆXc. In a clustered survey design on households, for instance, we know the exact total
of an observed value, say income, for every household in our sample, because every individual
in a selected household is observed. There is no added uncertainty. Thus, the Horvitz-Thompson
variance estimator for a total in a one-stage cluster sample design is the same as the one intro-
duced above. We simply substitute τXk for xi and use the sampling probabilities of clusters, pik
and pil as they constitute the primary sampling units:
ˆvar(τˆCluX ) =
m∑
k=1
1− pik
pi2k
τXk
2 +
m∑
l=1
m∑
k=1
k̸=l
pikl − pikpil
piklpikpil
τXk τXl .
We now turn to the estimation of means. Whereas in the estimation of totals, differing cluster
sizes are not important, they obviously need to be taken into account in the estimation of means.
To estimate means, the svyymean function in the ‘survey’ package draws on a model-based esti-
mator (Kauermann and Küchenhoff 2010, pp. 168–170, 184). Consequently, we exclusively focus
on this type of estimator. The model-based estimator of a population mean in a one-stage cluster
design is given by
µˆCluX =
m∑
k=1
τXk
m∑
k=1
Nk
= x¯
where Nk denotes the number of elements in the kth cluster and x¯ the arithmetic mean of the
values of all secondary sampling units. Thus, to estimate the mean of the population values of x,
µX, we simply draw on the arithmetic mean of the sample values. The corresponding estimate of
variance is given by
ˆvar(µˆCluX ) =
1
n¯
1
m(m− 1)
m∑
k=1
(τXk −Nk µˆ
Clu
Xk
)2
where n¯ = 1m
m∑
k=1
Nk denotes the mean cluster size.13 Since the estimation draws on the variance
of cluster means and not the single values, differing cluster sizes are taken into account.14
The size of the effect of clustering on standard errors depends on the homogeneity within
clusters. It can be estimated by the intracluster correlation coefficient, ρ, which reports Pearson’s
correlation coefficient of unit pairs in a cluster (Lohr 2009, pp. 174–175). Since the effect of clus-
tering depends on the intra-cluster correlation, it differs between variables. This was already dis-
cussed above. It appears obvious that the increase in standard errors due to clustering is also
dependent on the type of the cluster. In general, we can expect homogeneity to be far greater
within households than within regions. In consequence, it is of far greater importance to account
for household clustering than for geographic clustering to prevent type I errors, i.e. the rejection
of a null-hypothesis that is true (cf. Neyman and Pearson 1928).
As we have seen above, survey designs that include cluster sampling can inflate standard
errors. Overestimation of precision can lead to unwarranted inferences. This is of pivotal im-
portance for the subsequent empirical analysis. One part of the analysis investigates differences
with regard to the availability of household appliances between individuals of different religious
groups. The data comes from a one-stage cluster design. Since household appliances are shared
within households, individuals within a household are homogenous with regard to this variables.
In contrast to simple random sampling, the inclusion of more than a single individual from each
household does not yield any added information. Introducing the false assumption of simple
random sampling of individuals would thus greatly reduce the estimation of standard errors. In
effect, such an overestimation in precision might yield significant differences between individuals
that do not reflect real differences in the population. This would be a type I error.
Taking clustering into account leads to a significant increase in confidence interval estimates,
as shown in figure 9.2 on page 156. It extends the width of the confidence interval by about 166
percent.
13If all cluster sizes,Nk, were known, we could draw on the mean cluster size of the population N¯.
14This becomes obvious when transforming the last term in the estimator: (τXk −Nkµˆ
Clu
Xk
)2 = N2k(µXk −µX)
2 (cf.
Kauermann and Küchenhoff 2010, p. 169).
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Figure 9.2: Effect of clustering on estimation of mean radio availability of Muslims in Western Mindanao.
Taking clustering into account signiﬁcantly increases conﬁdence intervals.
Stratiﬁcation
After ﬁnite populations and clustering, stratiﬁcation is the third characteristic of sample designs
that needs to be taken into account in standard error estimation. Stratiﬁcation describes a tech-
nique by which the population is ﬁrst divided into mutually exclusive strata according to speciﬁc
characteristics before the elements within each stratum are selected. In other words, stratiﬁca-
tion describes the adjustment of sampling probabilities of elements in the universe depending on
their group membership (Thompson 2012, pp. 141–156; Lohr 2009, pp. 73–115; Kish 1965, pp. 75–
112; Lumley 2010, pp. 21–23). For instance, the population might be divided into rural and ur-
ban population and then an adequate sample size for reliable estimates is taken in both groups.
This intentional, i.e. non-random, technique assures that the number of cases for small groups in
the population is not too low to yield acceptable estimates. More speciﬁcally, stratiﬁcation leads
to lower standard errors if strata are selected as to minimize variance between elements within
strata. Thus, whereas homogeneity within clusters increases standard errors, homogeneity within
strata decreases it. In the case of clusters, the inclusion in the sample of multiple units from single
homogenous clusters does not add new information leading to higher standard errors. The case
of stratiﬁcation differs in this respect. The sampling scheme is deliberately adjusted to optimize
the sample size for the subpopulation of interest. Statistically, the standard error estimation for
the population exclusively rests on the sum of the independent standard error estimations for the
strata. The gains from stratiﬁcation are thus largest where differences pertaining to the variable
of interest are minimized within and maximized between strata.
In the IPUMS-I samples, two types of stratiﬁcation occur: implicit stratiﬁcation due to system-
atic sampling, and explicit stratiﬁcation. Both are addressed in turn.
Primary sampling units in the IPUMS-I samples are often systematically, and not randomly,
sampled (Minnesota Population Center 2015a). In contrast to simple random sampling, system-
atic sampling strategies select every mth primary sampling unit from a list after selecting a ran-
dom starting point (Thompson 2012, pp. 157–170; Lohr 2009, pp. 50–51). The sampling interval
m is usually ﬁxed. For a relative sample size of 0.1, for instance, every tenth household on an
enumerated list of households is selected after a random start. Just as with cluster sampling, sys-
tematic sampling is often the method of choice in surveys of large populations, as it is easy to
implement. Similar to random sampling, the sampling probability of each primary sampling unit
is equal; for, the starting point is selected at random. In contrast to simple random samples, sys-
tematic sampling puts stratiﬁcation that exists in the ordering of primary sampling units into
effect (Kish 1965, pp. 114–115). If the enumerated list of households follows a geographical pat-
tern, as in many of the IPUMS-I samples, systematic sampling leads to a geographically more
evenly distributed sample of households than would random sampling. This is a form of implicit
low-level geographic stratiﬁcation (Minnesota Population Center 2015a). Implicit stratiﬁcation
leads to more precise estimates and, consequently, to lower standard errors. More speciﬁcally,
implicit stratiﬁcation through systematic sampling improves the precision of estimates of those
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Figure 9.3: Effect of stratiﬁcation on estimation of mean radio availability of Muslims in Western Mindanao.
Stratiﬁcation only marginally increases the precision of estimates.
variables that are directly related to or correlated with geography. In the IPUMS-I samples, this
speciﬁcally pertains to “race, ethnicity, education, household utilities, and dwelling characteris-
tics” (Minnesota Population Center 2015a). In effect, systematic sampling moderates the loss of
precision due to household clustering.
A second type of stratiﬁcation that is present in some of the IPUMS samples is explicit stratiﬁ-
cation. In explicit stratiﬁcation, the population is split into strata according to criteria of interest.
A case of explicit geographic stratiﬁcation, for instance, is the oversampling of rural areas. To be
able to account for stratiﬁcation requires slight adjustments of the H-T estimator. As described
above, stratiﬁed samples in effect consist of multiple independent subsamples. To estimate a pop-
ulation total or mean, these subsamples need to be added up. Consequently, the estimators for a
population total and population mean become
τˆStrX =
m∑
k=1
τˆXk
and
μˆStrX =
τˆStrX
N
respectively.15
To estimate standard errors, the H-T estimator aggregates the standard error estimates for
the different strata. As above, the estimations for strata are treated as if they were independent
samples:
ˆvar(τˆStrX ) =
m∑
k=1
ˆvar(τˆXk)
ˆvar(μˆStrX ) =
1
N2
ˆvar(τˆXk)
where τˆXk refers to the estimated total of variable Xwithin the k
th stratum. Since sampling strate-
gies might differ between strata, the respective estimators of the standard errors of totals and
means for substrata, ˆvar(τˆXk) and ˆvar(μˆXk), might also be different between strata and need to
be speciﬁed according to the survey design. These estimators were already described above and
will not be repeated here.
For most surveys the strata variable holds information on pseudo strata that account for sys-
tematic sampling. In some cases, such as the survey in India, the variable includes information
15In order to avoid unnecessary complications, the notation remains unchanged to the notations for clusters: ‘Stratum’
simply substitutes ‘cluster’. The same applies to the estimation of totals and means within strata. Depending on whether
clustering, simple random sampling, or weighted sampling is employed, the respective estimators were introduced above.
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Figure 9.4: Distribution of weights in Philippines 2000 survey data. X-axis cut at 20.
on explicit strata. As illustrated in ﬁgure 9.3, the consideration of implicit stratiﬁcation leads to a
marginal decrease in standard error estimates. It reduces the width of the conﬁdence interval by
0.86 percent.
Sampling weights
Thus far, we have assumed that the sampling probability of units is similar across units. The ﬁnite
population characteristic introduced above considers the size of the sampling probabilities. It
does not, however, reﬂect differing sampling probabilities between population elements. Unequal
probabilities for different elements might be intended as in the case of deliberate oversampling
of small populations. Other effects that make sample weights necessary is non-response or the
underenumeration of speciﬁc sampling units in the census. The Horvitz-Thompson estimators for
population values and variances account for unequal sampling probabilities, as they include the
sampling probability πi. To account for these effects, sampling weights are supplied by IPUMS-I
and are taken into account in all of our calculations.
The distribution of weights is illustrated in Figure 9.4. Since the sample includes ten percent
of the population, the mean value of weights, 10.29 is quite close to 10. Each person in the sample
represents roughly 10 people in the population. Only 0.6 percent of the sample units have an
assigned weight smaller than 5, and 0.21 percent have a weight larger than 15.
9.1.5 Horizontal Inequality
This section illustrates the calculation of the independent variable horizontal inequality for the 2000
survey in the Philippines. The variable is designed to include as much information as possible,
while simultaneously taking account of all characteristics of the sample design affecting standard
error estimation. It is thus as precise as possible and at the same time as conservative as necessary.
Under the condition of data availability, the estimation of horizontal inequality draws on up to
seven indicators. Five of the indicators allow for the measurement of the economic position of in-
dividuals, whereas the other two is used as an instrument for the social position of an individual.
All indicators are shown in table 9.3.
An indicator is excluded if more than half of the observations are missing. In the Phillipines
2000 survey, for instance, respondents were not asked for their employment status (see table 9.4).
The cross-correlation of the indicators of horizontal inequality is displayed in ﬁgure 9.5 on
page 159. All but two correlation coefﬁcients are negligible or weak: The availability of electric-
ity strongly and positively correlates with the ownership of a television set, which moderately
and positively correlates with radio availability. This indicates that each indicator adds genuine
information.
Themean of the correlation coefﬁcients between indicators of economic position is 0.33whereas
the correlation coefﬁcient between the two available indicators of the social position is 0.25. In
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Economic position
• availability of radio in household (radio)
• availability of television set in household (tv)
• availability of electricity set in household (electric)
• availability of a toilet in household (toilet)
• employment status, i.e.whether a person is currently not unemployed, i.e. employed or inactive
(empstat)
Social position
• literacy, i.e. the ability to write and read (lit)
• educational attainment, i.e. level of schooling completed (edattain)
Table 9.3: Inequality indicators.
1 0.61 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.27
1 0.4 0.25 0.19 0.28
1 0.15 0.11 0.13
1 0.12 0.15
1 0.25
1
electric
tv
radio
toilet
lit
edattain
electric tv radio toilet lit edattain
Indicator
In
di
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r
Figure 9.5: Cross-correlation table for horizontal inequality indicators. All but two correlation coefﬁcients
(electricity and television set, radio and television set) are negligible indicating that each indicator adds
information.
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type var values missings perc.missing
economic radio 7,417,810 0 0
economic tv 7,417,810 0 0
economic electric 7,417,810 0 0
economic toilet 7,417,810 0 0
economic empstat 0 7,417,810 100
social lit 6,482,233 935,577 13
social edattain 6,094,149 1,323,661 18
Table 9.4: Data availability for Philippines 2000 survey
comparison, the mean of the correlation coefficients between indicators belonging to different in-
dicator groups (e.g. tv and literacy) is 0.18 and thus smaller than each of the two within-group
correlations. Although the difference is not large, it indicates that the two indicators measure dif-
ferent dimensions of inequality. Moreover, the rather low correlation coefficients among most of
the indicators illustrate the added value of using multiple indicators where possible.
All information on horizontal inequality are summarized in figure 9.6 on page 161 : the es-
timated ratios of the availability of a radio, a television, electricity, and a toilet; the literacy rate
as well as mean educational attainment broken down by region; and religious group with 95
percent confidence intervals. The dashed and the solid line indicate the regional and population
mean, respectively. Confidence intervals of mean estimates are indicated by a shaded area around
the lines. Due to the large sample size and low resultant standard errors, they are barely visible.
To estimate whether the difference between the estimated mean of an indicator for a specific
subpopulation in a specific region (the group mean µˆgroupx ), and the estimated mean of that very
indicator for the whole population in that region (the regional mean µˆregx ) is due to chance, we
rely on Students’ t-test. The analysis includes the following steps: First, we estimate the differ-
ence between the group and the regional mean. Obviously, the best estimate is their difference:
µˆ
group
x − µˆ
reg
x .
Second, we calculate the variables needed for the t-test. Degrees of freedom are calculated
based on the number of distinct households in the sample: m− 1. This corrects for the clustered
nature of the survey. Whereas the units of observations are ultimately individuals, the obser-
vations are clustered in households. Households thus represent independent pieces of informa-
tion.16 The standard errors of the estimates for the group mean SEgroupx¯ and the regional means
were calculated with the ‘survey’ package as presented above.
To take into account the standard error of the estimate of the regional mean, the t-test was
repeated 1,000 times for each individual population mean. In each run, a different random value
of µˆregx is drawn based on the standard error estimate of the regional mean. If at least 950 of the t-
tests reject the null-hypothesis of no difference with a p-value smaller than 0.05, then we consider
the difference between the regional and the population mean to be significant.
Figure 9.8 displays a subset (we cut the x-axis) of the results of the repeated t-tests against the
results of a single t-test with µˆregx . The x-axis shows the p-value of the t-test comparing the esti-
mated group mean µˆgroupx with the estimated regional mean µˆ
reg
x . These would be the results
if the standard error of the estimate of the regional mean were not taken into account. Put dif-
ferently, µˆregx is in this case erroneously regarded a fixed population value and not an estimated
value. The y-axis shows the number of t-tests rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference with a
p-value smaller than 0.05. The dashed lines show the five percent threshold of p-values for both
tests. The gray area highlights those cases where a t-test falsely assuming µˆregx to be a population
value would reject the null-hypothesis of no difference and the repeated t-test does not reject the
null-hypothesis. A single t-test against µˆregx would have incorrectly rejected the null hypothesis
(type I error). The cases are shown in table 9.5. As expected these are all cases where the differ-
ence between the regional and the group mean is small (compare figures 9.6 on page 161). These
results illustrate the importance of integrating standard errors in the estimation of differences.
16For indicator values that might differ between people within the same household, i.e. educational attainment, literacy,
and educational attainment, the followed approach underestimates the degrees of freedom. This, however, is unproblem-
atic for two reasons. First, it leads to conservative estimates. Second, the mentioned variables can be expected to be highly
correlated within households.
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Figure 9.6: Means for indicators by region and religion. Non visible error bars are due to very small SE.
161
9.1. HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY CHAPTER 9. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
radio tv electric toilet lit edattain
B
icol
C
agayan
Valley
C
entral
Luzon
C
entral
M
indanao
and
A
utonom
ous
R
egion
of
M
uslim
M
indanao
C
entral
V
isayas
C
ordillera
A
dm
inistrative
R
egion
E
astern
V
isayas
Ilocos
N
ational
C
apital
R
egion
N
orthern
M
indanao,
S
outhern
M
indanao,
and
C
araga
S
outhern
Tagalog
W
estern
M
indanao
W
estern
V
isayas
-40%-20% 0% 20% 40% -40%-20% 0% 20% 40% -40%-20% 0% 20% 40% -40%-20% 0% 20% 40% -40%-20% 0% 20% 40% -40%-20% 0% 20% 40%
Difference between group and regional mean (95% conf. int.)
Religion Buddhist Christian Muslim No religion Other Means Regional Mean
Figure 9.7: Estimated difference between group and regional mean. Error bars not visible due to very small
SE. Hashtag marks cases where null hypothesis of no difference is rejected with 95 percent conﬁdence.)
162
9.1. HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY CHAPTER 9. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
0
250
500
750
1000
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
p-value of t-test ignoring SE of regional mean
N
o 
of
 t-
te
st
s 
w
ith
 p
 <
 0
.0
5 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
S
E
 o
f r
eg
io
na
l m
ea
n
Figure 9.8: Effect of standard error of regional mean. Gray area indicates cases where the inclusion of stan-
dard errors prevented possible type-I errors.
As a ﬁnal step, we can now turn to the results of the analysis. Figure 9.7 shows the estimates
for the differences between the group means and the regional means together with the 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals for each estimate. Cases where more than 95% of the repeated t-tests rejected the
null hypothesis of no difference are indicated by a hashtag. The analysis identiﬁes positive and
negative non-random deviations of the group from regional means. The analysis of the Philip-
pines yields 390 different estimates. For 213 cases, the t-test rejected the null hypothesis of no
difference. 76 of these are above and 137 below the regional mean. The amount of difference
ranges from -55% to 32%. The distribution of estimated differences by signiﬁcance is shown in
ﬁgure 9.9 on page 164. By large, it shows the expected picture. Differences identiﬁed as a possible
result of random variation cluster around zero, whereas the relative share of signiﬁcant differ-
ences increases further away from the center. However, there are also signiﬁcant differences with
small effect sizes and vice versa. This underlines the importance of integrating both, the level of
precision of estimates and the size of the estimated effect in the analysis. Ignoring either of the
two dimensions might result in false inferences.
Figure 9.7 on page 162 shows the estimates for the differences between the group means and
the regional means together with the 95% conﬁdence intervals for each estimate. Cases in which
more than 95% of the repeated t-tests rejected the null hypothesis of no difference are indicated
by a hashtag.
The ﬁgure presents a highly detailed picture of inequality in the Philippines. It is based on
data of more than 7 million survey respondents in more than 1.5 million households. All char-
acteristics of the sample designs are taken into account in the calculation of the estimates. The
data is disaggregated in two ways. First, it takes the ethnically deﬁned region-group as the unit
of analysis and is thereby geographically precise. Second, it includes inequality along multiple
dimensions and is thus very broad.
The aforementioned estimation procedure described in this section is applied to all samples
under analysis. This is brieﬂy summarized in the next subsection.
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religname geoname variable
Buddhist Western Visayas tv
Buddhist Western Mindanao electric
Christian Cagayan Valley edattain
Christian Cagayan Valley electric
Christian Cagayan Valley lit
Christian Cagayan Valley tv
Christian Central Luzon electric
Christian Southern Tagalog edattain
Christian Central Visayas electric
Christian Cordillera Administrative Region radio
Other Central Luzon toilet
Table 9.5: Cases of falsely rejected null hypothesis
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Figure 9.9: Distribution of estimated differences between group means and regional means. Colors indicate
whether at least 950 out of 1,000 t-tests rejected the null hypothesis of no difference at a level of p<0.5
9.1.6 Generalization
The procedures described above can now be applied to all samples. This subsection describes
how this was done. The generalization involves ﬁve steps:
1. Exclusion of cases due to missing data
2. Determination of availability of inequality indicators
3. Sample-speciﬁc speciﬁcation of survey design
4. Identiﬁcation of variables to distinguish groups
5. Computation of means and standard errors for available inequality indicators by group
The analysis, as illustrated above for the Philippines 2000 survey, could in principle be con-
ducted for all 39 datasets that are available for Asia. Due to missing data, however, some of the
datasets are excluded: The survey Pakistan 1973 is excluded since no data on groups, i.e. language,
religion, or ethnicity, is available. In the Philippines 1995 sample, data on religion is missing that
is available in the surveys 1990 and 2000. To ensure comparability, the 1995 dataset is excluded.
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Fraction Systematic Stratification Geo. Clustering HH Clustering Weighting Inclusion
Bangladesh 2001 0.10 X - - X - X
Bangladesh 2011 0.05 X - - X - X
Cambodia 1998 0.10 - X - X - X
Cambodia 2008 0.10 X - - X - X
China 1982 0.01 X - - X - X
China 1990 0.01 - - X X - X
India 1983 0.00 - - X X X X
India 1987 0.00 - - X X X X
India 1993 0.00 - - X X X X
India 1999 0.00 - - X X X X
India 2004 0.00 - - X X X X
Indonesia 1971 0.00 - X X X X X
Indonesia 1976 0.00 - X X X X X
Indonesia 1980 0.05 - - X X X X
Indonesia 1985 0.00 - - X X X X
Indonesia 1990 0.00 - - X X X X
Indonesia 2000 0.10 X - - X - X
Indonesia 2010 0.10 X - - X - X
Kyrgyz Republic 1999 0.10 X - - X - X
Kyrgyz Republic 2009 0.10 X - - X - X
Malaysia 1970 0.02 X - - X - X
Malaysia 1980 0.02 X - - X - X
Malaysia 1991 0.02 X - - X - X
Malaysia 2000 0.02 X - - X - X
Mongolia 2000 0.10 X - - X - X
Pakistan 1981 0.10 - - - - X X
Pakistan 1998 0.10 X - - X - X
Philippines 1990 0.10 - - X X X X
Philippines 2000 0.10 - - X X X X
Thailand 1970 0.02 - X - X X X
Thailand 1980 0.01 - X - X X X
Thailand 1990 0.01 - - X X X X
Thailand 2000 0.01 - - X X X X
Vietnam 1989 0.05 - X X X X X
Vietnam 1999 0.03 - X X X X X
Bangladesh 1991 0.10 X - - X - X
Pakistan 1973 0.02 - - X X X -
Philippines 1995 0.10 X - - X - -
Vietnam 2009 0.15 - X X X X -
Table 9.6: Survey Designs
In the Vietnam 2009 sample, the ethnicity variable takes the value of either ‘Kinh’ or ‘Others’ and
thus cannot be used to differentiate groups. This leaves us with 36 individual surveys (see first
column of table 9.6 on page 165).
As a second step, the availability of horizontal inequality indicators needs to be compared
across samples. As summarized in table 9.3, the estimation of horizontal inequality draws on up
to seven indicators conditional on their availability.
In a third step, the estimation of standard errors needs to be adjusted according to the char-
acteristics of the sample designs. Table 9.6 provides an overview over the sample designs as de-
scribed by the Minnesota Population Center (2015b). The first three columns describe the sam-
pling fraction, whether units were systematically sampled, and the use of complex stratification
techniques, respectively. The fourth and the fifth column indicate clustering by household or ge-
ographic region, respectively. As described above, large sample fractions as well as implicit and
explicit stratification yield smaller standard errors. Clustering, in contrast, inflates standard er-
rors. The last column indicates whether a sample is included in the final analysis.
The fourth step consists of determining how to distinguish groups. Aswith the other variables,
the availability of variables to discern groups (religion, language, and ethnicity) and the number
of categories within each of the variables (e.g., Buddhist, Christian) differs between samples.
The tables show that, due to restricted data availability, the categories to distinguish groups
necessarily vary between samples.Whereas the respondents religion is widely coded, information
about language and ethnicity are seldom available. Whether it is possible to compare the samples
thus hinges upon the question of whether the different categories are functionally equivalent be-
tween samples. From a more general point of view, all three of the used variables—i.e. religion,
language, and ethnicity—refer to comparatively stable and hard to change individual charac-
teristics that are important in the formation of collective self-concepts (Gurr 1974). However, the
relative importance of religion, language, and ethnicity differs between countries. For instance,
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Figure 9.10: Share of groups by split variable
religion forms an important part of collective self-categorization in the Philippines. It differenti-
ates the Moros living in the Southern Philippines from the majority of Christians predominantly
populating the other parts of the country. A similar approach to differentiate groups in Indonesia,
however, would be problematic. The ethnic Acehnese in Indonesia, for instance, share their Sunni
faith with the dominating part of the Indonesian population. Characteristic for the Achenese,
however, is, besides their own language and cultural practices, a decidedly stricter interpreta-
tion of Islam (Croissant, Schwank, et al. 2009, p. 123). The categories of the variables religion or
religiond do not reﬂect these differences as all Muslims are subsumed under a single category.
Consequently, it makes more sense to distinguish subgroups by language than by religion in the
case of Indonesia.
Figure 9.10 plots the share of groups of the total population for three categorizing variables
for Indonesia 1990.17 The barplot in the second column shows that all Muslims in Indonesia,
an estimated 87 percent of the population (based on the 1990 survey), are coded as ‘Muslims’.
The detailed coding of the variable religion which is shown in the third column simply splits
the category ‘Christian’ into ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestants/others’, but does not further differentiate
the category of Muslims. The coding does not reﬂect empirically important differences between
groups. Consequently, other variables are needed to deﬁne groups. Arguably, the variables lan-
guage (lang) or ethnic groups (ethnic) better reﬂect collective identities in Indonesia. Here, how-
ever, data availability is restricted: Information on language is only available for the sample of
1990, whereas information on ethnicity is only available for 2000.
Apart from data on split variables, the number of categories becomes an issue. The 1990 sam-
ple differentiates more than 170 languages and the 2010 sample more than 660 ethnic groups. If
17The estimation corrects for the varying sampling weights. Consequently, it does not depict the share of sampling units
but the estimated share of the size of the groups. In this case, standard errors are negligible.
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the number of categories becomes too large, type I errors become more frequent. This is because
the number of categories influences the estimation of standard errors via reduced sample sizes.
To minimize this problem, the number of categories is reduced by excluding small groups. In the
sample of Indonesia 1990, the exclusion of groups that make up for less than 0.5 percent of the
population reduces the number of differentiated languages to 17.
A threshold of 0.5 percentmight appear small. However, the subpopulation of those that speak
Acehnese— 0.98 percent of the population—encompasses an estimated 1,762,490 people, 11,799
of which are in the sample. The group is thus neither negligible in size, nor does the analysis
suffer from too small sample sizes. The estimated share of groups defined by language of the
total population is shown in the first column of figure 9.10 on 166 . In summary, the selection of
a variable to select groups needs to take into account the availability of variables, the number of
categories, and the empirical importance of available variables in the respective countries.
The fifth and last step encompasses the computation of means and standard errors for avail-
able inequality indicators for the chosen subpopulations. The procedure for each sample mirrors
the procedure that was described in the illustration. One issue that might arise in this step is a lack
of comparability of the values of the variables across samples. However, the Minnesota Popula-
tion Center (2013) has integrated variables across samples so that they become comparable. The
sampling design, however, needs to be adjusted for each individual sample according to table 9.6
on page 165.
In summary, the five steps described above allow for an estimation of means and standard
errors that can be compared across samples.
9.2 Measuring the Strategic EnvironmentwithDisaggregatedGeospa-
tial Data
Horizontal inequality is the main property of the macro-level to explain themotivation of individ-
uals to found, join, or partake in collective action in a political conflict. Apart from the horizontal
inequality, however, the decision is also influenced by the strategic environment. These opportu-
nity structures are the macro-level patterns influencing immediate decision-making processes. In
this study, the following five indicators are employed to account for the strategic environment:
• Youth bulge (subsec. 9.2.1)
• Population size (subsec. 9.2.2)
• Land class (subsec. 9.2.3)
• Ruggedness of terrain (subsec. 9.2.4)
• Resources (subsec. 9.2.5)
9.2.1 Youth Bulge
A first factor of the strategic environment possibly influencing the formation of non-state actors
is youth bulge. Apart from some research that has disaggregated data below the national level
(Urdal 2008), research on the effect of youth bulges on conflict has exclusively been cross-national
(cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Croissant, Wagschal, et al. 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Urdal 2006;
Wagschal, Metz, and Schwank 2008). This is hardly surprising since spatially disaggregated data
on demographic structures was not available until recently. However, this has changed with the
release of grid-based data on age distribution (Alegana et al. 2015; Deville et al. 2014; Gaughan
et al. 2013; Stevens et al. 2015; Tatem et al. 2013). The data is estimated based on census data,
household survey, and covariates (Alegana et al. 2015).
The rastered data has a resolution of 0.00833 decimal degrees which is about 1 square kilome-
ter at the equator and is available in the form of 28 raster layers for each year of observation. Each
layer represents the estimated total population of an age group defined in five-year steps for a
single sex (0-5 years & male, 0-5 years & female, 5-10 years & male, 5-10 years &female, ..., above
65 & male, above 65 & female).
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Figure 9.11: Youth Bulge in Asia and Oceania,2000
Youth bulge is operationalized as the relative share of those aged 15-25 of the total population
older than 15 years. To retrieve the respective estimates, the layer data was summarized accord-
ingly, resulting in a single layer holding the youth bulge measure in the original resolution. The
data was then aggregated to the level of subnational units by calculating the arithmetic mean in
each unit. Figure 9.11 shows a map of the youth bulge in Asia and Oceania in the year 2000.
9.2.2 Population Size
The size of the population is among the variables most robustly related to conﬂict (cf. ch. 2).
The population of a region can easily be estimated from the surveys with the Horvitz-Thompson
estimator as described above. Since the measure is calculated from censuses, it should lead to
valid population ﬁgures for subnational units. To test for the validity, an alternative measure for
the size of the population in each subnational unit can be derived from the same source that was
used for data on youth bulge. Figure 9.12 on page 169 shows this data. To mitigate the effect of
the great dispersion of population size, the natural logarithm of the variable is included in the
analysis.
9.2.3 Land Class
A third variable that affects decision-making processes of NSCA is the terrain of an area. Two
types of land classes have gained speciﬁc attention in conﬂict research: mountains and forested
areas.
Whereas early analyses of the link between geographical properties and political conﬂict have
focused on rather coarse indicators, such as the percentage of national territory covered by forest
(Buhaug and Gates 2002) or a country’s percentage of mountainous terrain (Buhaug and Lujala
2005; Collier and Hoefﬂer 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), satellite sensor-derived land class data
allows to construct indicators with far greater precision.
Land class data describe topography by classifying it into a number of categories. This analysis
rests on data by Tateishi et al. (2014), who developed a raster specifying the class of land cover into
20 different types (see ﬁrst column in table 9.7). The classiﬁcation process, in turn, primarily rests
on data from the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS), i.e. satellite sensors.
168
9.2. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT CHAPTER 9. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Longitude
La
tit
ud
e
40°S
20°S
0°
20°N
40°N
60°E 80°E 100°E 120°E 140°E 160°E
10- 5
10- 4
10- 3
10- 2
10- 1
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
Figure 9.12: Population in Asia and Oceania,scale log transformed
Processing the data, Tateishi et al. (2014) additionally made use of existing land cover data and
data such as, e.g., nightlight to classify urban areas.18
To suit the needs of the present analysis, the classiﬁcation scheme has been simpliﬁed by ag-
gregating classes. As depicted in table 9.7, the 20 existing classes were aggregated to ﬁve classes
based on the criterion of land accessibility. For instance, forests, mangroves, rock-, snow- or ice-
covered land were grouped in one category. This reclassiﬁcation is not only a more valid measure-
ment of the explanatory variable, land accessibility, but also increases the accuracy of the dataset.
Whereas the overall acccuracy of land classiﬁcation based on the original classiﬁcation scheme
can be estimated to be about 78 percent (ibid., p. 116), a great deal of inaccuracy results from clas-
siﬁcation errors between classes that are summarized for the purposes of this analysis.19 Since
the overall accuracy of the given data is already quite high and reclassiﬁcation greatly improves
accuracy on the cost of precision, we can assume the data to be reliable. Figure 9.13 shows the
land cover of Asia and Oceania.
9.2.4 Rugged Terrain
Broadening the classes subsumed under inaccessible terrain arguably increases the validity of
the indicator ‘landclass’. One of its main and most widely used components, however, is ﬂawed:
mountainous terrain. Although mountains are obviously correlated with inaccessibility, the indi-
cator fails to correctly classify mountain plateaus.
Due to these shortcomings, this analysis additionally draws on terrain ruggedness. A good
measure is the terrain ruggedness index as developed by Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot (1999). The in-
dex expresses height differences of a given point to eight adjacent points that are located, equally
spaced, around the point of interest. More speciﬁcally, it is deﬁned as the square root of the sum
of the squared height differences between these points.
Raster data based on 30 arc-seconds cells is provided by Nunn and Puga (2012). The variable
used in the analysis is the mean of the terrain ruggedness of the region. Water areas are excluded
based on the landclass data described above and the data is weighted for cell size.
18For a detailed scheme of how the data was produced see Tateishi et al. (2014, p. 104).
19In the single most inaccurate class ‘tree open’, for instance, 40 of 69 cells were incorrectly classiﬁed. 22 of these 40
incorrectly classiﬁed cells, however, lie within the broader category ‘Forest/Mangrove/Rock/Snow’ that is used in this
analysis.
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Original Class New Class
Broadleaf Evergreen Forest
Inaccessible Land
Broadleaf Deciduous Forest
Needleleaf Evergreen Forest
Needleleaf Deciduous Forest
Mixed Forest
Tree Open
Mangrove
Wetland
Bare area,consolidated(gravel,rock)
Bare area,unconsolidated (sand)
Snow / Ice
Shrub
Small or sparse vegetation
Herbaceous
Herbaceous with Sparse Tree/Shrub
Sparse vegetation
Cropland
CroplandPaddy ﬁeld
Cropland / Other Vegetation Mosaic
Urban Urban
Water bodies Water
Table 9.7: Reclassiﬁcation scheme for land class. The original classes of the data from Tateishi et al. (2014) are
aggregated to ﬁve new categories.
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Figure 9.14: Terrain Ruggedness in Asia and Oceania
9.2.5 Resources
To assess the role of resources, we included point data on diamonds (Gilmore et al. 2005; Lujala
2009), gold and tantalum (Frank 1999), cannabis and opium polygon data (Buhaug and Lujala
2005), as well as on the presence of oil (Lujala, Rød, and Thieme 2007).
9.2.6 Validity and Missing Data
All of the ﬁve variables described above are derived from georeferenced raster or even point
data. The use of raster data has its greatest advantages in conﬂict research where it can be linked
to point speciﬁc information. Information on the location of camps of NSCA, for instance, can
directly be linked to those cells of the raster that hold the information for that very area. This
provides huge improvements in the validity of indicators in comparison to highly aggregated
measures such as the percentage of a country covered by trees or mountains (cf. Collier and Hoef-
ﬂer 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Moreover, raster data also allows deriving measures for areas.
It can easily be aggregated to any geographical unit by taking the mean—or any other adequate
function—of those cell values falling in the area of interest.
As a trade-off, however, disaggregated data is not always available. This primarily affects
the temporal dimension and—due to the nature of the measured phenomena—the demographic
indicators ‘youth bulge’ and the alternative measurement of the total population. Lack of time-
series is less of a problem pertaining to indicators that hardly change over time, such as land class
and time invariant indicators such as terrain ruggedness.
9.3 Non State Actors
We now turn to our data on NSCA. Chapter 6 elaborated on a detailed conceptualization of non-
state conﬂict actors. The concept clearly reﬂects the critical realist approach to deﬁnitions and its
foundation in the philosophical discussion of collective intentionality. As a result, the deﬁnition
is neither particularly parsimonious nor exclusively designed to guide empirical research. As the
following discussion shows, however, the concept is well-balanced: It carves out the essential
properties of non-state conﬂict actors while at the same time providing a strong foundation for
empirical analysis. Whereas the former has been discussed in detail, the latter still has yet to be
proven.
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9.3.1 Disaggregated Conflict Actor Database
Empirical data on non-state conflict actors is stored in the Disaggregated Conflict Actors Databse
(DISCA). Taking the above definition as a point of departure, DISCA was designed from scratch
for the purpose of explaining the emergence and dynamic development of non-state conflict ac-
tors over time. It includes data on 73 distinct non-state actors in Asia and Oceania in the period
since 1945 (see table B.1).
The dataset stands out in four regards. First, it does not investigate conflict dyads but focuses
on single actors. In the NSA-Database by (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009a), for in-
stance, the strength of actors is coded relative to the government. We instead focus on the actor to
take into account the that NSCA might be engaged in different conflicts.
Second, the period of observation is determined by foundation and disbandment of NSCA
and not by the fact that they are engaged in conflict. The indicators to discern foundation are
derived from the concept developed in chapter 6. This allows for a precise and valid assessment
of when actors emerge and disband.
Third, the dataset is time-variant by allowing for entirely flexible coding of intervals. This
improves existing databases that only code single data points for long periods of observation.
Moreover, since the conflict data in DISCON is disaggregated by month, this allows to analyze
dynamics with great detail. Figure 9.16 illustrates the time variant data on size and weaponry for
selected Philippine NSCA.
Fourth, the data on non-state conflict actors is stored in a PostGIS enabled relational database
with PostgreSQL as the managing system.20 On the one hand, this allows to link DISCA to
databases on horizontal inequality, the strategic environment, as well as other conflict databases
to facilitate its use in analyses. On the other hand, the dataset is geographically disaggregated. It
holds information on the location of headquarters as well as territorial control for all of the in-
cluded conflict actors. Figure 9.15 maps all coded headquarters of the included non-state actors.
Apart from these four main advantages, DISCA also comprises data on relations of NSCA.
Here, we differentiate two types of relations: endogenous relations (e.g., the extraction of re-
sources in an area or extortion of the population) as well as exogenous relations (e.g. receiving
support from other state or non-state actors). Moreover, we coded the aims of actors. Tables A.1 –
A.6 describe the database tables and variables.21
20A relational database consists of tables. Each table holds information on specific characteristics of non-state actors and
consists of multiple columns storing values of variables. A single row in a table holds a unique piece of information on
the respective characteristic of non-state actors. IDs relate the tables.
21The codebook for DISCA is included in the Appendix of this chapter.
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Figure 9.15: Headquarters of NSCA
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Figure 9.16: Size and weaponry of NSCA
9.4 Horizontal inequality, the strategic environment, and the for-
mation of NSCA
Having described the measurement of the main concepts, we now turn to the analysis of the em-
pirical relationship between horizontal inequality, the strategic environment, and the emergence
of non-state conﬂict actors.
One of the main innovations of the following analysis is that it makes use of the most disag-
gregated data available. The measurement of horizontal inequality is based on individual-level
data and not group-level (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011) or country-level data (Col-
lier and Hoefﬂer 2004). The measurement of the strategic environment uses grid-based data with
a very high resolution and thus allows to derive measures that are highly valid. The data on non-
state actors was speciﬁcally collected for this analysis and does not derive data on the formation
of non-state actors from existing conﬂict datasets. The main unit of analysis is the group-region,
i.e. a population in a given region manifests a case in the dataset.
The main focus of the statistical analysis lies on the link between horizontal inequality and
the strategic environment, on the one hand, and the emergence of non-state conﬂict actors, on the
other. Two causal relations proposed in the theory are not tested and consequently take the status
of assumptions: First, the formation of groups (not NSCA) is not empirically analyzed. Rather,
it is assumed that groups form along religious, linguistic, or ethnic lines as discussed in chapter
8. Furthermore, since data availability differs between countries, it is assumed that these three
characteristics are functionally equivalent between individual societies.
Second, individual grievances and thus, by extension, the existence of aggrieved groups is not
empirically tested. Although it would be possible to infer individual grievances in populations
via value surveys, this is not done here. Such an analysis remains an important step for future
analyses.
Based on these assumptions, the following analysis investigates the link between horizontal
inequality and the formation of non-state conﬂict actors.
To test the effect of horizontal inequality, the following variables are constructed. They all are
characteristics of a group in a region: regional inequality denotes the mean value of the differences
from the regional mean for all available indicators measured in standard deviations. Economic
inequality and social inequality are the mean values for those indicators belonging to the respective
categories. Values below zero indicate the amount of deprivation, values above zero a privileged
position. In addition, each indicator of inequality is included separately.
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Figure 9.17: Distribution of inequality measure
To test for the inﬂuence of the strategic environment, we include the variables inaccessible ter-
rain and rugged terrain for the geographic context and youth bulge for the anthropological context.
Population is added as a control variable.
9.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 9.8 shows the descriptive statistics for the data. Figures 9.17 plots the distribution of the
inequality measure.
Table 9.8: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Inequality 3,464 0.226 0.756 −4.207 −0.101 0.556 4.434
Inaccessibility 3,464 0.550 0.255 0.009 0.394 0.774 0.936
Terrain Ruggedness 3,464 1.269 1.135 0.0003 0.443 1.733 5.539
Population (log) 3,464 14.918 1.626 9.986 13.830 15.935 18.893
Youth Bulge 3,464 26.411 4.585 14.041 24.025 29.797 37.820
9.4.2 Linking NSCA and Inequality
To investigate whether horizontal inequality leads to the formation of non-state actors, the latter
needs to be linked to the former. The research question is not whether regions with deprived
groups host any NSCA, but rather whether deprived groups form NSCA.
NSCAs and a regional population from the sample were considered to be related on two con-
ditions. First, an NSCA existed that fought in the name of the respective population or mainly
consisted of that population. This link is an M:N relationship. A population can have multiple
NSCA ﬁghting in its name such as, for instance, the MNLF and the MILF ﬁghting for the Mus-
lim Moro population in the Southern Philippines. Likewise, a single NSCA can ﬁght for multiple
populations such as, for instance, the MNLF ﬁghts for the various sub-tribes of the Moro popula-
tion in the Southern Philippines. In addition, the presence of a headquarter or major base of the
respective non-state actor is introduced as a necessary condition. Information on headquarters is
available in DISCA as seen on ﬁgure 9.15 on page 173. Second, there had to be a headquarter or
major base in the respective region. A population is only linked to an NSCA if the latter has a
main basis in that very region. Following the above example, for instance, the Muslim population
is only linked to the MNLF in the subnational unit ‘Central Mindanao and Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao’. The polygons for the subnational units are taken from the Minnesota Pop-
ulation Center (2013).22
22These polygons do not necessarily correspond to subnational units of today since, for reasons of consistency, some
units where merged. Varying borders of subnational units over time pose a large problem to panel analyses, especially
when working with different datasets. Since data on headquarters are available as spatial points, the position of headquar-
ters is linked to the regions by a spatial relationship. More speciﬁcally, it selects those regions that contain the respective
geographic point that is coded (via latitude and longitude) as the location of the headquarter or a main base. Thus, a
non-state actor is coded as existent in a given region if it is linked to a population of that very region and if it has a major
base there.
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Figure 9.18: Test for multicollinerity
9.4.3 Regression Speciﬁcation
Having linked the two datasets, we can proceed to the regression analysis. The ﬁrst step consists
in checking whether the assumptions applicable to logistic regression hold.
Moderate multicollinearity only occurs where it was to be expected (see ﬁgure 9.18). The max-
imum variance inﬂation factor of 1.12 is well below the threshold of 2 (Cohen et al. 2003). The
correlation between the two different measures of inaccessibility of terrain, terrain ruggedness
index and land class, indicates that they are complementary rather than alternative measures of
inaccessibility. Consequently, both are included on the right hand side. We moreover include in-
accessible terrain, terrain ruggedness, the size of the population, and youth bulge as indicators
for the strategic environment in the analysis.
Fixed effects are included to control for country and year speciﬁc effects. These ﬁxed effects
capture heterogeneity across countries and years and thereby account for the inﬂuence of unob-
served variables at the level of countries as well as for period-speciﬁc effects.
The logistic regression is performed with penalized likelihood based on Jeffreys invariant
prior (Jeffreys 1946). This ensures ﬁnite estimates in cases of perfect separation which occurs due
to the rare events of the outcome (Heinze and Schemper 2002a; Kosmidis and Firth 2009).
9.4.4 Results
Table 9.9 on page 177 shows the regression results. The results conﬁrm H1a as described in section
8.2. The measure of regional inequality is statistically signiﬁcant and shows the expected sign
(model 1). This indicates that those regions with deprived populations have a higher propensity
to host bases of non-state conﬂict actors. The result is similar for deprivation in the economic
(model 2) and the social ﬁeld (model 3) lending further support to the argument.
A closer look on the composite indicators reveals that almost all indicators of economic in-
equality are signiﬁcant (models 4 - 7). Only employment status seems to be unrelated to the
outcome. The composite indicators of social inequality are negative and signiﬁcant (models 9 -
10).
For the interpretation of the indicators of the strategic environment, we primarily focus on
model 1 because it draws on the whole sample. The results are mixed, but generally support H1b.
We expected inaccessible terrain (measured via types of land class) and rugged terrain (measured
via elevation) to be positively related to our dependent variable. Of these two indicators of the
geographic context, however, only the coefﬁcients of the former are signiﬁcant and point in the
expected direction. This indicates that the type of land cover seems to be more important than
ruggedness.
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The first of the two indicators for the anthropological context, i.e. population size, is signifi-
cantly and positively related to the existence of group headquarters. The second indicator, youth
bulge, is statistically significant and shows the expected positive sign.
All in all, the results lend support to hypotheses 1a and 1b. More specifically, we can state
the following: Based on the collected data, assuming the truth of the theoretical assumptions and
the adequacy of the concepts, and assuming that we have not ommitted influential explanatory
factors, we can conclude that it is highly unlikely that inequality and a strategic environment
facilitating interaction, mobilization, and organization are unrelated to the formation of non-state
conflict actors in a region.
The finding of significance as indicated by low p-values is only a first step. Given large sample
sizes, even very small differences between groups can yield significant differences. Consequently,
we take a closer look at the size of the effect of those variables that were identified to be signifi-
cantly related with the formation of non-state actors.
In general, the formation of non-state actors is a rare event. Deprivation with regard to the
regional mean leads to substantively higher risks of formation of non-state conflict actors. For
instance, an increase in the relative difference of a group to the regional mean by 1 standard
deviation decreases the probability of group formation by two thirds.
A comparison of the effect sizes of the three measures of the strategic environment reveals
substantive differences among them. Inaccessible terrain seems to increase the probability of
NSCA formation, although the effect is comparatively small and not robust across models. Ter-
rain ruggedness does not seem to affect the probability of the formation of NSCA. Youth bulge,
in contrast, has a very substantial effect. An increase in the share of youth by 1 percent increases
the probability of group formation by a factor of 2.7. The size of the population also seems to be
positively related to the propensity of group formation.
Taking into account statistical significance and effect sizes, we can thus conclude that inequal-
ity and youth bulges, in particular, but also inaccessible terrain and the population size increase
the probability of NSCA formation.
9.5 Dynamics of Violence in Intrastate Political Conflicts
Having described the formation of NSCA, we now turn to our second explanandum: the dynam-
ics of violence in intrastate conflict. As described in section 6.1, conflict intensity is defined as a
property of a sum of conflict measures in a geographical and temporal space. The primary units
of analysis in the DISCON Dataset are the calendar month and the ‘region,’ i.e. the first-level
subnational administrative unit of a country.
The Heidelberg approach addresses existing lacunae in conflict research by bringing forward
a multi-dimensional and multi-indicator approach to conflict intensity. The two main advantages
of the intensity data provided by DISCON is its level of disaggregation in terms of time and
space, on the one hand, and its multidimensionality, on the other. This allows for a disaggregated
analysis of conflict intensities beyond one-dimensional approaches exclusively focusing on the
number of battle-related deaths.
Moreover, the following investigates political conflicts from a new perspective. The most
widely used conflict dataset from UCDP has been studied countless times and has been corre-
lated with almost every imaginable variable (cf. Schrodt 2014). A new dataset is able to assess and
refine existing theoretical arguments.
The DISCON data to date has only been tested in a single empirical analysis by Trinn (2015).
Due to the innovative character of the dataset, the following in a first step presents intensity data
more generally and then proceeds with an empirical test of the hypotheses derived in chapter 8.
Overall, this leads to the following ternary structure:
Subsection 9.5.1 more closely examines patterns of conflict intensity in Asia and Oceania be-
tween 2000 and 2014. The section presents overall conflict patterns and identifies distinct profiles
of violence based on a latent class analysis. This is the first study that identifies and compares
such types based on a multi-dimensional view on conflict intensity.
Subsection 9.5.2 tests the relations between the natural and social space, on the one hand,
and conflict intensity, on the other. Since there is no approach that measures conflict intensities
on the regional level, no concept of conflict intensity that is at the same time as broad as the
Heidelberg approach and since data on inequality, terrain, youth bulges, and population have
not been available until recently, this is the first analysis of such kind.
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Subsection 9.5.3 investigates the link between characteristics of NSCA and profiles of violence.
9.5.1 Overview and Latent Class Analysis
As a first step, we can take a look at the distribution of intensities for all intrastate political conflicts
in Asia and Oceania between 2000 and 2014. This gives an idea of the distribution of conflict
intensities.
Figure 9.19 on page 180 shows the geographical distribution of intrastate and subnational
conflicts in Asia and Oceania. The map shows the highest intensity score between 2000 and 2014
for each subnational unit. Since the map does not show temporal variance or any aggregated
score of conflict affectedness, however, it is only an approximation to the conflict affectedness
of subnational units in Asia and Oceania. No temporal variance, but the temporally-aggregated
conflict affectedness is shown in figure 9.20 on page 181.
To compute the aggregated conflict affectedness for each subnational unit, the underlying
indicator scores were first summed and normalized to a scale from 0-11 for each regional-month
intensity. This score was then again summed over the 180 months in the period of observation.
This leads to a continuous score between 0 (no conflict in whole period of observation) to 1980
(full out war in every month between 2000 and 2014).
Figure 9.21 on page 182 shows the distribution of region-month intensities by conflict type. The
figure reveals that the intensity distribution is heavily right-skewed with regard to all three types
of constellations. Of all 6315 region-month in which violence occured, 93.5 percent were violent
crises, 3.8 percent limited wars, and 2.7 percent wars. This result is certainly expected, since wars
are obviously much rarer phenomenon than low-level violence. It underlines, however, the need
to differentiate distinct level of intensities to more adequately measured political conflicts.
Plotting the similar distribution for the sum of the composite indicators in figure 9.21 allows
to gain an even finer picture.
Until here, we have mainly focused on the magnitude of conflict. The second feature of the
Heidelberg approach includes its multi-dimensional measurement of conflict intensity. It allows
not only for assessing aggregative scores of intensity, but also to disentangle how conflicts are
fought, i.e. profiles of violence.
Figure 9.22 on page 182 provides an example. It shows the scores of the five intensity indica-
tors for the intrastate conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philip-
pine government in 2009 for each month. Aside from a non-violent phase of the conflict between
September and November, the figure reveals that June 2009 was specifically violent with a heavy
use of weapons, high numbers of personnel involved in the fighting, and a large number of fatal-
ities. There were however, no or only few refugees and no severe destruction in the region.
From an analytical perspective, the high number of data poses a challenge. Overall, 35 = 243
different indicator combinations are theoretically possible in each single region-month. Only 50.21
percent of these are actually observed.
It would be rather futile to plot a truth table over these types. Consequently, the following anal-
ysis conducts a latent class analysis to copewith the complexity of the data. Latent class analysis is
well suited for the given task, as it does not assume a specific distribution of the underlying data
and allows for categorial variables. The idea of latent class analysis is to categorize different pat-
terns of observed variables into groups based on an (assumed) underlying unobserved variable
(Clogg 1995; Linzer and Lewis 2011). Each case that enters the analysis is assigned a probability
of belonging to each of these groups.
As described, conflict intensity is operationalized via an aggregative index of the two indi-
cators for conflict means and the three indicators for conflict consequences. The indicators and
the aggregative logic follow the definition of conflict intensity as a property of a number of con-
flict measures in a temporal and geographical space indicating the severity of conflict in a given
region-month. The validity of the concept of conflict intensity is thus dependent upon whether
the five indicators adequately capture the idea of intensity.
The latent class analysis proceeds in an opposite direction. Instead of deriving indicators from
a concept, it identifies empirical patterns from indicator values. Taking the indicators as a point of
departure, it reveals patterns of empirical distributions. Thus, the intensity levels and the classes
derived from latent class analysis are complementary.
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Figure 9.19: Maximum region-month intensities of intra- and substate conﬂicts in Asia and Oceania, 2000-
2014
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Figure 9.20: Affectedness of subnational units in Asia and Oceania by intra- and substate conﬂicts, 2000-2014
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Figure 9.21: Distribution of intensity levels (top ﬁgure) and summed indicator values (bottom ﬁgure) by
conﬂict type
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Figure 9.22: Score of intensity indicators for Philippines (MILF / Mindanao)
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Figure 9.23: Bayesian Information Criterion for 2 - 7 classes
It does so by maximizing the log likelihood
ln(L) =
N∑
i=1
ln
R∑
r=1
pr
J∏
j=1
Kj∏
k=1
(πjrk)
Yik
, where i = 1, ...,N denotes a region-month with the responses on manifest variables j = 1, ..., J.
In the present example, we have N = 6, 247 cases and J = 5 indicators. Each indicator has Kj
different outcome values. In our case, we have three possible outcomes (1, 2, 3) for each of our
ﬁve indicators so that K = 3 for each j. r = 1, ...,R denotes the number of latent classes (in our case
four) and pr the unconditional probabilities of group membership which is equal to the share of
observations in group r. πjrk is the conditional probability that a given region-month in class r
has the outcome value k for variable j (Linzer 2011, p. 176).
In a ﬁrst step, we need to determine the number of groups that adequately separate the data.
Figure 9.23 shows the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for different group sizes (Schwarz
1978). It has its minimum at four groups.23
Looking at the size of the different classes, we can see that about three thirds of the cases fall
in class 3 and almost one ﬁfth in class 2. Classes 1 and 4 are both comparatively small with each
having about three percent of the cases attributed to these classes. Class 3 exclusively exists of
violent crisis. More interesting are those classes that consist of cases with differing region-month
intensity levels: classes 1, 2, and 4. Figure 9.24 shows the distribution of intensity levels over these
three classes. We ﬁnd that limited wars are found in signiﬁcant numbers in classes 1 (42.1 %) and 4
(31.5 %) as well as, to a lesser degree, in class 2 (26.4 %). Wars are exclusively found, and relatively
evenly distributed in, classes 4 (58.3 %) and 1 (41.7 %)
Apart from the largest class 3, the latent class analysis thus reveals three distinct proﬁles of
violence beyond the cumulative measure of conﬂict intensity.
Violent region-months falling into class 2 most signiﬁcantly differ from class 3 in that they are
characterized by more personnel in the dimension of means and more fatalities in the dimension
of consequences (see ﬁgures 9.25 and 9.26 on pages 185 and 185, respectively). Typical examples
are the conﬂicts between Buddhists and Rohingyas in Rakhine State in Myanmar and the conﬂict
for autonomy in Manipur. Both were predominantly fought as class 2 conﬂict.
Violent region-months falling into classes 1 aremost different from class 2 conﬂicts with regard
to employed weapons (means) and fatalities (consequences). Put differently, conﬂict of class 1 had
23Comparing groups based on Pearson’s χ2 goodness of ﬁt and likelihood ratio chi-square statistic would favor models
withmore classes. However, these do not penalize rising number of parameters. In general, the BIC is themost appropriate
measure to compare latent class models (Forster 2000; Ting Hsiang Lin 1997; cf. Linzer and Lewis 2011). Although from
comparing the BIC values we can say that there are not two, or more than four, groups to be identiﬁed by latent class
analysis, the BIC values for three and four groups do not differ by much. Comparing the mean BIC of 100 runs for three
and four models, respectively, leads to the acceptance of four models as more appropriate.
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Figure 9.24: Distribution of classes (top ﬁgure) and probability of membership by intensity levels (bottom
ﬁgure). Class 3 exclusively consists of violent crises and is thus ommitted in the ﬁgure below.
a much higher probability to see the employment of heavy weaponry and large fatality ﬁgures.
There are no typical cases of class 1 conﬂicts standing out. Conﬂicts with the comparatively largest
share of region-month intensities of class 1 include those between the government and Islamist
groups in Pakistan, as well as those among these groups.
Region-months falling into class 4 differ from the likewise predominantly highly violent class
1 conﬂicts with regard to destruction and refugees (consequences) as well as the number of em-
ployed personnel (means). Whereas medium or high levels of destruction are highly unlikely
in all other classes, they occur with a probability of 50% in class 4. Given the high threshold of
the indicator and the resulting low number of region-months characterized by destruction in the
whole sample, this is a large ﬁgure. Large numbers of refugees, i.e. more than 20,000 refugees
and internally displaced persons in a given region-month, occur almost exclusively in class 4 con-
ﬂicts. With regard to the number of involved persons in the most severe individual measure in
a region-month, class 1 region-months are mostly characterized by intermediate numbers of in-
volved personnel, not differing much from the mostly low-violent conﬂicts of class 2. Here, class
4 markedly differs, where the probability of high numbers of personnel is highly likely. The most
typical conﬂict in class 4 is the secessionist conﬂict in Aceh.
Overall, there are no absolutely clear-cut patterns. With the exception of a large number of
conﬂicts that were exclusively or almost exclusively fought on a low level of violence and thus
belong to class 3, it is not possible to assign single conﬂicts to single classes. An example of a
conﬂict that is quite evenly distributed among classes is the conﬂict between the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front and the Philippine government. The conﬂict saw an overall of 79 violent region-
month between 2000 and 2014. The latent class analysis assigned ﬁve of these region month to
class 1, 20 to class 2, 46 to class 3, and eight to class 4.
9.5.2 Determinants of Conﬂict Intensity
We now move from descriptive to explanatory analysis. This chapter analyzes determinants of
conﬂict intensity based on characteristics of the political and economic system of the respective
nation-state as well as topographical, economic, demographic, and resource-related characteris-
tics at the level of subnational units. The main unit of analysis is the region-year24. This is more
adequate than the region-month, since the data of those variables that do vary over time (night-
24‘Region’ here always denotes the ﬁrst-level subnational unit of a country.
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Figure 9.25: Conditional probabilities of intensity indicators by latent class
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Figure 9.26: Indicator values with highest probability in each of the four identiﬁed classes of intensity proﬁles
185
9.5. PROFILES OF VIOLENCE CHAPTER 9. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
P
ro
po
rt
io
n 
of
 m
is
si
ng
s
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
N
ig
hl
ig
ht
X
-P
ol
ity
G
D
P
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Te
rr
ai
n 
R
.
In
ac
ce
ss
.
C
om
bi
na
tio
ns
N
ig
hl
ig
ht
X
-P
ol
ity
G
D
P
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Te
rr
ai
n 
R
.
In
ac
ce
ss
.
77532
12636
11976
3900
3432
3084
3060
2244
1944
1872
600
528
504
480
312
240
192
180
24
Figure 9.27: Proportion of missing data and total number of missing data combinations
light, population, xpolity (Vreeland 2008)) is available on a yearly basis. Moreover, choosing a
longer time-frame mitigates the problem of non-independence among units of observation.
The dependent variable is derived from the DISCON data. It is dichotomous and indicates
the occurrence of violence in at least one month in the respective region and the observed year.
Due to the repeated measurement of subnational units nested in countries over 14 years, we have
hierarchical time-series cross-sectional data.
Multilevel analysis is a method well suited for this task. The use of multilevel analysis has
several advantages over other regression approaches such as, e.g., a completely pooled design or
the speciﬁcation of ﬁxed effects. First, the non-independence of the different cases is less prob-
lematic than in pooled regressions. Pooled regression speciﬁcally underestimates standard errors
of indicators of higher-level variables (such as polity or gdp in our analysis).
Second, multilevel models allow the use of data referring to different levels and give results
referring to these levels. A multilevel analysis returns estimates for the average intercept across
groups (e.g. the average conﬂict probability in all countries), varying intercepts for each level
within the speciﬁed groups (average conﬂict probability in Thailand), coefﬁcients for group-level
predictors (the inﬂuence of the political system on the probability of conﬂict), and individual-level
predictors (the inﬂuence of a regions’s terrain on conﬂict probability).
This study employs a random intercept model in which the intercepts of the slopes vary
between subnational units, countries, and years. In addition to an overall intercept, which is
also provided by non-hierarchical regression models, random intercept models estimate group-
speciﬁc intercepts from group-level variables. From a theoretical perspective, the inﬂuence of the
independent variables on the probability of conﬂict is assumed to be equal across groups. Thus
slopes are assumed to be constant among groups.
The present analysis faces four challenges: missing data, adequate centering of input variables,
perfect separation, and multicollinearity. Each of the challenges and their respective solutions are
presented in turn.
Patterns of data missingness vary between variables. Figure 9.27 shows the proportion of
missing cases by variable (lefthand ﬁgure) and the distribution of missing cases by combinations
of variables (righthand ﬁgure) for the most disaggregated dataset of region-month. The largest
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share of missing values pertains to the youth bulge variable. Here, 13.5 percent of the data points
are missing. No data is available for Australia, Micronesia, Fiji, Japan, Maledives, Nauru, New
Zealand, Palau, and Taiwan. The variable with the second-largest share of missing data is night-
light with 13.5 percent missings. The inter-satellite calibration used to construct time-series data
is not available after 2012 (cf. Elvidge et al. 2014). Polity is the variable with the third largest share
of missing values ( 9.6 percent missing) This is because the Polity Project does not provide regime
data for the small states in the sample: Brunei, Micronesia, Maledives, Nauru, Palau, Timor-Leste,
and Vanuatu. Since most of the cases for missing regime data are already excluded due to a lack
of data on other variables, the effect of missing regime data does not loom large. This is different
for data on the gross domestic product, which is missing for North Korea, Myanmar, Maledives,
Nauru, and Taiwan. The effect of non-overlapping patterns of missing data is largest for the indi-
cators youth bulge and nightlight, which only overlap in 7.9 percent of the cases. Since we employ
list-wise deletion, this reduces the sample size quite considerably. With regard to units above the
first level of repeated measurements of subnational units, the sample is reduced to 25 countries, 12
years, and 499 unique subnational units.
The number of subnational units is certainly unproblematic. The number of countries is like-
wise high enough, given that it is above a threshold of 15-20 as proposed by Stegmueller (2013,
p. 758) for random-intercept models with binary dependent variables. 25 A number of 12 years is
more problematic. To deal with the low number of years, the following analysis includes a model
that does not estimate random intercepts for years but instead includes a trend variable that cap-
tures the increasing probability of conflict over the years. Moreover, the problem of small sample
sizes with regard to units above the first level only pertains to the estimation of group-level coef-
ficients. Coefficients on the first level are reliable even where the number of groups is small (Maas
and Hox 2004). Since the main interest of the following analysis is to investigate the effects of
first-level predictors, missing data should not pose a severe problem.
A second challenge is to adequately center the input variables. Centering facilitates interpreta-
tion of intercepts since 0 is not always an interpretable measure of input variables (e.g. for GDP).
The input variables of the following model are rescaled to have a mean of 0 and a standard devi-
ation of 0.5. Binary variables are rescaled to have a mean of 0 and a difference of 1 between their
categories (Gelman 2008). In essence, variables are centered at the grand mean. An alternative to
grand-mean centering (CGM) would be centering within cluster (CWC). CWC was implemented
in developing the regional inequality measure above. The national inequality indicator likewise
introduced above represents a mixed type. Here, centering was neither implemented with refer-
ence to the cluster mean, i.e. the regional mean, nor with reference to the grand mean, i.e. the
mean over all regions in the sample. Rather, the national mean was chosen as reference category.
Both ways of centering are adequate in their respective contexts since the way of centering is
primarily determined by theoretical arguments.a˘ In CGM, input variables can be interpreted as
composites of within and between cluster variation (Enders and Tofighi 2007). In a hierarchical
model with countries as grouping factor, for instance, level 1 input variables would capture vari-
ance between subnational units as well as between countries when CGM is applied. CWC would
eliminate between-country differences and exclusively represent differences between subnational
units within the respective country. As we are interested in absolute and not relative effects of the
input variables, CGM makes more sense in the present context.26 In the case of inequality, this
is clearly different. Here, the focus is on low relative positions in the social space. Consequently,
CGM is more appropriate.
A third challenge arising from the data structure is perfect separation. Perfect separation oc-
curs when the response can be perfectly predicted by a single or a combination of input variables.
In the present dataset, perfect separation arises due to the fact that some of the groups are entirely
non-violent throughout the period of observation. In this case, maximum likelihood estimation in
logistic regression leads to infinite estimates causing erroneous results (Day and Kerridge 1967).
The majority of solutions proposed in the literature are not applicable in the present analysis.
Omitting the variable that causes the results is not satisfactory from a theoretical perspective
since this would mean excluding a variable with potentially great explanatory power. Introduc-
ing fake data (Clogg et al. 1991) leads to unwanted results (Heinze and Schemper 2002b), exact
logistic regression is computationally intensive, and those penalized likelihood procedures that
were proposed by Firth (1993) are not (yet) implemented for hierarchical models.
25To be precise, Stegmueller (2013) uses a probit link in his simulation.
26This runs counter to the suggestions of Enders and Tofighi (2007).
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Figure 9.28: Test for multicollinerity
A method that is available for hierarchical models and does not have any of these drawbacks
is to put weakly informative prior distributions on the coefficients (Gelman et al. 2008). The basic
idea is to introduce minimal prior knowledge into the model by adding priors on the coefficients.
The prior distributions express the belief about the range of the respective variable before it is
evaluated. This procedure thus strikes a middle way between including highly specific subjective
prior beliefs (informative priors) and being agnostic about the parameter distribution (flat priors).
The weakly informative prior assigns low probabilities to those extreme values that arise in cases
of perfect separation but leaves the other estimates in place. It is thus perfectly suited for the
present analysis. To implement this estimation procedure, we broadly follow the specification as
laid out by Gelman et al. (ibid.) and as recently implemented in the ‘blmer’ package for R (Dorie
2015). After grand-mean centering the variables, a prior distribution with a scale of 10 and a mean
of 0 is introduced for the intercept and a prior distribution with a scale of 2.5 and a mean of 0 for
the first level coefficients (the ‘fixed effects’). CGM assures that the prior’s standard deviation is
large relative to the scale of the input variables.
Table 9.10 summarizes the data used in the regression analyses before rescaling. Figure 9.28
shows the patterns of multicollinearity between input variables. Due to high correlation coeffi-
cients, and a variance inflation factor of 2.34 for the full model, we estimate models that exclude
x-polity and its squared term, on the one hand, and youth bulge and gdp, in a single regression
equation as robustness checks.
Having inspected patterns of missing data, decided on the centering procedure, and detailed
the estimation procedure, we can now turn to the estimation. All in all, we estimate one main
model and nine sub models to assess the robustness of the results (see table 9.11 on 190).
The main model 1 includes all independent variables and varying intercepts for subnational
units, years, and countries. Model 2 employs a different specification of priors, priors with normal
distribution and a standard deviation of 3, to assess whether a different specification of priors
alters the results. Model 3 excludes the variable youth bulge and excludes priors to assess the
robustness of the results in case of standard maximum likelihood estimation. Model 4 is a logistic
regression with countries as fixed effects. Adding countries as fixed effects and not as grouping
factor in a multilevel model, is a specifically hard test to the results as it eliminates all cross-
country variation from the estimation. Thus, the estimates exclusively represent within-country
variation. Models 5 and 6 check for different specifications of the varying intercept (the ‘random
effects’). Model 5 excludes subnational regions as a grouping variable. Model 6 excludes years
as a grouping variable. This addresses the issue of a low number of countries. To account for a
positive trend in the number of subnational units affected by violent conflict over time (see figure
9.29), the number of years since 2000 is included as a trend variable that increases by 1 every year.
Models 7-10 each exclude one of the two pairs of correlated variables (see figure 9.28 on page
188) to assess whether this affects the results.
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Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Crisis Dummy 5,975 0.153 0.360 0 0 0 1
Limited War Dummy 5,975 0.011 0.103 0 0 0 1
War Dummy 5,975 0.005 0.070 0 0 0 1
Conﬂict Affectedness 5,975 1.360 6.724 0 0 0 152
Population 5,975 0.262 0.160 0.001 0.153 0.329 0.757
Youth Bulge 5,975 0.263 0.059 0.140 0.211 0.311 0.384
Resource Dummy 5,975 0.628 0.483 0 0 1 1
Diamonds 5,975 0.078 0.507 0 0 0 6
Drug 5,975 0.498 0.877 0 0 1 6
Gold 5,975 0.777 2.120 0 0 0 18
Oil 5,975 0.895 1.912 0 0 1 15
Tantalum 5,975 0.004 0.063 0 0 0 1
Terrain Ruggedness Index 5,975 0.162 0.173 0.00002 0.037 0.215 0.858
Inaccessibility 5,975 0.510 0.278 0.003 0.260 0.751 0.982
Nighlight 5,975 0.108 0.125 0.026 0.050 0.099 0.906
Violence(lag) 5,975 0.146 0.353 0 0 0 1
GDP 5,975 0.094 0.061 0.023 0.052 0.129 0.362
X-Polity 5,975 0.398 0.224 0.000 0.150 0.600 0.650
Trend 5,975 0.239 0.164 0.000 0.090 0.360 0.490
HASC 5,975 0.651 0.345 0.100 0.400 1.000 1.200
Year 5,975 2,006.512 3.447 2,001 2,004 2,010 2,012
Table 9.10: Summary Statistics
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Figure 9.29: Number of subnational region affected by violent conﬂict for each year on the period of obser-
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We can now start to evaluate our findings (see section 8.3). In agreement with H2a (see p. 143),
the anthropological context has a strong effect on the incidence of violent conflict in a region.
Both predictors—population size and youth bulge—are significantly and positively related to the
probability of conflict incidence. This lends further support to the youth bulge hypothesis (cf.
Croissant, Wagschal, et al. 2009) by using new data and data on the level of subnational units. The
fact that a larger population leads to a higher probability of conflict is not surprising (cf. ch. 2). We
may regard it as a control variable in our model. The significant coefficient between youth bulge
and conflict might also be a case of reversed causality. Violent crises might severely affect the
demographic structure by inducing refugee flows, deaths, and negative impact on the economic
systems. However, the demographic data is from the beginning of our observation period. This
supports the robustness of our results. On the other hand, many conflicts began well before the
year 2000. Reversed causality can thus not be fully excluded. As we aim to expand DISCON in
the future, this might allow for further investigation.
We can now turn to H2b (see p. 143). The two indicators of the geographic context show a
mixed picture. Whereas the ruggedness of the terrain seems not to be related to conflict, subna-
tional units with a higher share of inaccessible terrain see violent conflict more often. These results
further emphasize the importance of our newly developed measure of land class.
Our hypothesis H2c and H2d (see p. 143) related to the economic field. Two indicators allow
the assessment of the link between economic development and conflict probability (H2c): night-
light and the gross domestic product of the country. Against our expectation, higher developed
regions seem to have a higher probability of conflict incidence. We expected conflict to be less
likely in developed regions. A possible explanation for the result is the influence of extreme val-
ues. However, when substituting the indicator of nightlight with a logged version, the coefficient
only slightly changes (0.678 in model 1) and remains significant. A second possible explanation is
that the result is exclusively driven by the correlation between an increasing number of conflicts
and an increasing development over time. However, there are two arguments against this inter-
pretation. First, the hierarchical model accounts for year as a grouping factor. Second, model 6
explicitly captures the linear trend by including a trend variable. In both cases, the effect of night-
light remains robust and substantially unchanged. A theoretical interpretation of the result is that
absolute deprivation hinders conflict, as affected populations struggle to survive rather than re-
volt. Thus, wewould expect the probability of conflict to be lower for poor and rich regions.When
including a squared term of the centered input variable nightlight, however, both predictors lose
significance. This might be due to their high correlation, but at least does not support the absolute
deprivation hypothesis.
Surprisingly, the indicator of economic development at the national level, GDP per capita, is
not significant in any of the models. This might be due to the fact that subnational variation is
more important than between-country variation with regard to the explanation of subnational
patterns of conflict.
H2d (see p. 143) stipulated that conflict is more likely in subnational where natural resources
are present. However, none of the models support this hypothesis. This might be due to the fact
that the predictor ‘resources’ is highly aggregated and does not discriminate which type of re-
source is present in a given subnational region. Disaggregating the predictor by resource type,
however, does not change the results. Neither the presence of precious minerals such as dia-
monds, the cultivation of drugs, the presence of metals such as gold or tantalum, nor the presence
of oil seems to affect the prevalence of conflict. This is even more surprising as the indicators of
the different resource types are not highly correlated.
The impact of the configuration of the political field was assessed via the type of the political
regime. As described on page 143, we refrained from formulating a hypothesis but expected to
see no relationship. By including the regime type and its squared term, we tested for the degree
of democracy (X-Polity) as well as for anocratic regimes. Both terms are insignificant in the main
model 1, as well as when they are included one by one in models 7 and 8. When interpreting
this result, we have to keep in mind that only 25 countries are included in the sample although
the included countries cover the whole range of political systems.27 With this caveat, the results
cast further doubt on the results that anocratic regimes are specifically conflict prone (Fearon
and Laitin 2003; Hegre, Ellingsen, et al. 2001) and support the skeptical position by Vreeland
27The central Asian countries of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are located at the lower end of the X-Polity scale whereas
India and Mongolia are most democratic. Also see table 9.10
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Figure 9.30: Odds ratio and level of signiﬁcance of ﬁrst-level predictors
(2008). Future analyses should pursue different approaches to investigate the relation between
the political ﬁeld and conﬂict.
Having assessed the direction of effects, we can now assess the effect size. Since the input
variables were centered at the global mean, effect sizes can be compared based on the coefﬁcients.
Figure 9.30 on 192 shows the estimated odds ratios (i.e. the exponentiated coefﬁcients of model 1
as presented in table 9.11 on p. 190). of the individual level coefﬁcients together with 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals. The predictors related to the demographic context, i.e. population size and
youth bulge, are likewise those variables that have the strongest effects on conﬂict occurrence. The
share of inaccessible terrain and the economic development at the subnational level as measured
by nightlight have substantially lower effect sizes.
9.5.3 NSCA and Dynamics of Violence
In a ﬁnal analytical step, this subsection brings together data on non-state conﬂict actors and polit-
ical conﬂicts. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst empirical analysis investigating the link
between characteristics of non-state conﬂict actors and dynamics of violence from a comparative
perspective with more than just a few countries and dynamic data on NSCA.
Based on the arguments in section 8.3, this section empirically investigates how actor charac-
teristics and the strategic environment of actors inﬂuences the emergence of patterns of violence.
H3 (see p. 145) proposed that the more balanced the distribution of power between conﬂict
actors, the more likely higher conﬂict intensities are. We can test the hypothesis on grounds of
data from DISCA. A drawback is that we have no instrument to measure the strength of states.
Still, this does not post an insurmountable problem for three reasons. Theoretically, it is widely
shared in conﬂict research (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Kalyvas 2006) that states are stronger than
non-state actors. Empirically, a look at the data conﬁrms this view. There are no obvious cases in
DISCON in which we would assume the NSCA to be signiﬁcantly stronger than the respective
states. Methodologically, introducing a measure of strength for state actors leads to problems of
comparability. It is not straightforward to put indicators for non-state actor strength in relation to
indicators for state strength.
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Therefore, we can assume that the strength of NSCA is a valid instrument for the balance of
power between state and non-state actors in intrastate conflict. The stronger non-state actors are,
the smaller the difference is to the strength of the state. We use four instruments to measure the
strength of NSCA: their size, available weaponry, territorial control, and the presence of resources
in areas that are at least partially controlled by the non-state actors.
Figure 9.31 on page 194 shows the distribution of intensity levels for each of the indicators
used to measure the strength of NSCA. Each point represents a unique combination of non-state
actor, conflict, year, and month. The distribution allows to discern several patterns in the data.
Concentrating on the top figure in figure 9.31, we can see that size is positively correlated with
conflict intensity. Almost all conflict months that where fought on a highly violent level included
actors with at least 100 (categories 2 - 4) group members. Portrayed from another angle, actors
with a size of 101 - 1,000 (category 2) members were involved in highly violent conflict with a
chance of 1.6 %. Actors with a size of 1,000 - 10,000 members (category 3) with a chance of 6.6
%. Although the pattern does not hold for actors with a size of > 10,000 members, a positive
correlation between actor size and conflict intensity is clearly visible.
The availability of weapons (second figure from top) seems to be negatively correlated with
conflict intensity. Whereas only 2.9 % of those actors who had only light weapons at their dis-
posal where involved in a highly violent conflict, 15.7 % of those with heavy weapons were. The
availability of heavy weapons, is however, a rare phenomenon. By coloring the points by NSCA,
we can see that there were only two actors that had heavy weapons at their disposal and where
involved in an intrastate conflict between 2000 and 2014: the United Wa State Army and the Sri
Lankan LTTE. Whereas the former agreed to a ceasefire with the government in 1989, the latter
was involved in a highly-violent war until it was defeated by the Sri Lankan army in 2009.
With regard to the distribution of intensity levels by the degree of territorial control, one result
stands out: 79% of all highly violent conflict intensities happened in cases where NSCA had at
least partial control over a territory. A similar pattern can be identified with regard to the presence
of resources in the areas under control by NSCA.
The fact that the results are similar stems from a high correlation between both variables,
which is unsurprising given the fact that the latter was only coded ‘1’ in cases where resources
were present and the respective territory was at least partly under NSCA control (see figure 9.32
on 195).
To confirm our results, we run three regression analyses (see table 9.14): a generalized linear
model with an ordinal dependent variable, which takes the three values ‘non-violent rmi’, ‘low-
violent rmi’, and ‘highly-violent rmi’ (model 1) and two logistic regressions with a dummy for
violent (model 2) and highly violent (model 3) conflict as dependent variable. All three models
include a lagged dependent variable to control for autocorrelation.28 Apart from the explanatory
variables—excluding territorial control due to its high correlation with resource control—, we
include three control variables: ‘Endogenous’ is coded as ‘1’ if NSCA extract monetary means or
natural resources, possibly mediating the effect of resource presence; ‘Exogenous’ is coded as ‘1’
if NSCA are supported by third parties, possibly influencing conflict dynamics (Kirchner 2016);
and ‘structure’ is included since we would expect the structure of NCSA to be linked to conflict
intensity (cf. ch. 8.3).29
The analysis largely confirms our preliminary results derived from an inspection of figure
9.31. Size is positively and significantly related to conflict intensity and violent conflict (model
1 and 2), but not to highly violent conflict. Weaponry shows a negative coefficient due to the
aforementioned pattern in the data. The effect of resources control seems to be nonlinear: We find
no relation in the ordinal model (model 1); a negative but very small effect on the incidence of
violence; and a quite large effect on the occurrence of highly violent conflict.30
These results go well with our expectations formulated in section 8.3. Actors that are small in
size seem to employ tactics of avoidance, behavior that explains the almost complete absence of
highly violent conflict for actors with less than 100 members. In contrast, open confrontation with
the government is specifically likely for actors with 1,000 to 10,000 members. Guerrilla tactics are
particularly prevalent for actors between 100 and 10,000 members.
28The coefficients for these variables are excluded from the tables for better readibility.
29When including territorial control instead of resource control in the regression, the former turns out insignificant in
all three models. The other results remain largely unchanged.
30Since we did not formulate specific hypotheses for the effect of the control variables, we leave the results for future
investigations.
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Figure 9.31: Distribution of intensity level by level of strength indicators
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Figure 9.32: Test for multicollinerity
(1) (2) (3)
Size 0.613∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.051) (0.055) (0.235)
Weaponry −4.077∗∗∗ −3.987∗∗∗ −2.271∗
(0.545) (0.481) (0.994)
Structure 0.666∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.678
(0.138) (0.156) (0.562)
Endogenous 0.364∗∗ 0.338∗ 0.718
(0.141) (0.140) (0.376)
Exogenous 0.687∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.349
(0.090) (0.100) (0.572)
Resources −0.070 −0.166∗ 1.026∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.080) (0.280)
Constant −3.410∗∗∗ −18.868
(0.616) (567.170)
Observations 6,972 6,972 6,972
Log Likelihood −3,077.002 −592.467
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,188.004 1,218.935
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 9.12: Attributes of NSCA and disaggregated intensity indicators.
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The presence of resources in areas under at least partial NSCA control greatly increases the
incidence of highly violent conflicts. The fact that resources are stationary makes it much more
difficult for NSCA to unilaterally impose certain tactics. Resource-rich areas are a likely target
for government attacks. Where NSCA aim to defend these areas, they simply must stand up
to confrontation. Resource control thus comes with a burden in terms of tactical flexibility. A
disaggregation of the resource variable by resource type as shown in table 9.13 indicates that the
effect seems to be driven by the presence of oil.31 We leave these results for future investigations.
(1) (2) (3)
Gold −0.023 −0.039 0.157
(0.064) (0.065) (0.158)
Diamonds −0.326∗∗ −0.334∗∗ −0.022
(0.108) (0.105) (0.167)
Drugs 0.035 0.048 0.106
(0.028) (0.031) (0.075)
Oil 0.078∗ 0.027 0.449∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.044) (0.119)
Constant −3.091∗∗∗ −19.466
(0.635) (567.636)
Observations 6,972 6,972 6,972
Log Likelihood −3,072.599 −586.785
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,185.198 1,213.569
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 9.13: Resources and conflict intensity
In summary, the empirical results generally confirm H3 and likewise identify routes for fur-
ther improvement. Specifically the validity of the ‘David assumption’ (see sec. 8.3) seems to be
dependent on the strategic environment of NSCA. We leave it open for future investigation to
more closely investigate in how far the relation of NSCA to their environment influences their
tactical flexibility.
We now turn to our last analytical step. Making use of the highly disaggregated data of DIS-
CON and DISCA, we investigate the empirical link between the territorial control by an NSCA
and profiles of violence.
Table 9.14 presents the results of five generalized linear models with an ordinal dependent
variable corresponding to the five intensity indicators of the Heidelberg approach (cf. sec. 6).32
We find only partial support for hypothesis H4a (see page 146). Territorial control seems to
make the employment of larger units of personnel less likely. Although the effect is rather small,
this result runs counter to our expectations and needs further investigation in the future. The
effect of territorial control on the employment of heavy weaponry, however, confirms our expec-
tation. For a one-unit increase in territorial control (from ‘no control’ to ‘partial control’ of a terri-
tory or from ‘partial control’ to ‘full control’) the odds of the employment of heavy weapons are
1.49 times greater, given all other variables are held constant.33 The same holds true for refugees,
which confirms H4b (see page 146) Here, the effect is even greater with an estimated odds ratio
31Apart from the disaggregation of the resource variable by type, the models are identical to the models of table 9.14.
For better readability, only results for resource types are displayed.
32As above, a lagged dependent variable is included in each model but omitted in the output.
33Odds ratios can be obtained by exponentiating the reported coefficients.
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of 2.28. This means that the impact of conflicts on the civilian population is highest, where NSCA
control territory.34
The analysis moreover allows to further specify the mechanisms discussed in the last sec-
tion. The increase in intensity due to stronger NSCA seems to be driven by higher fatality scores
(model 2) and higher numbers of employed personnel (model 3). The latter result is less surpris-
ing since the employment of large forces requires the group to have enoughmen or women and is
likewise found with regard to weapons of their employment (model 5). Apart from this feasibility
mechanism, however, the increase in fatality figures further supports our theoretical expectations.
destruction fatalities personnel refugees weapons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size 0.016 0.571∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.336 0.054
(0.116) (0.101) (0.079) (0.234) (0.119)
Weaponry −0.086 0.904∗∗ 0.146 2.245∗∗∗ 2.614∗∗∗
(0.553) (0.289) (0.279) (0.567) (0.318)
Structure 0.203 0.113 −0.187 −0.207 −0.032
(0.160) (0.129) (0.116) (0.329) (0.170)
Endogenous 0.445 −0.357 −0.479∗ 0.494 0.114
(0.396) (0.292) (0.218) (0.529) (0.322)
Exogenous −1.080∗∗∗ 0.270∗ −0.215∗ −1.702∗∗∗ −1.234∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.113) (0.092) (0.314) (0.153)
Level of Control −0.268 0.201 −0.234∗ 0.827∗∗ 0.400∗∗
(0.157) (0.111) (0.102) (0.290) (0.152)
Observations 3,446 3,446 3,446 3,446 3,446
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 9.14: Attributes of NSCA and intensity indicators.
9.6 Summary
The results of the empirical analysis largely confirm the theoretical expectations formulated in
chapter 8. As wewill summarize our empirical findings in the subsequent conclusion, we can here
briefly discuss limitations of the present analysis as well as point out possible future directions.
Several limitations apply. First, we were not able to test all proposed mechanisms. The empiri-
cal analysis mainly picked three concepts, i.e. a specific configuration of the social space, a specific
configuration of the natural space, and the existence of non-state conflict actors, and evaluated
how they are empirically related. The empirical analysis of the mechanisms could be improved
by adding data such as value surveys measuring individual grievances directly. This would allow
to empirically test some of those statements that now take the form of assumptions.
Second, the analysis is geographically limited to countries in Asia andOceania. This restriction
has been partly due to data availability and partly to pragmatic considerations. A further step
would be to extend the analysis for all those countries for which data is available. The statistical
procedure to derive the measure of inequality is now largely automated. Under the condition of
34Likewise, heavy weaponry increases the number of refugees. Due to reasons discussed above, however, we refrain
from interpreting these results.
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enough available computing power, it allows to apply the presented approach to all samples that
are available through IPUMS.
Third, the analysis is limitedwith regard to the included variables. Due to the fact that we used
the most disaggregated data available, the availability of data is necessarily limited. As more data
becomes available, the number of explanatory variables can be extended.
All data on horizontal inequality, the natural space, conflict intensity, and non-state conflict
actors is stored in a single PostGIS enabled PostgreSQL database that can be accessed online and
can thus be used in future collaborative projects.
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Conclusion
Let us now summarize our findings. The main thesis of the present analysis posits that a close
investigation of philosophy of science and social ontology contributes to conflict research by pro-
viding better concepts, theories, and empirical analyses.
In contrast, conflict research today almost exclusively focuses on empirical questions. The cur-
rent discussion is thereby dominated by practical questions of how data should be collected and
analyzed. The general way forward has been to incrementally add data on empirical phenomena.
Whenever new data becomes available, new research questions are generated and quickly ad-
dressed, adding yet another little piece to the greater puzzle at hand.While the discipline has seen
remarkable progress—specifically in the last years—a consensus of opinion among researchers is
not yet in sight with regard to explaining the dynamics of intrastate conflict. We reached this
conclusion based on a research synthesis, which likewise identified the four following character-
istic shortcomings of current conflict research: a one-dimensional explanatory focus on conflict
onset, narrow operationalizations of intensity via death figures, a unilateral focus on macro-level
variables, and a neglect of social variables.
In order to contribute to the discussion, this thesis has added yet more data in the form of
two datasets on political conflict and non-state conflict actors. But it has done so based on a fun-
damentally different approach: Taking a large step back, we have delved unusually deep into
questions of philosophy of science and social ontology. Before we were able to gain explanatory
leverage from this basic research, however, we had to address a shortcoming bearing far-reaching
consequences, namely: the one-sided focus on a diachronic perspective, which privileges causal
processes and activity at the expense of a synchronic perspective, which focuses on constitutive
synchronic relations. Taking both perspectives into account allowed us to gain a complete picture
of the social reality revolving around concepts of intentionality and agency.
With these fundamental categories of social reality at hand, we were able to proceed to our
point of departure, which relied in two ‘simple’ questions: What are political conflicts, and what
are non-state conflict actors? What might appear to many as an unnecessary detour potentially
complicating a rather practical issue has borne fruit. In answering these questions on the grounds
of an account, which is deeply entrenched in critical realism, the thesis fulfilled all four aims set
out in the introduction. It put forward real definitions of political conflict and non-state actors
(aim 1), a critical reflection of three explanatory approaches that dominate conflict research (aim
2), and explanatory models to explain the formation of non-state conflict actors (aim 3) as well
as profiles of violence in intrastate conflict (aim 4). All of the conceptual and theoretical work
was put to use in an empirical analysis, in order to illustrate the immediate added value to our
understanding of conflict dynamics. The following summarizes our main findings and elaborates
on their relevance with regard to current conflict research.
We argue that conflict should ultimately be defined as an incompatibility of intentions existing
where at least two actors possess incompatible ideas of how they would like the world to be. This
entails a departure from the view that conflicts are aggregates of conflictive actions, finding its
expression in the latest—albeit not particularly new—trend of event-based research. In contrast,
we argue that although agency creates and recreates conflict (in the diachronic perspective), a one-
dimensional focus on processes leaves out important structural characteristics (the synchronic
perspective). Nearly every aspect of this thesis was directly related to this concept of political
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conflict. First and foremost, it guided the data collection efforts of the new DISCON dataset and
allowed a deduction of conflict actors and conflict intensity as two central explananda.
Advances were also made with regard to our understanding of non-state conflict actors. Our
main result is that non-state conflict actors exist over and above individuals and thereby must
be legitimately regarded as real. This goes against a view, which is widely held both within and
outside scientific research, namely, that our discourse regarding groups in conflicts is merely a
pragmatic approach to the overwhelming empirical complexity of conflicts. According to this
view, once enough data becomes available, we can strive toward the pinnacle of research, which
focuses on individuals and not on the unsubstantiated position of ‘groupism’ (Brubaker 2004).
Transferring philosophical arguments of emergence, supervenience, and multiple realizability
as well as of collective intentionality to conflict research enabled us to reject a pragmatic ‘as-if’
perspective, as well to substantially justify the existence of collective subjects. The discourse sur-
rounding a genuine meso-level is thus neither naïve (Popper 1959), nor pragmatic (Cederman,
Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013), but probably true.
As far as explanatory approaches are concerned, this means that it is adequate to include in
explanations a genuine analytical meso-level. In response to the existing disagreement regarding
an adequate definition of NSCA, we were able to draw from arguments on collective intentional-
ity to carve out the core characteristics of NSCA. In essence, non-state conflict actors are specific
kinds of groups that are able to act as single units, are involved in a political conflict, and are
neither affiliated nor in cooperation with any given government. Non-state conflict actors can act
as one if they establish procedures to form consistent and adequate beliefs and volitions as well
procedures to determine individuals to act on behalf of the group.
In line with our critical realist stance, we were able to derive some fundamental insights re-
garding how non-state conflict actors operate. What binds the individuals of non-state conflict
actors together is the mutually-shared and reciprocal belief that they themselves constitute that
group. This allows to relatively clearly define the boundaries of non-state conflict actors, and can
further contribute to our understanding of whether or not certain individuals belong to non-state
conflict actors. These questions are of greatest importance, for instance, when it comes to court
proceedings on the accusation of membership to a terrorist group, as in recent cases related to
the so-called ‘Islamic State’. Drawing on research on intentionality, we found that although indi-
viduals are always responsible for their behavior, they might at times act upon reasons that are
neither their own, nor those of other individuals, but rather genuinely attributable to collective
subjects. And since reasons and behavior are both necessary attributes of action, the liability of
an action can be likewise attributed to a collective and the respective individual(s) who act on the
collective volition. We were thus able to draw specific as well as politically and morally relevant
conclusions from our approach.
The analytical value of the newly-developed concepts of political conflict and non-state actors
reaches far beyond the present analysis. The critical realist perspective presented in this work
enabled the placement of conflict research in Heidelberg on a new footing (Schwank, Trinn, and
Wencker 2013; Trinn, Wencker, and Schwank 2016). That our ‘step back’ is more than a philo-
sophical game is evidenced in the fact that the concept is currently successfully applied.1 This
illustrates that the threefold understanding of conflict—via actors, issues, and measures—allows
researchers to address a wide range of issues encountered in practical research.
Concerning theory, the central claim puts forth that empiricism and instrumentalism should
have no place in the social sciences. Specifically the DN-model (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948)
turned out be an inadequate account of explanation. The ability of prediction is not the hallmark
of a good theory. Rather, explanation means inquiring into the ‘inner working’ of entities in order
to elucidate what makes them work the way they do. Methods that aim to identify regularities
might provide us with evidence for the function of mechanisms. And we made use of methods
such as these in the empirical analysis. A purely regularity-based approach, however, is mislead-
ing. Due to this, we founded our empirical analysis on an extensive discussion of concepts and
theoretical mechanisms.
With this in mind, we identified a moderate collectivist explanatory approach to be most ad-
equate with regard to the explanation of conflict dynamics. It complements the individualist ex-
planatory approach—typical for the economic perspective in conflict research—by accounting for
1The Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research uses the approach in its annually published Conflict
Barometer (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2016). Moreover, it is included in the Index for Risk
Management (IASC 2016) of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the European Commission.
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Nr. Hypothesis Result
1a Horizontal inequalities make the formation of non-state conflict actors more
likely.
Confirmed
1b A strategic environment that facilitates interaction, mobilization, and
organization makes the formation of Non-State Conflict Actors more likely.
Confirmed
2a Youth bulges make the occurrence of violent intrastate conflict more likely. Confirmed
2b Rugged and inaccessible terrain make the occurrence of violent intrastate
conflict more likely.
Partly confirmed
2c Violent intrastate conflict is less likely in economically developed regions. Rejected
2d The presence of resources makes the occurrence of violent intrastate conflict
more likely.
Rejected
3 The more balanced the distribution of power between conflict actors, the
more likely higher conflict intensities are.
Largely confirmed
4a Non-state conflict actors that are centrally organized and control territory are
more able to act in larger units and to operate heavy weapons than those that
are decentralized and lack territorial control.
Partly confirmed
4b The higher the degree of control over a certain territory by a non-state conflict
actor, the higher the number of refugees or internally displaced persons.
Confirmed
Table 10.1: Summary of findings.
long-term formative effects of structures on individuals. In contrast to the collectivist perspective,
it includes a theory of action.
Based on these considerations, we developed a moderate collectivist theory aiming to explain
both the formation of non-state actors and profiles of violence in intrastate political conflict. To
grasp the dual role of structure, typical for moderate collectivist explanatory approaches, we
drew on Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. We found that an explanation has to account for the fact
that structures always exist as immediate strategic environments and as incorporated structures.
Based on self-categorization theory and the grievance perspective we formulated a grievance and
an opportunity mechanism from which we derived our main hypotheses on actor formation. We
hypothesized that horizontal inequalities and a strategic environment, which facilitates interac-
tion, mobilization, and organization, make the formation of non-state conflict actors more likely.
Arguing that downward causation plays only a minor role when it comes to tactical decisions,
our explanation of profiles of violence focused on the balance of power and characteristics of
rebel groups.
To test these arguments, we have gone great lengths with regard to data collection. Most im-
portantly in this endeavor, the analysis introduced two new datasets. First, the DISCON dataset
applies the Heidelberg approach and comprises disaggregated data on political conflicts in Asia
and Oceania, as well as their intensities from 2000 to 2014. Its counterpart with regard to non-state
conflict actors, DISCA, holds time-variant information on organizational features, the radius of
action, volitions, and cooperation between actors. Moreover, the analysis introduced a new mea-
sure of horizontal inequality that includes the most recent and disaggregated, individual-level
data in order to assess horizontal inequality more precisely than ever before. Where applicable,
we further included spatially- and temporally-disaggregated data on geographical, demographic,
economic, and political characteristics of the region of Asia and Oceania.
Together with the highly disaggregated nature of the data, the deductive approach to derive
indicators from constitutive attributes allowed us to make the theoretical and the empirical foci
overlap. The chasm between these two foci has constituted a characterizing and, from a critical
realist perspective, highly problematic feature of quantitative conflict research.
The empirical results of our analysis, summarized in table 10.1, largely confirm our hypotheses
and support, as well as significantly extended, existing work on the effect of inequality on conflict
dynamics (cf. Østby 2013).
In accordance with H1a, the formation of non-state actors turned out to be more likely where
groups are deprived along ethnic lines. The results are robust with regard to the regional mean
and the national mean, as well as for inequality in the economic and the social space. Agreeing
with H1b, the strategic environment is significantly related to the probability of group formation.
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Specifically the existence of youth bulges seems to have a high explanatory value with regard to
non-state conflict actor formation.
We then turned to profiles of violence in intrastate political conflict. A latent class analysis of
the new DISCON data revealed that four distinct profiles of violence characterize intrastate polit-
ical conflict in Asia and Oceania between 2000 and 2014. This hints toward underlying patterns
with regard to conflict dynamics and warrants further investigation.
Aiming to explain patterns of violence, we first looked at structural characteristics of subna-
tional units and states. As expected, we found that youth bulges (H2a) and inaccessible terrain,
but not rugged terrain (H2b), seem to be positively related to conflict occurrence. Youth bulge
together with the control variable of population size has the most substantial effect on the prob-
ability of conflict occurrence. Our newly constructed indicator of inaccessibility via land cover
seems to uncover important features of subnational units that have not been previously iden-
tified. Counter to our expectation, conflict occurrence is more likely in economically developed
regions (H2c), whereas the level of development of the state and the presence of resources in
a region (H2d) do not seem to influence conflict probability. Moreover, we found no indication
that anocratic regimes are more likely to be affected by political conflict, thereby supporting the
skeptical position by Vreeland (2008).
In the second step of our analysis of conflict dynamics, we again turned to a further analysis
along the lines of the proposed macro-micro-macro model by specifically focusing on the relation
of non-state conflict actors both to the state and to their environment. The results show that weak
actors are indeed able to evade highly-violent conflict and are also comparatively involved in vio-
lent conflict less often (H3). Confrontational tactics are specifically likely among non-state conflict
actors that have more than 1,000 members. Moreover, combining data on different kinds of nat-
ural resources and territorial control by non-state conflict actors allowed us to find the specific
mechanism by which resource presence affects violence in intrastate political conflict: Although
resource presence per se does not seem to affect conflict propensity, territorial control of resource-
rich areas greatly increases the probability of highly-violent conflict. The stationary character of
resources—specifically the presence of oil—seems to foster a confrontational logic. Control over
resources comes with a burden with regard to tactical flexibility.
In the third and final step, we further disaggregated properties of non-state conflict actors
and intensified our investigation into which organizational features of NSCA lead to the specific
profiles of violence in intrastate political conflict. Our expectations were partly confirmed. Non-
state conflict actors controlling territory seem to bemore able to operate heavyweapons although,
counter to our expectations, they seemed to fight in smaller units. The link between territorial
control and highly violent conflict identified above (H3) seems to be driven by the fact that we
see the employment of heavy weapons in these cases. We find only partial support for H4a. At
least, territorial control seems to make the employment of heavy weapons more likely. Of greatest
social relevance is our last finding: The impact of conflict on the civilian population is highest
where NSCA control territory (H4b).
In summary, our critical realist view on social reality, as manifested in our comprehensive
moderate collectivist model of social explanation, allowed us to systematize the state of research
with regard to explanatory variables and theoretical arguments. Furthermore, it enabled us to
formulate new hypotheses on the formation and tactics of NSCA. Bringing together the most
recent data with our original data allowed us to evaluate existing explanatory approaches, as
well as to test our arguments. We found the link between structures, groups, collective subjects,
and conflict intensity to be far more nuanced than often proposed in the literature. And even if
one were to disagree with the empirical results presented here, we hope to have demonstrated
that conflict research can greatly benefit from taking a step back to put our research practices on a
sounder footing. What emerges is a practice of science that puts more emphasis on real definitions
as well as on theory. At the same time this does not leave us locked up in the ivory tower, but
rather clarifies our empirical understanding of political conflicts.
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Appendix A
DISCA Codebook
This codebook lists all variables comprised in the Disaggregated Conflict Actor Database, DISCA.
It gives a short description of each variable, specifies the data type and, if applicable, the type of
scale and the number of categories. The database is implemented in PostgreSQL.
The dataset is subdivided into four sub-datasets.
NSCA Basis Data (table A.1) provides basic information on non-state conflict actors such as
name and date of formation.
NSCA Split Data (table A.2) provides information on the merging and splitting of actors.
NSCA Time Series - Organization (table A.3) holds information on central intrinsic characteris-
tics of NSCA’s internal organizationwhich vary over time such as their size and collective identity.
NSCA Time Series - Resources (table A.4) comprises data on, first, NSCA’s own activity to gain
resources and, second, external support. Table A.5 differentiates and describes the categories of
the variables used in the dataset in further detail.
The cun_id2ucdp2nsca dataset (table A.6 links the most important datasets on non-state actors,
i.e. the Non-State Actor Database by David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Idean
Salehyan and the UCDP Actor Dataset by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.
203
APPENDIX A. DISCA CODEBOOK
Table A.1: NSCA Basis Data
variable description data type, scale, categories
pkey ID for unique identification of row int
nsca_id ID for unique identification of NSCA int
name_abbrev abbreviation of Name varchar
name_for name in the language of home country varchar
name_english name in English varchar
foundation date of foundation date
foundation_early early estimate of date of foundation date
foundation_late early estimate of date of foundation date
disbandment date of disbandment (if applicable) date
confidence level of coding reliability int, ordinal, 3
info description of the included data varchar
sources list of sources varchar
comment comments on the data varchar
modified date and time of last update date
Table A.2: NSCA Split Data
variable description data type, scale, categories
pkey ID for unique identification of row int
origin_nsca_id NSCA_id of parent int
faction_nsca_id NSCA_id of breakaway faction int
split_date date of split date
confidence level of coding reliability int, ordinal, 3
info description of the included data varchar
comment comments on the Data varchar
modified date and time of last update date
Table A.3: Time Series Data - Organization
variable description data type, scale, categories
pkey ID for unique identification of row int
nsca_id ID for unique identification of NSCA int
period_start beginning of analytical period date
period_end end of analytical period date
weapons type of weapons at disposal of actor int, ordinal, 2
size number of members int, metric
size_category number of members, categorial int, ordinal, 4
structure type of internal organization int, ordinal, 2
identity type of collective identity int, nominal, 5
orientation type of orientation int, nominal, 5
confidence level of coding reliability int, ordinal, 3
info description of the included data varchar
sources list of sources varchar
comment comments on the data varchar
modified date and time of last update date
Table A.4: Time-Series Data - Resources
variable description data type, scale, categories
pkey ID for unique identification of row int
nsca_id ID for unique identification of NSCA int
period_start beginning of analytical period date
period_end end of analytical period date
endo-\exogenous resources self-acclaimed or externally provided bit, nominal, 2
domestic\foreign location\origin of resources bit, nominal, 2
type type of resource int, ordinal, 5
supporter name of supporting actor varchar
confidence level of coding reliability int, ordinal, 3
info description of the included data varchar
sources list of sources varchar
comment comments on the data varchar
modified date and time of last update date
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Table A.5: List of Variable Categories
variable categories code description
disbandment_type
split 1 split of group
annihilation 2 annihilation by other actor
voluntary dissolution 3 voluntary dissolution
structure
centralized 1 centralized organizational s.
decentralized 2 network-like organizational s.
size category
⩽100 1 100 group members or less
101 - 1 000 2 between 101 and 1 000 group members
1 001 - 10 000 3 between 1 000 and 10 000 groupmembers
>10 000 4 more than 10 000 group members
weapons
light 1 light w. at actors disposal
heavy 2 heavy w. at actors disposal
identity
religious 1 collective i. based on religious affiliation
economic 2 collective i. based on economic ideology
ethnolinguistic 3 collective i. based on shared ethnicity
political 4 collective i. based on political ideology
environmental 5 collective i. based on environmental ideology
orientation
religious 1 o. towards changing the religious field
economic 2 o. towards changing the economic field
ethnolinguistic 3 o. towards changing the ethnolinguistic field
political 4 o. towards changing the political field
environmental 5 o. towards changing the environmental field
type
training 1 entities for the training for NSA members
weapons 2 supply or production of weapons
monetary means 3 supply or extraction of money or equivalents
natural resources 4 supply of extraction of natural resources
confidence
low 1 coding based on own expertise
medium 2 coding based on single source
high 3 coding based on multiple reliable sources
Table A.6: Description of variables in cun_id2ucdp2nsca
variable description data type
pkey ID for unique identification of row int
cun_id obsid in Non-State Actor Dataset varchar
ucdp_id actorid in UCDP Actor Dataset int
nsca_id ID for unique identification of Non-State Conflict Actor int
conis_id ID in CONIS Database int
comment Comments on the Data varchar
modified Date and time of last update date
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List of NSCA in DISCA
name_abb name_eng
KNU Karen National Union
MIM Muslim (later: Mindanao) Independence Movement
NDFB National Democratic Front of Bodoland (until 1994: Bodo Security Force)
NLFT National Liberation Front of Tripura
HPC-D Hmar People’s Convention- Democracy
BRA Baloch Republican Army
NSCN-K National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khalplang
New PULO New Pattani United Liberation Organization
Mahagujarat Mahagujarat Movement
BRN-C Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PULO Pattani United Liberation Organization
UWSA United Wa State Army
OPM Free Papua Movement
HPC Hmar People’s Convention
GAM Aceh FreedomMovement
GLO Gorkha Liberation Organisation
NSCN-IM National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Thuingaleng Muivah
BNCT Borok National Council of Tripura
TVF / TNV Tripuri National Volunteer Force
GJM Gorkha Janmukti Morcha
BLT / BLTF Bodo Liberation Tigers or Bodo Liberation Tiger Force
NLFT - BD National Liberation Front of Tripura - Biswamohan Debbarma faction
DHD Dima Halim Daogah
UPDF United People’s Democratic Front
ATTF All Tripura Tiger Force
BRA Bougainville Revolutionary Army
TTTT Te Taata Tahiti Tiama
FLNKS Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group (PHI)
EROS Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students
HNLC Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council
ETLO East Turkistan Liberation Organization
ULFA United Liberation Front of Assam
HM Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
MNF Mizo National Front
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
ULFA-ATF (aka ULFA-I) United Liberation Front of Assam-Anti Talks Faction
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party
RNS Republic of the North Solomons
CNF Chin National Front
NSCN National Socialist Council of Nagaland
BLA Balochistan Liberation Army
SSIA Shan State Independence Army
PFAR Popular Front for Armed Resistance
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
BLF Baluch Liberation Front
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SUA Shan United Army
KIO Kachin Independence Organization
MTA Mong Tai Army
PCJSS Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity
Parari Parari
SSA - N Shan State Army - North
ETIM East Turkistan Islamic Movement
BLUF Balochistan Liberation United Front
NNC Naga National Council
RSF Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo
SSA-S Shan State Army-South
GNLF Gorkha National Liberation Front
BRN National Revolution Front
SNUF Shan National United Front
KRF Kokang Revolutionary Force
BNPP / BIPP Patani National Liberation Front
PNLO Pa-O National Liberation Organization
SSA Shan State Army
PULF People’s United Liberation Front
BPLF Baluch People’s Liberation Front
UNLF United National Liberation Front
NLFT - NJ National Liberation Front of Tripura - Nayanbasi Jamatiya faction
JeM Jaish-e-Mohammed
KMM Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia
SURA Shan United Revolutionary Army
Table B.1: Non-State Actors in DISCA
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